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DOING JUSTICE TO LAW: AND WHAT JUSTICE
ROTHGERBER PARTICIPANTS DID TO LAW
KAREN A. LASHt
Ms. Lash gave the keynote presentation at the November 4, 2011
Rothgerber Conference. In it she challenged those present to report
in 100 days on what they had done to advance a justice goal- "what
one thing that has been inspired, catalyzed or planned at this confer-
ence." What follows is the speech, with an epilogue summarizing the
fruits of the 100-day challenge.
Thank you Deborah [Cantrell] for your generous words, which
mean so much coming from you. Thanks too to Colorado Law Professor
Melissa Hart, director of the Byron White Center for the Study of Amer-
ican Constitutional Law, for organizing what is already an amazing
Rothgerber Conference.
It's a particular privilege to be here in the high altitude at the top of
our profession, swapping ideas with folks from the Colorado Access to
Justice Commission,' the Universities of Colorado and Denver, state and
federal government, private attorneys, the legal academy, judiciary, and
local and national advocacy organizations. If it takes a village to raise the
bar for access to justice, the villagers here are the ones to do it.
I was deeply honored when Melissa called inviting me to join this
impressive gathering of leading thinkers. I asked her what kind of a con-
ference it would be-more of a think tank-like gathering, an academic
fountain of ideas, or more of a "do tank," to hammer out concrete plans
for what to do She answered, "both." My remarks, therefore, center on
how people in the business of thinking translate their ideas into action.
First, I'll describe how our office-the US Department of Justice's Ac-
cess to Justice Initiative-is translating ideas to actions; then, I'll invite
us all to "do" something new to get the ideas generated here out of the
room and into the streets.
I say "something new" with humility, recognizing that each of you
are already doing so much to support local and national efforts that pro-
vide critical and often life-changing legal services to those who cannot
afford them.
t Senior Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice Access to Justice Initiative.
I. For more information on the Colorado Access to Justice Commission, see Access to
Justice Commission, COLO. BAR ASS'N, http://www.cobar.org/page.cfm/ID/20129/ (last visited Dec.
18, 2012).
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Moreover, if what Melissa had in mind was someone to bark out a
rallying cry from the ramparts, I fear she'll be disappointed because I
don't have that skill. Instead, I speak as a first-rate noodge, a Yiddish
term for kind of a pest derived from Polish words for fretting and aching,
but not quite as bad as a nudnik. Some of you know this about me first
hand. Having never thought much of "don't ask, don't tell" in any form,
I'll be making a noodgy ask before lunch is over. I'll challenge each of
us to just DO something, just a little something more than what we do
now.
First, I'll talk about what the ATJ Initiative is doing. Our office, the
brainchild of the President and Attorney General Eric Holder, opened in
March 2010, led by the legendary Larry Tribe. More recently, Mark
Childress stepped in as our new Senior Counselor.
Mark has spent most of his professional life learning how both the
executive and legislative branches of government work-working for
Senators Daschle and Kennedy and most recently as acting General
Counsel for Health & Human Services. This man knows where the fed-
eral levers are, how-as he is fond of saying-to use the inertia inherent
in bureaucracy to our advantage, and how to find ways to fold access to
justice considerations into government processes and procedures wher-
ever possible.
We have focused on studying and improving civil legal assistance
to poor people as well as the closely-related crisis in indigent defense-
two small, manageable tasks for a staff of six. But even without a grant-
making budget or any enforcement authority, we've discovered that other
useful tools came with our little office in the main building of the De-
partment of Justice: a bully pulpit; mechanisms to convene and connect
players; access to Department of Justice policy makers like the Solicitor
General and Office of Legislative Affairs, as well as to other federal
agencies that might consider spending their grant dollars to increase ac-
cess to justice; and the ability to inject ATJ perspectives in the more than
a dozen inter-agency working groups on which we serve. All these levers
combined, it turns out, can nudge-or noodge-us as a country closer to
the national ideals of justice for all.
On the defender side we're working to help states develop high-
quality indigent defense systems. That includes working to expand re-
search and data on delivery systems, and to increase funding, training,
2technical assistance, and other support for defender programs.
One recent example involves a new partnership with our office, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Federal Public Defenders, and the Execu-
2. For specific examples, see Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the American Bar
Association's National Summit on Indigent Defense, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 4, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/isolopa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120204.html.
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tive Office for U.S. Attorneys to organize the first tribal court trial advo-
cacy program for tribal defenders, prosecutors, and judges. This historic
Rapid City training was so successful that five more are now planned in
Arizona, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, and Washington.
On the civil side, we're supporting development of quality civil le-
gal aid systems.
One recent example of using the bully pulpit to this end occurred
just a few weeks ago, when we gathered at the White House to honor
sixteen remarkable advocates from across the legal profession whom
President Obama had designated as "Champions of Change," including
the Brennan Center's Laura Abel,4 who is here today.
These champions engaged in a dialogue with the Attorney General
based on questions posed by law professors and law students across the
country about their work helping families facing foreclosure, addressing
civil rights violations, and improving court access for people with limited
English proficiency. Watching live on-line were students, staff, and fac-
ulty at 118 law schools-including both Colorado and Denver-bringing
thousands together for a conversation that reflected how much this Ad-
ministration values public interest legal work and seeks to encourage and
support the next generation of public interest lawyers.
We're also working hard to preserve existing funding and unlock
new funding streams, also known as noodging other agencies to spend
their grant dollars with ATJ in mind.
The latest example involves working with the Department of Labor
on their job-training grants to help people with criminal records get jobs
and generally rejoin their communities. The Department of Labor has
agreed to allow, and even encourage, using these job-training grant funds
to include legal services. The idea is that even the best job-training pro-
gram works better if a man who goes through the training can get his
record expunged, or get back his revoked drivers license, so he can get to
the interview and have a better chance at getting the job. Along the same
lines, modifying his child support order to reflect unearned dol'ars while
in prison could leave him enough money to pay his rent.
A "before" and "after" demonstration at our meeting with the De-
partment of Labor vividly showed the difference a little lawyering can
make. Here's the rap sheet of a client of New York's Center for Commu-
nity Alternatives before getting legal help. Under New York law, em-
ployers can't ask about arrests that did not lead to criminal convictions.
3. For a video recording of this event, see Champions of Change: Closing the Justice Gap in
America, YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-OvnKy9RHI wg.
4. For a post detailing the work Ms. Abel was being recognized for, see Laura Abel, Holding
Our Nation to Its Promise, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 21, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.govblog/2011/10/21/holding-our-nation-its-promise.
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Yet his report had old arrests that went no further, and the all-important
box indicating "Yes" or "No" to a police record says "Yes." Here's the
same guy's rap sheet after a lawyer removed the information that isn't
allowed under New York law-the box accurately changed to "No," a
change that should help give this job-trained applicant a better chance at
a new life. Legal help, here, could make the difference for one man and
over scores of clients and grants, a program's success. Now, when new
Department of Labor reentry job-training programs grant solicitations are
released, we'll make sure the word gets out so that legal services pro-
grams and their local potential partners know they are eligible-and en-
couraged to include legal services in their grant applications.
We will continue to pursue this strategy aggressively since we be-
lieve there are other federal government safety-net programs that could
also work better with legal aid lawyers on the team.
These are just a few of the strategies we've learned we can do dur-
ing our brief tenure. They make some small headway in closing the jus-
tice gap, but we can't do it alone. As Uncle Sam has said before, "We
need you." Indeed, our work depends on what you do-your research,
your pilot projects, your lessons learned, your new court rules, such as
Colorado's recent rule enabling unbundling services, your new clinics,
all of it.
That's the soft transition from the talking to the noodging. If Melis-
sa and the other conference planners took full advantage of the extraor-
dinary talent and expertise in this room, you'd all commit to doing some-
thing extra to close the justice gap. Given who is here, and the conversa-
tions underway, identifying the "what to do" prospects is pretty easy.
* Steve Scudder5 is prioritizing the big pro bono ideas just amassed
at the ABA's Pro Bono Summit in Colorado-well represented by Jus-
tice Hobbs and Jonathan Asher-and needs help.
* The Turner v. Rogers6 panel wants help thinking through and im-
plementing their ideas for a post-Turner strategy so we can ensure self-
represented litigants actually get meaningful access. In fact, I'll digress
from the "what-to-do" prospects to make an offer of the sort we hope
you'll be making. Thanks in large part to the human catalyst Richard
Zorza , our office and the Health & Human Services Office of Child
Support Enforcement-represented today by Nancy Thoma Groetken-
5. Steven Scudder is counsel for the ABA Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public
Service. For more information, see Staff, ABA CTR. FOR PRO BONO EXCHANGE,
http://centerforprobono.wordpress.com/about/staff/ (last visited June 3, 2012).
6. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
7. Richard Zorza is an attorney and independent consultant who has worked for the past
fifteen years on issues of access to justice. He is the coordinator of the national Self-Represented
Litigation Network and his own blog, Richard Zorza's Access to Justice. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE
BLOG, http://accesstojustice.net/ (last visited June 3, 2012).
796 [Vol. 89:4
KEYNOTE: DOING JUSTICE TO LAW
have launched an interagency working group to develop a federal strate-
gy to address the marching orders in Turner. Turner panelists, I took lots
of notes and hope and expect we can do something together.
* Jeff Selbin8 will talk about his work with Becky Sandefur study-
ing the "clinic effect" and hope academics will take that information
back to present to their faculties.
* The Cause Lawyering panel needs help with their campaign for
Cause Lawyering course offerings at more law schools.
* The Research panel will make the case for plugging the research
gap. A sustainable organized research capacity hasn't existed since 1981
when the LSC Research Institute run by Alan Houseman9 had to shut its
doors.
* David Udell'o wants partners to figure out what measures should
be used to tell us if our legal systems are delivering justice, and what
methodology should be used to establish best practices.
* Alan Houseman will ask us to enroll the business community in
the access to justice cause.
I hope these ideas and many more will be translated into action and
advanced in the Operationalizing panel. There will be no shortage of
excellent to-do options from which to choose.
Along the way, as you decide just what task to embrace, keep in
mind the words of the Nike commercial, "Just do it." Nike, after all, is
the Greek goddess of victory. Or, more directly on point, is JFK's fa-
mous charge to late twentieth century idealists asking what you can do
for your country, not what your country can do for you. If you are more
inclined toward the non-governmental sector, remember the words of Dr.
Martin Luther King, celebrated not just for his dream but for the things
he did to move towards making that dream reality. He said, "The time is
always right to do what is right." In the same spirit, death-penalty activist
Sister Helen Prejean said in her contribution to NPR's This I Believe se-
ries, "The only way I know what I really believe, is by keeping watch
over what I do."
In the spirit of the words of these giants, let me begin to noodge.
8. Jeffrey Selbin is Faculty Director of East Bay Community Law Center and Clinical Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Berkeley Law-Faculty
Profiles, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF L., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-
programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?faclD-780 (last visited June 3, 2012).
9. Alan Houseman is the Executive Director of The Center for Law and Social Policy
(CLASP). Experts: Alan W. Houseman, CLASP, http://www.clasp.orgfexperts?id-0006 (last visited
June 3, 2012).
10. David Udell is Director of The National Center for Access to Justice and Visiting Profes-
sor from Practice at Cardozo Law School. Staff NAT'L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST.,
http://www.ncforaj.org/home/staff (last visited June 3, 2012).
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Last September a New York Times article, Making Change Happen,
on a Deadline," described how the World Bank uses a strategy called
Rapid Results to achieve big goals in just 100 days. From Nicaragua to
villages in Ghana and Sierra Leone, local NGOs tripled the number of
people who got tested for HIV, quintupled the use of family planning
services, and improved local infrastructure by digging wells and building
schools. Apparently the Rapid Result technique works because deadlines,
motivation, and confidence are often more important than technology
and money.
Today, all I'll ask you to do for your country is answer an email
about your Rapid Result. In 100 days, I'm going to send each of you an
email asking about your version of Rapid Results. What did you ad-
vance-what one thing that has been inspired, catalyzed, or planned at
this conference. We'll collect your response, and depending on what we
get, we'll find ways to use it. It could be in speeches, ideas introduced to
a relevant interagency working group or shared at conferences, or an
entry for the Department of Justice blog about what you've done, what
you've learned about what you've done, and what next steps you've
planned.
Looking at the people in this room makes me optimistic that we re-
ally can close the justice gap, as long as we don't give in to cynicism or
to the temptation to not try and give up. Recall the last time you sat
through a meeting, and someone said "we can't do that because we've
never done it before," and a few minutes later, someone else said, about
the same thing, "we tried that and it didn't work." Our job, all of us in
the profession of protecting and preserving justice, is to fight off cyni-
cism with the same strength and ingenuity that we fight injustice. I think
we'll be amazed by what can happen, in just 100 days.
To put a new spin on a popular bumper sticker, "shift happens,"
even when all the instruments we have predict that shift is impossible.
* Six states and the District of Columbia, where I live, shifted to-
ward marriage equality, allowing me to marry the woman I now call my
"wife."
* Technology shifted transportation into the very skies, as my wife
and I learned last summer on a beach vacation in the Outer Banks. Peo-
ple said the Wright Brothers would never achieve powered air flight. But
they did. And only sixty-five years after the Wright Flyer took flight-
really, it was the equivalent of a bike with a little motor and wings-the
Apollo 11 landed on the moon.
I1. Tina Rosenberg, Making Change Happen, on a Deadline, N.Y. TIMES-OPINIONATOR
(Sept. 29, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/making-change-
happen-on-a-deadline/.
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* Justice shifts too. Before 1963 few lawyers dared to imagine that
federal constitutional law would compel counsel for every indigent crim-
inal defendant facing possible jail time. But Gideon v. Wainwright 2 hap-
pened.
Every day when my colleagues and I begin our work shifts by walk-
mg into the Department of Justice, we see photos of President Obama
and Attorney General Holder. Every day, those pictures remind us that
while U.S. race relations remain troubled in many ways, seismic shifts
have also happened. Despite persistent gaps between law on the books
and law in action-not to mention ideals and everyday life-shifts con-
tinue to happen. I'll press my "shift" key in 100 days as I type my emails
noodging you about what kind of justice you've done on your to-do list
lately. I look forward to weaving those deeds together and sharing what
we are all doing to achieve the fundamental promises of our country.
Thank you.
EPILOGUE: THE FRUIT RIPENED 100-DAYS LATER
I was really enjoying Karen's keynote remarks until I realized that
there would be a homework assignment. And not just any homework
assignment. But one that is going to blow up on me in 100 days. That
said, you have to like the urgency that comes with that kind of call to
action.
100 Days Later: Advancing Access to Justice Through the Courts
A cornucopia of fruitful judicial efforts emerged from the 100-day
challenge issued at the Rothgerber conference:
Judge Daniel Taubman, as part of his service on the Commission
on the Legal Profession's working group dealing with access to justice
and pro bono issues, proposed recommendations, including the need for a
secure funding source for Colorado Legal Services, increased pro bono
efforts through voluntary or mandatory pro bono reporting, increased
support for the Judicial Branch's efforts to obtain funding for pro se cen-
ters, and improved access to justice for moderate income people by link-
ing them with recent unemployed law school graduates.14 Thanks in part
to judicial noodging over the last 100 days, the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion's Board of Governors approved a resolution recommending that the
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
13. University of Colorado Law School Professor J. Brad Bernthal, speaking at the
Rothgerber Conference
14. Email from Judge Daniel Taubman, Colo. Court of Appeals, to author (Feb. 24, 2012) (on
file with author).
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Colorado Supreme Court allocate some attorney registration fees to sup-
port Colorado Legal Services for the next two years.15
* Additional noodging from the bench and bar over the last 100
days enabled Justice Greg Hobbs to report record high pro bono activi-
ty16 A whopping 160 Colorado firms achieved the Rule of Professional
Conduct 6.1 goal of fifty hours of pro bono legal services per attorney in
2011, with 209 firms now appearing on the Colorado Supreme Court's
pro bono commitment list.17 The end of year surge is a significant in-
crease since 2008 when 109 firms appeared on the commitment list,
eighty-three of which achieved the goal.
* Justice Hobbs sent the above pro bono report as he left for Fort
Collins to participate in the local Larimer Bar Association's pro bono
recognition ceremony, the first of a series with judicial support that will
be held around the state through June.
David Udell and Laura Abel'8 of the National Center for Access to
Justice also focused on court-based advancements:
* In partnership with New York Unified Court System, the Center
submitted a funding concept paper titled Representation Counts to the
State Justice Institute. If funded, the partners would work together to
systematically review the status of unrepresented litigants in the courts,
research the approaches used by other states, and use that information to
improve the delivery of services in New York.19
* The Center published a National Law Journal op-ed calling for a
national Justice Index, advancing the idea promoted by Rothgerber pre-
senters James Greiner, Becky Sandefur, Laura Abel, David Udell, and
others that we need more data about who has access to what types of
justice (as well as where, when, and under what circumstances). 20 The
Justice Index will use data to "illuminate the performance of state[-
]based justice systems in delivering justice," while highlighting the need
for increased funding and other reforms.21
15. See Sara Crocker, CBA Board of Governors Support Request to Courts to Provide Emer-
gency Funding to Legal Aid, CBA LEGAL CONNECTION (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://cbaclelegalconnection.com/2012/02/cba-board-of-govemors-support-request-to-courts-to-
provide-emergency-funding-to-legal-aid/.
16. Email from Justice Gregory Hobbs, Colo. Supreme Court, to author (Feb. 27, 2012) (on
file with author).
17. Colorado Supreme Court Pro Bono Legal Service Commitment and Recognition Program
RPC 6.1, COLO. ST. JUD. BRANCH (February 27, 2012),
www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme-Court/Pro-Bono.cfm.
18. Since the Rothgerber Conference, Laura Abel joined the National Center for Access to
Justice as Deputy Director. Staff supra note 10.
19. Laura Abel, 100 Days Promoting Access to Justice, NAT'L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST.
(Feb. 29, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://www.ncforaj.org/home/news/1 00dayspromotingaccesstojustice.
20. See Cara Anna and David Udell, We Need a National Justice Index, NAT'L L.J. (Dec. 5,
2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202534218778&slretum=1.
21. Abel, supra note 19.
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* The Center is bringing together experts on performance meas-
urement and advocacy for a panel conversation at the May 2012 Equal
Justice Conference to further promote the use of data to illuminate access
to justice in the courts. The panel will include representatives from the
Florida courts, the World Justice Project, Jacksonville Legal Aid, and the
Center, itself, to discuss the latest approaches to using the tools of per-
formance measurement to increase access to justice.
Michael Millemann, University of Maryland Jacob A. France Pro-
fessor of Public Interest Law, addressed both civil and criminal justice
problems in the courts in three ways:22
* As a member of the Maryland Access to Justice Commission and
as chair of its self-represented litigant subcommittee, Professor
Millemann applied the Rothgerber discussion about removing access
barriers to repairing rules authorizing unbundled representation with the
goal of approval by the Maryland Court of Appeals this fall.
* His subcommittee is working to launch an unbundled representa-
tion pilot project that will utilize empirical evaluation to build in an as-
sessment tool.
* As chair of the Office of Public Defender's Board of Trustees,
Professor Millemann is working with the office to implement a new poli-
cy that will require legal representation at 180,000 bail hearings a year.23
Richard Zorza, consultant and coordinator of the national Self-
Represented Litigation Network, led an effort to establish decision proto-
cols for what's known as the "triage" 24 process: 25
* Focusing on how court-based self-help centers decide who gets
what help, Mr. Zorza assembled a group that included several Rothgerber
participants to draft a set of triage "principles" to determine how a court
22. Email from Professor Michael Millemann, Univ. of Md. Jacob A. France Professor of
Pub. Interest Law, to author (Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
23. Cf Tricia Bishop, Appeals Court Ruling Requires Lawyers at Bail Hearings, BALT. SUN
(Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-01-04/news/bs-md-public-defenders-
20120104 1.public-defender-appeals-court-hearings (discussing the response on behalf of the
Maryland Office of the Public Defender's to a court opinion requiring legal representation during
bail hearings).
24. Triage is a word used to describe processes designed to make sure that those in need of
access to justice most efficiently obtain the services they need to achieve such access, and that they
are directed to the processes in the court itself that help ensure speedy, appropriate and fair resolu-
tion. For more information about triage, see generally Richard Zorza, The Access to Justice "Sorting
Hat": Towards a System of Triage and Intake that Maximizes Access and Outcomes, 89 DENV. U. L.
REv. 859 (2012); Thomas M. Clarke and Victor E. Flango, Case Triage for the 21st Century, NAT'L
CTR. FOR ST. COURTS (2011), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/
ref/collection/ctadmin/id/1 847.
25. Email from Richard Zorza, consultant and coordinator of the Nat'l Self-Represented
Litigation Network, to author (Feb. 25, 2012) (on file with author).
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should treat a case with a self-represented litigant, as well as to decide
what services should be provided to litigants to navigate the court track.26
100 Days Later: Advancing Access to Justice at Law Schools
University of Colorado Law School continued its leadership role
from the Rothgerber conference:
* J. Brad Bernthal, Associate Clinical Professor of Law in the En-
trepreneurial Law Clinic (ELC), is developing a model for Colorado
"deal attorneys"--especially in-house attorneys-to expand pro bono
transactional assistance for startups and micro-entrepreneurs in Colora-
do's Front Range. The ELC is currently in the feasibility analysis stage,
tapping the talent of spring 2012 students who are interviewing Colorado
deal attorneys to measure interest in participation and to identify barriers
that currently frustrate pro bono participation. ELC students are also
reaching out to other organizations currently involved or potentially in-
terested in transactional pro bono services.27
* Deborah J. Cantrell, Associate Professor and Director of Clinical
Education University of Colorado Law School, is spearheading efforts to
get a new low bono network set up as a collaboration between the law
school, the Boulder County Bar Association, and individual lawyers in
Boulder County who are already experimenting with low-bono or un-
bundled services. Modeled on the version of the Law School Consortium
Project developed at the University of Maryland, and with coaching from
Rothgerber presenter Professor Millemann, the network's nascent plan-
ning team predicts it will be open to any Boulder County attorney, offer-
ing research assistance and other support from Colorado law to network
attorneys doing low bono or unbundled work.
* Melissa Hart, Associate Professor and Byron White Center for the
Study of American Constitutional Law Director, reports that the White
Center started an access to justice initiative to accomplish the following:
(1) launch a new mentoring program that partners a law student, a recent
graduate, and a more senior lawyer in a one-year mentoring group to,
among other things, take at least one pro bono case; (2) develop the Col-
orado Law Faculty Pro Bono Push, asking Colorado Law faculty to take
on one pro bono case and to work with students on that case; and (3) start
a pro bono pairing project that will partner current students with senior
attorneys to work on pro bono cases. The Byron White Center will offer
26. See Richard Zorza, A New Cut at Triage Principles, RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO
JUSTICE BLOG (Feb. 28, 2012), http://accesstojustice.net/2012/02/28/a-new-cut-at-triage-principles/.
27. Email from Professor J. Brad Bernthal, Assoc. Clinical Professor of Law in the Entrepre-
neurial Law Clinic at the Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., to author (Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
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support including assistance in finding pro bono cases, free continuing
legal education, and help with pro bono case-related questions.28
Making an East Coast push to increase access to justice in law
schools, David Udell and Laura Abel of the National Center for Access
to Justice2 9 found new ways to engage law students:
Joining with the U.S. Department of Justice Access to Justice Ini-
tiative, the Center worked with the recently re-opened 9/11 Victim Com-
pensation Fund to help create a law student pro bono program that will
rely on students to help 9/11 victims file their applications for awards
from the fund.
* The Center's staff are teaching a new course at Cardozo Law
School this spring, The Justice Gap, Strategies for Delivering on the
Promise of Equal Justice in American Courts, that incorporates ideas
gleaned from several Rothgerber presenters who spoke about integrating
access to justice themes into the law school curriculum. 30
Out on the West Coast, Luz E. Herrera, Thomas Jefferson School of
Law Assistant Professor, reports on new incubator projects:31
* A favorable December faculty vote on her proposed Attorney In-
cubator project signals her school's commitment to support new gradu-
ates who provide unbundled legal services at affordable fees. Plans for
after the Attorney Incubator launch include a new law school based self-
help center that operates in the evenings and on Saturdays when the
courts and legal aid offices are closed.
* Talk of the need for innovative pro bono models prompted Pro-
fessor Herrera to work over the last 100 days to apply the incubator
model to Community Lawyers, Inc., a nonprofit she co-founded in
Compton, California.32 She has laid the groundwork to build an attorney
support program for recently unemployed graduates and underemployed
lawyers who provide client education and pro bono consultations, in ex-
change for a network that reduces their isolation and helps them build
their practice.
28. Email from Professor Melissa Hart, Assoc. Professor at the Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. and
Dir. Of the Byron White Ctr. for the Study of Am. Constitutional Law, to author (Feb. 24, 2012) (on
file with author).
29. Email from David Udell, Dir. of The Nat'l Ctr. for Access to Justice, to author (Feb. 22,
2012) (on file with author).
30. See David Udell, Spring 2012, Justice Gap Seminar, Cardozo Law School, NAT'L CTR.
FOR ACCESS TO JUST. ( Nov. 11, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://www.ncforaj.orgfhome/events/
spring2Ol2justicegapseminarcardozolawschool (containing a description of the course).
31. Email from Professor Luz E. Herrera, Assistant Professor at the Thomas Jefferson Sch. of
Law, to author(Feb. 25, 2012) (on file with author).
32. For more information, see COMMUNITY LAWYERS, INC., www.community-lawyers.org
(last visited Dec. 18 2012).
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100 Days later: Closing the Research Gap
D. James Greiner, Harvard Law School Assistant Professor, used
the Rothgerber Conference as a forum for getting feedback on research
projects he was considering:33
* Thanks to positive feedback from Rothgerber participants, Pro-
fessor Greiner spent many of his last 100 days pursuing projects to assess
the effectiveness of free financial counseling and advice versus an offer
of a free attorney-client relationship when a consumer is sued in debt
collection litigation. Given the congressional mandate in recent bank-
ruptcy legislation that individuals filing for certain kinds of bankruptcy
certify that they have undergone counseling, he hopes to learn whether
such counseling actually improves the lot of a consumer with troubled
finances, or whether the counseling requirement serves as a barrier to the
discharge of burdensome debt.
Jeffrey Selbin, Berkeley Law Clinical Professor, got the evidence-
based message: 34
* Challenged by the repeated admonitions from Rothgerber panel-
ists to learn more about what we do and what works, Professor Selbin
completed an essay (with co-authors) arguing for more and better re-
search in clinics and legal services. 35
These many reports, research projects, policies, and classes show
what a difference 100 days can make. The innovations pursued with such
determination show how right Margaret Mead was when she observed
that a few talented, dedicated people can change the world.6
33. Email from Professor D. James Greiner, Assistant Professor at Harvard Law Sch., to
author (Feb. 22, 2012) (on file with author).
34. Email from Professor Jeffrey Selbin, Clinical Professor at the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley,
Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with author).
35. See Jeffrey Selbin et al., Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice:
Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012),
http://yalelawjoumal.org/images/pdfs/1 099.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Jone Johnson Lewis, Margaret Mead Quotes, ABOUT.COM,
http://womenshistory.about.com/cs/quotes/a/qu margaretmead.htm.
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TURNER V. ROGERS AND THE RIGHT OF MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
LAURA K. ABELt
The Supreme Court's opinion last term in Turner v. Rogers was a
new take on an old question: what is meaningful access to the courts, and
how do we know when a litigant has it?' In Turner, a man sent to prison
for a year for civil contempt for willful failure to pay court-ordered child
support claimed that his due process rights had been violated because he
lacked legal representation at his contempt hearing.
The Court held that a litigant does not have meaningful access to
the courts if all he can do is file initial papers or walk into the courthouse
door. Rather, the Court held, for a litigant to have meaningful access, he
must be able to identify the central issues in the case and present evi-
dence and arguments regarding those issues. 2 In so holding, the Court
implicitly rejected the definition of meaningful access used by the Court
in its 1996 opinion Lewis v. Casey,3 which encompassed only the ability
to present grievances to the Court, and embraced a broader definition
from its 1977 opinion in Bounds v. Smith4 that litigants must be able to
engage in "an adversary presentation." This portion of the opinion thus
holds promise for a reinvigorated federal constitutional role in ensuring
that people who lack counsel nonetheless are able to participate meaning-
fully in their civil cases.
At the same time, the Court's application of its meaningful access
standard threatens to rob that standard of any real meaning. The Court
adopted a suggestion by a nonparty, presented for the first and only time
in a Supreme Court amicus brief, that civil contempt defendants can ob-
tain meaningful access to the courts if they are provided with minimal
assistance: a notice identifying the ability to pay as the central issue in
the case, a form requesting information about their ability to pay, a hear-
ing at which they are questioned about the information on the form, and a
finding on whether the defendant had the ability to pay.5 The Court's
embrace of this extra-record information resembles the Court's analyses
of the abilities of pro se litigants in two other cases, Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social ServiceS6 and Walters v. National Association of Radia-
t Deputy Director, National Center for Access to Justice at Cardozo Law School
1. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
2. See discussion infra Part 11.
3. 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996).
4. 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977).
5. See discussion infra Part Ill.
6. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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tion Survivors,7 which likewise rely on the Justices' intuitions regarding
the abilities of pro se litigants, even in the face of evidence to the contra-
ry.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Court's opin-
ion in Turner and how the legal academy has reacted to it so far. Part II
describes the Court's holding regarding the definition of meaningful ac-
cess, compares that definition to the definitions used in Lewis and
Bounds, and posits that what emboldened the Turner Court to broaden
the right of meaningful access were innovations in pro se assistance that
are cheaper than providing counsel. Part III describes how the Turner
Court relied on facts not in evidence to conclude that measures short of
counsel could provide meaningful access to the courts, notes that appel-
late courts generally do not rely on extra-record evidence, and points to
similarities between the Court's treatment of the facts in this case and in
Lassiter and Walters. Finally, the Article concludes that the only way to
make the meaningful access standard meaningful is for the courts to rely
on empirical evidence regarding the capabilities of pro se litigants.
I. THE TURNER OPINION
In Turner, the Court considered the plight of Michael Turner, who
spent a year in prison for civil contempt for failure to pay child support.
He had no lawyer at his civil contempt hearing.9 Mr. Turner argued that
his due process rights were violated when he was incarcerated for over a
year without being represented by counsel.'o Justice Breyer, writing for a
five-justice majority, held that Mr. Turner did not have a categorical
right to counsel under the federal Constitution." The Court applied the
Mathews v. Eldridgel2 test for due process violations, which considers:
(1) the nature of "the private interest that will be affected," (2) the
comparative "risk" of an "erroneous deprivation" of that interest with
and without "additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and (3)
the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not provid-
ing "additional or substitute procedural requirement[s]." 3
The Court acknowledged that the first factor "argues strongly" in
favor of the appointment of counsel because Mr. Turner faced the poten-
tial loss of his liberty. 14 However, the Court held that the second factor
weighed against appointment of counsel because the "critical question,"
which the Court identified as the defendant's "ability to pay," is often
7. 473 U.S. 305 (1985); see discussion infra Part Ill.
8. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2515-16.
11. Id. at 2520.
12. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13. Id. at 2517-18 (quoting Eldridge,424 U.S. at 335).
14. Id. at 2518.
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"straightforward" when "the right procedures are in place." 5 To identify
those procedures, the Court relied on a suggestion by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, appearing as amicus curiae, that:
Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his "ability
to pay" is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a
form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an
opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements
and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his
responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that
the defendant has the ability to pay.
The Court also held that the second and third Mathews factors
weighed against appointing counsel because Rebecca Rogers, the mother
of Mr. Turner's child and his opposing party, lacked representation, so
that "[a] requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial
parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that
would 'alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.""' In fact, the
Court concluded, providing Mr. Turner with counsel "could make the
proceedings less fair overall, increasing the risk of a decision that would
erroneously deprive a family of the support it is entitled to receive."18
To some observers, the decision holds the promise of expanded ac-
cess to the courts.19 For instance, if the Court relies on Turner to hold
that there is a right to counsel in civil cases in which there is counsel on
the other side, or in which the government is on the other side, then the
case may ultimately be viewed as expanding the right to counsel in civil
cases. 2 0 Additionally, Turner may come to be seen as requiring trial
courts to provide unrepresented litigants with assistance short of full rep-
resentation, such as forms, information about court processes, and ques-
tions from the bench about essential issues.2 1
15. Id. at 2518-19.
16. Id. at 2519.
17. Id. at 2519 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973)).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Richard Zorza & David Udell, A Final Turner Post From Your Co-Hosts,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 28, 2011, 12:20 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-v-rogers; Jeanne Charn,
Turner v. Rogers, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 7:07 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-2.html.
20. See Mark Noferi, Turner' Could Support Appointed Counsel for Immigrants, 246 N.Y.
L.J. 15, (2011) ("In short, although the Court sidestepped arguments regarding immigrant detainees,
its reasoning might one day support a groundbreaking right to counsel for immigrants detained
pending deportation proceedings .... ).
21. See Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of
Turner v. Rogers, JUDGES' J., Fall 2011, at 16, 16 ("Before Turner, it was not yet fully settled for all
whether judges can appropriately intervene in such civil cases. After Turner, the issues are when
must they do so, and how they can most effectively do so in the situations in which they are either
required or choose to intervene."); Michael Millemann, Turner-Implications for Civil Gideon, the
Use of Unbundled Legal Services to Provide Access, and the Lawyers' Practice Monopoly,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 26, . 2011 8:28 PM),
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The Turner opinion has also been criticized on many grounds. It
represents a dangerous incursion into the principle that people should not
be sent to prison until they have had the benefit of a lawyer making the
strongest possible case for their freedom. 22 It understates the difficulty of
the willfulness determination at the heart of the case, in part by charac-
terizing the central issue as "ability to pay," not willfulness. 23 The
Court's claim that providing Mr. Turner with a lawyer would make the
proceeding less fair is odd, given that the judge is the ultimate decider of
the facts and the law, whether or not there is a lawyer. 24 And, the Court
did not adequately acknowledge that while Mr. Turner's freedom was at
stake his opponent's was not, a situation that could justify providing rep-
resentation to him but not her.2 5 In Part III below, this Article describes
another flaw in the decision: the Court's reliance on facts not in the rec-
ord to determine the level of assistance that unrepresented litigants need
in order to have meaningful access to the courts.
II. TURNER HOLDS THAT LITIGANTS MUST BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY
CRITICAL ISSUES AND PRESENT RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR ACCESS TO
BE MEANINGFUL
The Turner Court held that while Mr. Turner did not necessarily
have a right to counsel, he did have a right to meaningful access to the
courts, and that the right had been violated in his case. Specifically, the
Court held, Mr. Turner should have been provided with notice that the
key issue in his case was whether he was able to pay child support, a
form eliciting relevant information about his ability to pay, and a hearing
at which he could answer any remaining questions about his ability to
pay.26 Thus, the Court held that in order for Mr. Turner to have meaning-
ful access, he should have been able to identify the critical issues in his
case and present relevant evidence regarding those issues.
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-v-rogers ("[Diepending on
the three Mathews factors, some of the forms of limited assistance that many legal services projects
provide to indigent litigants in family law cases may be constitutionally required in some of those
and other civil cases, thus validating the access to court right.").
22. Joy Moses, With Turner, Access to Justice Efforts Must Expand, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(June 27, 2011 4:39 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-
v-rogers.
23. Norman Reimer, Turner v. Rogers: The Right to Counsel Haunted by the Ghost of Gag-
non, CONCURRING OPINIONs (June 27, 2011, 4:51 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-the-right-to-counsel-haunted-
by-the-ghost-of-gagnon.html; John Pollock, Turner v. Rogers: Why the Supreme Court Is a Day Late
and a Dollar Short, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 22, 2011, 6:05 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/tumer-v-rogers-why-the-supreme-court-is-a-
day-late-and-a-dollar-short.html#more-46984.
24. Bruce Green, A Professional Responsibility Perspective on Turner v. Rogers,




26. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
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The Turner Court's definition of meaningful access echoes the defi-
nition the Court used in Bounds in 1977.27 In Bounds, prisoners claimed
that their right of access to the courts was being violated because they
lacked adequate access to law libraries and as a result had difficulty fil-
ing lawsuits challenging their criminal convictions and the conditions of
their confinement. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that
the Constitution guaranteed the prisoners "a reasonably adequate oppor-
tunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights
to the courts."2 8 While the Court's focus was on prisoners' ability to file
petitions and complaints,2 9 the Court also held that prisoners needed ac-
cess to legal materials in order to cite cases in "an adversary presenta-
tion" to respond to arguments made by the state.30
Twenty years later, in Lewis, the Court severely limited Bounds's
interpretation of the requirements of meaningful access. Lewis concerned
a class action brought by people incarcerated in Arizona state prisons,
claiming that they were unable to exercise their right of meaningful ac-
cess to the courts because the law libraries in their prisons contained out-
dated materials, law library staff were insufficiently trained, and access
to photocopying was limited.3 1 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
characterized the right of meaningful access as "a right to bring to court a
grievance that the inmate wished to present." 32 He specifically criticized
Bounds for implying "that the State must enable the prisoner to discover
grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court."33
The meaningful access envisioned by Justice Breyer in Turner-the
ability to identify the critical issues in the case and present relevant evi-
dence regarding those issues-is similar to the view of meaningful ac-
cess specifically rejected in Lewis-the ability "to discover grievances,
and to litigate effectively once in court." The Turner Court does not dis-
cuss or even cite Lewis and Bounds. Thus, the Court gives no explanation
for departing from Lewis's narrow definition, and we can only speculate.
The political climate surrounding the cases may be one reason. At
the time Lewis was decided, anti-prisoner sentiment was high. Members
of Congress had touted horror stories regarding frivolous prisoner litiga-
tion, warning that the litigation was overwhelming the courts, unduly
interfering with state control of penal institutions, and impoverishing
27. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
28. Id. at 825.
29. Id. at 828 n.17.
30. Id at 826.
31. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996).
32. Id. at 354.
33. Id The Lewis Court also imposed a stringent "actual injury" requirement on prisoners
seeking meaningful access, and held that in prisoner cases courts must weigh meaningful access
claims against the prison's legitimate penological interests. Id. at 348-49, 361.
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state governments. 34 The Gingrich Congress had responded in 1996 both
by passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act,35 which made it more diffi-
cult both for prisoners to find attorneys and for them to represent them-
selves, and by placing Legal Services Corporation (LSC)-funded civil
legal aid attorneys off limits to prisoners. Lewis was decided the same
year.
But Lewis was a product of its times in another way, too: it was
based on the premise that providing prisoners with lawyers was the only
way to empower prisoners to "discover grievances, and to litigate effec-
tively once in court." The Court warned: "To demand the conferral of
such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and in-
deed largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand perma-
nent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution re-
quires." 37 Thus, the Lewis Court's rejection of a broader reading of the
right of meaningful access was based on a tautology: the only way to
satisfy the broader right would be to provide counsel, and the Constitu-
tion does not require the appointment of counsel in civil cases.
In the years that have elapsed since Lewis, there has been a revolu-
tion in assistance for pro se litigants. Forty years after LSC's founding, it
is well established that the supply of civil legal aid attorneys is, and al-
ways has been, grossly inadequate to meet the demand. LSC-funded pro-
grams turn away half the people who seek their help; study after study
shows that, at most, 20% of the legal needs of low-income communities
are satisfied; and in civil cases concerning the lives of low-income peo-
ple, the vast majority of litigants are unrepresented.38
As a result, courts, civil legal aid programs, and community organi-
zations are experimenting with techniques to help unrepresented litigants
in court. These include websites and computer kiosks with online infor-
mation and forms, self-help centers, attorney-for-a-day programs, and
more.39 Justice Breyer's idea that Michael Turner should have been pro-
vided with a "form" is an apparent nod to this spectrum of services.40
34. Amy Petre Hill, Death Through Administrative Indifference: The Prison Litigation Re-
form Act Allows Women to Die in Cahfornia's Substandard Prison Health Care System, 13
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 223, 236-37 (2002).
35. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(1995); see
also David Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1454-55, 1458-
59(2010).
36. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to -56 (1996).
37. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
38. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1-3, 25-
26 (2009).
39. Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869,
882-83 (2009).
40. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and
Pro Se Access to Justice 989 (Univ. Penn L. Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 11-36, Univ.
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The Turner Court's statement that Mr. Turner should have been
provided with "an opportunity at the hearing. . . to respond to statements
and questions about his financial status (e.g., those triggered by his re-
sponses on the form)"41 echoes another innovation in pro se assistance:
the notion that judges sometimes need to affirmatively question pro se
litigants who have no other way of raising critical issues. 42 Here, the
Court is adopting the Solicitor General's suggestion that "[t]o the extent
the court had questions about the information on the form or disbelieved
it, the court could question the contemnor about his finances at the con-
tempt hearing."4 3 Unlike the Solicitor General, the Court does not specify
that it is the judge who must ask the parent questions about his financial
status raised by his responses on the form. But if the judge does not ask,
who will? It is unlikely that opposing counsel would ask because the
Turner ruling is limited to cases in which there is no attorney on the oth-
er side. An opposing parent is not likely to ask because he is not likely to
be more knowledgeable about the law than the defendant is. And an op-
posing attorney or parent is unlikely to have an incentive to ask Mr.
Turner to clarify unclear responses in a way that would elicit evidence
favorable to Mr. Turner.
Thus, the Turner Court's suggestion resembles the notion, em-
braced by the American Bar Association in a 2008 resolution, that a
judge may have an affirmative duty to question a pro se litigant in order
to elicit relevant information." As Stephen Gillers and Russell Engler
noted in a 2007 report, there has been "a consistent trend to encourage
judges to make reasonable accommodations to unrepresented litigants as
a matter of fairness."4 5 Admittedly, the ABA resolution is a suggestion,
Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 157, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1919534
("Turner invites forward-looking, flexible pro se alternatives."); Chain, supra note 19.
41. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
42. See Zorza, supra note 21, at 16 (characterizing Turner as an "effective endorsement of
judicial engagement as helping ensure, and indeed sometimes required to ensure, fairness and accu-
racy, and to meet the requirements of due process").
43. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 25, Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).
44. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, BEST PRACTICES FOR JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND
TRIAL OF CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN HOUSING COURT, sec. II.D.8 (2008)
("[I]t may be necessary for the Judge to ask open-ended questions regarding specific elements of the
landlord's claims or the unrepresented tenant's defenses or counterclaims to assist the unrepresented
litigant in articulating the elements of her/his claims, defenses or counterclaims."); see also Russell
Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETH. & PUBLIC POL'Y 367 (2010); N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS' ASS'N, BEST PRACTICES FOR
JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND TRIAL OF CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN
HOUSING COURT 11 (2008), available at http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles(Publications/Publicationsl 166_1.pdf; Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1987, 2017 (1999).
45. Russell Engler & Stephen Gillers, Background Memo on Judicial Ethics: The Role of
Judges in Settlement and Trial in Cases Involving Unrepresented Litigants, in New York County
Lawyers' Association, REPORT ON PROTOCOLS FOR JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND TRIAL OF
CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS app. A at 2 n.6 (2006), available at
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/News/News59 2.pdf; see also Russell Engler, The Toughest Nut:
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not a requirement, and it is hardly embraced in all courts by all judges.46
But the salient point is that the idea of an affirmative judicial obligation
to question pro se litigants was gaining ground just as the Turner deci-
sion came down.
The spectrum of self-help services is a necessary innovation in light
of the extreme shortage of counsel for low-income communities. At the
same time, we lack an evidence base to determine the scope and efficacy
of self-help services.47 Some worry that self-help services will provide
the appearance of a solution to the pro se crisis when in fact pro se liti-
gants still cannot effectively assert their claims.4 8 To some extent, the
Turner opinion provides evidence for these fears. The Solicitor General's
contention that there were adequate alternatives to counsel was clearly a
basis for the Turner Court's rejection of the right to counsel in Turner's
case. Jo-Ann Wallace, President and CEO of the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, warns that Turner "could potentially be interpret-
ed to lessen the need for attorneys in cases in which they are essential."4 9
At the same time, the case demonstrates that while government, in-
cluding the judiciary, is often paralyzed by policies that appear too ex-
pensive or unwieldy, it can be persuaded to act when the solution appears
more manageable. The Lewis Court developed a narrow view of "mean-
ingful access" in the belief that truly meaningful access--enabling pro se
litigants to litigate effectively- would require the appointment of coun-
sel and be prohibitively expensive.5 0 Believing that cheaper pro se help
options would suffice to enable pro se litigants to litigate effectively, the
Turner Court was able to embrace a definition of meaningful access that
encompassed the ability to litigate.
Handling Cases Pitting Unrepresented Litigants Against Represented Ones, 62 JUVENILE & FAMILY
CT. J. 10 (2011) (tracing the chronology of guidelines regarding judicial engagement in cases involv-
ing pro se litigants).
46. See Engler & Gillers, supra note 45, at 21 (acknowledging the need for judicial education
and training to "embolden judges who might otherwise feel isolated and fearful to use these tech-
niques").
47. DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 120-21 (2004); Laura Abel, Evidence-Based
Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L & Soc. CHANGE 295, 297 (2010); Sande Buhai, Access to Justice for
Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 993 (2009).
48. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865,
871-73 (2004).
49. Jo-Ann Wallace, Turner v. Rogers Is a Watershed Moment for Civil Justice Guidance,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 3:03 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/tumer-v-rogers-is-watershed-moment-for-
civil-justice-guidance.html#more-47345.
50. See RHODE, supra note 47, at 9-10 ("As law professor Geoffrey Hazard has noted, no
'politically sober judge, however anguished by injustice unfolding before her eyes,' could welcome
the battles involved in trying to establish some broadly enforceable right to counsel.").
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III. THE TURNER COURT OVERSTEPPED THE APPELLATE ROLE WHEN IT
FOUND THAT NOTICE, A FORM, A HEARING, AND A FINDING WOULD
PROVIDE MEANINGFUL ACCESS
What Turner gives with one hand, it takes away with the other. As
the previous section discussed, the Court signals a possible willingness to
demand that courts do more to provide meaningful access. However, the
Turner Court relies on supposition regarding the types of assistance that
will enable a pro se litigant to obtain meaningful access, rather than en-
gaging in an evidence-based examination of what it would take for a
litigant to have such access. 5' As a rule, federal appellate courts decide
cases based on the facts in the record. Ideally, the trial court will have
made findings of fact. The appellate court then reviews most factual find-
52
ings deferentially, asking only whether they are clearly erroneous.
When, as in Turner, the factual findings are made by a state court and
concern a claimed violation of a federal constitutional right, however, the
appellate court may scrutinize the factual findings more closely, and will
apply particular scrutiny to whether the trial court attached the proper
significance to the facts.53 Even then, however, appellate courts tend to
accept the trial court's findings. And, appellate courts tend to refrain
from making new findings based on facts that were not before the trial
court.54
The Turner Court departed from this method of review quite dra-
matically. It accepted as true a claim presented by the Solicitor. General
for the first time in an amicus brief: that notice, a form, a hearing at
51. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 78, 93 (2011) (characterizing Turner as "predi-
cated on Justices' own impressionistic senses of both the costs and the benefits of using particular
procedures"); id. at 158 (criticizing the Mathews v. Eldridge test used in Turner because "[n]either
judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let alone
model (or know) the impact in terms of false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or
different processes. . . . While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because the data
are missing. Interpretative choices abound."); Norman Reimer, Turner v. Rogers and the Ghost of
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, THE CHAMPION, July-Aug. 2011, at 7,
http://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=20800 ("From the criminal defense practitioner's stand-
point, the Court's decision betrays naive simplicity and a breathtaking disconnect from the real
world.").
52. FED. R. Clv. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111-12 (1980) ("[W]e customarily accept the
factual findings of state courts in the absence of 'extraordinary circumstances."') (quoting Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952)).
53. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
567-68 (1995) (stating that Supreme Court would "make a fresh examination of crucial facts" pre-
sented to the trial court in First Amendment case).
54. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52 § 2577 (3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-49 (2000) (conducting "independent review" of the "factual record" in
First Amendment case, without adding facts not already in the record). But see Brianne J. Gorod,
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 26-35 (2011)
(describing cases in which Supreme Court relied on facts not in the record).
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which the judge could question the defendant, and a finding "can assure
the 'fundamental fairness' of the proceeding even where the State does
not pay for counsel for an indigent defendant."5" There was no evidence
on this question before the trial court, and the parties themselves did not
brief it at the Supreme Court. 56 If the Court were following usual appel-
late procedure, it would have sent the case back to the trial court for an
assessment of the facts." Or, because Mr. Turner himself could not bene-
fit from such a factual assessment because he had already served his
prison term, the appellate court would have described the legal standard
and left it to trial courts in future cases to determine what measures
would enable litigants to adequately present a defense, given the liti-
gants' educational background, cognitive abilities, and the complexity of
the case.
To be sure, courts are not required to hear evidence regarding facts
that are self-evident or are a matter of common sense. 59 The Supreme
Court has a long tradition of relying on common sense or intuition, rather
than empirical evidence, to determine whether a particular type of help is
needed to provide meaningful access to court.60 That is entirely appropri-
ate when a litigant claims that a particular type of help is needed to over-
come an absolute roadblock to meaningful participation. For instance,
common sense is all that is required to determine whether a person con-
fined to a wheelchair needs help getting to a second-floor courtroom.6 1
Common sense suffices to determine whether imposition of a fee at a
particular stage in a case will preclude an indigent litigant from partici-
pating in that stage.6 2 The same is true of the cases in which indigent
litigants argue that the state should pay for tests, experts, and other types
55. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-20 (2011); see also id. at 2524 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("'The record is insufficient' regarding alternative procedures because '[t]hey were
raised for the very first time at the merits stage here; so, there's been no development' (quoting Tr.
of Oral Arg. 49, 43)).
56. Barton & Bibas, supra note 40, at 989 n. 108("[T]he Court, reaching the issue sua sponte,
did not have the benefit of research or briefing on the various procedures with which states are
experimenting to facilitate pro se access to civil justice.").
57. See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 380-81 (2008) (chiding
court of appeals for balancing probative value of evidence against possible prejudicial effect, and
remanding case for trial court to make that determination in the first instance); Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1982) (holding that court of appeals should not have considered evi-
dence that trial court failed to consider, and remanding to trial court for consideration of that evi-
dence in the first instance).
58. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
59. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony only when "specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
60. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("Not only these precedents
but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.").
61. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004).
62. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1996) (record preparation fee in appeal of
termination of parental rights); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (right to waiver of
court costs on basis of indigence in divorce case); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956)
(right to free transcript for first appeal from criminal conviction).
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of necessary evidence.63 Likewise, common sense may suffice when a
litigant seeks an opportunity to present documentary evidence or live
testimony.
But intuition is inadequate to the task of determining whether coun-
sel is necessary for a litigant to have meaningful access, and whether less
expensive types of assistance along the spectrum of pro se help will suf-
fice to allow a pro se litigant to participate meaningfully in his case. The
Turner Court wrote that for many defendants facing civil contempt for
failure to pay child support, a form would enable them to demonstrate
their inability to pay. But will just any "form" enable the average liti-
gant to provide the court with necessary information? Depending on font,
sentence and word length, and line spacing, as well as on the education
levels and cognitive capacities of the particular litigants, the form may be
66incomprehensible to a large percentage of litigants.
Intuition is not only an insufficient tool for determining whether a
pro se litigant has meaningful access; it is a biased one. That is to say, it
will not only render the wrong result, but more often than not it will re-
sult in pro se litigants being denied the assistance they need for meaning-
ful access. Judges are more likely to believe that the substance and pro-
cedures of the cases they hear are comprehensible to the average person
than they are to believe that the cases are complicated and incomprehen-
sible. Judges, after all, have received three years of legal training aimed
at instilling familiarity with law and procedure.68 They have experience
63. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (state must pay for blood grouping tests
sought by an indigent litigant).
64. See Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (declining to reach merits after
Social Security Administration began providing benefits recipients with notice and an opportunity to
submit rebuttal evidence).
65. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
66. See Nat'l Cancer Inst., Simplification of Informed Consent Documents, CANCER.GOV
(Aug, 8, 2011), http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/patientsafety/simplification-of-informed-
consent-docs/page2 ("Use of active voice, short sentences, personal pronouns, clear page layout with
'white space' borders, and large fonts make documents easier to read.").
67. SELF-REPRESENTATION LITIG. NETWORK, TOUR GUIDE: A SELF-GUIDED TOUR OF YOUR
COURTHOUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT 5 (2008), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/tourguide.pdf ("[A] judge or administrator may not
even observe barriers that may exist for uninitiated members of the public in an environment that is
so familiar to him or her . . . ."); JOHN M. GRAECEN, RESOURCES TO ASSIST SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS: A FIFTY-STATE REVIEW OF THE "STATE OF THE ART" 23 (National ed. 2011) ("[S]tate
level forms committees made up of judges and attorneys are incapable of achieving the objective of
third grade forms comprehension without the assistance of language experts. . . .The inherent bias of
legally trained professionals is towards the use of familiar and precise legal terminology because
specific legal terms are used in statutes and case law and have acquired an accretion of accepted
meaning and nuance that seems difficult or impossible to convey in a few words of plain English.
The legally trained mind seems invariably to favor precision in legal meaning over general under-
standability when choosing the words to use in a form."), available at
http://www.msbf.org/selfhelp/GreacenReportNationalEdition.pdf. Of course, there are many judges
who have a deep understanding of the problems faced by pro se litigants. My point here is simply
that judges have a tendency to underestimate the difficulty of self representation.
68. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., SUMMARY, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 5 (2007), available at
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in the workings of their own courtrooms and the case law, laws, and
rules used therein. And they do not have a large stake in the cases before
them, unlike the litigants, who may have difficulty thinking clearly in a
case involving the potential loss of a child, home, or livelihood.69
There are two types of empirical data that courts could consider to
more rigorously assess whether a particular type of assistance is suffi-
cient to provide a litigant with meaningful access. First, courts could
assess the tasks litigants need to perform in that type of case, the obsta-
cles to performing those tasks, and the interventions that would suffice to
enable litigants to overcome those obstacles. This Article will use the
term "process analysis" to describe that method. Second, courts could
consider "outcome" studies, which compare the outcomes of those cases
in which the intervention was provided with those in which the interven-
tion was not provided.7 0
As the Article describes below, Turner's reliance on intuition in lieu
of empirical data to determine whether a litigant has meaningful access is
of a piece with the Court's analytical style in two other seminal cases in
which unrepresented people sought attorney assistance: Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services and Walters v. National Association of Radi-
ation Survivors.7' As this section shows, taken together, the cases evince
a willingness to reach conclusions that certain litigants have meaningful
access even in the absence of reliable evidence.
A. Process Analysis
Courts could rely on process analysis to assess claims that a certain
type of assistance is necessary to allow a litigant to obtain meaningful
access. Using this method, a researcher would compile a list of all the
tasks that a litigant must perform in that type of case, and then assess the
obstacles that litigants face in performing those tasks and whether the
assistance requested will allow a litigant to perform the tasks.7 2 Michael
Turner presented this type of evidence when he argued that the willful-
ness or ability to pay determination can be complex.7 3 For example, a
http://www.camegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrarypdf 632.pdf ("Within
months of their arrival in law school, students demonstrate new capacities for understanding legal
processes, for seeing both sides of legal arguments, for sifting through facts and precedents in search
of the more plausible account, for using precise language, and for understanding the applications and
conflicts of legal rules.").
69. See Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof Social Justice, and Public Assistance Adminis-
trative Hearings, 30 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 601, 625 (2010) ("When a pro se liti-
gant's income, assets, healthcare and well-being are on the line, he or she faces formidable emotion-
al barriers to articulating a clear case and proving facts. In the best circumstances it is diflicult to
keep a clear head and an objective view of the strengths and weaknesses of the case.").
70. See Abel, supra note 47, at 299-300 (using this typology).
71. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985).
72. Abel, supra note 47, at 304.
73. Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, 46, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).
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defendant may have to show not only that he is unemployed, but that he
has not made any unwise choices about how to spend his money. 4 The
Turner Court also had before it evidence that many parents facing civil
contempt have little education,7 5 and that defendants often fail to assert
76meritorious defenses in these cases.
However, as described above, there was no evidence before the
Court regarding whether the Court's solution-notice, a form, a hearing
at which the judge could question the defendant, and a finding-would
enable either Mr. Turner or the typical litigant to adequately present a
defense, given the litigant's educational background, cognitive abilities,
and the complexity of the case. Thus, to complete the process analysis by
determining that the solution would in fact provide meaningful access,
the Supreme Court relied solely on unsupported contentions offered in an
amicus brief.
In Walters, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's explicit
factual findings regarding the difficulty of self-representation. In that
case, veterans who were injured in U.S. atomic bomb tests challenged a
statute barring attorneys from accepting more than $10 to represent vet-
erans seeking disability benefits from the Veterans Administration. Con-
sidering this claim, the district court reviewed what it characterized as "a
full factual presentation as to the actual operation and effect of the
$10.00 limit." 77
Holding that the plaintiffs were highly likely to succeed on their
claim that the $10 cap violated the veterans' due process rights, the dis-
trict court judge found that "[t]he undisputed factual evidence submitted
by the plaintiffs in this case shows that both the procedures and the sub-
stance entailed in presenting [disability] claims to the VA are extremely
complex." 78 He also found that "neither the VA officials themselves nor
the [non-attorney] service organizations are providing the full array of
services that paid attorneys might make available to claimants."7 9 He
concluded that "[i]t is highly unlikely that veterans or their families will,
74. Id at 35 n.20.
75. Id. at 47; Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) ("A 2002
study of fathers with child support obligations found that 41% of indigent fathers did not have a high
school diploma-double the rate for those whose income was not below the poverty threshold.").
76. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., supra note 75, at
14 (2002 HHS study showed that low-income parents are typically ordered to pay a greater propor-
tion of their income than is statutorily allowed).
77. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
78. Id. at 1307-08, 1319-20 (citing numerous depositions and affidavits).
79. Id. at 1310, 1320-23 (characterizing this conclusion as being based on "a great deal of
evidence regarding ... the extent to which VA employees or service organization representatives are
able to aid veterans in gathering supporting materials and presenting their claims").
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without the use of an attorney, prove able to build and present their cases
as ably as an attorney."80
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that in most cases an at-
torney was unnecessary, faulting the district court's process analysis as
incorrect. The Supreme Court held that while some cases might be com-
plex, the district court had not attempted to calculate how often that was
the case.8 Defining "complex" as involving tricky legal questions, the
Court stated that such cases were only "a tiny fraction of the total cases
pending."8 2 Most cases, the Court stated, concerned "simple questions of
fact, or medical questions relating to the degree of a claimant's disabil-
ity."83 The Court thus disagreed with the district court's reading of the
evidence, substituting its own judgment about the difficulty of the tasks
involved in litigating veterans' disability cases for the district court's
factual findings. 84
Taken together, Turner and Walters evince a view of judicial intui-
tion as being sufficient to assess both a pro se litigant's ability to conduct
litigation tasks and the utility of various types of legal assistance. The
Turner Court viewed the issue as so straightforward that it held that the
Constitution required trial courts to provide forms and other sorts of as-
sistance to pro se litigants, even though there was no evidence in the rec-
ord regarding the utility of that assistance. The Walters Court baldly stat-
ed that the district court judge who had reviewed a voluminous record
was simply wrong in his assessment of the difficulty of veterans' benefits
litigation.
B. Outcome Analysis
Another method to determine the value of a potential type of legal
assistance is outcome analysis, which compares the outcomes in cases in
which the intervention is used with those cases in which the intervention
is not used. Apparently, there were no outcome studies before the Court
in Turner. While such evidence was considered in Lassiter and Walters,
the evidence in both cases had serious flaws, and in the end the Court did
not rest its opinions in either case on the outcome evidence before it.
The gold standard in outcome comparison studies involves random-
ly assigning some subjects to a control group (which does not receive the
intervention) and others to a treatment group (which does receive the
80. Id. at 1323.
81. Walters, 473 U.S. at 329.
82. Id. at 329-30.
83. Id.
84. And, as Justice Brennan's dissent noted, instead of merely holding that the district court
had abused its discretion and returning the case to that court for a full trial on the merits, the Su-
preme Court decided the case on the merits, "bootstrapping its way past the rule that we may 'inti-




intervention). Randomization allows researchers to attempt to ensure
that the effects they are observing result from the intervention itself ra-
ther than from some other factor.86 For instance, without random assign-
ment, researchers comparing the outcomes of cases in which litigants had
legal representation with cases in which litigants did not have such repre-
sentation cannot know whether the litigants with lawyers had stronger
cases to begin with. Perhaps the litigants with stronger cases tried harder
to find lawyers, or perhaps the lawyers accepted only the strong cases.
Either instance would be an example of what statisticians call selection
bias.
A possible selection bias problem plagued studies proffered by the
parties in Lassiter." There, the Court held that Abby Gail Lassiter's due
process rights were not violated when South Carolina terminated her
right to a relationship with her infant son William, in a proceeding in
which she was not represented by counsel.89 In a footnote, the Court
acknowledged that both the state defendant and a law journal had con-
ducted "surveys purporting to reveal whether the presence of counsel
reduces the number of erroneous determinations in parental termination
proceedings." The Court dismissed both studies as "unilluminating."90
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, both studies found that par-
ents who were represented by counsel had a significantly higher success
rate than parents who were not represented by counsel. 91 These results
could have been the consequence of selection bias because they were not
based on random samples.92 Justice Brennan found them persuasive,
however. He rejected the possibility of selection bias, writing that be-
cause "no evidence in either study indicates that the defendant parent
who can retain or is offered counsel is less culpable than the one who
appears unrepresented, it seems reasonable to infer that a sizable number
of cases against unrepresented parents end in termination solely because
of the absence of counsel."93 The majority did not respond to this line of
reasoning. It made no attempt to grapple in any real way with the studies,
or to determine whether the cases in which counsel makes a difference
are the vast majority or are outliers.
85. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in LegalAssis-
tance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2012); Abel, supra note 47, at 299-300.
86. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. See Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel in
Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 733, 742-43 (2006) (noting that in Lassiter V.
Department ofSocial Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the Supreme Court underestimated the "risks of
error ... in most contested and litigated cases when litigants are unrepresented").
89. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
90. Id. at 29 n.5.
91. Id. at 46 n.15.
92. See discussion supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46 n.15.
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In contrast to the Lassiter majority's cursory dismissal of the out-
come studies presented in that case, the Walters majority harshly criti-
cized the trial court's refusal to rely on outcome studies. The district
court judge noted that the plaintiffs had gathered "a great deal of evi-
dence" through "extensive discovery." 94 Both sides had presented out-
come comparison studies-"statistics comparing the relative success of
those few attorneys who represent . .. claimants before the VA notwith-
standing the $10.00 fee limit with that of other representatives."9 5 The
veterans claimed that the statistics demonstrated that veterans with attor-
neys were more successful while the government claimed they showed
that veterans with attorneys were no more successful than those with-
out.9 6 The judge declined to decide who was right. Instead, he dismissed
the statistical evidence as irrelevant, writing:
The success rate of those few attorneys who are now taking [disabil-
ity] cases on essentially a pro bono basis is a completely inadequate
predictor of the success rate of paid attorneys. Not only may paid at-
torneys be able to devote more time and resources to the cases, but
they may also develop substantial expertise in the complicated legal
areas involved with SCDD claims. 97
The Supreme Court chided the district court for rejecting the out-
come data proffered by the parties, stating:
We have the most serious doubt whether a competent lawyer taking a
veteran's case on a pro bono basis would give less than his best ef-
fort, and we see no reason why experience in developing facts as to
causation in the numerous other areas of the law where it is relevant
would not be readily transferable to proceedings before the VA. 98
The Supreme Court's critique was apparently based entirely on the
Court's intuition; the Court did not point to any evidence to support its
claim. According to the Court's reading of the statistics, "[r]eliable evi-
dence before the District Court showed that claimants represented by
lawyers have a slightly better success rate before the [Board of Veteran
Appeals] than do claimants represented by service representatives, and
that both have a slightly better success rate than claimants who were not
represented at all."99 In the end it did not matter, however. The Court
concluded that under the Mathews v. Eldridge test for due process viola-
tions, the government's interest in keeping the proceedings non-
94. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1310 (D. Cal. 1984).
95. Id. at 1317. Apparently, neither study relied on random assignment or used any other
technique to deal with selection bias.
96. Id.
97. Id. (relying on deposition testimony by director of Compensation and Pension Service for
the Department of Veterans Benefits).
98. Walters v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 328 (1985).
99. Id at 331.
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adversarial outweighed any advantage the veterans might obtain from
having a lawyer. 00
There are some striking similarities between the treatment of out-
come studies in Lassiter and Walters. First, in both cases, at least one of
the parties offered an outcome study as evidence of the extent to which
attorneys do or do not make a difference in particular types of cases.
However, there were serious flaws in the studies. None of the studies
used randomization, so it was impossible to know whether the outcomes
observed were the result of attorney representation or of some other fac-
tor. In Walters, the outcome studies had another potential problem: while
the plaintiffs were seeking the ability to pay attorneys at a market rate,
there were no attorneys yet handling those cases at a market rate. As a
result, the studies could not assess the efficacy of market rate representa-
tion.
Second, at least some of the judges in both cases attempted to de-
termine whether the studies were probative of the difference an attorney
would make. However, the judges do not appear to have had testimony
from any statistical experts to help them make this determination. As a
result, they were forced to use their own intuitions about the difference
that legal representation would make in the case.
Third, in the end, the Court did not base its holdings on the statisti-
cal evidence. The Lassiter Court held that no matter how much differ-
ence a lawyer might make, Ms. Lassiter could not show that she was
prejudiced by the lack of counsel; the Walters Court held that the value
of keeping the proceedings non-adversarial outweighed any increase in
accuracy that a lawyer might impart.
IV. CONCLUSION
We do not yet know how courts will apply Turner; too little time
has elapsed since it was issued. The choices are clear, however: Turner
may come to stand for a definition of meaningful access to the courts as
including the ability to identify and present arguments and evidence re-
garding the central issues in a case. Or, it may come to stand for the
proposition that the meaningful access standard is toothless, given the
instinctive belief of many judges that self-representation is easier than it
really is.
The outcome may depend on whether future cases involve empirical
evidence. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of reliable data concerning
what kind of legal assistance various types of litigants need to obtain
meaningful access.'0o A few social scientists are attempting to fill the
100. Id.
101. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Access to Evidence: How an
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aidfor Low- and Moderate-Income Americans,
8212012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
void. A randomized study by University of California at Irvine law pro-
fessor Carroll Seron found that lawyer representation made a large dif-
ference in whether tenants facing eviction in New York City kept their
homes.10 2 Harvard law professor James Greiner and statistician Cassan-
dra Wolos Pattanyak are working their way through an ambitious agenda
of randomized outcome studies examining the effects of offers of attor-
ney representation and other types of legal assistance.1 03 They report that
offers of representation in unemployment insurance cases by a Harvard
Law School clinic did not affect the likelihood that the claimants would
prevail, although they were unable to reach a conclusion about whether
the actual use of representation affected the outcome. 104 Preliminary re-
sults from another of their studies, involving full-fledged lawyers han-
dling eviction cases in a Massachusetts district court (a court of general
jurisdiction), found that the clients were far more likely to retain posses-
sion of their homes when they received full representation than when
they received only limited legal assistance involving advice and help
filling out forms.10 5 In a third study, however, full-fledged lawyers han-
dling eviction cases in a specialized housing court in Massachusetts had
no greater effect on their clients' ability to retain possession whether they
provided full legal representation or just limited assistance. o0 American
Bar Foundation researcher Rebecca Sandefur has conducted a meta-
analysis of the existing studies regarding the effects of attorney represen-
tation, leading her to conclude that attorneys have a larger effect on the
outcome of their clients' cases in procedurally complex cases than in
cases in which the procedures are relatively straightforward. 10 7 These and
similar studies hold out a promise that some day we may have enough
outcome studies for courts to conclude confidently that a particular type
of assistance is or is not necessary for a litigant to obtain meaningful
access in a civil case.
We are not yet there, though. There simply are too few reliable out-
come studies to be able to reach conclusions extending much beyond the
specific findings of each study. The outcomes of these particular studies
AMERICAN PROGRESS 6 (June 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/
pdf/evidence.pdf; Abel, supra note 47, at 301-02.
102. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New
York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 419, 419
(2001).
103. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85.
104. Id.
105. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study
in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future (Mar. 29, 2012) (forthcoming Harvard
Law Review), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm?perid=1300384#showl948286.
106. D. James Greiner et al., How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Ran-
domized Experiment in Massachusetts Housing Court (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished paper) available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id=1 300384#showl 880078.
107. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 51, 51-52 (2010).
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may well depend on the characteristics of the particular lawyers who
handled the cases, the substantive law in that particular jurisdiction, or
procedures in the courts in which the cases were handled.108 In contrast
to the small number of rigorous outcome studies that have examined the
effect of attorney representation, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications rested on
the conclusions of a special master who had reviewed "testimony by
seven experts and . . . more than 2,000 pages of transcripts along with
hundreds of scientific studies." 09
For now, courts may have to rely more on careful process analysis
to assess litigants' abilities. The expertise psychiatrists have amassed
regarding the capabilities of criminal defendants may be helpful here." 0
The expertise of the many court officials, legal aid attorneys, and others
who staff self-help centers may prove useful, too."' Only when meaning-
ful access cases start focusing on these types of hard data can we expect
that the courts will begin providing truly meaningful access.
108. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85 (cautioning "that studies of the kind we conduct here
are heavily dependent on context," and writing that "with numerous studies, we could begin to make
more informed guesses as to which aspects of context matter most, and to base policy and funding
decisions on these more informed guesses").
109. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 217-18 (2011).
110. See generally Brief for Am. Psychiatric Assoc & Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Indiana v. Edwards 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208),
2008 WL 405546.
Ill. See John D. Graecen, Resources to Assist Self-Represented Litigants: A Fifty-State Review
of "State of the Art" MICHIGAN STATE BAR FOUND. (2011),
http://www.msbf.org/selfhelp/GreacenReportNationalEdition.pdf (describing self-help programs and
insights that the people who staff them have gained).
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THE EVOLUTION OF UNBUNDLING IN LITIGATION
MATTERS: THREE CASE STUDIES AND A LITERATURE
REVIEW
MOLLY M. JENNINGS' & D. JAMES GREINERtt
Perhaps the most famous "bundle" in United States law is the meta-
phor used to conceptualize property rights. Law students learn that one
way to understand property is as a bundle of rights: the right to possess,
the right to exclude, the right to sell, the right to destroy, the right to de-
vise, etc.' One reason to conceptualize anything in terms of a bundle is to
consider what happens if someone or something-the state, a third par-
ty-unties the binding or pulls out one of the sticks. In property, this
thought exercise helps students understand many of the doctrines taught
in the canonical first year course, including easements, adverse posses-
sion, and the rule against perpetuities.
Forrest "Woody" Mosten, whom some called the "Father of Un-
bundling" in the practice of law,2 no doubt had all this in mind when, in
the 1990s, he began traveling the nation with a bundle of popsicle sticks
tied together with a ribbon. To each stick, Mosten attached a label that
represented some aspect of legal practice, such as researching the law or
negotiating with opposing parties.' During his presentation, Mosten
would untie the ribbon and wave around the now-separated popsicle
sticks to emphasize his point that unbundling in the practice of law was
possible and desirable.4 Mosten's road show comprised part of a trend
towards the recognition, legitimization, and promotion of limited legal
assistance' in litigation matters. The trend began in California6 and since
has spread to almost every state in the nation,7 with most of the action
t J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School.
tt Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 2 (3d ed. 2010).
2. MADELYNN M. HERMAN, LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE: A-! EMERGING OPTION
FOR PRO SE LITIGANTS NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2003), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISProSeTrendsO3.pdf; Unbundling Legal Services,
MOSTEN MEDIATION, http://www.mostenmediation.com/books/unbundlinglegal.html (last visited
May 27, 2012).
3. In an article published in the early 1990s, Mosten identified seven sticks, including the
two mentioned above. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28
FAM. L.Q. 421, 423 (1994).
4. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Asher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Legal Servs. (Dec. 19, 2011).
5. Unbundled legal services go by a number of names, including discrete task representation,
limited assistance representation, and limited scope representation, among others.
6. Telephone Interview with M. Sue Talia, Private Family Law Judge (Feb. 7, 2012).
7. See generally Court Rules, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/delivery legalservices/resources/pro se unbundling resource_center/court rules.html (last
visited Dec. 14, 2011).
825
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
occurring in the last two decades.8 Although some continue to fight the
trend,9 these opponents appear to be losing the battle, and losing badly.'o
Given the ubiquity of the trend toward unbundling in litigation mat-
ters as well as the public nature of some of the opposition," it is unsur-
prising that the concept has received some attention in academic and
professional journals. Indeed, one of the two purposes of our contribution
to this symposium issue is to provide a bibliography of sources discuss-
ing the concept. We do so in Part III. Our second purpose, however, is to
address a lacuna in this literature concerning the answer to the following
question: how does a movement toward mainstreaming of limited assis-
tance in litigation matters begin, develop, and spread? To start to answer
this question, we interviewed relevant persons, and reviewed relevant
documents and literature, in three states: Colorado, Massachusetts, and
Alabama.12
A preview of our findings is as follows: Although we hesitate to
draw conclusions from a discussion of only three states, we did notice
several similarities in those we studied. First, in all three states, unbun-
dled representation had been actively practiced, in the context of litiga-
tion matters, by legal aid providers (joined in some cases by pro bono
attorneys) years before a recognizable movement toward mainstreaming
of unbundling began. In some instances, these legal assistance programs
were highly visible, in that they included providing representation to
eligible clients in the hallways outside of courtrooms, in mediation ses-
sions, and even in court colloquies and motion arguments. What we find
notable about this fact is that in each of the three states, few of the pri-
vate bar or judicial actors we interviewed mentioned the legal assistance
experience as providing a source of lessons learned, or a possible model,
for a more generalized move towards unbundling (until we asked). In
Massachusetts, for example, legal assistance programs operated lawyer
for the day (LFTD) programs in family and housing courts for years be-
8. M. SUE TALIA, ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL UNBUNDLING PROGRAM 3
n.2 (2005); Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit ofJustice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbun-
died Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 453, 461 n.32 (2011); see also Margaret
Graham Tebo, Loosening Ties: Unbundling Legal Services Can Open Door to New Clients, 89
A.B.A. J. 35 (2003).
9. For example, although not technically an unbundling matter, the Texas Family Bar con-
tinues to oppose the plans formulated by the Texas Supreme Court, made in consultation with the
Texas State Bar and the Texas Access to Justice Commission, to develop and to make available
standardized pleading and order forms for divorce cases. See Richard Zorza, For Texas Advocates,
No Good Deed Goes Appreciated, ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://accesstojustice.net/2012/01/23/for-texas-access-advocates-no-good-deed-goes-appreciated/.
10. See Court Rules, supra note 7.
I1. See, e.g., John L. Kane, Jr., Debunking Unbundling, 29 COLO. LAW. 15 (2000) (guest
editorial by a United States Senior District Judge arguing against unbundling).
12. Our selection of these three states was not scientific. We chose Colorado because we
thought it might be of interest to readers of the Denver University Law Review. We chose Massachu-
setts because both of us currently reside there. We chose Alabama because it seemed likely to be
different from Colorado and Massachusetts.
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fore the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court authorized what it labeled
its "Pilot Project" on limited assistance representation (LAR)." Further
investigation turned up links between legal services and pro bono efforts
on the one hand and the unbundling movement on the other.14 Yet the
lessons drawn from the former efforts were limited. Those with whom
we spoke described the pilot project as an essential coalition-building
measure, necessary to convince the stakeholders involved of unbun-
dling's efficacy;" the previous experiences of those in legal services and
pro bono programs were not considered sufficient to persuade. This dis-
connect between what was already happening in legal assistance and
what was thought to be revolutionary in the private bar may hint at deep-
er themes concerning the distinct worldviews among types of litigators
and among judicial actors performing conceptually similar tasks and
occupying similar public spaces. We hope to explore these themes in
future work.
Second, while the movement toward recognition, legitimization,
and promotion of limited assistance in litigation matters germinated in
different places in different states, it eventually had to include a coalition
of leaders in the private bar, judges and justices of state appellate and
supreme courts, administrators of state ethical rules and guidelines, and
others. Moreover, with respect to the judiciary, an unbundling movement
turned a key corner when judges agreed to give up a cherished power,
namely, the power to decide whether to allow an attorney who had for-
mally entered a piece of litigation on a limited basis to withdraw. That is,
to induce attorneys to enter a piece of litigation for a particular hearing or
for a single aspect of the matter, courts had to pre-commit to allow litiga-
tors to withdraw after aspect of the case had concluded.
Third, no one we interviewed knew whether unbundling worked.
That is, no one knew whether the movement to legitimize unbundling in
litigation matters (which has consisted primarily of making and advertis-
ing changes to ethical rules, judicial guidelines, and rules of civil proce-
dure) had any serious effect on the way in which the private bar conduct-
ed business, on the number or percentage of litigants who self-
represented in court hearings or during other phases of litigation, or on
any discernible aspect of access to justice.16 Although some with whom
we spoke cited examples of individual attorneys or offices offering A la
13. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Order In Re: Limited Assistance Representation (Apr. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/docs/Rules/LimitedAssistance Representation orderl
04-09.pdf.
14. For example, the various committees responsible for devising and implementing the pilot
project included members from the legal services and pro bono communities. Telephone Interview
with Cynthia J. Cohen, Assoc. Justice, Mass. App. Ct. (Mar. 27, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gregory Hobbs, Assoc. Justice, Colo. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 9,
2012) (lamenting the dearth of statistical evidence on the use of unbundled legal services and other
access to justice interventions).
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carte services for litigation matters, and some cited the value of easily-
limited representation as a recruitment tool for pro bono groups, no one
could point to (nor did our independent research unearth) a credible
study or evaluation purporting to assess the effect of a statewide move-
ment or of an individual program that offered unbundled representa-
tion.17 This is not to say that we know that unbundling is ineffective;
rather, our point is one of ignorance. We do not know what the effects of
LAR movements or programs are on a macro or micro level. Indeed, no
one knows even whether the changes states made to their ethical and
other rules have resulted in a greater availability and usage of unbundled
*18services.
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we define what we mean by un-
bundled legal services in litigation matters; rehearse the justifications
proponents offer to support it; then review briefly the laws, ethical rules,
codes of judicial conduct, and informal practices that must be altered to
mainstream unbundling. In Part II, we provide our short case studies of
the evolution of limited-scope representation in Colorado, Massachu-
setts, and Alabama. In Part III, we discuss the bibliography we compiled.
I. WHAT IS THE UNBUNDLED PRACTICE OF LAW IN LITIGATION
MATTERS?
A. Our Definition
We propose the following definition of the unbundled practice of
law in litigation matters 9 : unbundling occurs when a licensed attorney
provides a limited set of legal services, in a litigation matter, accompa-
nied by the expectation that the client will proceed pro se on all other
aspects of the matter.20 The services provided are less than the set of ser-
vices ordinarily expected in the context of a traditional "full" attorney-
17. One of us recently coauthored two studies evaluating unbundled legal assistance programs
vis-A-vis offers of full representation. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assis-
tance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future (Jan. 18,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1948286; D. James Greiner et al., How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A
Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing Court (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1880078.
18. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Asher, Exec. Dir., Colo. Legal Servs. (Mar. 29, 2012).
19. We use this term to include matters that have not yet reached litigation (or administrative
adjudication), but will do so if not settled.
20. The American Bar Association Section on Litigation has identified thirteen different
varieties of limited scope legal assistance. AM. BAR ASS'N, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE: A REPORT OF THE MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE 16-38 (2003). The most important of
these varieties for our paper are (1) preparing or reviewing documents and pleadings (also called
ghostwriting), (2) stand-alone interviews and advice, (3) Lawyer of the Day programs, and (4) repre-
sentation in an initial case or proceeding that affects the result of a subsequent case or proceeding in
which the client appears pro se. Our definition excludes two of the ABA categories: collaborative
lawyering and group representation. Although collaborative lawyering may technically be limited-
scope representation under our definition, as the lawyers determine they will not represent the parties
in court, it differs from unbundling as we conceive it for the purposes of this paper.
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client relationship. This definition is intentionally limited in several
ways. First, we exclude the provision of legal services by law students,
paralegals, and other non-attorney but legally trained personnel. We do
not intend to suggest that such services are unimportant in any sense. Our
purpose in this paper, however, is to illuminate certain aspects about the
behavior of licensed attorneys and their counterparts in adjudicatory sys-
tems, and we limit our definition accordingly.
Second, we intentionally focus on unbundled services "in litigation
matters," meaning matters that already are or will soon be before judicial
or agency decision makers. Again, this limit is simply to focus our Arti-
cle. We do not intend to suggest that LAR outside of an adjudicatory
process is unimportant. To the contrary, our point here is that in many
ways, litigation is the last frontier for unbundling in the practice of law.
For reasons not entirely clear to us, it has been thought to present the
most difficult setting in which unbundled representation might operate.
Discrete task representation has long been standard practice outside of
the adjudicatory context, particularly in transactional work and estate
planning. For example, clients have frequently hired lawyers to draft
contracts, but not to represent them in the precursor negotiations.21
Third, we limit our consideration of LAR to settings in which the
client is expected to self-represent in the portions of the matter that the
lawyer will not handle. We make this clarification because, in the course
of our interviews, we were reminded of the routine practice of separating
22
representation in, among other places, insurance defense. For instance,
a lawyer for an insurance company may represent an insured on a claim
but not any counterclaims arising from the same incident, with the expec-
tation that the insured will retain separate counsel for the counterclaim.23
Again, we do not intend to suggest that this practice is uninteresting, but
merely that this practice implicates concerns different from those we
focus on here.
Although we do not discuss further the legal services or practices
excluded in the three previous paragraphs, the above discussion helps to
highlight a major point of this Article: the bundle of sticks constituting
legal representation has always been tied loosely, if it was tied at all,
even in the litigation context. What has changed in the past two decades
21. See Bradley A. Vauter, Unbundling: Filling the Gap, 79 MICH. B.J. 1688, 1689 (2000).
22. Telephone Interview with John Lebsack, Shareholder, White & Steele P.C. (Jan. 9, 2012).
23. Id. The insurance lawyers choose this route because providing the client with full repre-
sentation may represent a conflict of interest. Id. The conflict of interest arises because the insurance
company may have a financial incentive to settle a claim on terms to which the opposing litigant will
agree only if the insured drops (or otherwise settles) a counterclaim on terms the insured does not
find desirable. See Ethical Duties of Attorney Selected by Insurer to Represent Insured, Colo. Ethics
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is that the looseness of the tie has been recognized, legitimized, and en-
couraged by a number of actors in the legal system.
We close this subsection with an attempt to apply our definition,
i.e., to determine what services our definition encompasses. To begin, we
recognize that there is a broad continuum of services that ranges from
information provision, such as informing a potential client of the hours
and location of a courthouse, to some kind of service that unquestionably
constitutes unbundled representation, such as arguing a motion on a cli-
ent's behalf. In our view, however, definitions others have proposed,
such as a hard line at the courtroom door,24 or distinctions among degrees
of ghostwriting, 25 are either insufficiently inclusive or borderline impos-
sible to apply in practice. We suggest one helpful tool in drawing con-
cededly difficult 26 lines is to say that when an attorney's conduct argua-
bly implicates ethical or legal duties apart from those that govern the
relationship between the client and the attorney, then the conduct has
moved beyond information provision and into the realm of unbundled
legal practice.
Ours is a definition of inclusion, not exclusion: conduct that impli-
cates no external relationship might still constitute unbundled representa-
tion. But a definition of inclusion can be useful. Under our use of the
term, unbundled representation includes contacting or negotiating with
an opposing party or attorney on a client's behalf, even if the attorney
expressly limits the effort to a single conversation over the telephone,
because such conduct arguably implicates opposing counsel's duties re-
garding contact with represented parties. Our definition of unbundling
also includes ghostwriting, instructing the client on particularized argu-
ments to make at a hearing, and appearing on a client's behalf as part of a
LFTD program because such conduct arguably implicates27 duties owed
to the tribunal.
24. See Profile: "Unbundled" Legal Services Attorney Panel, Maricopa, Arizona,
UNBUNDLED LAW, http://www.unbundledlaw.org/old/Program Profiles/Maricopa profile.htm (last
visited May 27, 2012) (describing the panel as providing advice outside of the courtroom but not
limited appearances within it).
25. See Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1145, I 16-67
(2002) (noting the existence of such ethics opinions and explaining that such standards are ripe for
inconsistent application).
26. Some of the ethical opinions and other writings we reviewed for this Article were difficult
to understand regarding how and where to draw the line between information provision and the
practice of law. See, e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-1 (May 29, 1998), available at
http://www.massbar.org/publications/ethics-opinions/1 990-1999/1998/opinion-no-98- 1.
27. Our point here is not to suggest that, because an ethical or legal duty is arguably triggered,
one or another form of disclosure or some other course of conduct is ethically or legally compelled.
Jurisdictions may, and in fact already have, differed on what sorts of disclosure they require of
attorneys who have, say, ghostwritten documents. Compare ME. R. Civ. P. I1(b) (requiring a ghost-
writing attorney to include a full signature block on all documents submitted to the court), and Kan.
Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 09-01 (Nov. 24, 2009) (requiring "any document prepared by the attorney is
marked 'Prepared with the Assistance of Counsel."'), with CAL. R. COURT 3.37(a) (requiring no
disclosure at all). Rather, our point is that conduct that arguably implicates such duties of or to the
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In terms of examples of specific programs, Hennepin County, Min-
nesota, maintains a self-help center in a court frequented by pro se liti-
gants where court employees provide referrals, answer questions, and
maintain a public computer with access to court records.2 8 This is not
unbundling. The center also has a "Legal Access Point" at which an at-
torney offers litigants 15-minute advice sessions;2 9 depending on what is
said in those sessions, these might constitute unbundled representation.
Perhaps the most difficult case for our purposes is the instructional clinic,
in which a knowledgeable person teaches attendees about a particular
kind of legal proceeding, the applicable law, and useful strategies.
Courts, 3 0 legal aid organizations or pro bono groups,3 ' and law students32
can all provide clinics. The courts in Ventura County, California organ-
ize this type of clinic weekly.33 Volunteer attorneys, law students, and
paralegals sponsor each clinic, which begins with an overview of the
court system and then proceeds into the details of a specific family law
topic. 34 Each evening, a filing clerk examines each participant's plead-
ings and then files them. Our sense is to exclude informational clinics,
even those conducted by lawyers, from the definition of unbundling un-
less the clinics include lawyers' eliciting facts from litigants, then using
those facts to provide advice designed to shape pleadings. This practice
essentially constitutes a limited form of ghostwriting, and for the reasons
stated above it is included in our definition.
B. What Are the Alleged Benefits of Unbundling in Adjudication?
Having defined what we mean by unbundling in litigation, a second
question arises: why pursue it? In other words, what arguments have
proponents of unbundling marshaled to support the movements we de-
scribe in Part II? Essentially, proponents' arguments fall into four major
categories: access to justice, increased client choice, judicial administra-
tion, and business opportunities.
First, proponents of discrete task representation have argued that it
facilitates access to justice. By allowing a set of persons who cannot af-
ford to hire a lawyer for an entire matter to hire one for discrete tasks
within that matter, the argument runs, unbundling allows clients to real-
tribunal requires examination to decide what ethical and legal rules should apply, and conduct of this
nature should be included in a definition of unbundled assistance.
28. Brenda Star Adams, Unbundled Legal Services: A Solution to the Problems Caused by
Pro Se Litigation in Massachusetts's Civil Courts, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 303, 328 (2005).
29. Id.
30. Tiffany Buxton, Note, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 103, 122 (2002).
31. Id. at 123.
32. See Margaret Martin Barry, Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack ofPro
Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them? 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879,
1898-99 (1999).
33. Buxton, supra note 30, at 122.
34. Id. at 122.
35. Id.
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ize their goals more cheaply, easily, and quickly. 6 Second, proponents
have contended that unbundling empowers the class of clients who actu-
ally could afford bundled legal services. This is a straightforward anti-
paternalism argument: consumers should be allowed to buy exactly what
they want to and no more.37 Third, proponents have suggested that un-
bundling constitutes a response to the pro se litigation crisis that has af-
flicted the adjudicatory systems of state courts, as well as state and fed-
eral administrative agencies, for some time. The idea here is that having
an attorney engage in discrete tasks will facilitate settlements, under-
standable pleadings, and smooth adjudicatory proceedings.38 Fourth,
proponents have asserted that discrete task representation represents a
coherent business model. According to this view, attorneys can access a
heretofore untapped market, namely, potential clients with income or
assets sufficient to allow them to purchase some but not all of the sticks
in the traditional representation bundle. 9
Because other authors have thoroughly explored these justifications,
we have little to add here except for the observation that each of these
justifications depends on assumptions that, to our knowledge, have never
been credibly evaluated. Perhaps the most important of these assump-
tions is the idea that every little bit helps, and each little bit helps a little
more. In other words, with respect to the set of things that lawyers do, a
little is better than nothing, some is better than a little, more is better than
some, and a lot is better than more. Our view is that, a priori, there is
little reason to believe (or to disbelieve) this assumption in the unbun-
dling context, particularly with respect to the access to justice rationale.
Perhaps, like a small dose of antibiotics, a small amount of lawyering can
be ineffective, or even harmful, as at least some previous research in a
somewhat analogous context has suggested.40
36. See id. at 122-23; see also John C. Rothermich, Ethical and Procedural Implications of
"Ghostwriting" for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2687, 2728-29 (1999); Alicia M. Farley, Note, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited
Appearances Can Provide an Ethically Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Liti-
gants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 565-66 (2007); David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such
Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off II GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 959, 974-75 (1998); cf Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should
Clients Get What They Pay For? II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 956-57 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias,
Reply to Hyman and Silver: Clients Should Not Get Less Than They Deserve, II GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 981, 987-88 (1998).
37. FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE To DELIVERING LEGAL
SERVICES A LA CARTE 9 (2000).
38. Comment, A National Conference on 'Unbundled' Legal Services, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 26,
28 (2002). Some with whom we spoke contended that this purpose trumped all others, and that
because of this fact courts were the primary movers behind the unbundling movement in most states.
E.g., Telephone Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 14. Associate Justice Cohen served as
Chair of the Supreme Judicial Court Steering Committee on Self-Represented Litigants. Id.
39. MOSTEN, supra note 37, at I1.
40. See, e.g., JOHN M. GREACEN, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL
SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE KNow 20 (2002), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf. After finding that visiting a
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C. What Must a Jurisdiction Do to Mainstream Unbundling?
We discuss here the set of steps that jurisdictions typically have tak-
en to recognize, legitimize, and promote limited legal assistance in litiga-
tion matters. Jurisdictions have taken these steps in part to allay a variety
of attorney fears, 41 which include malpractice suits, court sanctions, or
judges that refuse to release them from cases despite contracts with cli-
ents limiting their involvement.42 Based on our limited survey of three
states, it appears that unbundling rules have evolved in a rough concep-
tual order, beginning with basic rule changes or ethical opinions permit-
ting unbundling and moving toward more comprehensive revamping of
rules. 4 3 Although we present these changes in something like a conceptu-
al order, we recognize that they do not always evolve in this sequence.
The process has been evolutionary and can proceed step by step or via
convulsive change. States sometimes changed their rules, surveyed the
resulting landscape, and realized new possibilities for change.
Preliminary steps typically began with amendments or interpreta-
tions to the equivalent to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
1.2(c) and 6.5. With respect to the former, all fifty states have a rule
equivalent to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(c)." On its
self-help center did not make it more likely that litigants would prevail, the authors state: "The Van
Nuys Legal Self Help Center evaluation concluded that litigants who had received Center services,
who then lost their unlawful detainer cases, were more likely to perceive that they had not been
prepared than litigants who had not visited the Center. In other words, visiting the Center appears to
have increased a litigant's expectations of his or her own ability to perform in court." Id.
Our sense of caution on this score is heightened by Forrest Mosten's list of sample per-
sonal characteristics that might make a client an appropriate candidate for an unbundled relationship.
This list includes handling details well; following through on deadlines; reading technical documents
effectively; having at least one year of college education; and possessing sufficiently functional
eyesight, hearing, and other physical conditions. MOSTEN, supra note 37, at 27. Almost any popula-
tion will have a wide variation on these characteristics, so it is hard to know whether the lower-to-
middle-income population that is allegedly benefited by the availability of an unbundled market for
legal services possesses these skills in sufficient quantity to allow unbundling to have a significant
access-to-justice impact.
41. LIMITED REPRESENTATION COMM. OF THE CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT
ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 15 (2001) available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/delivery/downloads/ca200lunb
undlingreport.authcheckdam.pdf.
42. See, e.g., id (reporting the findings of a focus group that discussed attorneys' resistance to
limited scope representation). The malpractice worry is slowly being put to rest by malpractice
insurers, who are actually seeing lower rates of malpractice suit for attorneys who provide discrete
task representation. ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE: A REPORT OF THE MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE 52-54 (2003).
43. For example, some states that have joined the party later than others, such as Alabama,
examined the universe of state approaches to unbundling rules and regulations before adopting any
rules. This process allowed them to adopt both the basic rules and the more specific rules at the same
time. Telephone Interview with Henry Callaway, Member, Hand Arendall, LLC & Tracy Daniel,
Exec. Dir., Ala. Law Found. (Jan. 5, 2012).
44. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT (2011), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access-across america first report
of the civiljustice infrastructure mappingproject.pdf.
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face, this rule might appear to authorize limited legal services. 45 Howev-
er, the rule by itself has often been insufficient to convince the bar that
providing unbundled services was ethical and legal, and in any event,
states interpreted the rule's text in widely varying ways.4 6 For example,
the Alabama State Bar released an ethics opinion in 2010 interpreting
47Rule 1.2(c) to allow ghostwriting and other unbundled legal services,
but Massachusetts' interpretation (since effectively overruled by other
rule changes) was narrower in that it permitted only limited advice while
barring ghostwriting and more substantial aid to otherwise pro se liti-
gants.48 Meanwhile Mississippi's 1990 opinion specifically condoned
only limited advice given to small businessmen during clinics held by the
Chamber of Commerce.4 9 Similarly, most states have adopted ABA
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 6.5, which governs conflicts of in-
terest for limited legal service programs,o or a substantial equivalent.
But these rule changes have ordinarily provided insufficient balm
for the fears attorneys associate with unbundling, particularly regarding
whether a judge will honor a limited representation agreement by allow-
ing an attorney to withdraw from a case once the attorney has appeared
to argue a motion or conduct a single hearing. While some organizations
had well-established relationships with judges who allowed limited scope
representation and withdrawal," mainstreaming of unbundling depended
on firmer assurances.52
45. For example, Rule 1.2(c) is cited in a Colorado ethics opinion that authorizes insurance
defense attorneys to represent insureds on claims but not counterclaims. Colo. Ethics Op. 91 (Jan.
16, 1993), available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfmi/ ID/386/sublD/l 812/CETH/Ethics-Opinion-
91:-Ethical-Duties-of-Attorney-Selected-by-Insurer-to-Represent-Insured,-01/16/93/.
46. For instance, the Massachusetts Bar Association raised concerns that substantial attorney
involvement in otherwise pro se litigation would be unethical; the opinion deemed appropriate "only
background advice and counseling . . . ." Mass. Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 98-1, supra note 26. For an-
other view, see UNBUNDLEDLAW, supra note 24, which described RPC 1.2 as authorizing advice
outside of the courtroom but not limited appearances within it. Note that in Massachusetts, Opinion
98-1 has since been supplanted by a MBA resolution endorsing LAR. Tricia Oliver, Delegates
Complete Full Agenda at November Meeting in Springfield, MASS. LAWYERS J., (Jan. 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.massbar.org/publications/lawyers-journal/2011/january/delegates-complete-full-
agenda-at-november-meeting-in-springfield.
47. The Unbundling of Legal Services and "Ghostwriting," Ala. State Bar, Ethics Op. 2010-1
(2010), available at http://www.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneld-424. As we discuss in Part 11,
this ethics opinion was the first step in a still-ongoing process. Telephone Interview with Henry
Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43.
48. Mass. Bar Op. 98-1, supra note 26.
49. Miss. Bar Ass'n Op. 176 (Sept. 7, 1990), available at http://www.msbar.org/ eth-
ic opinions.php?id-438.
50. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted Rule 6.5 or its equivalent.
SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 44. Of the seven states that have not adopted Rule 6.5, three (West
Virginia, Mississippi, and Kansas) have ethics opinions that permit unbundling in some form. Mis-
sissippi, however, discussed supra, does not contemplate limited scope representation for pro se or
indigent litigants.
51. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Richard MacMahon, S. Coastal Legal Services (Feb.
1, 2012); see also Telephone Interview with Judge Dina Fein, First Justice, Massachusetts Housing
Court, Western Division (Jan. 27, 2012).
52. See Telephone Interview with Daniel M. Taubman, Judge, Colo. Court of Appeals (Jan. 3,
2012); see also Telephone Interview with Adam Espinosa, Assistant Regulation Counsel, Colo.
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Overall, states have addressed four primary areas in order to main-
stream unbundling: the attorney-client relationship, the duty of candor to
the court, the relationship with opposing counsel, and judicial conduct.
We discuss each in turn.
1. The Attorney-Client Relationship
States have examined the set of rules governing the reasonableness
of limited scope representation for a given client, including informed
consent and competency of representation. Rule 1.2(c) has been men-
tioned above, but other rules are implicated,53 and the collective interac-
tion of these rules has required clarification.54 Those states wishing to
incentivize unbundling also have considered the following issues unan-
swered by the text of professional conduct rules:
* What does competent representation look like in the limited rep-
resentation context?55
* What is informed consent to limited representation?56 What risks
and benefits should a client considering limited scope representation be
apprised of?" How would a stock paragraph in an engagement letter that
explained the alternatives read?
* Are there circumstances in which limited scope representation is
per se unreasonable?58 What about per se reasonable?
2. The Duty of Candor to the Court
The ABA's comments on Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3
establish that an attorney is responsible for pleadings and other litigation
documents. 9 This commentary has created confusion for attorneys wish-
Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 2012) (noting attorneys' fears that they would enter an appearance that
would not be honored by the presiding judge).
53. For example, the attorney competency requirement is not set forth within 1.2(c) but rather
in Model Rule 1.1, which governs all representations. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1
(1983).
54. See Telephone Interview with Daniel M. Taubman, supra note 52 (discussing the necessi-
ty of understanding how the definition of informed consent, which requires disclosure of both the
risks and benefits of a specific choice, interacts with the choice to proceed pro se or with limited
representation).
55. The requirement of competency is imposed by MODEL RULES OF PROF'S CONDUCT R 1.1.
56. Informed consent is required by MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c).
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as an
"agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated ade-
quate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonable alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct").
58. For example, some have suggested it would be per se unreasonable to limit the scope of
representation in a criminal matter by defending only one of the charges against a client from a
single incident. See, e.g., Adam Espinosa, Ethical Considerations when Providing Unbundled Legal
Services, 40 COLO. LAW. 75, 76 (2011). Others have suggested that some problems may be so com-
plex that competent advice cannot be provided in a limited service context. See, e.g., Emily K.
Spitser, The Ethics of Unbundling Legal Services in America: Re-visiting American Legal Ethics at
the Turn of the Millenium 39 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt.
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ing to engage in certain forms of unbundled representation, with ghost-
writing serving as the primary focus of the resulting debate. States have
considered the following questions implicating the duty of candor:
* What information, if any, must a ghostwriting attorney provide on
any documents filed with the court? A full signature block?60 The attor-
ney's name?61 A statement that the document was prepared with profes-
sional legal assistance? 62 Or no disclosure at all?63 Do the answers to
these questions depend on whether the lawyer composes an original doc-
ument as opposed to assisting as a litigant fills out a pre-existing stand-
ardized pleading form? If so, how much of a pleading may a lawyer
compose before she triggers the different (presumably higher) duties
attendant to composition of an original pleading?
* Must other assistance, such as coaching a client on how to argue a
motion, be disclosed to the court? If so, what other assistance?6 How
and when should such disclosure be made?
3. Relationship with Opposing Counsel
Limited scope representation necessarily implicates existing rules
about contact with represented parties, as a party engaging a lawyer on a
limited basis will, at times, be unrepresented. Therefore, states have been
forced to consider the following questions:
* Who does an opposing party or attorney contact, the client or the
lawyer? Does the answer to this question change at different points in the
proceeding, and if so, what facts charge opposing counsel with notice
that a direct contact with the client would be unethical? 65
* On whom will process be served?66
60. See ME. R. Civ. P. I I(b).
61. See IOWA R. Civ. P. 1.423(1).
62. See N.M. R. PROF'L. CONDUCT 16-303(E).
63. See CAL. R. Civ. PROC. 3.37(a).
64. See Mass. Bar Op. 98-1, supra note 26 (suggesting that "on-going behind the scenes
representation," if not disclosed, "runs a risk of circumventing the whole panoply of ethical restraints
that would be binding upon the attorney if she was visible"). Again, we note that the Massachusetts
Bar Association has since endorsed LAR. Oliver, supra note 46.
65. Some, but probably not enough, clarification can come from court-approved forms to use
when making and ending a limited appearance. See Mass. Probate & Family Ct., Notice of Limited
Appearance, available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/
courts/probateandfamilycourt/documents/noticeoflimitedappearance.pdf; Mass. Probate & Family
Ct., Notice of Withdrawal of Limited Appearance, available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/probateandfamilycourt/documents/
noticeofwithdrawaloflimitedappearance.pdf; Colo. Ct. Form JDF 630, Civil Notice of Limited Ap-
pearance, available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=795; Colo. Ct.
Form JDF 632, Civil Notice of Completion by Att'y, available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=797.
66. See, e.g., VT. R. Civ. P. 79.1(b); N.D. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1).
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4. Judicial Conduct
Experience has shown that the cooperation of the presiding judge
was essential for effective unbundled representation. Again, a primary
emphasis of unbundling efforts has been to obtain a judicial commitment
to allow attorneys to withdraw when they have exhausted their obliga-
tions under unbundled agreements. For this reason, many states adopted
more comprehensive rules governing entrance and withdrawal of limited
appearances. These additional rules constrained a judge's discretion to
prevent an attorney from withdrawing from a case.6 7 Apart from this
question, states have also considered the following questions implicating
judicial conduct:
* How much help can a judge provide to litigants, and does the an-
swer to this question vary according the nature of an attorney's involve-
ment?68
* How liberally should pleadings be construed, and does the answer
to this question vary according to how extensively an attorney has
ghostwritten the pleading?
* How should a judge treat pleadings where it is unclear if the party
is represented?69
* Should federal judges behave differently than state judges? 70
67. These rules can appear either in a state's rules of civil procedure or a state's rules of
professional conduct. See, e.g., N.D. R. Ctv. P. 11(e); NEB. RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 501.2; IOWA
R. Civ. P. 1.404(3)-(4).
68. For example, Delaware has developed a set ofjudicial guidelines for dealing with pro se
or partially-represented litigants, which recommends that a judge use her "discretion to assume more
than a passive role in assuring that during litigation the merits of a case are adequately presented
through testimony and other evidence," while remaining "neutral in the consideration of the merits
and in ruling on the matter." DEL. S. CT., DELAWARE'S JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL HEARINGS
INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 1.1 (2011), available at
http://courts.delaware.gov/supreme/AdmDir/adl78guidelines.pdf. Other states have rules addressing
adjudication with self-represented parties; these rules vary in the level of judicial engagement and
intervention they encourage. See, e.g., MASS. JUD. INST., JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL
HEARINGS INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2006), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/judguidelinescivhearingstoc.html. One person with whom we spoke
suggested that Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a comprehensive set of rules. Telephone
Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 14.
69. Several states have enacted a presumption that a party is unrepresented. See, e.g., UTAH R.
PROF'L CONDUCT 4.2,4.3; WASH. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.2,4.3.
70. This has been a major issue in Colorado, where a federal judge excoriated ghostwriting
early in the development of unbundling. See Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226,
1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994), af'd on other grounds, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996). The Colorado feder-
al courts have affirmed this position, refusing to adopt Colorado state rules of professional conduct
that would permit ghostwriting or other forms of unbundling. In the Matter of Rules of Professional
Conduct, Amended Administrative Order 1999-6 (Apr. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.cod.uscourts.govtDocuments/Orders/99-AdminOrder-6.pdf. This is not to say that the
federal courts are uniformly opposed to ghostwriting; rather, some types of federal court proceed-
ings, such as immigration hearings, have provided models for state attempts to implement limited
scope representation. Email from Dianne Van Voorhees, Exec. Dir., Metro Volunteer Lawyers, to
Molly Jennings, (March 29, 2012 2:25:26 PM EDT) (on file with authors).
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II. How UNBUNDLING FOR LITIGATION MATTERS HAS EVOLVED
In this Part, we provide the results of our attempt to understand how
unbundling for litigation matters evolved in our three study states. We
begin with a very brief national overview before turning to Colorado,
Massachusetts, and Alabama.
Nationally, the first rumblings of unbundling in litigation matters
we found occurred in the early 1970s with the establishment of private
legal clinics. These clinics focused on legal services that could be stand-
ardized, such as divorces and bankruptcies. 7 1 They represented a move
toward a consumer-friendly legal market and enjoyed success in the
1970s.72 According to Mosten, as legal clients joined broader consumer
trends, they began demanding more control over and understanding of
the court system. The traditional private bar eventually picked up this
momentum.74
Attorneys like M. Sue Talia and Mosten began advocating broader
use of unbundled legal services as a method of increasing business for
the small-firm or solo practitioner. 75 Done correctly, they emphasized,
limited scope representation was a "low risk practice, of great service to
the courts and litigants and profitable to the lawyer."76
Elsewhere, courts and legal services providers turned to unbundling
to increase the number of clients they could serve. For instance, Mari-
copa County, Arizona began an unbundling project in 1994 in its superi-
or court that referred pro se litigants to attorneys who, for a fee, advised
them on legal strategy or procedure. 77 Further, groups such as North Cen-
tral Alabama Legal Services have offered assistance completing forms
for simple family law cases since the 1980s. 78
Unbundling reached a visible national stage with the first national
conference on the subject, held in Baltimore in 2000.79 Panel topics in-
cluded "Unbundled Practice and Pro Bono Opportunities" alongside
"Successful Models for Unbundled Practice: Pioneers in the Field,"80
71. Mosten, supra note 3, at 425; Henry J. Reske, New Niche for Firm that Leda Revolution,
80 ABAJ, 22 (1994), at 22. Two examples of clinic-based law firms are Jacoby & Myers and Hyatt
Legal Services. Id.
72. Reske, supra note 71, at 22.
73. Mosten, supra note 3, at 425.
74. Id.; see also Reske, supra note 71, at 22 ("Like the Romans when they conquered the
Greeks, the traditional forms of law firms have maintained their dominance by learning from those
they have overcome.").
75. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with M. Sue Talia, supra note 6.
76. M. SUE TALIA, ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTING A SUCCESSFUL UNBUNDLING PROGRAM, I
(2005), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/South%20Central%2ONotebook%2OContents/
Tab%206/Roadmap%20fo0 /o2Olmplementing.pdf.
77. UNBUNDLED LAW, supra note 24.
78. Telephone Interview with Tom Keith, Legal Services Ala. (Jan. 18, 2012).
79. Conference Program, UNBUNDLED LAW, http://unbundledlaw.org/
old/program/program.htm#WORKSHOPS AND MATERIALS (last visited May. 28, 2012).
80. Id.
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demonstrating the alternative justifications of limited service representa-
tion as an access to justice measure and as a new business model. In
2002, the American Bar Association finalized changes to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to provide bare-bones authorization for
unbundling, including proposed amendments to Rules 1.2(c) and 6.5
(both discussed above).8 ' More recently, the ABA Standing Committee
on Delivery of Legal Services announced its plan to introduce a resolu-
tion in support of unbundled legal services at the ABA's 2013 mid-year
conference. 82 These changes, limited as they were, complimented an
increased focus on unbundling at the state level, to which we now turn.
A. Colorado
In Colorado, unbundling in litigation matters began with localized
coalitions among legal services groups, pro bono efforts, and individual
courts. As a 1998 Colorado ethics opinion would subsequently note, the
Denver District Court established an "Information and Referral Office"
around 1996, staffed by attorneys who provided limited legal advice and
would refer clients to attorneys offering unbundled legal services. 8 3 At
this time, it was not 100% clear that these efforts were legal and ethical,
although the involvement of the local court system no doubt provided
substantial cover to attorneys engaged in the practice. The current direc-
tor of Colorado Legal Services explained to us that the legal services
attorneys involved "put the huge unmet need [of the otherwise unrepre-
sented] ahead of rule evolution."84 Similarly, the Metro Volunteer Law-
yers program, which provided pro bono volunteer opportunities for Den-
81. Ethics 2000 Commission, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/policy/ethics 2000 commission.htmi (last visited May 29, 2012).
Rule 1.2(c) was amended to "more clearly permit, but also more specifically regulate" limited scope
representation agreements. Reporter's Explanation of Changes: Rule 1.2, AM. BAR ASS'N, available
at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/policy/ethics 2000_commission/
e2k rulel2rem.html (last visited May 28, 2012). Rule 6.5 was amended in order to permit attorneys
to participate in LFTD programs without fear of violating conflict-of-interest rules. Reporter's
Explanation of Changes: Rule 6.5, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k rule65rem.html (last visited
May 11, 2012).
82. See Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal-services.html (last visited July 30, 2012). The
resolution confirms that the ABA supports limited scope representation as a means of increasing
access to justice and that the ABA will work to increase public awareness of limited scope represen-
tation. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES (July 19, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/deliverylegal services/2012%201imited%20scope%20representation%20re
port%201s del.authcheckdam.pdf
83. Colo. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 101 (Jan. 17, 1998), add. 2006, available at
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfmn/ID/ 386/sublD/1 822/CETH/Ethics-Opinion- 101:-Unbundled-Legal-
Services,-01/17/98.
84. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Asher, supra note 4.
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ver-area lawyers, had begun providing legal advice through its LFTD
program in the early 1990s."s
According to participants, these programs worked because the law-
yers in charge of individual programs had strong relationships with judg-
es in courts inundated with pro se litigants, judges who were willing to
be flexible in attempts to restore some sense of order to the courtroom. 86
The existence of these programs, which predated the statewide push to-
wards unbundling, induced Colorado legal aid attorneys and pro bono
program administrators to play a somewhat unusual and partly behind-
the-scenes role. That is, despite the fact that they were already actively
engaged in the unbundled practice, legal aid and pro bono attorneys did
not initiate the statewide effort to mainstream that practice. Rather, when
that effort began, these attorneys sought to shape the resulting rule
amendments to assure that their preexisting programs would be deemed
ethical and otherwise permissible.87
The movement toward recognizing, legitimizing, mainstreaming,
and promoting unbundling began when Forrest Mosten gave several
presentations in the early 1990s on the concept.8' Despite a 1994 opinion
by a Colorado federal district judge excoriating ghostwriting,89 the Den-
ver Bar Association requested a formal opinion from the Ethics Commit-
tee of the Colorado Bar Association in 1996.90 In January 1998, the Eth-
ics Committee responded by adopting Ethical Opinion 101, which con-
cluded that unbundling was permissible under Colorado's Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct.91 The opinion permitted unbundling in the broadest
sense, limiting it only by the lawyer's duty to provide competent repre-
sentation for her client.92
The ethics opinion was swiftly followed by a rules change. In July
1999, the Colorado Supreme Court amended Rules of Professional Con-
duct 1.2, 4.2, and 4.3, as well as Rule 11 of the Colorado Rules of Civil
85. Telephone Interview with Dianne Van Voorhees, Exec. Dir., Metro Volunteer Lawyers
Program (Jan. 12, 2012); Telephone Interview with Gina Weitzenkom, Mills & Weitzenkorn P.C.
(Jan. 12, 2012); Telephone Interview with Gregory Hobbs, supra note 16 (acknowledging that in its
original form, this program consisted of pro se divorce clinics, at which lawyers taught pro se liti-
gants how to fill out the forms needed to obtain a divorce).
86. Telephone Interview with Gina Weitzenkorn, supra note 85. The judges in the district
court where the Metro Volunteer Lawyers programs began providing rooms and access to the neces-
sary court files.
87. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Asher, supra note 18.
88. Telephone Interview with Daniel M. Taubman, supra note 52; Telephone Interview with
Jonathan Asher, note 4.
89. Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994), aff'don
other grounds, 85 F. 3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996).
90. Letter from Steven C. Choquette & Jon S. Nicholls, co-chairs of the Denver Bar Ass'n
Legal Servs. Comm., Barbara G. Chamberlain, Dir. of the Thursday Night Bar Program, and David
B. Ells, Dir. of the Colo. Bar Ass'n Pub. Legal Educ., to Kathie J. Fliss, Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm. (Oct. 9, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Choquette Letter].
91. Colo. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 101,supra note 83 (referencing the 2006 addendum).
92. Id.
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Procedure, in order to permit unbundling for pro se litigants without fil-
ing a notice of appearance.93 These rules permitted ghostwriting (but in-
sisted that the attorney's name, address, telephone number, and registra-
tion number appear on the pleading).9 4 The swift adoption of these new
rules was possible because of the relatively limited objection to unbun-
dling from either state judges95 or the private bar.96
The interviews and other research we conducted made clear that in
the consideration of these rule changes and in the deliberations regarding
what role unbundling should play in Colorado practice, the experiences
of the Denver-based programs discussed above played only a limited
part. These programs did, however, play some role. For example, the
Denver Bar Association's 1996 request to the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion's Ethics Committee for an opinion on unbundling97 was in part
spurred by the Bar's desire to clarify the ethical status of some of its pro
bono efforts, and these programs were identified as examples in subse-
quent presentations to the private bar.9 8 But few of the persons we inter-
viewed mentioned these programs until we asked about them. Rather, the
rule changes were expected to expand unbundling in the private bar with
two goals in mind: making legal services more affordable for middle-
income Coloradans and increasing pro bono participation. To accom-
plish this, the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations collaborated to
hold several events designed to encourage unbundling.' 00 The bench also
worked to increase use of unbundling as an access to justice tool, most
recently through the Access to Justice Commission, created through ap-
pointments by the Colorado bar and the Colorado Supreme Court.o'0 De-
spite the efforts of the bench and bar, private attorney involvement in
unbundling remained low.102 Bar-sponsored pro bono organizations
93. Raymond P. Micklewright, Discrete Task Representation a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services,
29 COLO. LAW. 5 (January 2000); Colo. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 101, supra note 83.
94. COLO. R. Civ. P. I1(b) (2012) (providing that an attorney's name on the ghostwritten
pleading does not constitute an appearance).
95. The federal judiciary in Colorado remained hostile toward limited scope representation,
issuing administrative order 1999-6 in April 2000, reaffirming its disapproval of ghostwriting. Colo.
Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 101, supra note 83 (referencing the 2006 addendum). The district court af-
firmed this position yet again in 2002, adopting local rules that integrated all state rules of procedure
and professional conduct except those mentioned in administrative order 1999-6. Id.
96. One justice suggested that the private bar may have been more willing to support unbun-
dling because a mandatory pro bono rule was also on the table at the same time these rules were
adopted. Telephone Interview with Gregory Hobbs, supra note 16.
97. Choquette Letter, supra note 90.
98. Email from Dianne Van Voorhees, Exec. Dir., Metro Volunteer Lawyers, to Molly Jen-
nings (March 29, 2012 2:25:26 PM EDT) (on file with author).
99. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Asher, supra note 4.
100. Loren Ginsburg, BBR: Unbundling Legal Services?, THE DoCKET, 15 (May 1998) (report-
ing on the Colorado Bench/Bar Retreat panels on unbundling); Unbundling Your Legal Practice:
How to Offer Limited Legal Services (flyer advertising a continuing legal education event in Denver
on September 10, 1997).
101. Colorado Access to Justice Commission formed. COLO. BAR ASSOC., Access to Justice
Commission, http://www.cobar.org/page.cfn/ID/20129 (last visited Dec. 9,2011).
102. Telephone Interview with Adam Espinosa, supra note 52.
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sought to use limited scope representation both to serve more people and
to entice more attorneys to volunteer,' 03 but the effectiveness of this ef-
fort remained unclear.
In the late 2000s, attorneys began to change their perspective on
unbundling, perhaps due to deteriorating economic conditions.'1' The
bench and bar made further efforts to emphasize unbundling to the pri-
vate bar. Adam Espinosa, a Colorado Assistant Regulation Counsel, and
Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Daniel Taubman began giving presen-
tations to private bar lawyers on how unbundling worked under Colorado
law.'05 At these presentations, attorneys frequently raised an issue exist-
ing Colorado rules did not address: how could an attorney entering a case
for a specific purpose be certain she would be able to withdraw once that
purpose was served? 06 The Colorado Supreme Court responded to this
concern by adopting amendments to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure
121 that abrogated the judge's discretion to keep an attorney on a case
after filing a limited appearance. o0
We draw the following lessons from the Colorado experience. First,
legal aid providers and pro bono groups made informal arrangements
with local courts to enable unbundled representation for litigation matters
years before changes in rules mainstreamed the practice. Second, rule
changes were iterative; initial changes were found insufficient, and a
sustained effort was necessary. A key moment in the process occurred
when courts gave up the discretion regarding whether to allow an attor-
ney who entered a case for a limited purpose to withdraw after that pur-
pose had been fulfilled. Third, in Colorado, resistance came primarily
from the federal courts; the movement to mainstream unbundling had
powerful allies in the state bench, the bar, and the office of disciplinary
counsel, among others. Even with such allies, changes made thus far
have taken over fifteen years to put in place.
B. Massachusetts
Like Colorado, Massachusetts was home to a number of providers
who assisted clients on a limited-scope basis before rule changes and
ethics opinions mainstreamed unbundling. Early LFTD programs began
103. Telephone Interview with Dianne Van Voorhees, supra note 85.
104. Telephone Interview with Adam Espinosa, supra note 52.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Adam Espinosa & Daniel M. Taubman, Limited Scope Representation Under the Pro-
posed Amendment to CRCP 121, §1-1, 40 COLO. LAW. 89 (Nov. 2011). Along with the new rule, the
Colorado courts adopted JDF forms 630, 631, and 632 which an attorney may file to indicate a
limited appearance. Zachary Willis, State Judicial Issues Forms Allowing Limited Appearances by
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in the late 1980s and early 1990s.'08 These programs began by offering
limited advice and counseling to pro se litigants, gradually expanded to
include representation in mediation sessions,' 09 and moved from there to
having attorneys argue motions or engage in court colloquies.o10 Ordinar-
ily, these programs were staffed by a combination of legal aid providers
and pro bono attorneys; in some cases, legal aid providers specialized in
full representation, while litigants referred to bar-pro bono groups during
triage often received limited services."' Meanwhile, even apart from the
legal aid context, attorneys and clients also began to engage in unbundled
arrangements, whereby the scope of representation was dictated by some
combination of the client's gumption and ability to pay for legal ser-
*112vices.
As was true in Colorado, Massachusetts's movement toward legiti-
mizing unbundling began with an early ethics opinion, adopted in
1998.1' By that time, Massachusetts had already (in 1997114) adopted
Model Rule 1.2(c). Unlike Colorado, however, Massachusetts's ethics
opinion initially envisioned a narrower role for unbundling. The ethics
opinion distinguished "limited background advice and counseling" from
ghostwriting and "more extensive services," permitting only the for-
mer."' On its face, then, the ethics opinion left unclear the ethical status
of a number of forms of unbundling, such as LFTD representation in
settlement discussions and mediation sessions.
Some judges did try to capitalize on the early momentum generated
by the rule adoption and the ethics opinion. A year after the adoption of
the ethics opinion, a committee of the Massachusetts Probate and Family
Court released a report that suggested "controlled unbundling" as a po-
tential solution to the pro se crisis."' 6 A feature of "controlled unbun-
108. Telephone Interview with Ilene Mitchell, Admin. Office of the Mass. Probate & Family
Ct. (Jan. 19, 2012).
109. Telephone Interview with Sandy Moskowitz, Former Dir. of the Bos. Housing Ct. LFTD
Program (Jan. 30, 2012). In Boston, the mediation component was added to the program in the early
2000s. Id.; see also email from Stephanie Lee, Boston Bar Ass'n (Feb. 6, 2012) (on file with author).
Programs outside of Boston followed suit, offering representation in mediation sessions run by
housing specialists. Ross Dollof & Patricio Rossi, Mediation Project Gets Results for North Shore
Tenants, 16 LEGAL SERVS. REPORTER 1, 12-14 (2006) (discussing the decision by Neighborhood
Legal Services, Inc. to create a LFTD program that extended representation to mediation sessions in
the Northeast Housing Court); see also Telephone Interview with Judge Dina Fein, supra note 51.
110. Telephone Interview with Sheila Casey, Exec. Dir., Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc.
(March 30, 2012) (stating that in 2006, the NLS lawyer for the day program began engaging in court
colloquies and motion arguments on behalf of clients).
111. Telephone Interview with Richard MacMahon, supra note 51.
112. See PROBATE & FAMILY CT. PRO SE COMM., PRO SE LITIGANTS: THE CHALLENGE OF THE
FUTURE 42 (1995), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/
courts/probateandfamilycourt/prosefinalreport.pdf (noting that, in the probate and family court, "it is
becoming more common that litigants are retaining attorneys but using them selectively depending
on the nature of the court appearance.").
113. Mass. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 98-1, supra note 26.
114. MASS. R. PROF'L CONDUCT. 1.2 (2012).
115. Mass. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 98-1, supra note 26.
116. PROBATE & FAMILY CT. PRO SE COMM., supra note 112, at 42-43.
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dling" was that the judge retained discretion as to whether to permit an
attorney to withdraw from a case entered for a limited purpose once that
purpose was resolved.1 7 This suggestion triggered the common attorney
fear of indefinite commitment to a case, as articulated above, and opposi-
tion in the private bar halted further movement toward "controlled un-
bundling."" 8
For a year or so after the release of the report suggesting "controlled
unbundling," little changed in Massachusetts."19 Then, Massachusetts
Chief Justice Margaret Marshall convened an access to justice confer-
ence in March 2001, which she followed about six months later with the
establishment of the Supreme Judicial Court Steering Committee on
Self-Represented Litigants.12 0 The Steering Committee began meeting in
April 2002 and started work on several initiatives, including a blue-
ribbon Working Group on expanding access to legal representation.121
In an effort to reassure the private bar that its concerns would re-
ceive serious attention, the Group's co-chairs were selected from nomi-
nations by the Boston Bar Association and Massachusetts Bar Associa-
tion.122 The Steering Committee also assured that the Working Group's
membership included representatives of legal aid organizations that had
experience with unbundled programs.' 23 The Working Group issued sev-
eral reports and recommendations. One report argued that ghostwriting
was not unethical and that concerns regarding duty of candor to the court
could be addressed by including an annotation on a court document not-
Ing that it was prepared with assistance of counsel.12 4 The Group further
recommended that Massachusetts engage in a pilot project testing the
provision of unbundled legal services. The Steering Committee on Self-
Represented Litigants received this recommendation with caution, fear-
ing the reaction of the private bar, but at a subsequent meeting of the
Massachusetts Bar Association, attorneys and judges who had previously
opposed LAR thought the idea of a pilot project worth trying.2
The pilot program began in two courts but soon expanded to include
a third; it was only open to attorneys who had completed training in
LAR.126 An advisory group for the pilot program included representa-
117. Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, Assoc. Justice, Mass. App. Ct. (Jan. 9, 2011).
118. Interview with Jayne Tyrrell, Dir. of Massachusetts interest on Lawyers Trust Fund Ac-
counts (Dec. 20, 2011).




123. Telephone Interview with Cynthia 1. Cohen, supra note 14.
124. Id. The Working Group also pushed Massachusetts to adopt Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 6.5, which governs conflict checking for attorneys involved in pro bono limited representa-
tion programs.
125. Id.
126. Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 117. See generally Suffolk, SS. Supreme
Judicial Court, Order In Re: Limited Representation Pilot Project, (Aug. 1, 2006), available at
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tives from various sectors of the bar, including legal aid and pro bono
groups.12 7 The advisory group also proposed the term "limited assistance
representation" instead of "unbundling" so as to separate the concept
from the "controlled unbundling" idea.'28 After receiving positive reac-
tions (drawn in large part from surveys of judiciary staff) regarding the
pilots, the Steering Committee issued a report recommending that LAR
be made available in all of the state trial courts.129 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court issued an order empowering each of the state's
seven trial court departments to authorize LAR, and the departments in
turn issued the appropriate orders.' 3 0 These orders required attorneys to
undergo LAR training; further, entry and exit from a piece of litigation
was to be effectuated automatically by filing appropriate notices, thus
removing the need for a court order permitting the withdrawal.' 3' Some
reports suggest that LAR has been used to leverage pro bono assistance,
but has not caught on in the fee for service context, at least in the state's
housing courts.13 2
We draw the following conclusions from the Massachusetts experi-
ence. First, unbundling was an established part of several legal assistance
programs run both by legal aid providers and by pro bono attorneys prior
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's "pilots." Further, under
applicable court rules, legal aid and pro bono attorneys were subject to
the same ethical strictures as the private bar.13 3 Despite these facts, these
programs were not seen as providing sufficient information for judg-
ments regarding how challenges such as contact with represented parties
and entry/withdrawal from pending litigation should be addressed
statewide. Instead, the "pilots" were considered necessary to address
these issues.
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/limited-rep.html. The program began in the Boston Family Court
and the Springfield Family Court. Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 117. It later expand-
ed to the Deadham Probate and Family Court in Suffolk, SS. Supreme Judicial Court, Amended
Order In Re: Limited Representation Pilot Project, (June 28, 2007), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/limited-rep.html.
127. Telephone Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 14.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STEERING COMMITTEE ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN OUR
COURTS: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/ report-self-rep-litigants.html.
130. Interview with Cynthia J. Cohen, supra note 117; see, e.g., Mass. Housing Ct. Dept.,
Standing Order 1-10, Limited Assistance Representation (Aug. 30, 2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/housingcourt/housing-standing-orderl-10.pdf.
131. The orders of the various Massachusetts trial court divisions resemble one another. Tele-
phone Interview with Judge Dina Fein, First Justice, Mass. Housing Ct., W. Div. (March 26, 2012).
132. Telephone Interview with Judge Dina Fein, supra note 51. Judge Fein suggested further
marketing programs targeted at the state bar to promote interest in unbundling on a fee-for-service
basis.
133. See, e.g., Mass. Housing Ct. Dept., Standing Order 1-01, Lawyer for a Day Program




Even today, Massachusetts legal and ethical rules as applied in cer-
tain courts draw a line between, say, LAR as part of a LFTD program
(which are typically run by legal aid providers and pro bono attorneys)
versus limited appearances by attorneys not associated with such a pro-
gram. For example, an attorney who appears in the Massachusetts North-
east Housing Court to argue a motion as part of that court's LFTD pro-
gram is governed by Massachusetts Housing Court Standing Order 1-01,
need not file a notice of limited appearance or a notice of withdrawal of
limited appearance, and need not have completed any special training. 134
In contrast, when a lawyer's appearance to argue a motion is separate
from the Northeast Housing Court's LFTD program, her appearance is
governed by Massachusetts Housing Court Standing Order 1-10. This
latter order requires that the lawyer file a notice of limited appearance
and a notice of withdrawal of limited appearance, and the lawyer must
have undergone LAR training.' 1 We confess that we are uncertain as to
the conceptual distinction between these two situations, particularly giv-
en that Massachusetts Housing Court Standing Order 1-01 expressly
provides that the Rules of Professional Conduct apply in full to LFTD
attorneys. 36
Second, in Massachusetts, there was substantial opposition to un-
bundling at the inception of the movement, and this opposition led to
another iterative process towards mainstreaming. Third, a key sticking
point in the process was whether courts would give up the discretion
regarding whether to allow an attorney who entered a case for a limited
purpose to withdraw after that purpose had been fulfilled. Progress was
only possible after courts made clear that they would in fact do so.
C Alabama
Alabama's rule changes and official adoption of unbundling rules
happened later than the other states surveyed. Nevertheless, some legal
aid providers and pro bono groups began providing various forms of
unbundled assistance before the organized bar began seriously consider-
ing rule changes that mainstreamed the practice. For instance, responding
to both the wave of pro se litigants experienced by Alabama state courts
134. Telephone Interview with Sheila Casey, supra note I10; Mass. Housing Ct. Dept., Stand-
ing Order 1-01, supra note 133. For a similar understanding in family court, see Telephone Interview
with Ilene Mitchell, supra note 108.
135. Mass. Housing Ct. Department Standing Order 1-10, supra note 130, at 1-2. For a similar
regime in family courts, see Memorandum from Paula M. Carey, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts.
Probate and Family Court to All Judges, Registers, Chief Probation Officers, Judicial Case Manag-
ers, and Family Law Facilitators of the Probate and Family Court Re: Ltd. Assistance Representation
(May 8, 2009), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/
courts/probateandfamilycourt/documents/memorelarstatewide.pdf.
136. Mass. Housing Ct. Dept., Standing Order 1-01, supra note 133; see also Russell Engler,
And Justice for All -Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Role of the Judges, Media-
tors, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REv 1987, 2046 (1999) (describing pro se interventions as lying
along a spectrum rather than on one side or the other of a hard-and-fast line).
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and to funding cuts, 13 7 Legal Services of North Central Alabama'38 began
creating pro se forms in the mid-1980s without the advance approval of
the courts.13 9 Feeling it was irresponsible to hand out the forms without
direction, Legal Services of North Central Alabama also began providing
limited advice to pro se litigants looking to use the forms.140 Further-
more, legal services attorneys in Alabama have for years engaged in lim-
ited representation in the form of telephone negotiations with opposing
parties without formally entering cases. 14 1
Movement towards mainstreaming began within the organized bar
in 2000, later than in Colorado and Massachusetts.14 2 At that time, Chief
Justice Perry Hooper and Alabama State Bar president Wade Baxley
nominated an access to justice task force.143 When Chief Justice Hooper
retired in 2001, however, the task force stopped meeting.' 4 A subcom-
mittee organized by the Alabama State Bar Committee on Volunteer
Lawyers Programs/Access to Legal Services attempted to continue the
work of the task force, but after gathering some pro se forms and holding
a few meetings, the subcommittee found it lacked the authority to go
further.145 In 2004-2005, the bar put together a task force that produced
two concrete recommendations to improve access to justice: (1) appoint-
Ing a committee to develop and distribute pro se forms and (2) enabling
limited scope representation.14 6 This committee report, while highlight-
ing potential benefits of unbundling, failed to convince the bar to take
affirmative steps. The Alabama State Bar chose to focus on increasing
the number of pro se forms and essentially tabled the limited scope rep-
resentation recommendation, citing concerns about the unauthorized
practice of law. 147
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Alabama renewed the focus on un-
bundling (along with several other measures) by establishing an Access
137. Interview of Tom Keith by Kenneth Cain, Jr. (July 26, 1992), available at
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/nejl/TomKeith trans.cfm.
138. At the time, Legal Services of North-Central Alabama was its own organization. In 2004,
all the legal services organizations in Alabama merged into one group, Legal Services Alabama.
About Us, LEGAL SERVICES ALABAMA, http://www.legalservicesalabama.org/ about us/ (last visited
May 29, 2012).
139. Telephone Interview with Tom Keith, supra note 78; Interview of Tom Keith by Kenneth
Cain, Jr., supra note 137.
140. Telephone Interview with Tom Keith, supra note 78; Telephone Interview with Stacey
Haire, Attorney, formerly of Legal Services of North Central Alabama (Jan. 20, 2012).
141. Telephone Interview with James Chipley, Attorney, Legal Services of Alabama (February
22, 2012).
142. Telephone Interview with Tom Keith, supra note 78; ACCESS TO JUSTICE TASK FORCE,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE? SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN THE ALABAMA COURT SYSTEM 2 (2005).
143. Id.
144. Id.; Dana Beyerle, Justice Hooper to Retire, GADSEN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2000, at BI, B8.
145. ACCESS TO JUSTICE TASK FORCE, supra note 142, at 2-3.
146. Id. at 4, 6; Telephone Interview with Henry Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43.
147. Telephone Interview with Henry Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43.
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to Justice Commission (ATJ Commission).14 8 While the order establish-
ing the ATJ Commission did not specifically reference unbundling, the
Commission financed a state bar Pro Bono Committee that began look-
ing into unbundling as a response to the pro se crisis. 149 This Committee
began to develop a set of rule changes to promote limited scope represen-
tation that, it was hoped, would provide sufficient specificity for attor-
neys considering unbundling their practices.150 The proposed changes,
based on lessons learned from other states, included (1) clarification of
what must be included in a limited scope representation agreement, (2)
how to determine if a party was represented or unrepresented, (3) per-
mission for ghostwriting if document includes notation that it was pre-
pared with assistance of counsel, and (4) an automatic withdrawal provi-
sion for limited scope attorneys.5 1
Momentum grew in 2010, when the Alabama State Bar General
Counsel's office issued Ethics Opinion 2010-01, stating that the rules as
they stood permitted ghostwriting and limited scope representation.152
Although the Commission noted that the ethics opinion did not provide
sufficient guidance to induce private attorneys to incorporate unbundled
legal services into their practices,1 53 certain pro bono groups took the
opinion as sufficient initiative to launch new programs to serve the un-
derrepresented.154
Finally, the Alabama State Bar Board of Bar Commissioners ap-
proved the Pro Bono Committee's proposed rule changes in November
2011, after which they were sent to the Alabama Supreme Court for ap-
proval.15 5 The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the new rules on March
26, 2012.16
We draw the following lessons from the Alabama experience. First,
as in Colorado and Massachusetts, legal aid and pro bono groups were
pursuing unbundled representation in litigation matters before alterations
to court and ethics rules mainstreamed the practice. Yet again, this expe-
148. About Us, ALA. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM'N (2009), http://alabamaatj.org/about us.html
(last visited May 29, 2012).
149. Telephone Interview with Henry Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43.
150. Id. The proposed rule changes will affect Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.2,
4.2, and 4.3, as well as Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure II and 87. Memorandum from Henry
Callaway on behalf of the Pro Bono and Public Service Committee to the Alabama State Bar Execu-
tive Committee (July 22, 2011) (on file with author).
151. Memorandum from Henry Callaway, supra note 150.
152. Ala. State Bar, Ethics Op. 2010-1, supra note 47.
153. Memorandum from Henry Callaway, supra note 150.
154. Telephone Interview with Kelli Mauro, Exec. Dir., Birmingham Volunteer Lawyers
Program (Jan. 26, 2012).
155. Minutes of the Ala. State Bar Bd. Comm'rs Meeting 6 (Nov. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.alabar.org/bbc/minutes/ 111/MinutesBoard%20MeetingNovember4201 I.pdf; Tele-
phone Interview with Henry Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43.
156. Ala. Sup. Ct., Order Approving Amendment to Rules 1.1, 1.2(c), 4.2, & 4.3 of the Ala.
Rules of Prof'l Conduct (Ala. Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.alabar.org/medialimg/Ala-
Sup-Ct-Order/20-LSR.pdf.
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rience was thought to have limited relevance to the mainstreaming effort.
Second, Alabama learned from the experience of other states and, in do-
ing so, was able to propose a more comprehensive set of rule changes. 57
Third, opposition within Alabama to the concept of unbundling has been
somewhat muted, and the organized private bar for the most part has
been a proponent, not an obstacle, to mainstreaming.
D. Common Conclusions
We articulated our view of the lessons common to all three states in
the Introduction to this Article. To avoid too much repetition, we simply
summarize our views here. First, in all three states, legal aid providers
(joined in some cases by pro bono providers) had actively practiced un-
bundled forms of representation in litigation matters in years before a
recognizable mainstreaming movement began. Second, the movement
toward recognizing, legitimizing, and promoting limited assistance in
litigation matters had to include a coalition of leaders in the private bar,
the judiciary, administrators of state ethical rules and guidelines, and
others. Third, no one knows whether the mainstreaming efforts have in
fact realized the goals they were designed to promote.
1II. THE BIBLIOGRAPHY
The final part of this paper consists of a bibliography of sources
concerning unbundling, which is available at www.denverlawreview.org.
We limit this bibliography to sources that focus on the definition of un-
bundling we laid out in Part I, supra-for instance, we have excluded
sources that deal primarily with collaborative lawyering' 58 and law stu-
dent clinics, both of which fall beyond the scope of this paper. Further,
we exclude the numerous state bar publications on unbundlingl5 9 because
of the volume of such publications, the difficulty in obtaining them, and
the fact that many are listed elsewhere.'6 0 The national bar publications
157. Persons involved with the push for unbundling in Alabama had gone so far as to hire a
consultant familiar with the California experience to generate ideas and to facilitate more compre-
hensive moves. Telephone Interview with Henry Callaway & Tracy Daniel, supra note 43 (discuss-
ing the hiring of M. Sue Talia, Private Family Law Judge, as a consultant).
158. Collaborative lawyering involves a lawyer-client relationship limited by an agreement that
"the lawyer will not represent the client in court in an adversarial proceeding against the other party
at any time." Susan L. Amato, Collaborative Family Law: Setting the Framework for Effective
Collaborative Practice, in UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON
NAVIGATING THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS, WORKING WITH CLIENTS, AND ANALYZING THE
LATEST TRENDS 179 (2011). If an agreement between the parties is not reached, none of the collabo-
rative professionals will participate in any adversarial court proceeding involving these parties. Id.
159. We have included two pieces from Colorado publications because they represent a high-
profile debate on the propriety of unbundling between the state and federal courts in the State. See
Kane, supra note 11 (describing support for unbundling); Micklewright, supra note 93 (same).
160. The ABA Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, for instance, maintains
a bibliography of sources relating to unbundling, which includes many relevant state bar publica-
tions. See Pro Se/Unbundling Resource Center: Articles, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/delivery/
delunbundart.html (last visited May 28, 2012).
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included in our bibliography accurately reflect the content of many of the
state bar articles, which tend to describe recent developments in state
law.
The sources are organized into the following categories:
* Problem/Trend Descriptive: These sources explore the problem
of pro se litigation and trends in unbundling.
* Empirical: These pieces take an empirical look at unbundling's
efficacy or provide a framework for future empirical work.
* Ethical: Pieces in this category consider the ethical implications
of unbundling.
* Legal: Sources in this category analyze the rules of civil proce-
dure or professional conduct relevant to unbundling.
* Operational: These articles consider the steps a practitioner must
take to unbundle his practice.
* Ghostwriting: Articles in this category look at issues unique to
ghostwriting.
* Judicial Role: These pieces suggest varied best practices for
judges faced with parties using limited representation.
* Court-Based Delivery Systems: These sources explore unbundling
services provided through court-based self-help centers.
* Clinics: Articles in this category consider the effectiveness of pro
se clinics, whereby a legal services organization teaches pro se litigants
how to proceed before they go to court.
* Elder Lawyering: These sources appraise issues specific to un-
bundling for elderly clients.
* Hotlines: These pieces investigate the use of hotlines for delivery
of unbundled legal services.
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JUSTICE GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR.t
Access to justice is the single most compelling reason for a legal
profession. The day we take our oath as attorneys, we swear never to
refuse the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.' A core value of the
legal profession is to provide legal services without fee to persons of
limited means and organizations serving their needs.
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 recognizes this core
value for lawyers and judges alike: "Each lawyer has a professional re-
sponsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay." 2 In addi-
tion, judges "should fulfill their pro bono publico responsibility by per-
forming services or participating in activities ... for improving the law,
the legal system or the legal profession."'
Judicial support for pro bono legal service is thus housed within
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 and enjoys the unstinting
assistance of the Colorado Bar Association and local bar associations.4
Lawyer suggestions for rule changes have resulted in a number of new or
amended rules adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court, along with chief
justice directives, to aid attorneys in performing their pro bono responsi-
bilities.
t Justice, Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Hobbs has served on the court since his ap-
pointment by Governor Roy Romer in 1996. Prior to his appointment, Justice Hobbs practiced at
Hobbs, Trout & Raley P.C. and Davis, Graham & Stubbs; served as the First Assistant Attorney
General, Natural Resources Section, State of Colorado, as an Enforcement Attorney with the United
States Environmental Protection Agency; and as a law clerk for Judge William E. Doyle of the
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Justice Hobbs also previously taught sixth grade in
New York City and served in the Peace Corps in South America.
1. In accordance with Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 201.14, a Colorado licensed attor-
ney swears an Oath of Admission administered by the Colorado Supreme Court that states "I will
never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed."
Colorado Attorney Oath of Admission, COLO. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/1653/CETH/Colorado-Attomey-Oath-of-Admission/ (last visit-
ed Apr. I, 2012); see also Greg Hobbs, Access to Justice-The Single-Most Compelling Reason for a
Legal Profession, COLO. LAW. Apr. 2011, at 59, 59, available at
http://www.cobar.org/tcltcl_articles.cfm?articleid=6982.
2. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2011).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Outstanding examples of lawyers who helped steer major rule changes through the Colo-
rado Supreme Court committee rulemaking process include Jon Asher and Dianne Van Voorhees in
regard to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) (limited scope representation rule); Ilene Bloom in
regard to the commentary to Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1, Sara Crocker, Profile
of the New DBA President: A New President in Bloom, DOCKET, July-Aug. 2011, at 4, 4, available
at http://www.cobar.org/docket/doc articles.cfm?ArticlelD-7142; and John Gleason in regard to the
Pro Bono Emeritus rule in Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 223, JoAnn Vogt, New Rule Allows
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LIMITED SCOPE REPRESENTATION RULES
Colorado attorneys are authorized by the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct to undertake
limited representation of self-represented parties, pro bono or for a fee.6
Under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b) and 311(b), attor-
neys may provide drafting assistance to self-represented parties who file
pleadings in court proceedings.7  The pleading filed by the self-
represented party must identify the assisting attorney.8 The attorney's
assistance in preparing the pleading does not constitute an entry of ap-
pearance. 9 Without the necessity of any disclosure, attorneys may assist
self-represented parties to fill out pre-printed and electronically pub-
lished forms issued through the Colorado Judicial Branch for use in
court.'0
Under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 121 Section 1-1(5), attor-
neys may make limited appearances in court on behalf of self-
represented parties in specified proceedings with consent of those par-
ties.' Leave of court is not required for the attorney to make or complete
the limited appearance.12 In addition, the consent, notice of limited ap-
pearance, and completion of limited appearance forms are available at
the web page of the Colorado judicial branch.13
Retired and Inactive Lawyers to Provide Pro Bono Legal Services, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 75,
75, available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl-articles.cfin?articleid=5228.
6. COLO. R. Civ. P. 1l(b); COLO. R. Civ. P. 311(b); COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
6.1.




11. COLO. R. Civ. P. 121 § 1-1(5); see also Adam J. Espinosa & Daniel M. Taubman, Limited
Scope Representation Under the Proposed Amendment to C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-1, COLO. LAW., Nov.
2011, at 89, 89, available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl articles.cfm?articleid=7300 (discussing the
reasons for adopting of the now-effective COLO. R. CIV. P. 121 § 1-1(5)).
12. COLO. R. Civ. P. 121 § 1-1(5).
13. Judicial Department Form 630: Notice of Limited Appearance by Attorney with Consent
of Pro Se Party Under C.R.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section /-I(5) in a Civil Matter, COLO. STATE
JUDICIAL BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=795
(general civil matter form); Judicial Department Form 631: Consent to Limited Appearance by an
Attorney Under C.R.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section 1-1(5) in a Civil Matter, COLO. STATE JUDICIAL
BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=796 (general civil
matter form); Judicial Department Form 632: Notice of Completion of Limited Appearance under
CR.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section 1-1(5) in a Civil Matter, COLO. STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH (Oct.
2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=797 (general civil matter form);
Judicial Department Form 1334: Notice of Limited Appearance by an Attorney with Consent of Pro
Se Party under C.R.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section 1-1(5) in a Family Law Matter, COLO. STATE
JUDICIAL BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=798
(domestic relation matter form); Judicial Department Form 1335: Consent to Limited Appearance
by an Attorney under C.R.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section 1-1(5) in a Family Law Matter, COLO. STATE
JUDICIAL BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=799
(domestic relation matter form); Judicial Department Form 1336: Notice of Completion of Limited
Appearance under C.R.C.P. 11(b) and 121, Section 1-I(5) in a Family Law Matter, COLO. STATE
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Colorado ethical rules allow attorneys and clients to agree upon lim-
ited scope representation for all types of legal service regardless of
whether a court appearance occurs. Colorado Rule of Professional Con-
duct 1.2(c) provides that "[a] lawyer may limit the scope or objectives, or
both, of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances and the client gives informed consent."1 4 Under Colorado
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0(e), "informed consent" requires the
lawyer to communicate "adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct."' 5 Furthermore, clients and attorneys must enter into a
limited-scope-representation and fee agreement. For the protection of
both parties, prudence suggests this should be done in writing.
The Colorado Supreme Court, working with its Judicial Advisory
Council, adopted the limited representation rules (also known as the "un-
bundling" rules) because, for example, 75% to 85% of domestic civil
cases filed in Colorado trial courts involve at least one pro se party, many
of whom presumably are persons of limited means who cannot afford an
attorney and need pro bono assistance. 17 Others cannot afford the full
range of legal services an attorney can provide. Colorado trial and appel-
late judges agree that it would be better for all parties to be represented,
but, failing that, some attorney help is preferable to no help.'
COURT RULES TO ASSIST PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICE
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 sets forth a goal of fifty
hours of pro bono legal service per year by each Colorado licensed attor-
ney.19 A "substantial majority of the fifty hours" should be "without fee
or expectation of fee to persons of limited means or charitable, religious,
civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters
that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited
means."20
The Commentary to Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 contains a
recommended pro bono policy for all Colorado licensed attorneys and
firms.21 Without intending to be restrictive, the Commentary identifies
JUDICIAL BRANCH (Oct. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=800
(domestic relation matter form).
14. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2008).
15. Id. R. 1.0(e).
16. Adam J. Espinosa, Ethical Considerations When Providing Unbundled Legal Services,
COLO. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 75, 75, available at
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tci articles.cfmn?articleid=7208.
17. Memorandum from Veronica Marceny, Office of the State Court Administrator, Colorado
State Judicial Branch, to author (on file with author).
18. During his sixteen years as a member of the Colorado Supreme Court, the author has
consistently heard this from trial judges throughout the state.
19. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2008).
20. Id.
21. Id. R. 6.1 cmt.
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categories of matters qualifying as pro bono service.22 It also suggests
how a small, medium, or large law firm might establish procedures for
administering its pro bono program.23
Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 260.8 provides for attorneys to
receive up to nine hours of Continuing Legal Education credit per three-
year reporting period for uncompensated pro bono representation or
mentoring of another lawyer or law student providing the representa-
24tion.
Chief Justice Directive 98-01 provides for a waiver of filing fees
and certain costs for indigent persons in civil cases.2 5 When an attorney
receives a pro bono case from a legal services provider, the provider
makes the indigency determination, and the attorney taking the case ef-
fectuates the filing fee and cost waiver by signing and filing the applica-
ble judicial branch form.26 Legal services providers typically have mal-
practice insurance that covers pro bono attorneys, 2 7 but an attorney tak-
ing an individual matter from such a provider should verify this, if she or
he does not carry suitable coverage.
Colorado has a pro bono emeritus program for attorneys who
choose not to engage in the practice of law other than pro bono work for
indigent or near-indigent clients. Under Colorado Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 223, for a small one-time administrative fee of $50, the Colorado
Supreme Court waives annual registration fees for otherwise inactive
attorneys who take pro bono cases for indigent persons under the auspi-
ces of a legal services provider.28 Attorneys in good standing who are
licensed in other states are eligible to practice for pro bono clients in
Colorado under this type of registration.29
Chief Justice Directive 06-03 addresses interpreter services in court-
related proceedings. 30 This directive has been amended to introduce a
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. COLO. R. Civ. P. 260.8.
25. Michael L. Bender, Chief Justice Directive 98-01: Costs for Indigent Persons in Civil
Matters, SUPREME CT. COLO. (Aug. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/
Courts/SupremeCourt/Directives/98-01 Amended8-12-1 1withAttachmentARevised3-12.pdf.
26. The legal services provider and the attorney sign JDF Form 203. Judicial Department
Form 203: Certification of Determination of Indigency, COLO. STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH (Aug.
2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/renderForm.cfm?Form=140. The legal services provider
maintains and fills out JDF Form 205. Judicial Department Form 205: Motion to File Without
Payment of Filing Fee or Waive Other Costs Owed to the State and Supporting Financial Affidavit,
COLO. STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH (Aug. 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/
renderForm.cfin? Form=142.
27. See Volunteer with MVL, METRO VOLUNTEER LAW., http://209.240.137.109/volunteer-
with-mvl/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
28. COLO. R. Civ. P. 223.
29. Id.
30. Michael L. Bender, ChiefJustice Directive 06-03: Directive Concerning Language Inter-
preters and Access to the Courts by Persons with Limited English Proficiency, SUPREME CT. COLO.,
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more comprehensive provision of language services, not only for indi-
gent persons, but all persons involved in Colorado court proceedings.
The Colorado Judicial Branch website maintains a large variety of self-
help forms and information for use in court proceedings, available to the
public without charge.3 2
COLORADO SUPREME COURT PRO BONO RECOGNITION PROGRAM
Through its Pro Bono Recognition Program, the Colorado Supreme
Court asks all law firms, in-house counsel groups, and government attor-
ney groups, whatever their size, to commit to an average of fifty hours of
pro bono legal services per Colorado licensed attorney annually across
the firm or group, prorated for part-time attorneys.3 3 This averaging
mechanism recognizes that some attorneys in the firm or group might
have more than fifty hours, offsetting those who have less. A substantial
majority of these hours should be for indigent persons or organizations
that serve the indigent.34
Each year, the Colorado Supreme Court recognizes those law firms,
in-house counsel groups, and government attorney groups that commit to
this goal and the firms that achieved this goal in the prior calendar year.
These firms self-report their commitment and achievement to the court.
At a presentation ceremony, the court presents a certificate of pro bono
commitment and service to each of these firms and groups, signed by the
seven justices. In addition, members of the court travel to local bar asso-
ciation events to award these certificates and recognize attorneys receiv-
ing local bar association awards for their pro bono work.
The commitment list has grown from 45 firms in 2006 to 211 firms,
in-house counsel groups, and government attorney groups in 2012 . Of
these 211 firms and groups, 163 achieved the 50-hour per attorney goal,
on the average, across the firm or group in calendar year 201 1.36 The
Colorado Judicial Branch website publishes the Colorado Supreme
Court's pro bono recognition list and it is updated on a continual basis.37
The Colorado Lawyer, the Colorado Bar Association's monthly publica-
1 (June 2011), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/SupremeCourt/Directives/CJD%2006-
03%20amended%2006-1 1.pdf.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Forms, COLO. STATE JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Forms/Index.cfm
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
33. Chief Justice Mary J. Mullarkey, ChiefJustice's Invitation to Participate in Pro Bono
Commitment and Annual Recognition of the Commitment's Achievement, COLO. STATE JUDICIAL
BRANCH,
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/SupCtCJIlnviteProBonoLegalSvcsRecogProg_1.pdf (last
visited Apr. 28, 2012).
34. Id
35. Colorado Supreme Court Pro Bono Legal Service Commitment and Recognition Program
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tion, also publishes this list.38 Annually, in the last week of October, the
chiefjustice issues a proclamation honoring pro bono week in connection
with the American Bar Association's annual observance.
A pro bono civil appeals appellate program has been established,
with forty lawyers signing up thus far, to take cases in the Colorado
Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court for unrepresented
parties who qualify for pro bono assistance.40
COLORADO ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION
The Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado Bar Association
have jointly chartered an Access to Justice Commission and local Access
to Justice Committees across the state. Their purpose is to work with the
Judicial Advisory Council, attorneys, the courts, community organiza-
tions, Colorado Legal Services, Metro Volunteer Lawyers, other local
legal service providers, the Colorado Legal Aid Foundation, Colorado
General Assembly, the American Bar Association, the Legal Services
Corporation, and the U.S. Congress, among others, to help design, im-
plement, and fund legal services, and pro bono and self-help programs
for indigent persons and self-represented parties. 41 The chief justice of
the Colorado Supreme Court appoints four members to the twenty-
member Commission: a county court judge, a district court judge, a court
of appeals judge, and a supreme court justice.4 2
The Commission has helped to obtain approximately $500,000 in
appropriations annually from the Colorado General Assembly to the ju-
dicial branch for grants to legal service providers in aid of persons and
families who suffer domestic abuse.4 3 Nevertheless, based on testimony
the Commission received at hearings throughout the state, up to 90% of
indigent persons qualifying for representation by paid legal service attor-
neys are turned away for lack of adequate staff.4 4 Pro bono attorney ser-
vices and financial contributions to funding legal service providers are in
desperate demand throughout the state. In May of 2012, at the request of
38. Supreme Court of Colo., Colorado Supreme Court Pro Bono Legal Services Commitment
and Recognition Program, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 102, 102, available at
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl-articles.cfn?articleid=7517.
39. See Press Release, Colorado Judicial Branch, Colorado Chief Justice Proclaims Pro Bono
Week (Oct. 25, 2010) available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/PressDocs/pro%20bono%20proc%20PR%20FINAL.pdf.
40. See Katayoun A. Donnelly & Geoff Klingspom, Colorado's New Pro Bono Program for
Civil Appeals, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2011, at 15, 15, available at
http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tclarticles.cfn?articleid=7196.
41. See Colo. Access to Justice Comm'n, Commission Bylaws, COLO. BAR Ass'N art. 1-11
(2007), http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/3218/DPWAJ/Commission-Bylaws/.
42. Colo. Access to Justice Commission, COLO. BAR Ass'N (2012),
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/3213/DPWAJ/Access-to-Justice-Commission/.
43. Colorado Access to Justice Commission, The Justice Crisis in Colorado, A Report on the
Civil Legal Needs of the Indigent in Colorado, COLO. BAR ASS'N 5 (Jan. 2008),
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Access%2to%20JusticeO8ATJ FULLReport.pdf.
44. Id. at 10.
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the Colorado Access to Justice Commission and the Board of Governors
of the Colorado Bar Association, the Colorado Supreme Court approved
short term emergency funding for Colorado Legal Services in the amount
of $1,500,000.00 over the next two years from Attorney Regulation
Funds held by the court.45
FAIR FIELD FOR DECISION
The coin of the legal profession is time, money, and faithful service.
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1 encourages attorneys and
judges to honor all three by contributing financially to legal services and
providing, or assisting in the provision of, pro bono legal services to
those who cannot afford attorneys to solve the legal quandaries that oth-
ers face in and out of court.46
Judicial rules and canons recognize that a self-represented party pit-
ted against a represented party should have a fair field for decision. Pro
bono representation, limited representation of self-represented parties for
a fee, and self-help instructional materials support access to justice, the
single most compelling reason for a legal profession.47
The Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct, Comment to Canon 2,
Rule 2.2, Impartiality and Fairness, states that "[i]t is not a violation of
this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure self-
represented litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard."48
The Comment to Canon 2, Rule 2.6, Ensuring the Right to Be
Heard, recites some steps that a judge may take to ensure that self-
represented litigants' rights are heard:
(2) The steps that are permissible in ensuring a self-represented liti-
gant's right to be heard according to law include but are not limited
to liberally construing pleadings; providing brief information about
the proceeding and evidentiary and foundational requirements; modi-
fying the traditional order of taking evidence; attempting to make le-
gal concepts understandable, explaining the basis for a ruling; and
making referrals to any resources available to assist the litigant in
preparation of the case. Self-represented litigants are still required to
comply with the same substantive law and procedural requirement as
represented litigants.4
9
The Colorado Supreme Court has not adopted mandatory pro bono
service or reporting rules. Whenever the imposition of one or both has
been raised as a possibility, the Colorado Bar Association, a voluntary
45. Order of Chief Justice Michael Bender (May 17, 2012).
46. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 6.1(b)(3) (2008).
47. See Justice Greg Hobbs, Access to Justice: The Single Most Compelling Reason for a
Legal Profession, OKLA. BAR J., Mar. 12, 2011, at X, Y.
48. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2010).
49. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 R. 2.6. cmt. 2 (2010).
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bar association, has urged the court not to do so. At the same time, it has
dedicated considerable efforts, staffing, and funds to supporting pro bono
legal services by attorneys. The supreme court asks all firms and groups
to commit to the pro bono commitment and recognition program.
Both of Colorado's law schools, the University of Colorado Law
School and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, expect their
students to perform pro bono legal services in cooperation with Colorado
licensed attorneys.so We know from experience that new attorneys who
we swear into the bar want an interesting professional livelihood that
includes pro bono service for those who cannot afford an attorney. Let's
meet the oath to which we all subscribed! Do pro bono.
50. See Academic Requirements, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER STURM COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.law.du.edulindex.php/registrar/course-information/required-courses/academic-
requirements (last visited Apr. 28, 2012); Overview, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW,
http://www.colorado.edullaw/about/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
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One of the most memorable images in the first Harry Potter film, a
film built on such images, is that of Harry wearing the Sorting Hat and
finding out from the slightly hesitant voice provided by Leslie Philips
that he is to join Gryffindor House.' The Hat thinks aloud, providing a
certain transparency to a difficult decision.
We know far less, however, about the processes by which the mil-
lions of people who approach courts, legal aid intake systems, and hot-
lines are directed into them, or the access services they do or do not re-
ceive, or indeed the consequences of those choices. All we really know is
that these processes are fragmented, inconsistent, and non-transparent.
We also know that these access systems feed into a relatively predictable
court process, in which procedures are governed by case type, such as
family law, landlord tenant, small claims, or subsets of those, and, with
the exception of some jurisdictions, in which relatively few access ser-
2
vices are as yet provided to litigants as part of the processing of the case.
The very differing needs of cases are not reflected in the ways those cas-
es are processed by the courts.
The importance of building a transparent and defensible sorting sys-
tem has recently increased dramatically. When the Supreme Court in
f Mr. Zorza is coordinator of the Self-Represented Litigation Network. Special thanks to the
following: Laura Abel, Deborah Chase, Tom Clarke, Professor Russell Engler, John Greacen Profes-
sor James Greiner, Bonnie Hough, Claudia Johnson, Karen Lash, Susan Ledray, Ed Marks, Profes-
sor Michael Milleman, Tina Rasnow, Glenn Rawdon, Professor David Udell, Cynthia Vaughn, and
the Honorable Laurie Zelon.
1. HARRY POTTER & THE SORCERER'S STONE (Warner Bros. 2001). Disclosure: The author
of this paper still does not know how or why at his school in England he was assigned to the slightly
less romantically named "A Club." In any event, the opinions in this paper are those of the author
alone, and not of any clubs, "houses," or organizations with which he has been associated.
2. It is an interesting question why we know so little about these systems. In part, our lack of
knowledge about this issue is just a conseqence of the general lack of research on civil aspects of the
court system. There may, however, be a different force at work. A focus on triage would, and indeed
will, require honesty about the consequences of scarcity, not just as a general matter, but in concrete
cases, and that can be difficult for those in charge of the systems to deal with. See generally Earl
Johnson, Jr., Justice for America's Poor in the Year 2020: Some Possibilities Based on Experiences
Here and Abroad, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2009); Meehan Rasch, Development: A New Public-
Interest Appellate Model: Public Counsel's Court-Based Self-Help Clinic and Pro Bono "Triage"
for Indigent Pro Se Civil Litigants on Appeal, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 461 (2010); Peter Salem,
Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Family Court Services: The Connecticut Judicial
Branch's Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741 (2007).
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Turner v. Rogers3 reversed a child support civil contempt incarceration
for failure to provide procedures that would ensure sufficient fairness and
accuracy to a self-represented litigant, and indicated that the procedures
needed would depend on the particular circumstances of the case, it was
in effect endorsing the need for triage, at least in cases in which such
accuracy and fairness were not protected by the provision of counsel. It
is of interest that in a recent speech Justice Breyer, the author of Turner,
urged those with views to engage in the debate on the need for triage.4
The need for attention to the overall problem is also increased by
the focus that some courts are now starting to pay to the possibility of
treating cases less uniformly. For a generation most courts have had in
place systems of caseflow management, essentially case aging tickler
systems. Many of these systems now employ "differentiated caseflow
management," which manage these systems differently based on case
complexity. 5The new change, of potentially immense significance, is
that some courts are considering or experimenting with treating the entire
processing of the case differently depending on its attributes, including
6issues to be decided, rather than case type.
The understanding of the need for triage has also increased with the
cuts to legal aid and court budgets, and the realization that 100% access
to justice cannot realistically be achieved by funding a traditional lawyer
in all cases. The California Shriver Pilot statute assumes that there must
be a process of triage and indicates the general criteria to be used in that
program.7  The practical reality is that without an integrated well-
3. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). A different article in this Symposium Issue
analyses how prior cases, together with Turner, create a right of access, as opposed to a right to
counsel, and how that right can be met in many ways. Implicit in that analysis is the idea that there is
a right to triage to decide which of those services is required to obtain access. Indeed, such a right
with respect to whether counsel is needed in a particular case dates at least to Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), although sadly the access community has long ignored that
aspect of the case, focusing instead on the no-automatic right-to-counsel holding of the case as an
example of the hostility of the system to access. See generally Archive for Symposium on Turner v.
Rogers, CONCURRING OPtNIONs, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium
-turner-v-rogers (last visited April 10, 2012).
4. Justice Stephen Breyer, Speech to National Legal Aid and Defender Association Annual
Conference, NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER'S Assoc. (December 9, 2011),
http://www.nladal00years.org/audiopage?q-node/13002.
5. THOMAS M. CLARKE & VICTOR E. FLANGO, Triage: Case Management for the 21st Cen-
tury, 2011 NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS: FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 146, 146 (2012).
6. This idea, and the first experiments are detailed in CLARKE & FLANGO, supra note 5, at
147-48. As discussed below, attributes might include case complexity, relationship of the parties,
whereas, case type tends to derive from the formal legal issue at hand.
7. The statute lists the following factors as to whether counsel is to be provided:
Case complexity[, w]hether the other party is represented[, t]he adversarial nature of the
proceeding[, t]he availability and effectiveness of other types of services, such as self-
help, in light of the potential client and the nature of the case[, l]anguage issues[,
d]isability access issues[, l]iteracy issues[, t]he merits of the case [, t]he nature and se-
verity of potential consequences for the potential client if representation is not provided[,
and w]hether the provision of legal services may eliminate or reduce the need for and
cost of public social services for the potential client and others in the potential client's
household.
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designed, transparent, and intellectually defensible triage system, there is
simply no chance of achieving either improvements in court efficiency or
significant expansion in access, let alone the 100% access that is the only
defensible ultimate goal.
In fact, of course, there are multiple complex systems already in
place, particularly on the litigant services side. The problem is that those
systems are often ad-hoc, frequently not intentionally designed, rarely
publicly described, almost never based on objective research, and not
integrated with each other. This results in inconsistency, lack of credibil-
ity, inefficiency, and failure to service many in legal need.
This Article attempts to start the process of discussion and design
that is needed to put such an integrated system in place.
The main suggestions in the paper are as follows:
* Recognize and design around the fact that there are two different
triage processes: one dealing with how a court will handle a case and one
dealing with how litigants will obtain the services they need to interact
with the court and other players. (This would include situations in which
going to court would not be involved.) The questions are whether this
triage is being done thoughtfully and effectively, and how we can best
ensure that all systems use their resources well.
* Develop an agreed upon set of core principles that would guide
the design of triage processes.
* Consider, as one possibility, a process in which a trained assessor
makes recommendations for both sets of triage based upon relatively
general protocols.
* Consider as an alternative system one in which an algorithm
makes the recommendations based upon information provided by liti-
gants, the court, and access providers to a web gateway, while being sen-
sitive to the risks of non-human decision-making.
* In either possible system, the decision about the track to which a
court assigns a matter should be based upon the kind of tasks the court
will need to do, rather than the case type.
A.B. 590 § 6851 (b)(7) (Cal. 2009); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MODEL ACCESS
ACT §3 (2010).
8. See Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: The Emerging Consensus and Some Questions and
Implications, 95 JUDICATURE 156, 166-167 (2011); Richard Zorza, Courts in the 21st Century: The
Access to Justice Transformation, 49 JUDGE'S J. 14, 17 (2010); Russell Engler, Toward a Context-
Based Civil Right to Counsel, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196 (2006). While not the subject of this
paper, the author believes that the other sine qua non for creation of 100% access is system simplifi-
cation. While this is excruciatingly hard to achieve in practice, there is probably a better chance than
ever before of progress, largely because of the parallel and intersecting financial crises faced by
courts, legal aid, and indeed the private bar.
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* In either possible system, the decision about the services the liti-
gant will receive should be based upon the tasks the litigant will need to
perform in the track to which she has been assigned, and her capacity to
perform those tasks given the kinds of services provided.
* Be sensitive during the design process to the fact of the relative
lack of validation of theories about the impact of different services upon
outcomes.
* At least in the case of the tech-based algorithm, use a presump-
tion-based system, in which the tasks and services would be presumed
based upon the court track, the stake, the relationship (including power
relationship) between the parties, the case type, and the prior presence of
an attorney on the other side. The presumptive result would then be mod-
ified based upon the capacity of the litigant and based upon data not nec-
essarily directly relevant to the case, including potential information re-
lating to ability to prosecute the case on their own, language spoken at
home, literacy level, and prior experiences in court.
* Recognize that at least one of the reasons for the lack of progress
in this general area has been fear of the consequences of identifying indi-
vidual cases in which services are required but cannot be provided for
resource reasons.
* Faced with these resource limitations, build the system so that the
system would change its behavior to match service need and availability.
This could be done in ways that either protect those with lower capacity
or those facing the highest stakes and most difficult issues.
* Ensure that the system produced ongoing reporting of the mis-
match between litigant services need and capacity, and these results
could then be used to design new service components and argue for addi-
tional resources.
The paper starts by discussing the analytically foundational rela-
tionship between triage in different parts of the system (Part I). It then
suggests a set of principles under which any triage system should operate
(Part II) and briefly assesses the current system against those principles
(Part III). The paper then proposes and assesses two very different alter-
native models: one based on individualized assessment and one using
technology to apply formal protocols (Parts IV and V). The paper con-
cludes by discussing the potential problems associated with deploying
either of these models (Part VD
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURT PROCESS TRIAGE AND
LITIGANT SERVICE TRIAGE
Until now, triage has been discussed, if at all, only in either the
court or legal aid context. This works for each system only if the other
system is not doing triage. If the organization focuses only on access
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services for individuals, or only on the court's process, then the system
the organization is building will be aimed at a moving target that will
itself respond differently depending on how the other is behaving, lead-
ing to endless loops and confusion.
The only way to think rationally about this problem is to analyze
not only the needs and potential of triage with respect to access services
such as might be provided to individuals needing access to justice ser-
vices, including but not only as litigants, but also to integrate that with
consideration of the needs and potential of the court's overall caseflow
system and its division of cases. The goal is to figure out how the two
processes can work together to provide both optimum case handling from
the court's point of view (described as court process triage) and access
from the individual's point of view (described as individual services tri-
age).
There are a variety of ways of breaking up the analysis of the triage
systems, although all lead to the conclusion that an ideal system would
be structured to make all the decisions about case processing and indi-
vidual services in one process-or at least one that seems integrated to its
users.
* Individual Services versus Case Processing Focus
In this division, there are separate triage systems for services pro-
vided to individuals, compared to the court processes that are provided to
all the parties-usually together. In this division, court self-help and
forms services would fit under individual services and be triaged together
with full representation services. This is the approach assumed in the
remainder of this paper, although the other approaches are detailed for
clarity. This approach is chosen because it most accurately reflects the
needs of litigants and other individuals. It does, however, require closer
working relationships between courts and non-court service organiza-
tions.
* Service Provider Focus
In this division, each provider system gets their own triage system.
The court and legal aid each triages into their own system, and it treats
the other system as fixed-until of course it changes its behavior. The
theory here would be that this would reflect management and political
reality. Under this division, court self-help services would be allocated in
the court category. This system would be easiest to administer from a
strictly bureaucratic perspective.
* Neutral versus Advocacy Services
Under a third option, probably the most analytically correct, the dis-
tinction would be between services provided under a neutral banner and
those provided as advocacy. Under this division, forms assistance would
8632012]
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be treated as neutral if provided outside the attorney-client relationship,
regardless of the provider.9
It is possible to imagine systems in which the court decides what
process is appropriate, and the other part of the system then decides what
people need in terms of services to participate appropriately in that pro-
cess.io Alternatively, service institutions or advocacy systems could first
decide what services will be provided, and the court could then use those
determinations as one of the bases for its process choice decision.
But it is much better to attempt to design a system that works as
one, i.e., one in which the court system (or the case processing system or
the neutral service system) decides what process it will put the case
through in the same general process that it is decided what other services
will be provided to individuals to help them negotiate that process, or
through non-litigation processes. The system built will need to allow for
the case posture to change and be iterative in order to bring additional
resources to bear.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR TRIAGE AND INTAKE
Any broad system of court and access services triage and intake is
going to have to be acceptable to a wide variety of stakeholders and par-
ticipants. As such, it must be designed on strong foundations that respect
differences in perspective and permit collaboration between organiza-
tions with very different cultures, budgets, and institutional needs." The
best foundation seems to be a set of commonly agreed upon principles
that can be used to resolve differences. The following are offered as a
first cut and apply regardless of the choices suggested in Part 1:12
1. Universality
* Everyone in need should be able to use the system, get into the
system, and get the help they need to obtain access to justice.
9. For discussion on related topics and some of the relatvely limited writing on this issue, see
Paul R.Tremblay, Acting 'A Very Moral Type of God': Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2475 (1999); Justine A. Dunlap, I Don't Want to Play God-A Response to Professor Trem-
blay, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2601 (1999).
10. Although there would be complexities for problems that occur outside court processes,
such as the writing of a will.
11. Courts, for example, must be neutral, are under pressure to move cases quickly with
limited resources, and to reflect social policy choices. Civil legal aid programs may have substantive
reform agendas (fighting poverty, protecting the rights of the disabled), often operate under re-
strictions imposed by funders, and have a desire to maintain their independence from the judiciary.
Law school clinics have a need to select the cases that will provide their students with the best learn-
ing opportunities.
12. These proposed principles are based in significant part on a set that were brainstormed by
a working group at the 2012 Technology Initiative Grants Conference. For more information, see
Richard Zorza, Exciting Triage Progress at TIG Conference, RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE
BLOG (January 15, 2012), http://accesstojustice.net/2012/01/15/exciting-triage-progress-at-tig-
conference/. Special thanks to those who participated-in that meeting, as well as to Tom Clarke, who
proposed a restructuring that was close to the final product in this paper.
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* The system should provide actual court access and actual services
help to everybody who uses it, providing help at an appropriate level of
meaningful assistance.
2. Consistency and Predictability of Triage Outcomes
* The system should be consistent in who is provided with what
services or goes into which court processes.
3.User Focus, Control, Support, and Choice
* The system should be user-friendly, user-oriented, and user-
directed (if it is to meet user needs, not just or even primarily those of the
organizations participating).
* The system should allow users maximum control over the paths
and services they use, consistent with cost issues.'3
* The system should offer multiple ways for users to enter and
move between service options and choices (such as deciding to seek le-
gal assistance after first attempting self-help).
* The system should include varied user support systems.
* The system should minimize the need for users to provide repeat-
ed information.
* The system should get people directly linked to, and trackably
processed by, the organizational resources from which they need a re-
sponse.
* The system should have the capacity to export data directly into
multiple, standardized organization intake or information systems and
tools-it should not be just a referral system.
* The system should have built into it the up-to-date case-
acceptance criteria and service availability data, so that there are no
"dead-end" hand-offs.
* The system should include mechanisms for follow up in order to
minimize multiple, duplicative, or incorrect referrals.
4. Comprehensiveness of Problems and Services
* The system should be comprehensive in the range of problems
identified and addressed.
* The system should take advantage of legal analysis, social science
research, and ongoing analysis of existing case and intake data to be able
to ask sufficient questions to make sure that it identifies and responds to
an appropriately holistic range of a person's issues.
13. The impact of cost issues may be very different in the court process versus litigant ser-
vices areas of triage.
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* The system should include access to all service mechanisms, in-
cluding court access services, legal aid programs, law school clinics,
providers of unbundled services, informational websites, document as-
sembly systems, online chat, pro bono, and private lawyer referral sys-
tems.
* The system should be expandable to include future delivery mo-
dalities.
5. Cost Benefit and Impact Maximization
* The system should connect people to the highest level of needed
and useful access services assistance that is available to them, consistent
with cost-effectiveness.
* The system should allocate scarce assistance resources where
they will have the biggest impact.
* The system should direct cases into routes and services that in-
volve the least cost and inconvenience for both litigants and the system,
consistent with a fair determination.
6. Transparency
* The system should be transparent in the patterns of its operations,
while providing privacy to individual users.
7. Evidence Based
* Individual service acceptance and priority criteria should be in-
formed by and reflect research and ongoing data analysis.
* The system should be "self-learning" so that it provides better re-
sponses and improved outcomes as there is more experience.
III. THE CURRENT SYSTEM, AND How IT STACKS UP AGAINST THESE
PRINCIPLES
Not to put too fine a point on it, but the current system seems like
an almost complete antithesis of one that would be in compliance with
the above principles.
It has four main groups of component elements: a national network
of legal aid, pro bono, and clinic intake systems; a patchwork of court
based service selection systems operated by those courts that provide
access services; systems of websites that provide information and tools,
and various courts and state systems that do the same thing; and bar op-
erated referral services that include low and middle income components.
In addition, court diversion into mediation offers some elements of tri-
age, at least where it follows protocols, or is discretionary rather than
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fully automatic for a case type. The near chaos of this system reflects the
broader fragmentation in the systems that actually deliver services.14
A. The Current System
1. Court Process Triage
Currently, courts triage by dividing cases by case type and then
generally putting all the cases of the same type within the same queue.
They may well split within overall types-divorces go into a different
queue than guardianships. Sometimes there is branching-the uncontest-
ed go on a different calendar call, but that is the extent of the triage. The
decision is made on the papers alone and limited to an extremely short
list of factors.'6
However, as Clarke and Flango point out, differentiated case man-
agement systems do treat cases differently based on some estimate of
anticipated complexity and workload.' 7
As a general matter, however, there is little system, little logic, and
not enough focus on the overall system and its needs.
2. Legal Aid, Clinic, and Pro Bono Intake Systems
The legal aid, clinic, and pro bono systems are scarcity based. The
task of their systems is to allocate extremely limited advocacy resources
among an overwhelming pool, and to do so in a system that is character-
ized by provider fragmentation and lack of coordination or central plan-
ning. For most organizations, the issue is whether to provide the tradi-
tional full services of an attorney (done in the minority of cases), to pro-
vide brief services probably limited to that provided during a phone call,
or to refer to online or group services.
Actual sorting occurs in the following ways:
14. This fragmentation is both described and labeled in REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C.
SMYTH, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL
JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT ix (2011) ("The results [of the research] are sobering.
They underscore a fundamental absence of coordination in the system, fragmentation and inequality
in who gets served and how, and arbitrariness in access to justice depending on where one lives.").
Funders are not funding holistic systems-rather bits of fragmented systems. To the degree that
different systems have different resources available it is natural that some systems will be more
developed and sophisticated than others.
15. CLARKE & FLANGO, supra note 5, at 146.
16. Some courts push all divorce cases into mediation-and then add a minor triage element
by providing an exemption for domestic violence cases. There is also talk of treating supposed "high
conflict" cases differently. Although this approach has come under criticism from the advocacy
community for treating both parties as equally to blame for the extent of the conflict.
17. CLARKE & FLANGO, supra note 5, at 146. It should be noted that the system described in
Peter Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Family Court Services: The Connecticut
Judicial Branch's Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741 (2007), is highly elaborate, with
use of scaling of conflict, dangerousness, etc, in detirming triaging into more consentual and less
adversarial processes. That paper has an extensive bibliograpy.
8672012]
DENVER UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW
* Organizations have priorities (indeed, if funded by the Legal Ser-
vices Corporation, they are required to have them).'8 They can rarely, if
ever, take all of the cases within the priorities.
* Organizations limit intake by day and time of day, and often have
long phone waits.
* Organizations require interviews with an advocate, in which dis-
cretionary and essentially unguided decisions about the value of repre-
sentation services are made.' 9
* Some states have integrated intake phone lines that refer to the
most appropriate organization that then makes a decision whether to ac-
cept the case.2 0
* Finally, it should be noted that categorical triage occurs when a
statutory or constitutional role results in a right to counsel, which is then
met by a government agency, private lawyers paid by the state, or by a
non-profit operating under contract.
No state can reasonably claim to have a system that is making
broadly defensible choices about who is getting what level of service,
although most do not provide services to those who do not benefit. In
many states, huge amounts of provider and litigant time are wasted in
"pinball" referral systems.2'
3. Court-Based Litigant Service Allocation
More and more courts are providing informational services to a sig-
nificant segment of their litigant population. At this point about 70% of
22states do so in at least some locations. Over time, these services are
expanding more deeply into the overall processing of the case. Early in
the development of these services, they were limited to the provision of
18. LSC grantees are required to establish priorities. 45 C.F.R, §1620.3(a) (2000). LSC has
also made suggestions for the priorities process, and for priorities. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION,
SUGGESTED LIST OF PRIORITIES FOR LSC RECIPIENTS ADOPTED BY THE BD. OF DIR. OF THE LEGAL
SERV. CORP (1996).
19. For example, the Legal Services of New Jersey hotline procedure is explained at
Statewide Hotline, LEGAL SERV. OF N.J. (April 16, 2012), http://www.lsnj.org/
StatewideHotline.aspx.
20. LSC has collected resources on hotlines at http://lri.lsc.gov/search/node/hotlines. In the
early to mid 2000s the Legal Services Corporation made TIG grants available to fund the integration
of advanced telephony systems to streamline intake procedures in various programs. Prior to that set
of grants, the Agency on Aging, had funded senior legal hotlines in multiple states. These experi-
ments in coordinated intake, using telephony, yielded a good set of examples of how legal aid groups
could reform their intake systems to be able to do more and better intakes, and ultimately end up
with better cases to represent, than the traditional "walk in the door" approach. However, not all
legal aid groups abandoned the 1970s approach of letting potential clients self select by distance to
the intake locations-and to date in many states, legal aid groups are content with taking cases near
their office catchment areas-rather than proactively looking for cases for their full service area and
with certain criteria for extended services and litigation.
21. It cannot be avoided that the fragmentation is made worse by restrictions on LSC funding.
22. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 14, at 11.
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forms (without assistance in filling them in) but now include non-private
one-on-one consultations about the status of the case based on the file
and what needs to be done, review of the sufficiency of completed forms,
services to assist in moving procedurally stuck cases, etc. 2 3
To provide such services, court centers have to engage in some
form of triage. This is because they have to provide services to all, and
yet their resources are severely limited. A few self-help programs per-
form triage using a list of services-referrals and in-house-with service
criteria. Some self-help centers are starting to bring in house more pro
bono services. In the final analysis, those who cannot be referred out, or
put into a particular internal service, are simply served as fast as possible
consistent with daily demand. At this stage there is much individual dis-
cretion in the system.
At other centers, informal interviews conducted by the author of the
paper with self-help center directors in California revealed a number of
triage perspectives like the following, caught in reconstructed quotes:
* "We refer when we can, then for everyone else we try to help."
* "I try to figure out what tasks a person needs to do to handle the
case, and whether they can do them. If not I try to find a referral, but
there is not always one there."
* "Sometimes it is just a matter of doing the best I can to help them,
knowing that in the end, nothing I can do is going to make much differ-
ence."24
Put another way, it is an informal system with each court's proce-
dures depending very much on the availability of referrals-which then
go into the systems described above in subpart 2, the legal aid, clinic, and
pro bono intake systems, with all their uncertainties.
23. The current state of such informational services is illustrated by CALIFORNIA
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATION OF SELF-HELP
CENTERS IN CALIFORNIA TRIAL COURTS 9 (2008) (Guideline 15):
Basic core services most frequently include the following: Interview and assessment; As-
sistance with pleadings and fee waiver applications; Document review; Procedural infor-
mation, including but not limited to explanation and clarification of court orders and the
process by which to obtain, enforce, and modify orders; Assistance with understanding
service requirements and methods; Preparation for hearings; Completion of orders after
hearings and judgments; and Drafting stipulations. Additional services that self-help cen-
ters should consider offering include but are not limited to: Mediation or other settlement
assistance; Readiness reviews for calendar appearances; Case status meetings; and Court-
room assistance, including but not limited to answering questions from litigants, explain-
ing procedures, conducting mediations, preparing orders after hearing, and otherwise as-
sisting litigants without making an appearance or advocating on their behalf.
24. One Center director noted to the author that there are litigants who have difficulty under-
standing the limits upon what courts can do.
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4. Legal Aid and Court Website Services
There is now a wide mosaic of website services available. Every
state has an LSC supported site intended to provide a full range of legal
information, as well as referral information, to the self-represented.2 5
This includes broad information about non-litigation situations.
The court system is more varied, with many states having strong in-
formational systems, and others providing much more limited infor-
mation.26 Some local courts have detailed information, and most courts
have at least some online presence.2 7
Some of these sites provide links to forms, or online forms genera-
tors, but coverage is varied as to both content and geography.28
There are almost no examples of good diagnostic tools helping liti-
gants figure out whether they should be using forms or an alternative
approach.
5. Bar Referral Services
Bar referral systems are usually, but not always, operated by local
or state bar associations. Many, but not all, offer low cost referrals and
make no differentiation except in broad areas of practice such as family
law. A small number will refer for unbundled services. The intake sys-
tems include the gathering of no information about the case. In short they
are business referral systems, not triage systems.
6. Unbundled Diagnosis by Private Attorneys
Most of the small but growing number of attorneys who offer un-
bundled or discrete task representation include in the process a diagnostic
interview in which they work with the client to decide who does what.2 9
While this process is not generally considered part of the triage system, it
in fact plays this role since it helps litigants decide what they can do on
their own and what they will have to pay an attorney to do. The experi-
ence of these attorneys will be very valuable in developing broader diag-
25. LAWHELP.ORG, http://lawhelp.org, (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (provides access to all
states' self-help webistes).
26. State Court Websites, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/browse-by-state/state-court-websites.aspx (last
visited April 3, 2012).
27. Virtual Self-Help lawcenter, CONTRA COSTA CALIFORNIA COURT, http://www.cc-
courthelp.org/ (last modified April 13, 2012).
28. The Texas Access to Justice Commission recently surveyed the country as to availability
of forms. See Statewide Unform Fonns, RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG,
http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/3-states-forms-info-final.pdf (last visited April 3,
2012). See generally, JOHN GREACEN, RESOURCES TO ASSIST SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A
FIFTY-STATE REVIEW OF THE "STATE OF ART," available at
http://www.msbf.org/selfhelp/GreacenReportMichiganEdition.pdf (2011) (providing a more general
study of the Michigan Bar Foundation).
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.2(c) (requiring this diagnostic process).
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nostic processes, and the tools they use to help litigants decide what tasks
they can do themselves may well offer prototypes for the task capacity
analysis recommended below.
B. Does the Current System Satisfy the Proposed Principles?
Sadly, the current system does not even begin to satisfy the pro-
posed principles. It is neither predictable, nor consistent, nor comprehen-
sive. It is not user-oriented, efficient, or transparent. It fails to meet any
of the above principles-indeed, in many cases it fails to even attempt to
do so.
To be direct about this is not to criticize the good faith, the hard
work, or the intellectual capacity of those who direct the system. Rather,
it is to be honest about our collective failure to deliver a defensible sys-
tem.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODEL ONE: AN ASSESSMENT MODEL
The next section of this Article lays out a possible model, one based
on a human-based assessment of the needs of the case, and the people
involved. The section begins by summarizing the steps involved to de-
cide both the most appropriate court process and the services needed by
litigants in that track, and then goes on to discuss the potential appeal of
the approach.
A. How the Model Might Work
This model attempts both to triage cases into the appropriate court
process track and to ensure that litigants get the assistance and services
they need to present their cases fully in the track. For reasons of compre-
hensiveness, it assumes sufficient resources to provide counsel when
required-an optimistic assumption. (We cannot refuse to consider what
a system should look like because we do not yet have the resources to
support it, but we would have to consider how to modify it to function if
insufficient resources were available.)
The general approach 30 of this model is for all litigants without pre-
viously retained counsel to have an assessment staffer, possibly associat-
ed with the court, to review filed papers and interview parties. In addi-
tion, the assessment staffer should do each of the following:
30. Richard Zorza, After Turner: A Proposed "Attorney Diagnosis" Approach to Triage for
Access to Justice, RICHARD ZORZA's ACCEss TO JUSTICE BLOG (Sep. 6, 2011),
http://accesstojustice.net/2011/09/06/after-tumer-a-proposed-attomey-diagnosis-approach-to-triage-
for-access-to-justice/ [hereinafter Zorza, After Turner]. The idea is explored in more detail in a
follow-up post Richard Zorza, Questions and Answers About the Attorney Diagnosis Proposal,
RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Sep. 12, 2012),
http://accesstojustice.net/2011/09/12/questions-and-answers-about-the-attorney-diagnosis-proposaV
[hereinafter Zorza, Question and Answers].
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* Make a recommendation as to which of the available tracks into
which the case would be placed, including a super-simple uncontested
track.
* Assess what services are needed to enable each litigant to obtain
access to justice, taking into account the full range of available services.
If one or more parties do not have prior counsel and are financially eligi-
ble, make a recommendation for or against appointment of counsel for
such parties, taking into account the nature of the case, the merits and the
stakes for the litigant, and, most important of all, the sufficiency of alter-
native lower cost access services.
* In cases in which counsel is not provided, provide informational
services to both sides, or refer for unbundled services or to a variety of
forms of additional informational services.
In order to ensure consistency and fairness, the screener would op-
erate under a protocol, discussed below, but the ultimate decision would
include the totality of the circumstances and involve discretionary judg-
ment with a written, if brief, decision.31 Decisions would be subject to
review by a judge, on the papers, upon request by a party. The cost of the
screening process could be supported by an enhanced filing fee, which
would be waived as appropriate, while counsel costs would have to be
provided by other mechanisms. To the extent that counsel were not
available for financial reasons, even with full cooperation with and refer-
rals to legal aid, pro bono programs, and law school programs, a full rec-
ord of that unavailability would at least be clear.3 2
Below are the proposed steps in the process.
1. Initial Intake
When a litigant takes an initial action in a case, the intake person
would determine if the case were contested, to the extent known, and
would evaluate the person's financial eligibility status, which would be
used in subsequent assessment. Such intake might be done by a self-help
center, by a court clerk, or in a social service or administrative agency
office, and would not necessarily require a formal filing of a pleading,
although the filing of a pleading would automatically trigger this pro-
cess.33 Referral would be made into the assessment system in all but a
31. One commentator on an early draft of this paper felt that the discretionary component of
the option violated the transparency principle. The statement of reasons for the recommendation
should resolve this issue, and reviewability should address consistency concerns.
32. To the extent that the screening had found counsel required, but the system had failed to
provide counsel, questions might arise under Turner as to compliance with due process require-
ments. Note that in at least one state, the overall payment mechanism has been structured to automat-
ically pay for counsel when found to be constitutionally required. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 211 D, § 5
(2011).
33. Community-based programs might well reach many who would never come to court,
particularly for non-litigation matters.
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small number of cases in which no individualized assessment would be
needed.
2. Assessment, Track Assignment, and Referrals
In this key step the assessor diagnoses the person's legal needs and
may recommend that counsel be appointed. The assessor can also rec-
ommend the provision of unbundled services or refer for self-help. It is
the belief of this writer that the assessor should be an attorney and should
have a limited, confidential, but non-exclusive confidentiality relation-
ship with all the parties, as discussed below.
The assessor:
a. Reviews any paperwork and interviews the parties if
needed
The interview can be joint or separate, as requested by the parties.34
The interview should include the gathering of data required for the mak-
ing of the determinations described in the steps below.
b. Screens for categorical eligibility for counsel services
The screening attorney would first screen for certain forms of pre-
determined categorical eligibility of either one party or both parties to
receive a lawyer, such as child-custody with domestic violence cases or
tenants over 65 (other categories to be determined). The categories for
such eligibility will have been established in the overall system protocols
based in part on legal aid program criteria and on analysis under Turner
given the specific procedures in the court.
c. Makes an analysis of most appropriate court process track
Among the possible tracks:35
* Non litigation situations (which would mean a jump to the next
step, with the process possibly then being managed by a services pro-
gram rather than by the court)
* Uncontested cases requiring no court involvement beyond ap-
proval
* Uncontested cases requiring non-judicial court involvement to
optimize agreement and decisions for fairness and/or finality
* Contested cases amenable to alternative dispute resolution
34. The parties should be asked in private and individually if they wish to have individual
interviews to minimize the risk of coercion. As a general matter, uncontested matters, to the extent to
which they need an interview, are likely to be appropriate for joint interviews. See Zorza, After
Turner, supra note 30.
35. If the system were expanded to include administrative agency disputes, some of which
end up in court, this list of tracks might be expanded.
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* Contested cases requiring single final resolution between parties
* Contested cases requiring extensive supervision of the pre-trial
process
* Contested cases likely to require ongoing decision-making and/or
compliance activity
Note that this selection of tracks is ultimately derived from an anal-
ysis of the tasks that the court, either the judge or staff, is going to have
to do to conclude the case satisfactorily. While this is surely only a very
initial list of possible tracks, the court task approach is probably the best
way to approach the analysis.
d. Identify the most cost effective services for each of the par-
ties to obtain access to justice within that track taking into
account merit and stakes, including counsel if needed
In identifying the appropriateness and sufficiency of services, the
assessor would apply a set of standards and would consider i) the facts of
the case, ii) the track tentatively chosen, iii) the complexity of the gov-
erning procedural and substantive law, and iv) the parties' particular ca-
pacities (including literacy, linguistic capacity, mental capacity, and
amenability to negotiation, case complexity, and, arguably of particular
importance, whether opposing party would have counsel 36).
The process would be guided by a protocol, which would ultimately
focus on the tasks needed to be performed by or on behalf of the liti-
gant.37 For each litigant, the assessor needs to consider whether particular
tasks are likely to be needed in this case, whether the litigant has the ca-
pacity to complete them on her own in the court track as it actually oper-
ates, 38 and if not, what kind of service or assistance is needed.3 9 The as-
sumption is that the cheapest service, consistent with access, would be
chosen. For example, the checklist, to be filled out separately for each
party, might look like the following:
36. Note the risk of circularity. When both parties enter the system without counsel, the
assessor should consider the impact of providing counsel to both, neither, or one. It may be that the
capacity of one of the parties makes it necessary to appoint counsel, and that this will then trigger the
need for counsel for the opponent. In such a case, the search for alternative assistance services may
be highly cost effective. See Zorza, Questions and Answers, supra note 30.
37. This approach is drawn from that used in some existing self-help programs. See, e.g.,
CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 23, at 4 (Guideline 6).
38. See Zorza, After Turner, supra note 30. It is important to note that as the court gets better
at making itself litigant-friendly, more of these tasks can be performed with services on the left side
of the chart. This provides a powerful financial incentive to such simplification.
39. Id. In some cases a mix of services might be needed, such as both a guardian ad litem and
an attorney.
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Task Oriented Triage Checklist40
Task Name Needed? Perform on Perform Perform Perform Requires Important
own? with online with with counsel to
























It is important to note that this grid would expand with the availabil-
41ity of additional service modalities such as legal technicians or lay ad-
vocates.42
e. Screens for merit and stakes
For all persons diagnosed as potentially requiring appointment of
counsel or other high margin cost systems, the assessor would determine
whether there was sufficient significance of the matter at issue for the
party by applying appropriate standards as to whether the case was non-
frivolous whether the matter was important enough for the state to invest
resources.
40. The experience of attorneys who currently diagnose as part of the discrete task representa-
tion process would be very valuable in elaborating this list.
41. Order, Washington State Supreme Court (June 15, 2012)
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf (establishing
Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians). For a summary and discussion of the
Rule, see Richard Zorza, important Step Forward with Washington State Legal Technician Rule,
RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG, http://accesstojustice.net/2012/06/19/important-step-
forward-with-washington-state-legal-technician-rule/.
42. Richard Zorza, Non-Lawyer Assistance in the Courtroom-the UK Model, RICHARD
ZORZA's ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG, http://accesstojustice.net/2011/12/02/non-lawyer-assistance-in-
the-courtroom-the-uk-model/; Russell Engler, Opportunities and Challenges: Non-Lawyer Forms of
Assistance in Providing Access to Justice for Middle-income Earners, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS
TO JUSTICE (Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lome Sossin eds., 2012).
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f. Makes Referral and/or Recommendation
If the assessor diagnoses that informational services are sufficient,
then a referral is made directly. If the assessor determines that brief pro
bono unbundled or other uncompensated legal assistance is available or
sufficient, then a referral is made (permitting ultimate control over intake
to remain in legal aid programs). If it is determined that a compensated
unbundled or full service attorney is required, then the assessor attorney
would complete a Recommendation Form for review by the selected
decision maker.
3. Where Counsel is Recommended, Final Decision Maker Decides
to Appoint or Deny Counsel
The decision maker would review the assessor's recommendation
and make the final decision ex parte, on the papers, as to whether counsel
would be appointed for either or both parties.43 The decisional materials
would be confidential and not open to discovery. Ideally, retired judges
would serve in this role pro bono. Having retired judges perform this role
preserves the decision makers' independence, while maintaining a judi-
* 44cial perspective.
The overall approach should appeal to a variety of funding, bar,
court, and service delivery constituencies since it offers the following
benefits:
* Financial Efficiency and Incentives
The approach promotes cost effectiveness by putting simpler cases
into lower-cost court processes and by providing more expensive ser-
vices, such as counsel, only for those who need it most. It also creates
incentives for communities to establish funding for its functions, primari-
ly by making conspicuous the need for counsel and the consequences for
justice. It also builds in long-term incentives for developing the most
cost-effective alternatives. The cost of the process is reduced by having,
as in medical triage, different levels of professional skills applied during
different steps.
43. A process of further interlocutory review would run the risk of being be highly cumber-
some, and while there would always be the possibility of review as part of a later appeal on the
merits, such a right would be illusory as a practical matter in most cases, as Turner illustrates. Zorza,
After Turner, supra note 30.
44. Id. One possibility is to have a volunteer panel of three members decide. They could be
pulled from those with experience as bench officers, legal services attorneys, and government attor-
neys. This would provide a good balance in terms of experience identifying and evaluating the
criteria.
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* Financial Viability
Because communities can adjust the financial and substantive
screening standards, this approach thus does not commit communities to
an uncontrollable service entitlement system.
* Broad Legitimacy
As the approach becomes increasingly grounded in research-based
knowledge of the effectiveness of different forms of assistance, and since
decisions are made by trained assessors, possibly attorneys, and con-
firmed by judges, it will be perceived as broadly legitimate and as sup-
porting the efficiency of court operations.
* Middle-income Options
The approach anticipates that some communities might determine to
offer services to a middle-income population on a partially subsidized
basis, while charging others nothing, and still others full cost. It also al-
lows communities to determine to fund diagnostic screening for all
through a flexibly waived, enhanced filing fee (with a simple formula to
determine financial eligibility). These elements would make the adoption
of a 100% access system much more palatable.
* Flexibility.
The approach is flexible, allowing for variations and changes in cat-
egorical eligibility, in the standards governing the screening process, in
the ways that existing non-profit providers can participate in the provi-
sion of services, in how court processes can be made more effective, and
in the relationship to other players in the system.
B. Problems Implementing the Proposal
The biggest problem is cost-both the administrative cost of the
system and the cost of providing counsel to those for whom it is found
necessary.
As to administrative cost, this could be covered by an increased
waiveable filing fee. Litigants would reap the benefit of improved diag-
nosis and referral. Moreover, in a different version, multiple assessors
might interview the parties and meet to decide on the track. This would
make it possible for them to provide actual unbundled assistance at the
same time as the assessment interview, increasing the efficiency of the
system.
As to the cost of counsel, that will be a problem in any true triage
system. This proposal would reduce costs by moving people to lower
cost services whenever possible and would also incentivize changes in
the underlying tracks and case processing, which would further reduce
costs of counsel. This is both a minimum cost and a cost minimizing
system.
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Moreover, some of the costs of counsel could be covered by use of
existing legal aid, pro bono, and law school clinic resources.
V.ALTERNATIVE MODEL Two: A TECH-ENABLED GATEWAY
The second model also aims to select both the court process track
and the services to be provided to litigants, but it replaces the individual-
ized assessor with a tech-enabled gateway which would line up infor-
mation about the case and the litigants with a protocol and with infor-
mation about available services in order to make appropriate referrals.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the use of technology is that it
makes it possible to get needs of all parties in the mix without violating
confidentiality concerns. The system would gather information from all
parties and would then simultaneously use the algorithm to assign the
case to a court process track, identify the services litigants would need to
function in that track, and make referrals consistent with those needs as
well as the policies and 6apacities of providers. To function as a 100%
access system, this system would also need to be a system of residual
provision of counsel.
An additional advantage is its ability to modify its choices based on
updated information. For example, an assignment to the uncontested
track would change quickly with the filing of a contesting responsive
pleading.
A. How the System Might Work
1. Initiation and Information Submission
While the system would end up processing cases through the same
protocol, cases could be initiated in a wide variety of ways: from the
triage/intake portal online, from the portal at a kiosk in the court or legal
aid program, by electronic filing in the court, or in other ways in cooper-
ation with other agencies or web gateways.
The initiation process would include the submission of data that
would: 1) establish the case (initial pleading information), 2) permit the
system to make a preliminary court processing track decision (including
the non-litigation track), 3) permit the system to make a preliminary as-
sessment of the level of services needed to permit the person to pursue
and present their case, and 4) attempt to match the litigant to actual
available services, including consideration of programs' eligibility crite-
ria. The data submitted for the last item would be kept confidential.4 5
45. Id. This might require a change in law. Or, that portion of the intake process could be
under the control of a non-court agency. The user would have to know which information would be
kept confidential.
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A variety of support mechanisms would be available to help the liti-
gant. Help would be available in person at the court, by chat and co-
browsing over the Internet, or in person at community centers and librar-
ies.
2. Communication to Other Party
In litigation situations, the system would then communicate to the
opposing party that the action was being commenced and would give
them an opportunity, at the same range of locations, to provide the same
responsive information. This could be done electronically or by tradi-
tional service.46
3. Party Response or Failure
A responding party would submit the same information, except that
the interface for the portion that responded to the legal claims would be
structured to reflect the asserted claims. The same assistive services
would be available.
A failure to respond would be a key piece of data impacting the al-
location of both track and services below. If response is required, this
would mean a higher engagement track and higher services. If not, then
the opposite.
4. Simultaneous Assignment to Track and Identification of Service
Needs
The system would then be in a position to complete initial court
track and litigant service decisions. These would be subject to change
based on future changes in status in both components of the system.
These would be based on the same criteria as those described above
in Part V. However, rather than rely on the judgment of an individual
assessor, the system would ask questions from which the kind of court
processing needs and litigant capacity decisions could be made according
to a somewhat more formal protocol.
Assessing the court track would be done by asking questions that:
* Determine the court history between the parties;
* Estimate the level of conflict between the parties; 4 7
* Look at the stake in terms of finality and complexity;
46. Electronic service would probably require a change in law in many jurisdictions, although
this is now changing. See Richard Zorza, ABA Journal Discusses Electronic Service/Notice and the
Self-Represented, RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG,
http://accesstojustice.net/2011/10/05/aba-joumal-discusses-electronic-servicenotice-and-the-self-
represented/ (Oct. 5, 2011).
47. Cf Salem, Kulak & Deutsch, supra note 2, at 747-49.
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* Find out about whether the parties have prior compliance issues
with courts or other government agencies; and
* Estimate, using answers to questions in the section below, wheth-
er additional engagement from judge or court staff may be necessary,
resulting in assignment to a particular sub-track.4 8
The system would also use historical data on the case type to impact
the weighting of these factors. For example, it would know the history of
compliance with a particular class of small claims cases, or the relation-
ship between the age of the children and the extent of the need for ongo-
ing supervision of child visitation.
5. Integration into Court System
The choice of court track would then be passed to the court, with
the court's systems being responsible for establishing scheduling, etc.
Major changes in the court status, such as filing a late responsive plead-
ing, would trigger a re-referral to both parts of the triage system.
6. Identification of Need for and Availability of Services
The selection of court track will provide the first major data element
in determining the need for services for each of the litigants. The major
factors include what issue is at stake, the opponent (including power rela-
tionship and if other already has counsel), capacity of the party, the rela-
tionship between them, and the tasks needed to be performed in this con-
text.
The capacity/task relationship will have to be assessed using ques-
tions that are often indirect. One approach to each of the tasks described
above in Part IV may be to identify other equivalent tasks, whether the
litigant does them on their own or with help and how hard they find
them. Here are examples of questions (which will ultimately need valida-
tion).
Finalization of Pleadings
* What does an automated assessment of comprehensiveness of
pleadings (including literacy level), tell the system about the person's
capacity?
* Do you complete your own tax returns (1040 or 1040-EZ)?
* Do you have difficulty completing health insurance forms on
your own?
Presentation ofEvidence
48. Alternatively, these engagement issues might be managed within tracks and the services
provided be treated within the litigant services triage process. See Zorza, After Turner, supra note
30.
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* Do you find it easy to tell the doctor what is wrong with you
when you visit?
* When you call a store with a problem, are you able to explain the
problem?
Preparation ofJudgment
* Do you find it easy to understand and remember what a doctor
tells you to do? If you do not understand, are you able to comfortably ask
for a clearer explanation until you do understand?
* Do you think you have good follow-up skills? Do you take notes
to help remember what you need to do? Do you write down questions so
you won't forget to ask them later?
* Are you able to break down projects into separate discrete tasks
and perform those tasks in a logical order?
While none of these questions are perfect, and while some may
raise difficult privacy and other social policy concerns, they do provide a
way of developing a better picture of capacity.4 9
Education level, primary language, and age may also be relevant.
The goal then is to have an algorithm that can make at least a pre-
liminary screen. Particularly as more and more contested cases start with
an initial appearance that has a triaging role, or by a referral to a court
self-help service, such preliminary screening can be reviewed by an indi-
vidual who can then make a non-technology assessment of the appropri-
ateness of the systems initial decision.
The algorithm itself might be built on a presumptive model. In other
words, stake, power relationship, and court track might be used to devel-
op a presumptive list of needs and sufficient services for each situation,
with that presumption then being tested by capacity measuring questions
such as the ones above.
The algorithm has to be able to adjust based on the relationship be-
tween capacity and demand, with limited resources requiring a higher
threshold of need as capacity declines or demand increases. So, the pre-
sumption line has to move based on this match, and the system has to
know how to move the presumption line. However, the algorithm can
only change in steps over significant time periods, or the consistency
principle would be violated.
49. This set of questions, and indeed the attempt to assess capacity, is viewed by some as
paternalistic. The problem is that for triage to be effective it has to take into account individual
capacity, and we know that the traditional demographic information is just not sufficient to allow for
this assessment. See Zorza, supra note 38.
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7. Referrals
Referrals to certain programs may require no appointment or ac-
ceptance-examples would be online tools or walk-in programs. Others
may require appointment setting or acceptance by the service provider.
The system would generate notices to the litigant telling them which
services they have been found to need and directions where to go when
no follow up as to detail is needed.
For referrals to providers with independent intake, the system would
match the litigant's detail again with available programs eligibility crite-
ria and attempt to obtain electronic acceptance of the referral. This might
require simultaneously sending data about the litigant to several pro-
grams.so
8. Follow Up for Completion of Referral and Download of Data
The system should not hand off the referral process to the litigants
but should attempt to complete it, sending the litigants only the infor-
mation that they need to confirm appointment time or the equivalent. The
system should also have an electronic capacity to follow up to check that
the referral link has been made.
9. Appeal to a Human
At least until research has much more fully validated the protocols
and their criteria, users should be given the option at the end of the pro-
cess of requesting a conversation, possibly by phone, to explain why they
feel that they would not be able to manage their cases with the level of
assistance offered under the system. Such a conversation would be in-
formed by the materials produced by the system in aid of the analysis,
and might be particularly necessary in limited-English proficiency situa-
tions.5
10. Activity if Service Needs Can Not Be Met with Existing
Capacity
Unless there is a radical change in funding, a system like this will
result in findings of service needs that cannot be met. This requires that
the algorithm be able to adjust to provide services to those most urgently
in need-something the algorithm should relatively easily produce if it
can do its primary job. This can be done either by automatically adjust-
ing the grid of presumptive need generated by the facts of the case or by
changing the system of modifying those presumptions when sufficient
services are not available.
50. This might require change in ethics rules. The ABA should consider changing the Model
Rules to facilitate this process.
51. Interview with Associate Justice Laurie Zelon, California Court of Appeals.
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In addition, it should produce ongoing reporting about this service
gap. There are those who think that one reason these systems have not
made better progress analyzing triage is that they have not been willing
to face the programmatic reality of the consequences of the service gap.
B. Problems Implementing the Design
1. Service Capacity Issues
The biggest challenge by far, of course, is that the resources are not
there to provide all the access services. While the author strongly be-
lieves that a system such as this would be far cheaper to implement than
a classic right to counsel for all approach, the total cost of this system
will be hard to calculate until a pilot is attempted.
There are two possible strategies to follow. A small pilot in a small
area would give good data on total cost, as well as on savings relative to
traditional models. Indeed, if, as some advocated, the Shriver Pilot had
been focused on one county with the kind of approach described here,
then the pilot might have provided just that kind of data.52
The second strategy, as described above, would be to design the
service triage system so that it adjusts its behavior based on the match
between resources and need. There are actually two ways to do this, at
least in the tech version. In one, the presumptions of service need in-
ferred from the situation grid would be changed if need exceeded capaci-
ty. In the other, the presumptions would stay the same, but the formula
for adjusting those presumptions would change based on availability of
services. The first is more effective at protecting those with capacity is-
sues. The second is better at making sure that those facing higher stake,
higher conflict issues have counsel but would be less protective of those
with lower capacity.
2. Court Track Restructuring Issues
The process of persuading a court to modify its segmentation of
cases will be difficult. Clarke and Flango have it right; we need not to
focus on case type but on the issues to be decided and the processes
needed. However, case type as the dominant paradigm is hundreds of
years old, and is supported by systems of judicial and staff specialization,
computer software, physical design of courthouses, etc.
It might well be much easier to start a complexity and service court
track experiment in a new court. This was the model used in the highly
successful Midtown Community Court, which tested a variety of treat-
52. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, FACT SHEET: SARGENT SHRIVER CIVIL COUNSEL ACT
(AB 590) (FEUER) (2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/AB-590.pdf.
53. Thomas M. Clarke & Victor E. Flango, Case Triage for the 21st Century, 26 COURT
MANAGER 14 (2012).
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ment and community engagement innovations at the same time in Man-
hattan in the early 1990s. 5 4 As one who participated in the project, the
author can report that he finds it hard to imagine the project succeeding
without the flexibility provided by the ground up space, staff, and tech-
nology build-up.
3. Court Legal Aid Integration Issues
For courts, with their strong neutrality commitment and cultures, the
concept of having their operational and technology systems so tightly
interwoven with those of service providers, such as legal aid, will be a
source of significant anxiety. On the technology side, it should be noted,
however, that it is not proposed that legal aid operates the integrated tri-
age system, rather that the integrated system communicate with both
court and legal aid systems-and indeed with those of other neutral ser-
vice providers. Thus data would only go from the central system as
needed to enable processing in the system to which it went. The triage
system would be built both technically and legally to avoid compromis-
ing confidential data.
In the non-tech option, the assessor would also have confidential in-
formation from both sides, and rules would need to be established to
protect the confidentiality of that information-in a sense the role has
some similarities to that of a mediator who meets privately with both
sides and communicates only that which is authorized to be communicat-
ed.
4. Legal Aid Autonomy Issues
Legal aid programs are likely to fear loss of control over caseload-
always a risk in moving towards any system of provision of counsel ser-
vices other than by complete legal aid intake autonomy.ss
The access benefits of this system are just too great for a rational le-
gal aid provider to reject; however, some programs are likely to retain
some discretion over intake and certainly some discretion to handle cases
other than those coming in through this system. These would be matters
for negotiation. Legal aid programs would have huge costs by moving to
this system.
5. Protocol Development
Both models proposed in this paper assume some form of protocol.
The non-tech system would function well with limited protocols. The
54. Midtown Community Court, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION,
http://www.courtinnovation.org/project/midtown-community-court (last visited April 20, 2012)..
55. Lonnie Powers, Jim Bamberger, Gerry Singsen & De Miller, Key Questions and Consid-
erations Involved in State Deliberations Concerning an Expanded Civil Right to Counsel, MGMT.
INFO. EXCHANGE J., Summer 2010, at 10.
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tech system would require much more sophisticated protocols, which
would lead to clear decisions.
While those protocols will initially be based on consensus discus-
sions among advocates, courts, and research experts,56 in the long term,
the data coming out of the system should make possible first protocol
component validation and then lead to the suggestion of new compo-
nents.
6. Legitimacy of Protocols
Legitimacy of the protocols, particularly the litigant service proto-
cols, is likely to be a major issue. Many advocates believe that the deci-
sion to provide counsel is almost equivalent to deciding what the ulti-
mate decision by the court on the merits will be, so they see any triage
process as determinative.5 7
Ironically, much of the access community is likely to accept the le-
gitimacy of individualized assessment more easily than that of automated
protocols. This is because it reflects the way they work and uses skills
with which they are comfortable. It is, however, far less transparent and
far more likely to reflect unconscious bias.
7. Cost Issues
Deploying this system will not be cheap for courts, legal aid, or
whoever takes responsibly for the system as a whole. While it will ulti-
mately save court time, focus litigant services where needed, and elimi-
nate huge waste in current referral systems, it cannot be avoided that
establishing and operating the system will require initial investments.
The author recommends a small start and that the development of
protocols be supported by national resources, either from the federal
government or from foundations. He also believes that federal invest-
ment in pilots is highly appropriate. If the federal funding is provided for
56. A proposal for the funding of such a design process has been approved by the State Justice
Institute. The proposal was submitted jointly by the National Center for State Courts and the Self-
Represented Litigation Network.
57. Recent studies cast some doubt on the universality of this conclusion. Archive for the
'Symposium (What Difference Representation?)' Category, CONCURRING OPINIONS,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/representation-symposium (last visited Apr.
8, 2012). More recent research is discused at Zorza, Exciting Triage Progress at TIG Conference,
supra note 12; Richard Zorza, More Greiner et al Offers of Counsel Studies-The Debate Contin-
ues-Newsmaker Interview Planned, RICHARD ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011),
http://accesstojustice.net/2011/10/24/more-greiner-et-al-offers-of-counsel-studies-the-debate-
continues-newsmaker-interview-planned/.
58. It would be wise to build in statistical reporting systems designed to identify such asym-
metrical outcomes early in the use of the process. See Richard Zorza, Avoiding the "Shut Down
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research, the general protocols and software should work across the
country, greatly reducing costs.59
8. Management Issues
The state would have to decide who would build such a system and
who would administer it. As Professor Sandefur notes, no state has any
agency playing a coordination role that approximates the need.60 This
writer believes that responsibility must be taken by a body such as the
Access to Justice Commission, which combines the authority of its ap-
pointing authority from the state supreme courts with the legitimacy of
the range of its participants.
9. Possible Limited Deployment-Track or Service Assignment
Only
It should be noted that either of the two kinds of triage envisioned in
this paper could be piloted independently of the other. This would be
politically far simpler but would obviously lose some of the power of the
experiment.
CONCLUSION
We will never build either an efficient court system or a 100% ac-
cess-to-justice system without a triage system. In the past, we have shied
away from the attempt to do so, in part because of fear of the complexity
any system would require.
While the author understands that the thoughts in this paper repre-
sent only a small step in launching an ultimate design process, he hopes
that these initial ideas will act as a spur for a comprehensive and creative
discussion of how to build the system that is so desperately needed.
In particular, this paper highlights that any effectively functioning
system is going to have to be skillfully and legitimately coordinated. It is
hoped that this paper will also encourage states to start to wrestle with
the problem of how to establish a system to do so and that state players
will start to take responsibility for thinking about the triage function,
even before it is practicable to start to deploy it. Professor Dumbledore
would ask no less.
59. Compare the systems that have been deployed to support web information portals,
www.lawhelp.org, and document assembly, www.lawhelpinteractive.org. Both systems integrate
court and access to justice resources.
60. SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 14, at 9.
61. Laurence Tribe, Professor Harvard Law School, Keynote Address at the Conference of







The Great Recession has caused many new attorneys to question
their decisions to go to law school.' The highly publicized decline in
employment opportunities for lawyers has called into question the value
of obtaining a law degree. 2 The tightening of the economy has dimin-
ished the availability of entry-level jobs for law graduates across em-
ployment sectors. Large law firms are laying-off lawyers, bringing in
smaller first year associate classes,5 hiring more contract and experienced
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I. The Great Recession began at the end of 2007 but was accelerated in the summer of 2008
when investment banks closed, and transactional corporate work began to dry up. Corporate law
firms began layoffs, hiring freezes and explored other ways to lower their overhead, placing more
attorneys in the marketplace for legal work. James G. Leipold, The Changing Legal Employment
Market for New Law School Graduates, THE BAR EXAMINER, Nov. 2010, at 6-10. For the impact of
the Great Recession on large law firms, see Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle:
Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 28-40 (2011).
2. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BUI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?pagewanted-print; see also
Bill Hebert, What is the Value of a Law Degree?, CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL, Feb. 2011,
http://www.calbarjournal.com/February20l /Opinion/FromthePresident.aspx, and What is the Value
of a Law Degree? Part 2, CALIFORNIA BAR JOURNAL, Mar. 2011,
http://www.calbarjournal.com/March20l 1/Opinion/FromthePresident.aspx.
3. NALP reported that the employment rate of 85.6% was the lowest employment rate since
1994 when rate reported was 84.7%. See NALP, Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since
Class of 1994, NALP BULLETIN (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research; See also NALP,
Law School Grads Face Worst Job Market Yet Less than Half Find Jobs in Private Practice, NALP
PRESS RELEASE (July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/
Classof201 1ERSSSelectedFindingsPressRelease.pdf.
4. Jonathan D. Glater, The Lawyer Squeeze: Layoffs and Closings in a Field Thought to
Resist Downturns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at B l. Debra Cassens Weiss, BigLaw Laid Off More
than 12,000 People in 2009, the Worst Year Ever, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/biglaw laidoff more-than 12000_people in 2009 the w
orstyear ever; Martha Neil, Chadbourne Bids Final Farewell to II Deferred Members of Class of
2009, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chadbourne bids final good-bye to_11 deferred members of class of 2009/.
5. See Karen Sloan, Its Tough Out There, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202543428380&slreturn=1; Gerry Shih, Down-
turn Dims Prospects Even at Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at Bl; Molly
McDonough, Summer Associate Offers Plummet, Hitting 17-Year Low, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 3,
2010), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/summer associate offers plummet hitting 17-
year low/; see also Burk & McGowan, supra note 1, at 32-34.
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lateral attorneys.6 Government entities and public interest organizations
have suffered furloughs, and hiring freezes, and are relying more on
volunteers than on new employees to get the work done. To complicate
matters, the baby boomer generation of lawyers is retiring later and con-
tributing to a lack of new job opportunities. 9 As a result, a large number
of recent law graduates are unemployed, under-employed, or are working
in settings that do not require a bar license.' 0 James G. Leipold, executive
director of the National Association for Law Placement (NALP), report-
ed that "members of the law school graduating classes of 2009 and 2010
have faced the worst entry-level legal employment market in 50 years
and perhaps ever, and the market for the classes of 2011 and those that
will follow is likely forever changed."" The latest figures released by
198 of the 201 law schools accredited by the American Bar Association
(ABA) confirm Leipold's prediction. Only 55% of law students graduat-
ing in 2011 reported having full-time, long-term jobs requiring a law
degree, at nine months after graduation.12 The change in the job market
6. Claire Zillman, The New Normal, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Dec. 2010, at 67. Leigh
Jones, Faced with Data Explosion, Law Firms Tap Temp Attorneys, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
(Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/ccPubArticleCC.jsp?id=l 128947761813; Leipold, supra
note 1, at 10. But see NALP, Lateral Hiring on the Rise after Two Years of Decline, NALP
BULLETIN (April 2011), http://www.nalp.org/april201 _lateral hiring.
7. Ed O'Keefe, Justice Department Lawyers Say They'll Quit If Regional Offices Close,
WASH. POST, OCT. 18, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justice-
department-lawyers-say-theyll-quit-if-regional-offices-close/2011/10/18/glQAOJzNvL story.html;
John Eligon, District Attorney Cuts Jobs; Law Firms' Earnings Rise, N.Y. TIMES, APR. 29, 2011,
available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/29/district-attomey-cuts-jobs-law-firms-
earnings-rise/; Patrick McDonnell, L.A. City Attorney's Office Says Budget Cuts Are 'Threat to
Public Safety', L.A. TIMES, JAN. 4, 2011, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/201 I/jan/20/local/la-me-0120-city-attomey-20110120; Jason Ryan, Attor-
ney General Holder Orders Hiring Freeze; Discusses Tight Justice Department Budget, ABC NEWS
(Jan. 4, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/justice-department-attomey-general-eric-holder-
orders-hiring/story?id=12749770&page=l#.UAs9YaBDQww; Alex Williams, No Longer Their
Golden Ticket, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/fashion/17awyer.html?scp=1&sq-no%20onger/ 20their/ 20
golden%20ticket&st-cse.
8. Leipold, supra note 1, at 7-10.
9. See Barbara Rose, Not Done Yet, ABA JOURNAL (April 2010) (discussing the reluctance
or inability of lawyers to retire); see also Lawyer Retirement Flash Survey, ALTMAN WEIL, INC. 1,
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir-docs/resource/d5bcO7ce-97c2-4d82-abbe-
c5f89ae5296a document.pdf (reporting that 61% of attorneys surveyed plan on continuing to work
in some capacity after retirement).
10. See Debra Cassens Weiss, New Lawyer Says Waitress Job Pays More than Small Law
Firms, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 14, 2009, 8:20 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/new-lawyer sayswaitressjob_paysmore than small_1a
w firms/; see also Menachem Wecker, In Tough Job Market, Law Grads Use J.D.s for Nonlegal
Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2011/09/30/in-tough-job-market-law-grads-use-jds-for-
nonlegal-work; Debra Cassens Weiss, Nontraditional Careers for Law Grads Include Cartoonists
and Service Dog Trainers, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/nontraditional-careers-for-law grads include cartoonists_
and-services dogtr/.
I1. Leipold, supra note 1, at 6.
12. Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2012), availa-
ble at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052702304458604577486623469958142.html; see
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masks a long standing but rarely recognized reality. Law jobs, particular-
ly for new attorneys, have never been abundant.
Historically, most attorneys in the United States have created their
own jobs by establishing solo and small law firms. The latest ABA mar-
ket research indicates that about three-fourths of all attorneys work in
private practice.'3 Of those attorneys, almost half identify as solo practi-
tioners and approximately 14% work in small law offices with five or
less lawyers.' 4 ABA market research found that in 2005, only 16% of
attorneys in private practice work in law firms of more than 100 attor-
neys.'" In fact, the number of lawyers in private practice working in law
firms of more than 50 attorneys has never accounted for even one-fifth of
the private bar.' 6 Attorney demographics confirm that the majority of
lawyers in private practice are self-employed." Regardless of the large
number of lawyers in solo practice, few law graduates enter the profes-
sion understanding the opportunities and challenges of starting their own
law firms.
The reality of self-employment has not been well-received by many
new graduates. Fewer opportunities in the job market have spawned
blogs, editorials, articles and letters from and about angry and greatly
disappointed new lawyers who viewed law school as their ticket to a six-
figure salary upon graduation, but instead found poor job prospects and
student debt equivalent to a home mortgage.' 8 A group of law graduates
also Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-schools.html.
13. The American Bar Foundation published The Lawyer Statistical Reports in 2012, 2004,
1994. The reports respectively report that in 2005 75% of all lawyers worked in private practice.
Those figures were 75% in 2000 and 73% in 1991. The corresponding 1985 report also reports that
68% of all lawyers were in private practice in 1980. ABA MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, LAWYER
DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/damlaba/migrated/marketresearch/
PublicDocuments/lawyer demographics 2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf.
14. Id (showing that in 1980 and 2005 49% of private practitioners identified as working in
solo practice). The 2000 report shows 48% and the 1991 report states that 45% of private sector
attorneys worked as solo practitioners. Id.
15. Id The largest proportion of lawyers working in law firms with more than 100 attorneys
was reported in 2005, only three years before massive layoffs. The numbers for 1991 and 2000 were
13% and 14%, respectively. The 1980 data only measured law firms with more than 51 lawyers, so it
is unclear how many of them worked in law firms of more than 100 lawyers. Id.
16. In the late 1950s, only 38 law firms in the United States had more than fifty lawyers. See
Marc S. Galanter, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth
of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 749 (1990). In 1960, it is estimated that only two percent
of attorneys practiced in law firms of over 50 attorneys. In 1980, this number grew to 18%, still less
than one-fifth of the total amount of practicing attorneys in the private practice. Marc Galanter, "Old
and in the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal Profession and Its Impli-
cations for the Provision ofLegal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1092 (1999).
17. The percentage of existing solo practitioners has consistently been greater than that of
large law firms. The percentage was 64% in 1960, 52% in 1970, 49% in1980, 45% in 1991, and
finally 48% in 2000. Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition,
20 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 19, 30 (1986).
18. Encamacion Pyle, Law Grads: Lots ofDebt, Few Jobs, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar.
26, 2012), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/03/26/law-grads-lots-of-debt-few-
jobs.html; Segal, supra note 2.
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initiated lawsuits against their law schools alleging, among other things,
misrepresentation and fraud.1 9 Although the particular claims of the law-
suits vary, all of them accuse law schools of reporting exaggerated em-
ployment statistics in order to lure prospective students into law
schools.20 As a result of the public dissatisfaction of recent law graduates
and the high cost of legal education,2' the number of applications to ABA
accredited law schools declined in 2011.22 In December 2012, the Law
School Admissions Council reported an additional decline of 22%.23
19. As of July 20, 2012 the following law schools have been sued over their employment and
salary reports: Albany Law School, Brooklyn Law School, California Western School of Law,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, DePaul University College of Law,
Golden Gate University School of Law, John Marshall Law School, Maurice A. Deane School of
Law at Hofstra University, New York Law School, Southwestern Law School, Thomas M. Cooley
Law School, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, University of San Francisco Law School, and Wid-
ener University School of Law. See Karen Sloan, Law School Sued Over 'False' Employment Statis-
tics, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (May 27, 2011), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNUjsp?id=1 202495481202&Law school sued over false
employment statistics&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also Martha Neil, Honors Grad Working as
Doc Reviewer Sues Law School, Says She Was Misled by US News Stats, ABA JOURNAL (May 27,
2011),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/honorsgrad working asdocreviewer sues law school
says she wasmisled by/; Sophia Pearson, New York Law School Sued by Students over Claims
About Graduates' Success, BLOOMBERG (August 10, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201 I-
08-1 0/new-york-law-school-sued-by-students-over-claims-about-graduates-success.html; Peter
Fulham, Law Grads Sue Alma Maters for $450M, SLATE (August 12, 2011),
http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2011/08/12/law school lawsuit thomascooley newyorklaw school
sued by stu.html; Martha Neil, 12 More Law Schools Sued Over Reporting of Law Grad Employ-
ment and Salary Stats, ABA JOURNAL (February 1, 2012),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/l2 more law schools sued in consumer-
fraud-class action re reportedlaw/; Karen Sloan, Fresh round of litigation targets 12 law schools
over jobs data, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (February I, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202540950653; Shannon Rasbery, High Stu-
dent Loan Debt, Unemployment Lead to More Lawsuits against Law Schools, Student Loans Blog
(February 14, 2012), http://studentloansblog.nextstudent.com/2012/02/14/high-student-loan-debt-
unemployment-lead-to-more-lawsuits-against-law-schools/. The lawsuit against New York Law
School was dismissed on March 21, 2012. See Alexandra Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 2012). The lawsuit against Thomas Cooley Law School was dismissed on
July 20, 2012. See MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11-CV-831, 2012 WL
2994107 (W.D. Mich. July 20,2012).
20. See Jack Crittenden, Employment Data Under Fire, THE NATIONAL JURIST, Sep. 2010, at
5 (manipulating of employment data by law schools scrutinized); Segal, supra note 2; Kyle P.
McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward: Transparency at U.S. Law Schools, 32 PACE L. REV.
1 (2012) (calling for regulation of the collection and presentation of employment data at ABA-
approved law schools).
21. The ABA reported that in 2009 the average annual cost of law school tuition and fees was
$35,743 for private schools and $18,472 for resident students at public law schools. Section on Legal
Education, Statistics from ABA-Approved Law Schools, Law School Tuition 1985-2009, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal education and admissions toth
e bar/statistics/Is tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited July 22, 2012). These figures represent an
increase in tuition of 73% for private schools and 150% for public schools since 1999. See id.
22. Although the number of ABA applications reached an all-time high in 2010 at 602,252,
this figure dropped 11% to 536,200 in 2011. LSAC Volume Summary, LAW SCH. ADMISSION
COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/PDFs/LSAC-volume-summary.pdf (last visit-
ed, May 15, 2012). Similarly, the number of individuals sitting for the Law School Admissions Test
dropped by almost 26% in a two year period, from 171,514 exams taken in 2009 2010 to 129,958 in
2011-2012. LSATs Administered, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL,
http://www.Isac.org/LSACResources/Data/1sats-administered.asp (last visited May 15, 2012). See
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The future of the legal profession is uncertain. Some predict that
large law firms are unlikely to rebound to pre-recession hiring.24 It is also
not anticipated that government, academic, and public interest sectors
will represent more than a small fraction of available law jobs.25 The
most consistent and largest employment sector for lawyers will continue
to be solo practice. If the largest segment of our law students will even-
tually work for themselves, 26 then law schools should provide direction
about what it means to be a self-employed lawyer. Like their predeces-
sors, the self-employed lawyer of the twenty-first century must learn how
to think like a lawyer and find a niche within the business of law. How-
ever, to make a living in an increasingly complex and competitive legal
market, self-employed lawyers must also become lawyer-entrepreneurs.27
This Article does not offer a comprehensive understanding of the
study of entrepreneurship. 28 Nor does it engage the discussion of the ten-
29sion between professionalism standards and personal gain. Instead, this
piece focuses on what law schools can do to help the thousands of self-
employed lawyers who must embrace entrepreneurial models to survive
in a competitive market. Part I of this Article considers how technology
and the need for more affordable legal services require the transfor-
also David Segal, For 2nd Year, A Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2012, at B1.
23. Three-Year ABA Volume Comparison, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL,
http://www.Isac.org/Isacresources/data/three-year-volume.asp (last visited December 20, 2012).
24. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job Stagnation May Have Started
Before the Recession-And It May Be a Sign of Lasting Change, ABA JOURNAL (July 1, 2011 4:40
AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/paradigmshift (re-examining some long-
standing assumptions about lawyers and the clients they serve within the context of the demands of a
rapidly globalizing world); see also Maulik Shah, The Legal Education Bubble: How Law Schools
Should Repond to Changes in the Legal Market, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 843, 845-52 (2010)
(discussing how the legal market was impacted by the Great Recession).
25. Since 1980, no more than 8-9% of all lawyers worked in the govemment sector. During
that period, only 1% of lawyers where employed in education. Legal aid and public defender lawyers
were 2% of the profession's population in 1980 but their numbers declined to constitute 1% of the
lawyer population as of 1991. See ABA MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, supra note 13.
26. ABA Serves Solo and Small-Firm Lawyers with New Online Resource Center, ABA (Jan.
19, 2012), http://www.abanow.org/2012/01/aba-serves-solo-and-small-firm-lawyers-with-new-
online-resource-center/ (reporting that approximately 435,000 attorneys are in solo practice). There
were 1,245,205 total attorneys in the U.S. in April 2012. See ABA MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, supra
note 13.
27. See David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, What Makes an Entrepreneur?, 16 J.
LAB. ECON. 27 ("The simplest kind of entrepreneurship is self-employment.").
28. For an overview of the literature on entrepreneurship, see David E. Pozen, We Are All
Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 284-315 (2008) (comparing traditional and new
conceptualizations of the entrepreneur in the academic literature).
29. For a discussion on the tension between professionalism and commercialization of legal
services, see generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War
to Govern Client Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255 (2005); David Barmhizer, Profession Deleted:
Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for
Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203 (2004); Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
1 (1998); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283 (1998);
see also MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
177 (1977) (discussing how lawyers' social structure is at odds with its professional ideals).
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mation of solo attorneys into lawyer-entrepreneurs. It explores how tech-
nology and client preferences are impacting the practice of law for self-
employed lawyers that address personal legal services. Part II summariz-
es the findings of several empirical studies that help us understand what
it means to be a self-employed lawyer. It considers the challenges and
opportunities of lawyers as entrepreneurs. Part III posits that Millennial
generation lawyers are good candidates to become lawyer-entrepreneurs.
It contemplates a future where Millennial lawyer-entrepreneurs, if
properly supported, can exploit technology to increase access to justice
and achieve their personal goals. Part IV documents a sample of existing
and emerging efforts by law schools to train self-employed lawyers. This
section focuses specifically on the emergence of networks supporting
solo and small firm lawyers, attorney incubator programs and post-
graduate residencies. Part V offers recommendations for law schools
committed to advancing the training of lawyer-entrepreneurs. The per-
spective offered here is informed by my experience launching a solo
practice in 2002,30 my involvement in a national conversation about the
lack of affordable legal services,3' as a mentor to lawyers starting their
law practices, and is supported by empirical research.
I. LAW IN THE MILLENNIAL AGE
Today's law graduates are entering the profession at a time when
technology is drastically changing all aspects of our society, including
the business of law. The same technology that permits a U.S. lawyer to
service her clients from the comfort of her laptop facilitates the provision
of legal services from India to U.S. companies at a fraction of the price.32
In the last decade, thousands of legal jobs, primarily involving document
preparation and legal research, have been sent abroad.3 3 The long-term
impact of outsourcing is yet to be determined, but what is clear is that the
30. Luz E. Herrera, Reflections of a Community Lawyer, 3 MOD. AM. 39, 41-43 (2007),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/modemarnmerican/documents/Herrera.pdf.
31. Luz E. Herrera, Rethinking Private Attorney Involvement Through a "Low Bono" Lens,
43 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (2009) (arguing for inclusion of Main Street lawyers that charge low
bono fees in national efforts to increase access to justice).
32. Carole Silver, Putting Legal Process Outsourcing in Context: Why Globalization Matters,
20 No. 2 PROF. LAW. 26, 26-27 (2010) (referring to Mark Ross of Integreon who says that real
estate work costs 1/20th of what it cost 10-20 years ago and is done by paralegals, junior associates,
or contract attorneys).
33. See James R. Faulconbridge et al., Global Law Firms: Globalization and Organizational
Spaces of Cross-Border Legal Work, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 455, 455-59 (2008)
("[U]nderstanding how existing geographies of globalization of law and lawyers, alongside new
geographies of professional partnership and legal work, have created opportunities and challenges
for global law firms."); Carole Silver et al., Between Diffusion and Distinctiveness in Globalization:
US. Law Firms Go Global, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1431, 1438-45 (2009) ("The patterns of
staffing overseas offices reveal that the firns are substantially invested in the local and also pursue a
path of diffusion."); Milton C. Regan, Jr., & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Bounda-
ries: The Disaggregation ofLegal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2166-67 (2010) (discussing
whether the trend of law firms producing goods and services by relying on the supply chains that
extend beyond the formal boundaries of the organization will continue).
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delivery of legal services has drastically changed.3 4 Technology has facil-
itated the entry of new players that offer affordable alternatives to routine
services that many attorneys in solo practice provide. The use of technol-
ogy to facilitate the delivery of legal services is making legal information
more accessible and driving down profit margins of many lawyers. In
addition to the new non-lawyer competitors, self-employed lawyers that
provide personal services compete with paralegals and other non-lawyer
providers.35
In his thought-provoking book, The End ofLawyers?, futurist Rich-
ard Susskind argues that information technology and the commoditiza-
tion of legal services will "fundamentally transform legal services."36 He
explains the entry of new technology-adept non-lawyer competitors have
forced lawyers to deliver more services at lower prices.37 Susskind ar-
gues that the delivery of legal services will evolve through a spectrum
where traditional, one-on-one, personalized services will be only a small
portion of the overall legal services delivered. 38 He characterizes non-
routine, customized work that requires personal interaction with a client
as "bespoke" work. Bespoke work is specifically tailored to the particu-
lar needs and characteristics of the client. It is the primary mode of legal
services delivery championed by lawyers who make their living by cus-
tomizing their service.39 Susskind argues that consumers prefer a highly
"commoditized" service that has been standardized, systematized, pack-
aged, and offered at a fraction of the cost of bespoke work. 4 0 A commod-
itized legal service is described "as an IT-based offering that is undiffer-
34. Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 24.
35. For a discussion of the first wave of competitors that threatened to "delawyer" the legal
profession, see Gerry Singsen, Competition in Personal Legal Services, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 21,
24-40 (1989) (discussing the emergence of legal services providers in the early 1980s); see also
Reality Sinks In, ABA JOURNAL (August 2012) (reporting that 92 percent of respondents of the 2012
Law Firms in Transition Survey said that "price competition will be a permanent fixture of the post-
recession legal marketplace")
36. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES 27 (2008).
37. Id. at 27 (offering examples of attorneys asked to take work for fixed prices and to have
much more transparency in their billing). New non-lawyer competitors include companies that offer
clients to outsource legal work, entrepreneurial publishers, professional managers and investors who
fund non-lawyer companies that facilitate disruptive legal technology such as document assembly
and embedded legal knowledge in software programs to replace the need for lawyers in routine legal
work.
38. Id. at 28-29.
39. Id. at 29. Susskind explains that the term bespoke is a word commonly used in the UK to
describe a highly customized product. He explains that individuals refer to "bespoke software" they
refer to "software that is specifically written for one client". He further explains by explaining the
contrast between a "bespoke suit," a suit that is tailored to fit one specific individual, and a "off-the-
peg suit" designed for many people.
40. Id. at 31-32; cf CARROLL SERON, MANAGING ENTREPRENEURIAL LEGAL SERVICES: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SMALL-FIRM PRACTICE IN LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 75 (Robert L. Nelson ed., 1991) (dis-
cussing empirical research showing that legal services consumers prefer lawyers who are older, work
in their own offices and are conveniently located).
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entiated in the marketplace" by the consumer and is made available by
disruptive legal technologies.41
Disruptive legal technologies include systems, techniques, or appli-
cations that radically change the way an industry operates.4 2 Susskind
identifies ten disruptive legal technologies that are already making legal
services highly available by becoming accessible to multiple providers
whose competition lowers pricing to the consumer.43 Examples of such
disruptive legal technologies include automated document assembly, the
internet as an electronic legal marketplace, embedded legal knowledge,
workflow management, and online legal guidance." Such innovations
allow for competitive pricing for routine legal services and diminish the
role of a lawyer as service provider. Susskind concludes that in this new
paradigm, the success or failure of lawyers will depend on their willing-
ness to change the way they practice by welcoming new ways of organiz-
ing and delivering legal work.45 Susskind's message is not that disruptive
legal technology will make law and lawyers less relevant, but that tech-
nology has transformed the legal market to be a buyer's market.4 6
In the United States, legal services consumers are confirming part of
Susskind's hypothesis that they will opt for a less personalized service if
the alternative is too costly. The typical legal services consumer in the
U.S., makes approximately $25 per hour,47 and is priced out of the ser-
vices lawyers provide even at low attorney rates of $125-$150 an hour.4 8
A study by the World Justice Project found the United States ranked the
lowest among 11 developed nations in providing access to justice to its
citizens.4 9 The primary model for delivering legal services offers options
to a small fraction of those who qualify under specific poverty guide-
41. Id at 32.
42. Id. at 99.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id at 99-146. Chapter 4 describes automated document assembly, instant connectivity
(blackberries, social media, Skype), the internet as an electronic legal marketplace, e-Learning,
online legal guidance, legal open-sourcing, closed legal communities, workflow and project man-
agement, and embedded legal knowledge. Chapter 5 describes online dispute resolution. Id. at 147-
180.
45. Id. at 269.
46. Id at 270.
47. The hourly rate for consumers is calculated based on a median annual income of $50,020
and assumes a forty-hour workweek over fifty weeks. According to new data derived from the
monthly Current Population Survey, real median annual household income in January 2012 was
$50,020. Gordon Green & John Coder, Household Income Trends: January 2012, SENTIER
RESEARCH, LLC, 2 (Mar. 2012), http://www.sentierresearch.com/reports/
SentierResearch HouseholdIncomeTrendsReportJanuary_2012 12 03 01.pdf.
48. Richard S. Granat, eLawyering for a Competitive Advantage-How to Earn Legal Fees
While You Sleep, 2-3 (2008), http:/Imeetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/EP024500/
relatedresources/eLawyering for Competitive Advantage.pdf.
49. See Mark David Agrast et al, Rule of Law Index, THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, 103
(2011), http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/wjproli20l 10.pdf; Steven Seidenberg,
Unequal Justice: US. Trails High-Income Nations in Serving Civil Legal Needs, ABA JOURNAL
(June 1, 2012 1:50 AM), www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/unequaljustice u.s. trails high-
income nations.
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linesso and to those who can afford to pay attorney fees at market rates.
Legal services consumers generally perceive lawyers as an inefficient
use of their money and time.5 2 A 1993 survey revealed that a majority of
Americans believe that the phrases "greedy" and "make too much mon-
ey" properly describe lawyers. Individuals with legal problems will opt
for resources that are most affordable and convenient even when they
understand that the services provided may be sub-optimal compared to
what an attorney can provide.54 It is estimated that there is a latent legal
services market with an annual worth of $20 billion "that is not currently
being served by the legal profession."55 The legal profession's inability
to meet the needs of its citizens is documented by national and state stud-
i 56ies.
Venture capitalists have begun to address the need of the average
legal services consumers. Investors are showing interest in the legal in-
formatics market that provides lawyer alternatives to consumers.57 In
50. The Legal Services Corporation set income eligibility guidelines for free legal services in
2012 at 125% of federal poverty guidelines set forth by the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices. See Income Level for Individuals Eligible for Assistance, 77 Fed. Reg. 21 (Feb. 1, 2012) (to be
codified at 45 CFR Part 1611), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-
01/hitm/2012-2098.htm. For a family of four living in the contiguous United States, annual income
at 125% of the federal poverty guidelines is $28,813. Id. Through different sources of funding, some
legal aid organizations are able to offer free legal services to individuals at 200% of the poverty
guidelines. A family of four under 200% of poverty can make no more than $46, 100 per year in the
contiguous U.S. Id.
51. What an attorney charges for a service depends on a number of actors which include the
difficulty of the legal matter, the location where the services are rendered and the experience of the
attorney. There are currently websites that provide legal services consumers with ideas of how much
attorneys in a geographic region charge per basic service. See ATTORNEY FEE,
http://www.attomeyfee.com/ (last visited July 31, 2012).
52. Granat, supra note 48, at 3. Richard S Granat, Online Legal Services and Virtual Lawyer-
ing: What Is it, Why Is it Important and What Do You Do Now?, DIRECT LAW, 4 (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.directlaw.com/virtual-lawyering-for-competitive-advantage.pdf.
53. See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS
LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (1993) (finding that Americans rate lawyers as third from the
bottom, higher only than stockbrokers and politicians, when rating nine professions); see also Legal
Services Benchmarking, Report 11516, BDRC CONTINENTAL (June 2012),
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what-we-do/Research/Publications/pdf/individual consumers
use of legal services _sbreport_17_07 12_ii.pdf (an empirical study that explores how British
citizens make decisions about their legal needs).
54. Robert Capps, The Good Enough Revolution: When Cheap and Simple Is Just Fine,
WIRED (August 24, 2009), http://www.wired.com/gadgets/miscellaneous/magazine/l7-
09/ff goodenough?currentPage=4 (discussing how in various industries, including the legal industry,
customers will sacrifice quality for an inexpensive and convenient alternative).
55. Granat, supra note 48, at 1.
56. LSC reports that only one-fifth of those who require civil legal services in this country
receive them. See Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs
of Low-Income Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 18 (2009),
http://www.sc.gov/pdfs/documenting thejustice-gap in-america 2009.pdf, Herrera, supra note
30, at 5-6; see also Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a
Public Forum, 2012 PROF. LAW. 79, 85-87 (2012) (arguing that the U.S. legal profession is not
meeting the civil legal needs of the population); Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining Justice: The Legal
Profession's Role in Restricting Access to Legal Representation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1040-41
(2006).
57. Legal informatics refers to the application use of technology for the organization, storage,
and distribution of legal information.
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2011, Nolo Press, the leading publisher of self-help law books and soft-
ware, was purchased by a new media company for $21 million.5 In the
same year, well-regarded venture capitalists invested $41 million for
minority shares of LegalZoom, the leading provider of online legal forms
for individuals and small business, and another $18.5 million in Rocket
Lawyer, provider of legal forms and information.59 Entities such as
LegalZoom, Rocket Lawyer, Nolo Press, and similar entities not licensed
to practice law, have already identified the legal market as the next in-
dustry ripe for disruption by commoditization. 60 LegalZoom alone re-
ported more than two million customers and revenue of more than $100
million in 2011.61
The market for more affordable alternatives to lawyers will continue
to grow unless and until the legal profession offers legal services con-
sumers what they need and want.62 Lawyers working in courts and legal
aid organizations were amongst the first to integrate technology into their
existing structures to meet the demand for their services.63 Every state in
the country has an online platform to help self-represented litigants with
automated forms and legal information." Since 2000, the Legal Services
58. Nolo was purchased by Internet Brands, Inc, in 2011. Daniel Fisher, Entrepreneurs Versus
Lawyers, FORBES (Oct. 24, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/
1024/entrepreneurs-lawyers-suh-legalzoom-automate-daniel-fisher.html. Internet Brands has a
subsidiary company called Experthub which is the lead generator for Nolo Network. See About Us,
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/about.html (last visited May 14, 2012); see also Richard Granat, Nolo
Is Acquired by Registered Brands as Part of Legal Roll Up ELAWYERING BLOG (Apr. 30, 2011),
http://www.elawyeringredux.com/2011/04/articles/selfhelp-law/nolo-is-acquired-by-intemet-brands-
as-part-of-legal-roll-up/.
59. Id; see also LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited May 14, 2012);
ROCKET LAWYER, http://www.rocketlawyer.com (last visited May 14, 2012).
60. For a discussion of market disruptors, see Ken Docor, The Newsonomics of Amazon vs.
Main Street, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (July 26, 2012 10:00 AM) (explaining Amazon's disruption
of retail business), http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/07/the-newsonomics-of-amazon-vs-main-street/;
see also REID HOFFMAN & BEN CASNOCHA, THE START-UP OF YOU 19-21 (2012) (discussing
different companies such as Netflix who disrupted the movie rental industry and replace organiza-
tions such as Blockbuster).
61. Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, This Profitable, $100 Million Revenue Startup Doesn't Want to
Go Public, Bus. INSIDER (July 26, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-07-
26/tech/29970662_Iipos-ivp-techcrunch; LEGALZOOM, supra note 59; see also Legalzoom.com,
Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (May 10, 2012), available
at http://xml.10kwizard.com/filing raw.php?repo-tenk&ipage=8258454. But see Reynolds Holding
& Anthony Currie, Do-It- Yourself Law Firm IPO Looks a Bit Too Feisty, SLATE (July 24, 2012)
(questioning the valuation of Legalzoom.com considering lawsuits and reporting two years of losses
in 2009 and 2010), http://www.slate.com/blogs/breakingviews/2012/07/24/
do ityourself law firm ipo looks a bit too feisty .html.
62. Juice C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection or Protection
of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121 (2000) (claiming that the rise of the self-help movement is
motivated by the lack of affordable legal services).
63. Ronald W. Staudt, Technology for Justice Customers: Bridging the Digital Divide Facing
Self-Represented Litigants, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 71, 73-77 (2005)
(describing statewide internet platforms to offer free legal information and facilitate access to jus-
tice); see also John T. Broderick, Jr., & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, AT A21 (Jan. 2, 2010) (defending limited scope representation as a vehicle to help self-
represented litigants),
64. For a list of websites to assist self-represented litigants, see LAWHELP.ORG,
http://www.lawhelp.org/ (last visited July 31, 2012).
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Corporation has awarded technology grants to legal services providers to
develop programs using technology to increase the delivery of legal ser-
vices to those who cannot afford it.65 These grants have produced techno-
logical innovations that help legal aid organizations reach a greater num-
ber of legal services consumers.66 A LSC grant has funded the creation of
"Apps for Justice" clinics at law schools, where law students will partner
with legal aid organizations to develop new applications to facilitate le-
gal form automation.67 These creations help address the "justice gap" for
low-income individuals, but this same technology is also used by new
market competitors to drive down the price of legal services.6 8 The de-
mand for affordable legal services makes it more difficult for lawyers
who want to stop the proliferation of these new market competitors. Al-
legations by lawyers that Legalzoom and other new competitors are en-
gaging in unauthorized practice of law have not resulted in the type of
injunctive relief that many self-employed attorneys and bar associations
seek.
Attorneys in solo practice have an opportunity to leverage technolo-
gy to provide more cost-effective services to their potential client base.
Self-employed attorneys can also provide greater options to the commu-
nity of legal services consumers who are not finding alternatives they can
afford in the attorney marketplace. The last national legal services survey
revealed that 75% of low-income respondents contracted with a private
lawyer and that 68% of them actually paid a fee for those services.70
65. Technology Initiative Grants, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, http://tig.lsc.gov/about-
us/background (last visited July 31, 2012).
66. Over $40 million in Technology Initiative Grants have been distributed and have been
crucial in developing states' legal services websites. For more on the impact of these grants see
TIG's Impact, Legal Services Corporation, http://tig.1sc.gov/about-us/tigs-impact (last visited July
31, 2012).
67. Apps for Justice Wins Future Ed Contest, ITT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW (April
20, 2011), http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/news/apps-for-justice-wins-future-ed-contest; see also Ronald
W. Staudt, All the Wild Possibilities: Technology that Attacks Barriers to Access to Justice, 42 Lov.
L.A. L. REv. 1117 (2009) (describing the prominence of technology that "allows lawyers to build
guided Internet interviews for prospective clients and self-represented litigants").
68. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) defines the Justice Gap as the "difference between
the level of legal assistance available and the level that is necessary to meet the needs of low-income
Americans". Documenting the Justice Gap in America, LEGAL SERVICES CORP. 1 (September 2009),
http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
69. Legalzoom denies allegations that it engages in the unauthorized practice of law but has
paid millions to settle lawsuits against it. See Daniel Fisher, Non-Lawyers FindIt Hard Avoid Break-
ing Bar's Vague Rules, FORBES (July 25, 2011, 10:06 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/07/25/non-lawyers-find-it-hard-avoid-breaking-bars-
vague-rules (discussing non-lawyer battles with bar regulators who monitor unauthorized practice of
law activites). For LegalZoom's perspective on claims of unauthorized practice of law, see Perspec-
tives, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/perspectives (last visited May 14, 2012). See also
Holding & Currie, supra note 61.
70. Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans, ABA 9-11 (1994), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/lpegalneedstudy.pdf; see also Herrera, supra
note 31, at 37-38 (citing ABA Legal Needs Study, ALGODONES ASSOCIATES 7 (1998),
http://www.algodonesassociates.com/legal services/assessing needs/ABA%20Legal%20Needs.pdf.
); see also Access Across America: First Report of the Civil Justice Infrastructure Mapping Project,
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION 3 (October 7, 2011) (stating that evidence suggests that low-income
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Large corporate law firms do not generally service low- and middle-
income clients. 71 The majority of the American population who address-
es their legal problems will therefore look to self-employed lawyers or
less expensive non-lawyer alternatives to address their legal needs. Solo
lawyers are key players in delivering legal services to the majority of the
U.S. population. As a result, solo practice is more than a career path of
last resort. It is the most enduring segment of the bar that has consistently
helped individuals in our society navigate the democratic legal system
we live in.
While the commoditization of legal services may spell doomsday
for many self-employed attorneys, lawyer-entrepreneurs view disruptive
legal technologies as tools to become more competitive and profitable.
Lawyer-entrepreneurs understand the opportunities that exist in offering
affordable legal services, particularly to populations that are underserved.
They learn how to maximize technology to continue to deliver a person-
alized product at a competitive price to be viable in the post-Great Re-
cession era. Lawyer-entrepreneurs build their expertise and their client
base by providing quality legal services and developing a trusted reputa-
tion in their community. As a lawyer-entrepreneur's client base and repu-
tation grows, her success will be measured by her ability to incorporate
technology to grow her market share of both the latent legal services
market and the community of clients who can afford bespoke services.
The eLawyering Task Force of the Law Practice Management Sec-
tion of the ABA has become the bar's most important link to connecting
solo lawyers to the technology they need to become lawyer-
entrepreneurs.7 2 Bill Paul, former ABA president responsible for forming
the eLawyering Task Force, described eLaywering as "the utilization of
the Internet and e-mail networks for the delivery of legal services." The
eLawyering Task Force is well aware of the impact that the hundreds of
legal information websites are having on the solo bar providing personal
legal services. They estimate that in an eighteen month period more than
50,000 no-fault divorces were processed by online services, translating
into approximately $100,000,000 in lost revenue to family law attorneys
nationwide.74 The eLawyering Task Force has done extensive research
people who seek out legal assistance have most of their contacts with private attorneys in fee-based
arrangements rather than with legal aid or pro bono attorneys),
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/research/PursuingLaw-sPromise.html.
71. See discussion of Chicago Lawyers and Urban Lawyer studies infra Part Ill.
72. Granat, supra note 48, at I ("The legal information industry of self-help books/forms has
gone on-line. It has the solo and small law firm segment of the legal profession squarely in its
sights.").
73. Erin Walsh, Some Call It eLaywering, 12 A.B.A. Bus. L. SEC. 3 (2003),
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2003-01-02/walsh.html.
74. Granat, supra note 48, at 2. Richard Granat estimates the $100,000,000 figure by calculat-
ing the 70,000 online divorces that were filed on legal information websites by $1,500, which is the




on consumer preferences, and its members understand that there is little
lawyers can do to stop the continued commoditization of legal services.
This new market for legal services offers consumers greater options and
therefore forces attorneys to alter their pricing structures and strategies
for getting clients. The eLawyering Task Force encourages attorneys to
maximize technology to supplement their existing offering of legal ser-
vices.
To become lawyer-entrepreneurs, solo lawyers need greater instruc-
tion on how to maximize the use of technology to reach untapped mar-
kets. The impact of technology on the legal profession will be most pro-
foundly felt by the self-employed lawyers providing personal legal ser-
vices. As technology facilitates a more competitive legal market, which
drives down the prices of legal services self-employed, lawyers will have
to become well-versed in technology and in communicating their com-
petitive advantage in order to compete with less expensive non-lawyer
providers. Lawyer-entrepreneurs must focus on developing law practices
that facilitate legal service delivery for their clients to be successful in a
market with non-lawyer competitors. New ways of organizing and deliv-
ering legal work through disruptive technologies means that lawyer-
entrepreneurs have a greater capacity to be responsive to the needs of
legal services consumers. Lawyer-entrepreneurs acknowledge that to
remain competitive lawyer-entrepreneurs must integrate the latest tech-
nology into their law practices to offer affordable, accessible, and quality
legal services.
Richard S. Granat, a lawyer-entrepreneur who has co-chaired the
eLawyering Task Force since 2001, has embraced the concept of
eLawyering and virtual law practices.7 6 A Maryland licensed attorney
and formerly an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland, Granat
has been a long-time advocate of more options for moderate-income con-
sumers and the role of the solo bar in increasing access to legal ser-
vices.7 7 Through his virtual law firm, Granat serves self-represented in-
dividuals on family law matters by automating forms that clients com-
plete by filling out an online questionnaire that automatically populates
court-approved family law forms. This process enables Granat to review
a first draft and offer advice to a client at a fixed price similar to those
75. See generally Legal Services, YOUGov (2010), http://sixthsense.yougov.com/general-
market-reports/legal-services/legal-services.aspx.
76. A virtual law practice allows an attorney to deliver legal services through the Internet. The
primary element of a virtual law office is an online client portal where attorneys and clients com-
municate in a confidential platform. Virtual law offices are a complement to a traditional law prac-
tice. See Stephanie L. Kimbro, About the Author, VIRTUAL LAW PRACTICE,
http://virtuallawpractice.orglabout/ (last visited May 14, 2012).
77. Richard S. Granat, About Richard Granat, ELAWYERING BLOG,
http://www.elawyeringredux.com/promo/about/ (last visited May 14, 2012).
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offered by non-lawyer websites.18 Granat admits that such a practice re-
quires a higher volume of clients, but he also relies on technology to
generate the additional traffic. He reports spending approximately 15%
of his gross revenue on marketing through search engine optimization
and pay-per-click advertising. 79 Granat devotes only 250 hours a year to
run his Maryland law firm from his Palm Beach Gardens home.so He
reports a net profit of $45,000 for his part-time practice, which requires
no face-to-face interactions.81
Similarly, Stephanie Kimbro runs a virtual law firm that caters to
low- and moderate-income clients who need help with small business
transactions and estate planning. 82 She unbundles legal services work and
uses payment plans to reduce the cost of legal services.83 Like Granat,
Kimbro works from home or other remote locations and does not have
in-person meetings with clients.84 She started her virtual law firm "to
create a better work/life balance for herself as a mother of two young
children."" She transitioned to a virtual law firm model after starting a
more traditional law practice and finding that many of the individuals
who sought her services could not afford to subsidize her overhead.8 6
The virtual law firm allowed her to have a more flexible schedule, to
attend to her children's needs, and to reduce the cost of her services that
make her accessible to a larger group of potential clients.87
Integrating technology into a traditional law practice and creating a
virtual law firm platform does not mean that client relations are unim-
portant to lawyer-entrepreneurs. The ability to quickly respond to client
inquiries and to efficiently personalize communications requires that
lawyer-entrepreneurs effectively communicate with their clients in a
timely manner. Kimbro emphasizes the need for a client-centered ap-
proach and insists that good customer service is paramount to a success-
ful practice. 8 She suggests that the primary goals for attorneys building
an online client base are to "(1) build the reputation of your online prac-
tice as a secure, efficient, and affordable site to receive legal services,
and (2) build your reputation as a responsive lawyer who pays attention
to the individual online clients' needs."89 Since clients' legal problems
78. Richard S. Granat & Stephanie L. Kimbro, Serving Clients of Moderate Means with On-
Line Legal Services 6 (April 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id at 6.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id.
87. Id.





often transcend various areas of law, lawyer-entrepreneurs are recreating
the concept of solo and small law firms. Recently, Kimbro joined other
lawyer-entrepreneurs at Burton Law and is assembling a group of "re-
mote virtual practitioners in [North Carolina] to provide clients with
more holistic care." 90 Lawyer-entrepreneurs affiliate with like-minded
lawyers who can provide their clients with expertise in various areas of
law. These affiliations have many of the benefits of larger traditional law
partnerships but can reduce overhead and permit greater autonomy.91
Lawyer-entrepreneurs view technological innovations as a tool and
not a substitute to the "brand promise" an attorney needs to build a thriv-
ing law practice. Granat describes a "brand promise" as an attorney's
definition of who she wants to be and how she conveys herself and her
services to others. 92 An online platform can help attorneys with expertise
and a stable reputation build a law practice that provides fixed priced
services. 9 3 He cautions new attorneys to see a virtual presence as one part
of their marketing plan to attract clients. 94 Launching a virtual presence
must come after an attorney defines his identity in the profession by un-
derstanding what type of lawyer he wants to be and what client base he
will represent.95 Other success factors Granat identifies are a lawyer's
ability to maintain a physical office presence that allows for face-to-face
client meetings, and developing a solid network of professionals that can
serve clients' needs.9 6
Lawyer-entrepreneurs understand the importance of balancing via-
bility with accessibility. New ways of organizing and delivering legal
work through disruptive technologies means that lawyer-entrepreneurs
have a greater capacity to be responsive to the needs of legal services
consumers. Lawyer-entrepreneurs believe that the privilege of being a
lawyer comes with a responsibility to serve the public. Like Granat and
Kimbro, lawyer-entrepreneurs see technology as an opportunity to de-
velop products that consumers need and want. The demand for afforda-
ble legal services will continue to grow as the most diverse and techno-
90. Email from Stephanie L. Kimbro to Luz Herrera, Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas
Jefferson School of Law (August 5, 2012) (on file with author). For a bio on Stephanie Kimbro, see
Stephanie Kimbro, BURTON LAW, http://burton-law.comlawyers/stephanie-kimbro (last visited May
14,2012).
91. See This Is Burton, BURTON LAW, http://www.burton-law.com/this-is-burton/ (last visited
May 14, 2012) ("We use the latest technology available not as crutch, but as the driving force to
advance client service. We meet with clients personally. However, our lawyers are not contained
within a typical brick and mortar setting under one roof. Technology allows our lawyers to practice
in a greater geographic footprint while maintaining a work environment as if we are sitting in a
office next to one another.").
92. Richard S. Granat, Virtual Law Practice: Success Factors 3 (2011), available at
http://info.directlaw.com/blog-1/.
93. Id. at 3
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4.
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logically savvy generation in U.S. history plays a more prominent role as
both consumers and providers of legal services. 9 7
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SOLo BAR
For law schools to develop programs that help train law students to
become lawyer-entrepreneurs, law school staff need to understand the
common opportunities and challenges of self-employed attorneys. Alt-
hough, there is not an abundance of scholarship that focuses on the con-
temporary solo lawyer, some key empirical studies cast light on the for-
mation and daily lives of self-employed lawyers.
The most cited study of solo attorneys is Jerome Carlin's Lawyers
on Their Own.98 Carlin's work is now more than 50 years but it continues
to be the most cited authority on solo practitioners." In his work, Carlin
characterizes attorneys in solo practice as a group of unsophisticated and
financially unstable attorneys that give more deference to the dollar than
to professional standards.100 He notes that individual practitioners are
classified into a lower class of the metropolitan bar, consisting of prac-
tices of residual matters and clients.101 The majority of the lawyers Carlin
interviewed were first generation lawyers who attended law schools that
required only a high school degree or equivalent as a prerequisite to
study law.' 02 These lawyers were men who primarily grew up in immi-
grant communities and who saw law school as an opportunity for social
mobility.'03 They decided to attend law school to become professionals
and to be well regarded by their families and communities.'" Most
learned to practice law by observing more senior attorneys and working
for free or for little pay for one to two years while starting their own
97. See discussion of Millennials infra, Part IllB.
98. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 17-18 (1962). In his Methodological Note,
Carlin explains that of the 93 interviewed only 67 were in fact attorneys in full-time independent
practice, 6 were young lawyers just getting started but who had jobs elsewhere, II were no longer
practicing law and 9 were never in private practice. Although Carlin's first chapter includes the
results of all attorneys interviewed, the remaining study focuses on the 67 attorneys in full time law
practice. Id. at 212-15.
99. But see CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES OF
SOLO AND SMALL FIRM ATTORNEYS (1996) (examining the work lives of solo and small-firm law-
yers in New York). See also Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Develop-
ment of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 847 (2001) (examining the
social environment in which solo and small firm attorneys receive. mentoring, training, and advice
from colleagues).
100. CARLIN, supra note 98, at 17-18 (1962).
101. Id.
102. The concern at this time period was focused more on recruiting as many students as pos-
sible rather than looking for quality students. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 3-4. One subject explained, "Principally it was a question of going into some pursuit
that involved respect, dignity. Among Jewish people professions are very important. And with my
parents, they had little or no education, their children should have professions. There was a certain
amount of appeal. Professional men were looked up to then. At one time in former years, the al-
mighty dollar was not as important as it is today."
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practices.105 They reported working for other lawyers but ultimately leav-
ing because of disputes over fees or low compensation. Many of these
lawyers ventured on their own after learning that they could make more
money on their own than as employees. "I was very dissatisfied," ex-
plained one lawyer. 06 "I collected in fees the second year I was there
over $600,000 and I got $25 a week. It was unfair. I quit without having
another job."107
The subjects of Carlin's interviews expressed disappointment that
becoming a lawyer did not facilitate the upward social mobility they had
imagined.'0 Once they hung up their shingles, most of these lawyers had
"little freedom in choice of clients, type of work, or conditions of prac-
tice."' 09 They generally worked for small business owners and individu-
als whose legal problems were classified in eight general areas: business-
corporate work, real estate, tax, personal injury, divorce, collections,
criminal law and probate/estate practice. 0 Carlin found that attorneys in
solo practice took on legal work that more established attorneys did not
want to take and also performed routine legal work that could be per-
formed by non-lawyers." Much of the work solos took on in the early
years of practice required a great investment of time for a small amount
of money.1 2 Lawyers starting their own practices worked in non-legal
jobs to make ends meet and reported that "income in the early years
barely reach[ed] subsistence level."" 3
105. [d. at 8.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 173-85.
109. Id. at 206.
110. Id. at 41-122.
Ill. "Lower-level" lawyers performed work for working-class individuals and small busi-
nessmen that were essentially the same as a broker, such as referring the client to "upper-level"
lawyers. Id. at 114 -15.
112. Id. at 13-14.
113. Id at 14-17. To illustrate a common path and client base when starting a practice, Carlin
uses the example of a young lawyer whom he names Ronald who worked as a telephone solicitor for
a local window shop the year after completing law school and spent the first 18 months after passing
the bar working three different jobs for other small firm lawyers. He began conceptualizing his
practice by entering into an informal agreement with friends with the hope that such an agreement
would lead to a partnership. When one of the friends decided he did not want to share his success
with the others, Ronald opted to enter into a space-for-service arrangement with two other lawyers
who paid him for legal work on an hourly basis while Ronald set up his own practice. The interview
with Ronald revealed that the bulk of his clients were family members, friends, and individuals
within his personal network with personal legal problems. His only corporate client was an insurance
company whose owner was an acquaintance of his brother-in-law. When asked about the financial
viability of his practice Ronald confesses,
"It's really touch and go. I don't know whether I'll make it. I may have to give up the
practice .... I could make a lot more money doing something else. I was offered $10,000
at the lumber yard, and I had a $7,500 offer from the Illinois Commerce Commission."
Despite higher earning potential elsewhere, Ronald explains his decision to continue a career in law
because working in a profession is more valued by his family and community.
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Carlin found that another common characteristic of the solo bar was
the lawyers' propensity to violate the recommended ethical canons of the
time.1 4 Carlin justified the attorneys' inability to follow the recommend-
ed ethical practices because competition to secure clients and make a
living required these lawyers to solicit potential clients," exercise politi-
cal influence," 6 and engage in fee-splitting arrangements with both refer-
ral sources and clients." 7 Carlin concluded that most lawyers in his study
were dissatisfied with their own status within the profession." He char-
acterized them as "men of fairly high ambition who haven't made it.""l9
Two subsequent studies of the various sectors of lawyers in Chicago
offered additional insights into the solo and small firm bar. Each rein-
forced Carlin's portrait of solo lawyers as lawyers who command the
lowest status within the legal profession. The first empirical study of a
cross-section of all Chicago lawyers in 1975 (Chicago Lawyers) found
the profession was divided into one of two distinct hemispheres: lawyers
who represented corporate interests and lawyers who represented the
interests of individuals and small businesses.12 0 The prestige, income,
networks, and relationships of lawyers were found to be primarily deter-
mined by an attorney's client-base. 121 Attorneys who served corporate
clients enjoyed greater prestige and income than attorneys who provided
legal services to individuals and small businesses. 122 Chicago Lawyers
found that a lawyer's client base was a function of ethno-religious and
class background.12 3 Further, it showed that demographic characteristics
reflected the type of law schools lawyers attended.124 Lawyers that at-
tended elite law schools were less likely to practice in solo or small
firms.125
114. The Canons of Ethics in place during the time of Carlin's study were adopted by the ABA
in 1908. These canons were considered best practices and not requirements for lawyers. The Model
Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the ABA in 1969 was the first set of ethics regula-
tions that states adopted as requirements. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 2008); see also Leslie Levin, The Ethical World
of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOus. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004) (describing findings
about ethical practices of 41 attorneys in solo and small firms in the New York metropolitan area).
115. CARLIN, supra note 98, at 155-57.
116. Id. at l57-61.
117. Id. at 161-64.
118. Id. at 173-85.
119. Id. at 200.
120. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 319-320 (1982). The Chicago Lawyers study did not focus on solo and small firm law-
yer but instead randomly selected 777 lawyers from the full spectrum of lawyers in Chicago.
121. Id. at 127-28.
122. Id. at 134.
123. Id. at 167, 206.
124. Id. at 183, tbl.6.1 ("Percentage Distribution of Practitioners from Given Ethnoreligious
Backgrounds by Type of Law School Attended (Whites Only)").
125. See Joyce Sterling et al., The Changing Social Role of Urban Law Schools, 36 Sw. U. L.
REV. 389, 398 (2007) (explaining that 63% of graduates from the top 10 elite law schools and 45%
of the top graduates from schools ranked 11-32, are working in firms of more than 100 lawyers).
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Twenty years later, a similar research team returned to Chicago to
conduct interviews of a different set of attorneys which again spanned
various practice settings.126 The 1995 Urban Lawyers study described a
more specialized and fragmented bar.127 Large law firms with large cor-
porate clients attracted a disproportionate number of graduates from
prestigious law schools, but they began to hire from less elite schools to
satisfy the demand for corporate work.128 Although large law firms began
to hire more women and minorities, most were from the most prestigious
schools.129 Approximately 5% of all local law school graduates were
employed by the largest firms in Chicago.130 Solo and small firms con-
tinued to primarily represent individuals with personal legal services's3
but found increased competition for a fixed amount of work.132 Lawyers
in solo and small firm practice earned less than their corporate counter-
parts had in 1975.1'3 Only 6% of the attorneys surveyed reported hanging
out a shingle upon graduating from law school.13 4
Findings of Chicago Lawyers and the Urban Lawyers studies estab-
lish that non-elite law schools are the primary producers of solo practi-
tioners and that this group of attorneys occupies the least prestigious role
in the profession. The most recent empirical study of lawyers confirms
such findings. The After the JD Project, a national longitudinal study of
attorneys admitted to practice in the year 2000, found that local law
school graduates continue to dominate the small firm and solo practition-
er sectors.' 35 Law schools with a greater number of alumni who work in
the personal services sphere are deemed less prestigious than those
whose graduates work with corporate clients.' 36 However, today's solo
practitioners are more sophisticated and diverse than the lawyers inter-
126. JOHN P HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 6-
7(2005).
127. Carroll Seron, The Status of Legal Professionalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century:
Chicago Lawyers and Urban Lawyers, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 581, 582 (2007).
128. HEINZ, supra note 126, at 175.
129. d. at 57-60.
130. Id. at 58 tbl. 3.1; see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Educa-
tion and the Rise and Fall of Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 863, 875-76 (2007).
131. HEINZ, supra note 126, at 69-70 & tbl.3.2.
132. Id at 162-65.
133. Id. at 317 ("Solo practitioners declined from 21 percent to 15 percent of practicing law-
yers, but from 19 percent to 10 percent in income share ... . In 1995, the 25 percent of lawyers with
the highest incomes received 61 percent of total practice incomes, while the bottom 25 percent
received only 6 percent.").
134. Id at 142. In 1975, 13% of respondents reported starting their law practice immediately
after law school. NALP reported an increase in the number of graduates who reported working as
solo practitioners from 3.3% in 2008 to 5.7% in 2010. James Leipold, The Legal Job Market for New
Graduates Looks a Lot Like it Did 15 Years Ago (Only Worse), in NALP'S EMPLOYMENT FOR THE
CLASS OF 2010-SELECTED FINDINGS 1 (2011), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/
Classof201 OSelectedFindings.pdf.
135. After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal Careers, AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION 25 (2004), http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd.pdf,
see also, Jonakait, supra note 130, at 864 (stating that solo and small firm attorneys continue to
principally render personal legal services and serve small businesses).
136. Id. at 864.
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viewed by Carlin. 3 7 The solo bar includes a large percentage of women
and experienced lawyers who choose solo practice because it offers
greater flexibility and a better lifestyle than working in larger firms. 3 8
The characterization of attorney self-employment as a choice and
not a default decision is affirmed in two studies of solo and small firm
lawyers in the New York metropolitan area. In 2001, Leslie Levin inter-
viewed forty-one solo and small firm lawyers and found that "the typical
solo or small firm practitioner who represents the middle-class client is
not the undereducated and disillusioned lawyer who Carlin described
forty years ago, but rather someone who often has chosen that form of
practice and is generally satisfied with it." 39 She reports that practice
areas of solo and small firm lawyers are more specialized and targeted to
meet the legal needs of middle-class clients and that they receive "more
mentoring and training than previously reported, usually while working
in a law office with other lawyers who can provide substantial opportuni-
ties for observation." 4 0 Levin credits lawyer advice and mentor networks
for helping new attorneys receive answers to their questions and finds
that new lawyers develop their standards of ethical practices by relying
on these communities of practice.141 She acknowledges that technology
has contributed to facilitating communication with colleagues, legal re-
search, and law office management.14 2 Levin confirms that attorneys in
solo and small firm settings are more likely to be disciplined for ethical
violations.14 3 She explains that solo and small firm lawyers have fewer
resources than their counterparts in larger firms to defend disciplinary
actions'" and attributes bias within the profession as another factor to
consider in the disproportionate discipline of solo and small firm law-
yers.145
Perhaps the most illuminating research on understanding attorneys
in solo practice as entrepreneurs was conducted in 1989-1990 by Carroll
Seron. Seron studied the work lives of 102 lawyers in solo and small
firms in the New York metropolitan area who navigated law as a busi-
ness.14 6 For the attorneys Seron interviewed, the decision to "go solo"
largely depended on their desire for autonomy and flexibility in their
work setting as the impetus for starting their own businesses.14 7 Women
particularly reported opting out of the big firm practice to have more
137. Sterling et al., supra note 125, at 403-404.
138. Levin, supra note 99, at 849-850, 853.
139. Levin, supra note 99, at 896.
140. Id.
141. Levin, supra note 99, at 878.
142. Levin, supra note 114, at 316.
143. Id. at 898.
144. Levin, supra note 114, at 314.
145. Id.
146. SERON, supra note 99 at xi.
147. Id. at 12; See also CARLIN, supra note 98, at 184-86; CARROLL SERON, SOLO AND
SMALL-FIRM PRACTICE, IN LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER 35, 39 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1997).
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flexibility in fulfilling their parenting roles.148 Once an attorney made the
decision to be self-employed or to work in a small law firm, the primary
business concern was getting clients.14 9
Similar to Carlin's cohort, the attorneys interviewed by Seron ex-
pressed financial insecurity based on the vulnerability of the market and
an uncertain client base." 0 Most of the attorneys identified referrals from
former clients as the premier way of getting new clients."' They also
cited referrals from professional colleagues as a secondary but important
source of business.152 Like the lawyers surveyed by Carlin, this group of
lawyers saw friends and family as "a big but 'unfortunate' source of
business" because they did not pay for their work.'53 Solo and small firm
lawyers do not have an employer that can pool its resources to subsidize
much pro bono. As a result, solos' financial well-being largely depends
on their referral sources and their clients' ability to pay for legal services.
The attorneys Seron interviewed indicated their methods of creating
a viable client base included, writing newspaper, magazine, and journal
columns, presenting to groups, having articles written about them, creat-
ing brochures, and producing television and radio ads. 154 Their approach
to advertising was determined by whether an attorney was more tradi-
tional or entrepreneurial in their approach to client development. Tradi-
tionalists did not view advertising as a professional activity but preferred
relying on personal social networks to develop their client base. Activi-
ties they indicated led to paying work focused on involvement in their
community through local organizations. 5 5 These attorneys believed that
communication and personal client attention was the key to successful
client development.156 In contrast, entrepreneurs identified thoughtful
market niches developed to target and maximize more expensive media
advertising to potential clients.'57 These entrepreneurs were motivated to
track which brochure, radio spot, or television advertisement yielded the
best return on their investment.' 58 Most solo and small practitioners iden-
148. CARLIN, supra note 98, at at 143.
149. SERON, supra note 147, at 42.
150. Women married to successful men and single attorneys expressed a greater sense of
security than married baby boomer men. Id. at 15. What is notable from Seron's study is that women
were less likely to belong to business development networks. Seron attributes such gendered differ-
ence to "a gendered economy of social capital or a differential access to 'extra' time." Id. at 55-56;
see also SERON, supra note 147, at 36.
151. See SERON, supra note 99, at 140; see also SERON, supra note 147, at 36.
152. See SERON, supra note 99, at 140.
153. Id. at 54-55.
154. SERON, supra note 147, at 37; SERON, supra note 99, at 139.
155. Men were particularly more comfortable than women relying on personal social networks
for client development. Seron attributes the difference to a function of time availability, acknowledg-
ing that women still bear a great deal of the household and child rearing responsibilities. SERON,
supra note 99, at 139-40.
156. SERON, supra note 147, at 42.
157. Id. at 37.
158. SERON, supra note 99, at 139.
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tified a mix of traditional relationship development and advertisement in
the yellow pages or newspapers to get clients.15 9
Seron began her inquiry with a pilot study of self-described entre-
preneurs who saw themselves as businesspersons first and lawyers se-
cond.160 The pilot study guided the researcher to ask whether attorneys
"view their work as a service business or a commercial venture[.]" 6 1 The
pilot revealed that lawyers represented individual clients by managerial,
entrepreneurial, and professional orientations.16 2 She found that attorneys
with managerial orientations systematized and standardized services.
Attorneys with a professional orientation placed a premium on the im-
portance of developing a personalized client relationship based on trust
and privacy.'6 Entrepreneurs were less risk-adverse and thrived on un-
certainty. 165 The entrepreneurial lawyers in Seron's study were described
as having "a crystal-clear sense of what they wanted and eventually
got."l 66 These individuals had an expectation of autonomy while in law
school. They learned about the business of law and how to organize their
practices to be successful. 16 7 Seron found that her subjects' decisions
about transferring professional training into reputational skills and client
development were best understood "by deeply embedded, and paradoxi-
cal, patterns of socialization."1 68 She acknowledged that institutional and
economic forces play an important role in developing a professional
identity but concluded that social values and norms of the individual
attorneys also explain how attorneys decide to become self-employed,
get business, serve clients, and develop their public service ethos.169
The attorneys in Seron's study agreed that law school did not pre-
pare them "to deal with clients, handle a case in local court, or work with
other lawyers."170 They described learning to practice by working for
other solo or small firm practitioners, government, or legal departments
of private companies.171 A few described working in non-legal jobs be-
fore setting up their law offices. 7 2 These lawyers reported learning ter-
minology and courtroom navigation in their first jobs, where they devel-
oped relationships with attorneys and court officials that later served as
resources when researching how to build their own practice.'73 Another
159. SERON, supra note 147, at 137.
160. SERON, supra note 99 at 152.
161. Id at 153.




166. Id. at 10-11.
167. Id at l.
168. SERON, supra note 99, at 139.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 6.





group described observing others and learning by trial and error.17 4 The
minority of lawyers who had mentors claimed an easier transition into
practice, although the mentoring experience was not always positive. 7 5
These attorneys estimated that it took five years for them to become ac-
quainted with the practice of law, and at the end of that self-taught period
they learned that they also had to be proficient in running a business.
This entrepreneurial component seems more difficult for self-employed
lawyers to master than the actual legal work.
Seron confirms that much of the work that comes to solos and small
firms is routine in nature.77 Entrepreneurs see the routine nature as an
asset to serving more clients with fewer resources.7 8 They standardize
their practices to compete with non-lawyers who provide similar assis-
tance at lower rates.17 9 Many of these attorneys employ support staff that
can tackle a greater volume of legal work and are more readily able to
deliver the final product at a lower cost to the consumer. 8 0 The entrepre-
neurs in Seron's study maximized the use of emerging technology to
increase their profit margin and thus lead innovations in the delivery of
legal services.' 8' While less entrepreneurial attorneys computerized legal
forms and documents, only a quarter of the lawyers had computerized
billing and calendaring systems in place.182 Most lawyers indicated they
did not use online legal research tools and reported a preference to com-
municate with support staff through dictation equipment.'8 3 All the wom-
en in part-time solo practice performed the support tasks themselves. 84
The most successful entrepreneurial practices operated on volume, com-
puterized their systems, and had non-attorneys who sent letters and pre-
pared pleadings with a click of a button.'85
Seron's study also provides insight into how solo and small firm
lawyers view the legal profession's creed that lawyers have to pay socie-
ty back in exchange for their license to practice law.1 86 Entrepreneurs
believe that advertising and standardizing legal services fulfills their re-
174. SERON, supra note 147, at 35.
175. See SERON, supra note 99, at 10-11.





181. SERON, supra note 99, at 137.
182. Id at 76.
183. Id at 77.
184. Id
185. Id at 52-55.
186. Comment 6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, "A lawyer should be
mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes
persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should
devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system
of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate
legal counsel." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 6 (2002). .
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sponsibility for public service because of their ability to reach more con-
sumers in need of legal services and to offer a lower price point.' Tradi-
tionalists, on the other hand, discuss public service from the perspective
of volunteerism and are more in line with traditional notions of pro bo-
no.'88 Both sets of attorneys shared anecdotes of not getting paid for a
case, not charging a client, or agreeing to a pro bono request by a bar
association, as public service. 89
Seron concludes that the tension between professionalism and the
commercialization of law actually produces creative professional
paths.' 90 She does not claim that one type of solo or small firm lawyer is
better than the other. Instead she finds that there are many differences
between these groups that lend themselves to a variety of approaches to
the practice of law.191 Seron's entrepreneurs "set out to organize firms in
the media market of New York" 92 at a time when lawyer advertising was
a well-recognized right but which was still largely contained to the con-
fines of attorneys' social networks.' 93 These attorneys incorporated tech-
nology into their law offices' 94 and equated volume work with providing
greater access to legal services.'95 The majority of attorneys viewed
technology as an ancillary part of their practice that should be handled by
their support staff.19 6 Today, it is rare that attorneys in any practice area
would consider not using technology to support their practice. The inte-
gration of technology in today's law practice is the characteristic that
most differentiates today's self-employed lawyers from the ones previ-
ously studied.
As economic pressures and technological advances recreate our
brick and mortar concept of law firms to virtual law offices that can op-
erate from smart phones, the range of lawyers in solo practice will con-
tinue to evolve rapidly and transcend any area of practice or demograph-
ic. Lawyer-entrepreneurs must develop an expertise in law but they also
consciously develop business models that integrate technology and use
creative marketing techniques to create opportunities in untapped or un-
derserved markets. Lawyer-entrepreneurs include today's law students
and lawyers who have not yet learned to create their own opportunities.
187. Id.
188. Leslie C. Levin, Pro Bono Publico in a Parallel Universe: The Meaning of Pro Bono in
Solo and Small Law Firms, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 699, 703-04 (2009).
189. Id. at 716; see also SERON, supra note 99, at 132.
190. SERON, supra note 99, at 143.
191. Id. (stating that "there is a discontinuity between and among them" and "that there is room
for diversity within this professional milieu").
192. Id. at 18.
193. Id. at 48-66.
194. Id. at 102 ("Unlike many of their ore collegially oriented peers, innovators do not describe
themselves as 'computer illiterate' or 'dinosaurs."').
195. SERON, supra note 40, at 88.
196. SERON, supra note 99, at 77-78.
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III. MHLLENNIALS AS LAWYER-ENTREPRENEURS
An article in the February 2012 issue of Fast Company, a self-
described progressive business magazine, states that the current and fu-
ture of business is "pure chaos."' 97 It argues that the pace of change in
our economy and culture is accelerated by the global adoption of tech-
nology and those that can adapt to a fast-changing and chaotic future will
enjoy the most success. 198 The author advances the idea that individuals,
regardless of age, who can "recaliberat[e] careers, business models and
assumptions" are members of Generation Flux-the group that will fare
well in today's society.' 99 Changing business norms dictate that entrepre-
neurship is required not only to start up businesses but also to navigate a
professional career.200 Attorneys are no exception. Professionalization of
attorneys may render lawyers one of the most unprepared groups to join
Generation Flux.20 1 However, Seron explains that "institutional and eco-
nomic forces condition the development" of professional practices.202
A. Lawyers as Entrepreneurs
If environmental factors can influence the direction of professional
paths, then self-employed lawyers can learn to approach their law prac-
tices through an entrepreneurial framework. Lawyer-entrepreneurs are
not defined by any prevailing demographic profile, but by their ability to
adapt to new opportunities. 203 Its membership ranks include young and
old, men and women, and individuals of all ethnic backgrounds. Many of
these lawyers will not initially see themselves as entrepreneurs, but they
will nonetheless be operating their own small business as self-employed
lawyers. An entrepreneurial approach to self-employment includes estab-
lishing a business with an operational infrastructure that allows the self-
employed lawyer to generate a sustainable income.204 Lawyer-
197. Robert Safian, This Is Generation Flux: Meet the Pioneers of the New (And Chaotic)
Frontier of Business, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine
/162/generation-flux-future-of-business ("The future of business is pure chaos. Here's how you can
survive-and perhaps even thrive.").
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. HOFFMAN & CASNOCHA, supra note 60, at 4-6 ("[To] adapt to the challenges of profes-
sional life today, we need to rediscover our entrepreneurial instincts and use them to forge new sorts
of careers."). Reid Hoffman is the founder of LinkedIn.
201. LARSON, supra note 29, at 168 (1977) ("Because the legal profession mediates the institu-
tionalized resolution of conflict, its expertise and its livelihood directly depend on the stability and
legitimacy of a given institutional and legal framework. In the wider sense of the word, the legal
mind is therefore inherently conservative.") For further discussion on how legal education instills
conformity, see ERWIN SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL
MAN? (1964); Susan Strurm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in
a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 521-24 (2007).
202. SERON, supra note 99, at 139
203. HOFFMAN & CASNOCHA, supra note 60, at 49-79 (discussing the importance of adapting
to Plan B or Plan Z when Plan A does not work the way you envision).
204. MICHAEL E. GERBER ET AL., THE E MYTH ATTORNEY XVII (2010) (explaining that the
entrepreneurial myth is that "most attorneys don't own a true business-most own a job disguised as a
legal practice").
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entrepreneurs, like all lawyers, must learn to think like lawyers and pass
all the barriers to entry into the legal profession. 20 5 Additionally, lawyer-
entrepreneurs must also have or form the disposition necessary to run a
business.206
Many lawyers are not business-savvy but this does not mean they
cannot be taught to run viable law practices. Social scientists and econo-
mists tell us that lawyers tend to share particular characteristics but are
much more ambivalent about what defines an entrepreneur.207 Research
concludes that individuals who go to law school exhibit more need for
dominance, leadership, and attention than the general population. 2 08 The-
se studies reveal that prospective law students enter the legal profession
because they are interested "in the subject matter and a desire for intel-
209lectual stimulation" but also for money and prestige considerations.
Even after knowing the amount of debt that they will incur and the diffi-
cult job market that faces them, a significant population will continue to
enroll in law school. In discussing her decision to attend law school, third
year law student Farahnaz Ghaibi, explains, "I knew that law school was
going to be expensive before I attended. But I came to law school be-
cause there were personal and professional goals that I wanted to
meet."2 10 Ms. Ghaibi is not alone.
Despite the outcry over employment statistics, a June 2012 survey
of 645 prospective law students by Kaplan Test Prep found that a law
school's job placement numbers ranked last in the factors that prospec-
tive students considered in their decision about where to apply to law
school. 2 11 We can interpret this lack of priority on job placement on a
205. Barriers to entry include meeting state bar requirements such as exams and a satisfactory
assessment of good moral character.
206. Id at xviii ("The key to transforming your practice-and your life-is to grasp the pro-
found difference between going to work on your practice (systems thinker) and going to work in
your practice as an attorney . . . , it's the difference between going to work on your practice as an
entrepreneur and going to work in your practice as an attorney.")
207. Howard H. Stevenson & J. Carlos Jarillo, A Paradigm of Entrepreneurship: Entrepre-
neurial Management, II STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 17, 19-21 (1990) (providing an over-
view of why entrepreneurs act and stating that "it is extremely difficult to link particular psychologi-
cal or sociological traits casually to patterns of complex behavior, such as entrepreneurship").
208. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself A Review of the Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV 1337, 1403-04 (1997) (summarizing the
research on the literate on lawyer and law student personality traits). Lawyers exhibit similar charac-
teristics to those of law students but are found to be more achievement-oriented, competitive, and
aggressive when compared to non-lawyers. Id. at 1408-09.
209. Id at 1404.
210. Interview with Farahnaz Ghaibi, Student, TJSL, in San Diego, California (April 2, 2012)
(discussing her decision to attend law school).
211. Only 8 percent of respondents ranked job placement as the most important factor. The
cohort surveyed found that 22 percent ranked location as their top consideration, 20 percent identi-
fied academic programming as their main factor and 13 percent considered affordability as their top
criteria. Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Despite Uncertain Employment Landscape, Law School Appli-
cants Still Consider School Rankings Far More Important than Job Placement Rates When Deciding




misunderstanding of employment trends in the legal profession, a desire
to be self-employed, or a belief that a law degree will bring more career
advancement than they previously enjoy. Regardless of the reasons, most
prospective and current law students do not see themselves as entrepre-
neurs, and most law schools do not encourage such personification of
lawyers. Attorneys venture into solo practice for a variety of reasons.
Some find it is the best vehicle to be independent, creative, innovative,
and entrepreneurial. Others do it for greater flexibility with their time.
Still, there is a significant segment that become self-employed by default
after not landing a job of their choosing. Whether lawyers end up work-
ing for themselves due to few career options or if they deliberately hang
up their shingle to fulfill other non-prestige driven goals, what is true of
all these attorneys is that to survive in today's changing landscape, they
must see themselves not just as lawyers but as entrepreneurs.
ActionCoach, an international consultant firm for small businesses,
tells us that the first five phase of entrepreneurial development is to have
a self-employed mindset.2 12 The yearning for greater responsibility and
control over one's life is the primary driver of entrepreneurial success.213
The desire for greater autonomy must be combined with sufficient self-
confidence to propel an individual to do the same work they performed
214
as an employee but to do it on their own. In this first phase of entre-
preneurial development an individual must be willing to take risks and
abandon a zone of security while at the same time create a system of
support that encourages self-development.2 15 The primary pitfall in this
first phase is overconfidence that does not welcome the help of others'
experiences, feedback, and talent.2 16 A related trap is the tendency for the
newly self-employed to want to do everything themselves instead of cre-
ating a team that will work on creating an enterprise. 17 Such an attitude
is premised on the owner working for the business and not the business
working for its owner. Whether an individual with a self-employed
mindset can graduate to additional phases of entrepreneurial develop-
ment largely depends on her ability to see herself as an enterprise and not
as "the most important employee of [her] own self-employed venture."2 18
still-consider-school-rankings-far-more-important-than-job-placement-rates; see also, Karen Sloan,
Survey Suggests Prospective Law Students Still Have Stars in their Eyes, NAT'L L. J. (June 25,
2012).
212. 12 Essential Characteristics of an Entrepreneur, ACTIONCOACH,
http://www.actioncoach.com/downloads/whitepaper-FranchiseRep5.pdf (last visited May 24,
2012). The additional phases of development for successful entrepreneurs are: to lead and manage,
to develop the attitude ofowner/leader, to generate profits by leveraging success from related busi-
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ActionCoach, defines an entrepreneur as a "businessperson who not
only conceives and organizes ventures but also frequently takes risks in
doing so.",21 9 It claims that successful entrepreneurs share the following
twelve common traits: confidence, a sense of ownership, good communi-
cators, perpetual students, team players, dedicated, optimistic, grateful,
gregarious, system-oriented, lead by example, love learning, and are not
afraid of success or failure.220 Entrepreneurs have a strong sense of self-
esteem and belief in their own abilities to meet challenges. 2 2 1 They take
responsibility for finding solutions to problems.2 22 Entrepreneurs are
effective communicators. They develop a keen ear to hear what others
say and learn to communicate to take advantage of available opportuni-
ties. Entrepreneurs love learning.223 They conduct their own research,
they ask questions, and they leam from their errors and failures. Entre-
preneurs work in teams and automate processes to replicate consistent
results.224 They commit to meet specific goals and objectives and rise to
225meet challenges. Entrepreneurs are appreciative of their own and oth-
ers' accomplishments. They do not let shortcomings or disappointments
create obstacles for future advancement. 226 They exhibit enthusiasm for
their projects and can motivate themselves and others.227 Finally, entre-
preneurs allow themselves the opportunity to fail and more importantly,
to succeed. Even if the personality traits of lawyers and entrepreneurs are
not uniform, we know enough about lawyers who run their own business
and successful entrepreneurs to help inform the development of lawyer-
entrepreneurs. Creating opportunities for law students to develop the
self-employed mindset will benefit the students in any career path they
228
pursue as lawyers.
Entrepreneurship flourishes when opportunities close and individu-
als are forced to be creative and innovative. Technology, globalization,
and the increasing competition to deliver legal services have closed tradi-
tional opportunities and are forcing new attorneys to be more creative.
Lawyers who are unemployed, underemployed, or making a living by
taking on contract work are all potential lawyer-entrepreneurs. Lawyers
need to be trained to create their opportunities from their very own lap-
tops. Given job prospects in law and the particular characteristics of our
219. Id.
220. Id; see also Vivek Wadhwa et al., The Anatomy of an Entrepreneur: Family Background
and Motivation, THE KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP (July 2009),
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/ResearchAndPolicy/TheStudyOfEntrepreneurship/Anatomy
%20of/o2OEntre%20071309 FINAL.pdf.










current generation of law students, the Millennial generation of lawyers
may be the best suited group of attorneys to become lawyer-
entrepreneurs. This group has the potential to re-envision the legal pro-
fession and the delivery of legal services for the average consumer.
B. Millennials as Lawyer-Entrepreneurs
Members of the Millennial generation, born between approximately
1980 and 2000,229 are well-positioned to become lawyer-entrepreneurs.
Millennials are important to defining the future of the legal profession
because they are entering the job market just as the "mood of global ur-
gency and public action" is taking center stage. 2 30 They have been hit
hardest in this recession since they are among the "last [to get] hired and
the first to lose their jobs."231 Increasing competition for employment and
an uncertain economy mean that fewer job opportunities will force more
Millennials to generate their own paychecks.2 32 The Millennial genera-
tion is not the first to live through difficult economic times but they are
entering the profession at a time of transition in the legal profession. The
"pure chaos" that many Millennial lawyers are experiencing opens the
door to transformative innovation.
229. While there are various definitions of who belongs in the Millennials, most authors agree
that Millennials were born between 1980 and 2000. See NEIL HOWE & WILLIAM STRAUSS,
MILLENNIALS RISING: THE NEXT GREAT GENERATION 52 (2000) [hereinafter HOWE & STRAUSS,
MILLENNIALS RISING] (setting the starting point for Generation Y at 1982); WILLIAM STRAUSS &
NEIL HOWE, GENERATIONS: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE, 1584 TO 2069, at 335 (1991)
[hereinafter STRAUSS & HOWE, GENERATIONS] (setting Generation Y at those born between about
1982 and 2000); Joan Catherine Bohi, Generations Xand Yin Law School: Practical Strategies for
Teaching the "MTV/Google " Generation, 54 LoY. L. REV. 775, 778 (2008) (setting Generation Y at
those born between 1977 and 2003); Stephanie Armour, Generation Y: They've Arrived at Work
with a New Attitude, USA TODAY MONEY BLOG, (Nov. 6, 2005, 10:35 PM),
http://usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-1l-06-gen-y x.htm (setting Generation Y at those born
between about 1977 and 2002).
230. NEIL HOWE & WILLIAM STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS GO TO COLLEGE: STRATEGIES FOR A
NEW GENERATION ON CAMPUS 4 (2nd ed. 2007); MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS,
MILLENNIAL MAKEOVER: MY SPACE, YOUTUBE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 87-108
(2008) (arguing that Millennials will be responsible for the next a political realignment that will
result in significant institutional changes).
231. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MILLENNIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 39 (2010),
available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1 0/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-
change.pdf; see also Ronald Brownstein, Children of The Great Recession, THE ATLANTIC (May 5,
2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/special-report/the-next-economy/archive/2010/05/
children-of-the-great-recession/56248/ ("Even in this dire climate, some Millennials are finding new
ways to weather the storm, displaying the instinct for pragmatic problem-solving that generational
theorists consider one of their defining characteristics.").
232. Brenna Hawley, Millennials Show a Penchant for Entrepreneurship, Kauffman Survey
Finds, K.C. BUS. J. (Nov. 11, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/kansascity/news/
2011/11/1ll/millennials-show-a-penchant-for.html (reporting on a recent survey that found that 54
percent of people ages 18-32 want to start their own business); see also Lani Rosales, How
Millennials are Conditioned to Be Entrepreneurs, AGBEAT.COM (Mar. 15, 2012) (describing
Millennials as the entrepreneur generation).
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Neil Howe and William Strauss, who have written a series of books
on generations in the United States,233 explain that the Millennial genera-
tion is the largest generation of Americans ever born. 234 Howe and
Strauss explain that Millennials fulfill the social role vacated by the GI
Generation 23 5 and promise to be the next great generation of institution
builders who can push society to new heights.236 They describe
Millennials as optimistic, confident, connected, diverse, team-oriented,
and high achieving.2 37
Millennials' confidence and optimism stems from their belief that
they are "special." These traits are attributed to the parenting approach of
BabyBoomer and Generation X parents who raised their children with a
sense that Millennials are important to society. 238 They were raised with
a children-centric culture that gave birth to "helicopter parents" who
hovered over their offspring to ensure their children's needs were met.239
Millennials' constant parental praise instilled in them a high level of op-
timism-and confidence-in their future success.240 Millennials believe
they can accomplish any goal they set for themselves and are used to
being rewarded merely for undertaking a task. 241 This same confidence
and optimism is necessary to tackle the problem of the lack of access to
legal services to the majority of Americans. While previous generations
have been unable to properly address the large and growing issue of an
233. Their books include: NEIL HOWE & BILL STRAUSS, 13TH GEN: ABORT, RETRY, IGNORE,
FAIL? (1993); HOWE & STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING, supra note 229; WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL
HOWE, THE FOURTH TURNING: AN AMERICAN PROPHECY (1997); STRAUSS & HOWE,
GENERATIONS, supra note 229; WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL HOWE, MILLENNIALS AND THE POP
CULTURE: STRATEGIES FOR A NEW GENERATION OF CONSUMERS IN MUSIC, MOVIES, TELEVISION,
THE INTERNET, AND VIDEO GAMES (2006).
234. The Millennial generation accounted for 27.7 percent of the population in the 2010 Cen-
sus. CATALYST, GENERATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE IN THE UNITED STATES & CANADA 3 (2011),
available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/501/qt generations 8-16-11.pdf.
235. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 22.
236. Id. at 23; see also HOWE & STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING, supra note 229, at 66 tbl.27.
237. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 59-60; HOWE & STRAUSS, MILLENNIALS RISING,
supra note 229, at 43-44, 173-88; cf 12 Essential Characteristics ofan Entrepreneur, supra note
212 (describing the twelve characteristics of successful entrepreneurs).
238. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 59. Parents of Millennials touted family values,
women opted for in vitro children, men wanted to be present at childbirth, and children became
America's top priority. Id. at 60 ("As Millennials have absorbed the adult message that they domi-
nate America's agenda, they come easily to the belief that their problems are the nation's problems,
their future is the nation 's future, and, by extension, everyone in America will naturally be inclined
to help them solve those problems.").
239. Alan Galsky & Joyce Shotick, Managing Millennial Parents, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Jan. 5, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/Managing-Millennial-Parents/130146/ (dis-
cussing parent who "hover" over their children's education).
240. Jeffrey Zaslow, The Most-Praised Generation Goes to Work, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2007,
at W, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl17702894815776259.htmi (stating that
Millennials received so much praise that "employers are dishing out kudos to workers for little more
than showing up"); see also Susan Daicoff, The Future of the Legal Profession, 37 MONASH U. L.
REV. 7, 30 (2011) ("They have been called 'trophy kids' who have a sense of entitlement, as they
have experienced school and extracurricular activities where 'no one loses' and everyone gets a
'thanks for participating' trophy"); Susan K. McClellan, Externships for Millennial Generation Law
Students: Bridging the Generational Gap, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 255, 256 (2009).
241. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 111.
916 [Vol. 89:4
TRAINING LA WYER-ENTREPRENEURS
inaccessible legal system, characteristics of the Millennial generation
imply that they have the audacity to believe they have what it takes to
address the problem and develop a better life-work balance. The Millen-
nial demands work schedule flexibility to have more time for family and
personal passions.242 Most Millennials are interested in flexible work
environments and would rather "bootstrap than to bow down to a corpo-
rate master that treats them poorly." 24 3 Millennials will look at system-
oriented approaches as vehicles to create more family time and less pro-
fessional pressure.244 By creating their own business, Millennials can see
a more equitable return from their work, have a more flexible working
environment, and control the direction of their work.24 5
Millennials share a greater sense of global responsibility than previ-
ous generations.246 They were raised to believe that the success of the
nation is linked to their own success. 24 7 Millennials embrace the concept
of "doing good while doing well," and will therefore be more prone to
create low bono models of legal service delivery through technology that
allow them to do more good and allow them to live well. 24 8 When dis-
cussing career trajectory a current student stated,
Personally, I would love to be able to graduate and do pro bono or
cost-effective legal work. However, when there is $100K of student
loan debt suffocating finances, it's difficult to think that is a realistic
idea.249
While the goal of every generation is to generate favorable profits,
Millennials possess the mindset and potential to generate these same
types of profits in a way that is also helping others. Millennials seek so-
lutions for the pervasive problems facing the society.250 Millennials have
242. Meg Martin, Managing the Millennial Associate, 32 AUG WYo. LAW 58 (2009); see also
Ashley Hacker, Taming the Dragon of Golden Age Standards, 11 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 275 (2009).
243. Rosales, supra note 232, at 6.
244. Id. at 6-7; see also, Navi Radjou et al., Millennials Are the MacGyvers of Business, lBR
BLOG NETWORK (March 13, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/03/
millennials are the macgyvers.html (arguing that Millennials, like the TV character McGyver, are
the do-it-yourself generation that can do more with less).
245. Lani Rosales, How Millennials Are Conditioned to Be Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEURS 10
(2012).
246. WINOGRAD & HAIS, supra note 230, at 103--04.
247. Id.
248. See generally ALAN DERSHOWITZ, LETrERS TO A YOUNG LAWYER (2001) (discussing the
opportunities that young lawyers have to do good and do well). Low bono models of legal services
refer to reduced rates for legal service. Although it is unclear where the term originated it begins to
appear in the literature that discusses the development of the Law School Consortium Project. Low
bono is a play on the concept of "pro bono" ABA Model Rule 6.1 (b)(2) encourages the "delivery of
legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means" as a supplement to pro
bono service. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2006).
249. Interview with Molly Fashola, Student, TJSL, in San Diego, California (Feb. 28, 2012)
(discussing her reaction to a 12/17/2011 N. Y. Times article by David Segal).
250. Daicoff, supra note 240, at 30.
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a desire to improve the world and are innovative enough to remake insti-
tutions, including legal ones, from the ground up. 2 5 1
Millennials are also effective communicators who have strong so-
cial networks facilitated by social media.2 52 Millennials have been re-
ferred to as digital natives because they grew up accessing the world
from their laptops and cell phones.253 They have evolved with the inter-
net and view their smartphones, laptops, and similar devises as exten-
sions of themselves.254 Technology is their second natural language and
that facilitates their ability to communicate with each other constantly
regardless of geographic constraints.255 Millennials seem better prepared
than previous generations to develop effective virtual law office models
by using technology to systemize their work and tap into their client
market.
Millennials are a diverse lot who represent every economic sector
and ethnic group in this country and beyond.25 6 The latest demographic
figures demonstrate that Millennials are a global generation, and in fact,
non-white youth are often the "bigger contributors to this generation's
emerging persona than white youths." 257 The 2010 Census reported that
12.4% of the U.S. population was foreign born 2 5 8 and that almost one-
fifth of the population speaks a language other than English in their
household. 25 9 Non-white Millennials accounted for 39% of the Millennial
population and 11% reported at least one immigrant parent.260 According
to the Law School Admissions Council data, Millennials accounted for
251. Id.
252. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MILLENNIALS WILL BENEFIT AND SUFFER DUE TO THEIR
HYPERCONNECTIVED LIVES 8-9 (2012), available at http://pewintemet.org/-/media//
Files/Reports/2012/PIPFuture of Internet_2012_Young brains PDF.pdf; see also WINOGRAD &
HAIS, supra note 230, at 167 ("Social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook make it
possible for Millennials to share their lives with many more people than anyone, in any other genera-
tion, could have possibly imagined.").
253. Bohl, supra note 229, at 776.
254. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 231, at 8-9.
255. Bohi, supra note 229, at 777.
256. See LSAC Volume Summary-Matriculants By Ethnic and Gender Group, LAW SCH.
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, http://www.Isac.org/1sacresources/datalvs-ethnic-gender-matrics.asp (last
visited May 29, 2012) (reporting the following demographics enrolled in law school during in the
Fall 2010 cycle: 46% Women; 34% Non-Caucasian of which 7.2% were Black; 7.1% Asian; 6.1%
Latino, and 1.7 Puerto Rican).
257. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 41.
258. Native and Foreign-Born Populations by Selected Characteristics: 2010, UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/
12s0040.pdf.
259. Languages Spoken at Home: 2009, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/2012/tables/12s0053.pdf (reporting that 57 million of the
nation's 286 million residents above the age of five speak a language other than English).
260. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MILLENNIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 1, 10 (2010),
available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/20 10/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-
change.pdf. The Pew Report also compares Millennials to the Silent Generation-people born from
1928 to 1945 whose parents immigrated to the U.S. in the late 1800s. Unlike the Silent Generation
that had only 20% of non-Hispanic whites, ethnic and racial minorities make up 39% of the Millen-
nial generation. Id. at 9.
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82% of 2009 law school applicants. 26 1 The Millennial generation will
produce the most diverse group of lawyers in U.S. history.2 62 This diver-
sity of lawyers reflects a complex population that requires lawyers who
are attuned to the particular cultural nuances of each segment of society.
Millennials who can comfortably navigate the cultural dimensions that
surround the client communities they serve will find economic opportu-
nities in traditionally underserved markets.26 3 The growing diversity of
lawyers allows solo and small firm lawyers to target market niches that
reflect their personal interests and histories. Lawyer-entrepreneurs will
develop their client base by addressing the legal needs of individuals
who share their interests, passions, and life histories. Despite the diversi-
ty of interests, backgrounds, and approaches to law, Millennials are less
willing to work in silos.
Millennials work effectively in teams. They prefer socializing in
groups264 and value the contributions of their cohorts .265 Entrepreneurs
similarly understand that a business requires an investment of resources
from a larger constituency, so they assemble teams that can accomplish
more than any individual.2 6 6 Self-employed Millennial lawyers will con-
tinue to operate their own businesses, but they will be more likely to as-
26semble law firms that leverage their collective power.267 Millennials are
likely to seek innovative, technology-based, sustainable, cooperative
ways to practice and adjudicate law but are not likely to enjoy the soli-
tary, isolated aspects of the traditional practice of law. 2 68 When I shared
some of my ideas with a current student, a Millennial, he responded,
I think my generation is even more willing to work with others, tear
down borders, yet feel confident to go forth (take risks) to make sys-
tems more simple and fair. I feel large firms are a hegemonic reaction
to overpower adverse clients and maximize profit. I see our genera-
261. Kimberly Dustman & Phil Wandwerk, Analysis ofLaw School Applicants by Age Group,
LAW SCHOOL ADMIsSIONS COUNCIL (October 2010),
http://lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/PDFs/Analysis-Applicants-by-Age-Group.pdf.
262. See LSAC Volume Summary-Matriculants By Ethnic and Gender Group, LAW SCHOOL
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, http://www.1sac.org/1sacresources/datalvs-ethnic-gender-matrics.asp (last
visited May 29, 2012) (reporting the following demographics enrolled in law school during in the
Fall 2010 cycle: 46% Women; 34% Non-Caucasian of which 7.2% were Black; 7.1% Asian; 1.6%
Puerto Rican and 6.1% other Latinos).
263. Since 2000, the Latino community grew by 43% and accounts for the more than half of
total growth in the United States. Karen Humes et al., Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010
Census Brief 3 (Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen20lO/briefs/c2OlObr-02.pdf. Lawyers
who can navigate segments of this diverse cultural community that demands bilingual services will
fare well in the next three or four decades.
264. Daicoff, supra note 240, at 20; see also HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at ch. 9.
265. Tom Gimbel, Managing Millennials, 26 No. 6 LEGAL MGMT. 20 (2007) ("They are part
of the no-person-left-behind generation, and they're willing to fight for what is fair.").
266. 12 Essential Characteristics of an Entrepreneur, supra note 212; HOWE & STRAUSS,
supra note 230, at 121; see also Brownstein, supra note 231.
267. See Stephanie Kimbro, supra note 90; This Is Burton, supra note 91.
268. Id.
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tion utilizing technology to level the playing field, pull power away
from large firms, make the system more efficient and with confi-
dence, work in a friendly team environment to progress society.269
All Millennials will not become lawyer-entrepreneurs, but those who
forge forward to create new models of legal service delivery that will
provide consumers with a more affordable product that fits their particu-
lar needs.270
Millennial generation law students have much to offer the legal pro-
fession. As law schools reevaluate their curriculum and their commit-
ment to producing successful attorneys, they must not ignore the im-
portance of providing prospective lawyer-entrepreneurs with the net-
works and tools they need to be successful. What lawyer-entrepreneurs
need is a law degree that helps them be lawyers. In addition to substan-
tive knowledge of law, law students need to know how to leverage tech-
nology to create income streams that will allow them to pay their living
expenses and manage their educational debt.271 To better prepare our law
students we must elicit the assistance of others who are better versed in
technology, business, and management. Lawyer-entrepreneurs need to
graduate with business plans that target niche markets, use technology to
create viable income streams and create work-life balance to lead happy
lives.
IV. EXPERIMENTS IN TRAINING LAWYER-ENTREPRENEURS
Programs to train lawyer-entrepreneurs will require collaboration
between law schools, bar organizations, and individuals with special
skills to help lawyers establish viable business models. Law schools that
are already collaborating with the practicing bar and professionals who
support lawyer businesses are in a stronger position to develop programs
that produce lawyer-entrepreneurs. Targeting skills programs to address
the business needs of lawyer-entrepreneurs can benefit all students. Law
firm partners, managing attorneys in government agencies, executive
directors of nonprofit legal organizations, law school deans, and mem-
bers of the judiciary are all lawyers that must understand the cost of de-
livering legal services to be successful leaders in their field. Attorneys
who understand that every action to advance or curtail justice has a price
tag are more likely to synthesize the various components that limit or
269. Email from Eric Jon Bolt, TJSL student, to Luz Herrera, Assistant Professor of Law,
Thomas Jefferson School of Law (Feb. 24, 2012) (on file with author) (responding to my statement
that a diversity of approaches to lawyering is something Millennials welcome).
270. HOWE & STRAUSS, supra note 230, at 159 ("[H]igh-achieving Millennials will expect to
create products that compete actively with 'real world' professional products."); see also PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, MILLENNIALS: A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT 1, 13 (2010) (stating that
Millennials see "technology use is the single most popular response").
271. See Segal, supra note 2 ("[W]hen the numbers are crunched, studies find that most law
students need to earn around $65,000 a year to get the upper hand on their debt.").
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avail our system of justice.272 To understand legal need and how we can
address it, lawyers need to understand that consumers of legal services
want something more affordable than $10,000 retainers and hourly rates
of $300. As legal aid and court budgets are cut, law schools can address
the growing need for legal services and their alumni by facilitating pro-
grams that encourage newly minted lawyers to engage in some pro bono
and set fees at rates lower than market for at least a segment of their cli-
ents. This section briefly highlights existing and emerging efforts by law
schools to advance such models.
A. The Law School Consortium Project
The Law School Consortium Project (LSCP), funded by a grant
from the Open Society Institute, was the latest coordinated law school
effort to encourage more collaboration between law schools and the bar
in an effort to support solo and small firm lawyers.273 LSCP was formed
by City University of New York School of Law, University of Maryland
Law School, Northeastern University School of Law, and St. Mary's
University School of Law in 1997 .274 LSCP was founded on the notion
that law schools could help address the needs of low and moderate in-
come individuals by offering training, mentoring, and support to solo and
small-firm lawyers to serve their communities.27 5 LSCP supported law
schools' creation of support networks for solo and small-firm alumni to
facilitate training and education of new lawyers while advancing an
agenda for affordable legal services.276 A group of law schools developed
programs and formal networks,277 and in 2009, the LSCP national board
"went into a state of rest, having achieved its goal of establishing suc-
cessful practitioner networks to assist solo and small-firm lawyers serv-
272. There is a handful of emerging for-profit business ventures that seek to partner with law
schools to help train their graduates. But since those programs do not focus on increasing access to
justice, they have been excluded from discussion in this article. For an example of such an entity, see
LAW BUSINESS WORLD, http://www.lawbusinessworld.com (last visited July 22, 2012).
273. For a history of the founding and more detailed description of the Law School Consortium
Project, see Deborah Howard, The Law School Consortium Pruject: Law Schools Supporting Grad-
uates to Increase Access to Justice for Low and Moderate-Income Individuals and Communities, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1245, 1245-47 (2002);
274. Kristin Booth Glen, To Carry It On: A Decade ofDeaningAfter Haywood Burns, 10 N.Y.
CrrY L. REV. 7, 19-23 (describing how the Open Society Institute was used at CUNY School of
Law).
275. Howard, supra note 273, at 1245-46.
276. Id. at 1246-47.
277. Id. at 1245 n. 1. Although St. Mary's University School of Law withdrew from the LSCP
in 2000, the following law schools were also members: University of Michigan School of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law, New York Law School, Rutgers University, Syracuse
University School of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law, Thomas Cooley School of Law,
and Touro Law Center. The University of California Berkeley School of Law, The University of
California Davis School of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, University of the Pacific
McGeorge School of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law and Santa Clara University
School of Law joined forces to form the Northern California Collaborative. Law School Consortium
Project, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY LAW, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ll 03.htm (last
visited May 31, 2012).
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ing low and moderate-income individuals and communities nation-
wide."27 8 Some of these law schools continue their efforts to provide
support to their alumni who advance low bono work through solo and
small firm practices, but the University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law (Maryland School of Law) and City University of New
York (CUNY) School of Law and are the two that have already tested
two models-the affiliated non-profit support center and the post-
graduate incubator program.279
1. Maryland School of Law & Civil Justice, Inc.
Before the LSCP was formed, Maryland School of Law faculty and
alumni began developing the concept of Civil Justice, Inc. (Civil Justice)
-an independent non-profit organization affiliated with the Maryland
School of Law.2 80 Civil Justice operates a referral service that pairs a
network of solo and small firm lawyers committed to increasing access
to low- and moderate-income individuals. 281 Civil Justice offers mentor-
ing and networking opportunities that include informal counseling by
law school faculty and co-counseling arrangements with more experi-
enced attorneys.2 82 It also offers its members assistance in the manage-
ment of their practices to help them comply with ethical obligations and
run more effective law practices. 283 Civil Justice refers prospective cli-
ents to the solo and small firm bar who then negotiate their prices with
clients.284 Maryland School of Law supports Civil Justice by introducing
the skill set required to operate small law firms in their curriculum pro-
gram via its clinics, law practice management courses, and a professional
28responsibility course.285 Membership fees, referral fees, and staff attor-
ney fees from fee-shifting cases support Civil Justice.
2 8 6
In January 2011, Maryland School of Law partnered with Civil Jus-
tice to introduce its Solo Practice Incubator for Justice (Maryland's Incu-
278. The Law School Consortium Project, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/programs/clinic/initiatives/Iscp/ (last visited March 4, 2012).
279. Howard, supra note 273, at 1248-49.
280. Professors Michael Milleman and E. Clinton Bamberger worked with five alumni to
create the concept of Civil Justice, Inc. History, CIVIL JUSTICE, INC.,
http://www.civiljusticenetwork.org/About/Historymission.aspx (last visited May 31, 2012).
281. Member Benefits, CIVIL JUSTICE, INC., http://www.civiljusticenetwork.org/ForAttorneys/
Memberbenefits.aspx (last visited May 31, 2012).
282. Id
283. Id.; see also Howard, supra note 273, at 1249 (explaining that Civil Justice, Inc. offers its
members "mentoring; networking and peer technical assistance; practice management assistance;
substantive law training; access to a listserv; legal products and services at a reduced rate; a client
referral service; marketing services and opportunities; and mediation training").
284. Member Benefits, supra note 281.
285. Michael Millemann, The Symposium on the Profession and the Academy: Concluding
Thoughts, 70 MD. L. REV. 513, 524 (2011).
286. For a list of past cases, see Civil Justice Past Cases, CIVIL JUSTICE, INC.,
http://www.civiljusticenetwork.org/About/CivilJusticePastCases.aspx (last visited June 5, 2012).
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bator).287 Participants in Maryland's Incubator work for six months out
of Civil Justice's office across the street from Maryland School of
Law. 28 8 They receive discounted office space, training on. law office
management, mentoring from attorneys that belong to the Civil Justice
network and the opportunity to work on grant-funded initiatives that gen-
erate attorney fees. 2 89 The Career Development Office at Maryland
School of Law oversees program management and Civil Justice attorneys
provide training and guidance for new attorneys. 29 0 During their time in
Maryland's Incubator, attorneys will develop a business plan that outlin-
ing case management, billing practices, marketing, and other necessary
functions of their law office operations.291 Although Maryland's Incuba-
tor is still in its initial stages of development, Civil Justice has become an
important support structure for Maryland School of Law's alumni in solo
and small firm practice.292 Maryland School of Law has also partnered
with its alumni to launch JustAdvice. 29 3 JustAdvice offers legal services
consumers access to their alumni and oier lawyers who are willing to
provide a 30-minute consultation for $10 at clinics in family law, hous-
ing, criminal, employment, expungement, insurance, government bene-
fits, tax and elder law. 29 4 The program addresses legal need but also ex-
poses attorneys to a new group of prospective clients. Law schools are in
a strong position to develop these symbiotic relationships to support their
students and assist their local communities.
2. CUNY & Community Legal Resource Network
The City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law under-
stands this opportunity well. CUNY School of Law has perhaps the most
active and largest alumni support network and incubator for self-
employed graduates. The Community Legal Resource Network (CLRN)
is based at CUNY School of Law and operates primarily through a
listserv that connects more than 300 attorneys who are otherwise isolated
in solo and small firms.295 The virtual community allows alumni to sup-
port and mentor each other while CUNY staff facilitates continuing legal
education, discounts on law office management software and products,
and coordinates initiatives such as the Incubator for Justice (CUNY's
287. Law School Solo Practice Incubators and Legal Residency Programs 25, Hanover Re-
search (2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Hanover Report].
288. Id
289. Telephone interview with Leigh Maddox, Executive Director of Civil Justice, Inc. (July
14, 2012); see also Hanover Report, supra note 287, at 25-26.
290. Id
291. Id.
292. History, supra note 280. Approximately 80 attorneys belong to the Civil Justice network.
Hanover Report, supra note 287, at 26.
293. JUST ADVICE, http://justadvice.wordpress.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
294. THE PEOPLE'S LAW LIBRARY: LEGAL SERVICES DIRECTORY, http://www.peoples-
law.org/node/762 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012)
295. See Community Legal Resource Network (CLRN), CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.cuny.edu/clinics/Justicelnitiatives/Community.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
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Incubator).29 6 The program was founded to address the needs of students
and the communities they went to law school to represent.
CUNY's Incubator, established in 2007, trains CLRN members in
general law office management issues such as "billing, record-keeping,
technology, bookkeeping and taxes while, at the same time, facilitating
Incubator participants' involvement in larger justice initiatives and in
subject-based training in immigration law, labor and employment and
other topics that will arise continually as these attorneys build their prac-
tices., 2 97 The CUNY Incubator accommodates up to twelve attorneys
into solo and small law firms over an eighteen-month period.2 98 The at-
torneys independently operate their law firms but CUNY supports these
attorneys by facilitating the space at an affordable rate. CUNY alumni
pay $500 in rent for office space in downtown Manhattan, which is
shared with an adjunct faculty member and alumna, Laura Gentile, who
teaches law office management, is available to answer questions about
law office procedures. 2 99 "I will teach them everything from how to ana-
lyze and select a malpractice policy, to how to manage their money so
they never fall off the edge of doom," explains Gentile. 300 Participants in
CUNY's Incubator receive training "to fine-tune their skills as both law-
yers and micro-entrepreneurs. [Their] training provides participants with
the skills to eventually launch solo practices in underserved New York
City communities."'o CLRN and the CUNY Incubator use their network
to provide low-cost legal services to individuals in New York that would
not otherwise have access to lawyers.
The CUNY Incubator has become the model program for other law
schools seeking to support their self-employed graduates and address the
need for more affordable legal services. Fred Rooney, former director of
CLRN, is credited with establishing the CUNY Incubator and advising
law schools on how to develop similar efforts. 302 The CUNY Incubator
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Jonathan D. Glater, Lawyers Learn How to Be Businesslike, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008, at
B6.
299. Richard Zorza, NewsMaker Interview-Fred Rooney on the CUNY Incubator, RICHARD
ZORZA'S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Sept. 11, 2011). http://accesstojustice.net/
2011/09/22/newsmaker-interview-fred-rooney-on-the-cuny-incubator/; see also Emily Sachar,
CUNY to Train Start-Up Lawyers in Business Basics to Enhance Justice, CUNY LAW: A
COMMUNITY OF JUSTICE 6 (2007), available at http://www.law.cuny.edu/giving-
alumni/cunylaw/archive/07-fall-cunylaw.pdf.
300. Glater, supra note 298, at B6.
301. Zorza, supra note 299 (quoting Fred Rooney).
302. Fred Rooney reports that CLRN has provided technical support for the development of
incubators at the following schools: California Western School of Law, Charlotte School of Law,
Cleveland-Marshall School of Law, Florida International School of Law, Georgia State University
School of Law, McGeorge School of Law, Pace Law School, Seattle University School of Law,
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, University of California-Irvine School of Law, and University of
Maryland School of Law. Email from Fred Rooney, Dir., CLRN at CUNY Law, to Luz Herrera,
Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law (March 30, 2012) (on file with author).
In June 2012, Fred Rooney left CUNY to develop an incubator program in the Dominican Republi-
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relies on various funding sources that subsidize the cost of rent for incu-
bator participants and pays for CUNY personnel that provide support. 303
In addition to the law school, additional funding sources include private
foundations, state workforce development funds, and elected officials.
Elected officials provide CUNY School of Law grants to coordinate their
incubator participants into the various boroughs and offer legal services
for free to their constituents. Rooney reports that his success in raising
money is directly related to funders' interest in contributing to greater
access to justice in underserved communities. 305 Incubator programs such
as CUNY's give law schools the opportunity to offer greater support to
their self-employed graduates and to address legal needs in their local
communities.
B. Other Incubators
Other law schools have followed CUNY's example. In November
2010, the University of Missouri Kansas City (UMKC), in collaboration
with the Missouri Bar Association and the Kansas City Metropolitan Bar
Association, announced its own incubator.306 The incubator, with the
capacity to accommodate 8 to 10 lawyers, is housed next to the entrepre-
neurial clinical programs and across from the Kauffman Foundation of
Entrepreneurship. 307 The UMKC incubator also provides support in law
office management and mentoring to start law practices and is part of
UMKC's ongoing commitment to encourage entrepreneurship. UMKC's
commitment includes the Solo and Small Firm Institute, which has orga-
nized classes and a series of workshops focused on business planning,
founding and operating a law firm.308 UMKC reports that more than 150
graduates have completed the school's existing Solo and Small Firm
Institute curriculum between 2004 and the summer of 20 10.309 The Solo
and Small Firm Institute curriculum includes courses taught by faculty
from the Missouri-Kansas City Henry W. Bloch School of Business and
Public Administration. 3 o The curriculum helps prepare graduates to ap-
ply for the incubator. To be eligible to participate in the incubator, appli-
cants must submit a business plan that includes the intended practice
can through a Fulbright Fellowship. Interview with Fred Rooney, in San Diego, California (July 24,
2012).
303. Hanover Report, supra note 287, at 17 (reporting that the incubator is financed by CUNY,
private foundation funds, state fund sand participants' rent contributions).
304. Id.
305. Interview with Fred Rooney, in San Diego, California (July 24, 2012).
306. Steve Vockrodt, UMKC Incubator Preps Lawyers for Small, Solo Practices, KAN. CITY
Bus. J. (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/print-edition/2010/ll/12/umkc-
incubator-preps-solo-lawyers.html?sprint.
307. See Solo and Small Firm Incubator, UMKC SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.umkc.edullncubator (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).
308. UMKC School of Law Launches Solo and Small Firm Incubator, UNIVERSITY OF
MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.umkc.edu/news/news-release.asp?id-959.
309. Id The Solo and Small Firm Institute was launched in 2004. Id.
310. Id.
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areas, a marketing plan, three years of financial projections, and a state-
ment of commitment to offer free or low bono legal services to the local
community. 31l The UMKC Incubator is supported by private donors, law
firms, and local bar associations. 3 12
Florida International University College of Law (FIU) has similarly
developed the LawBridge program which it describes as "a post-graduate
program that provides new lawyers an opportunity to enter an appren-
ticeship with elements akin to both a medical school residency and a
business school entrepreneurial incubator." 313 The "LawBridge" program
provides program participants with office space in downtown Miami and
coaches them in a variety of areas related to law practice management,
accounting and risk management. 3 14 LawBridge participants meet period-
ically with bankers, accountants, marketing experts, and other profes-
sionals to discuss various aspects of the business side of the legal profes-
sion.315 The LawBridge program offers lectures and continuing legal
education courses, as well as structured networking opportunities with
316other members of the legal profession. FLU limits participation in the
LawBridge program to alumni who are admitted to the Florida bar within
twelve months of graduation. 3 17 Applicants must pay a $50 application
fee and submit a resume, a statement of interest, and an executive sum-
mary of their business plan." 8 Once admitted, participants must sign a
license agreement with FIU where participants agree to carry profession-
al liability insurance, comply with ethics rules, attend continuing legal
education courses, and participate in pro bono services. While it is not
clear that FIU's program encourages pro bono or low bono work, it has
the potential to meet unmet legal needs in Miami.
In the summer of 2012, California Western School of Law (Califor-
nia Western) and Thomas Jefferson School of Law (TJSL) announced
the launch of their incubator programs. 320 Both law schools received
311. Application Process, UMKC SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.umkc.edulcareers-cle/solo-and-
small-firm-application-process.asp (last visited July 2, 2012).
312. Sponsors, UMKC SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.umkc.edu/careers-cle/solo-and-small-firm-
incubator-sponsors.asp (last visited July 2, 2012).
313. Law Bridge: A Legal Residency Program, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY




316. Law Bridge FAQs, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://law.fiu.edu/alumni/lawbridge-a-legal-residency-program/lawbridge-faqs/ (last visited July 2,
2012).
317. Id.
318. Law Bridge Solo Practice Incubator Application for Admission, FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, http://law.fiu.edulwp-content/uploads/2012/
05/FlU-Law-Bridge-Application- 11-08-1 l.pdf (last visited July 2, 2012).
319. Id.
320. Karen Sloan, The Next Solo Incubator Will be in San Diego, NAT'L L. J. (May 15, 2012);




technical assistance from Fred Rooney and have developed their pro-
grams to meet the legal needs of the local community.321 California
Western's affiliated program, Access to Law, asks its attorneys to pledge
to provide a minimum of 100 pro bono hours per year.322 TJSL works
with the Family Justice Center to offer its clients legal information and
consultations in the areas of immigration, criminal, and landlord tenant
law. Both programs collaborate in offering continuing legal education
courses to their alumni and are linked to lawyer networks similar to
CLRN.323 Both programs have individuals who counsel these new law-
yers on how to developing low-bono opportunities to help build their
client base and address local need. In anticipation of its launch, TJSL
worked with MBA students at San Diego State University to develop law
office manuals and a business plan guide for its incubator participants.324
To develop a more robust pipeline into its incubator, TJSL also intro-
duced the Solo Practice Concentration to its curriculum in August
2012.325 Similar to the UMKC program, TJSL's Solo Practice Concentra-
tion attempts to get students ready for solo and small firm law practice
before graduation day.
The Columbus Bar Association offers a model for law schools who
wish to more directly collaborate with the organized bar and other law
schools. In April 2011, in Columbus Ohio, the Columbus Bar Associa-
tion launched a professional development center called Columbus Bar
inc.126 The "inc" in the program name is short for incubator and intends
"to offer new lawyers valuable experience and ongoing education to help
build their professional career, develop sound business management
skills, and engender high ethical standards."327 Columbus Bar inc select-
ed a total of eight recent law graduates from Capital University Law
School and Moritz College of Law to participate in a one year pilot pro-
gram to help participants launch solo practices. 3 28 The incubator is
housed in the same building as the Columbus Bar Association and
through its attorney network offers participants mentoring on "client
intake, billing practices, law office management, marketing, case man-
agement, discovery, and other practice-related topics." 329 Incubator par-
ticipants pay rent for fully-furnished space but the bar association helps
subsidize their costs by sending participants referrals from the bar's law-
yer referral service. In exchange for the support and mentoring, partici-
321. Id.
322. Sherwin, supra note 320.
323. Id.; see also Sloan, supra note 320.
324. Hanover Report, supra note 287, at 29-30
325. Steve Semeraro, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Commits to Solo Practice, THOMAS
JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW (May 21, 2012), http://www.tjsl.edu/news-media/2012/6505.
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pants agree to take on pro bono cases from the Columbus Bar Associa-
tion's Lawyers for Justice program.330
As law schools and bar associations look for ways to better support
new attorneys starting their own law firms, more collaboration between
bar associations, law schools, and even legal aid providers is likely to
emerge. 33 In addition to programs that help law students prepare for solo
and small firm practice, law schools are more seriously exploring the
option of establishing non-profit law firms to provide post-graduate resi-
dencies that offer new attorneys additional opportunities for skill devel-
opment.
C The Law School Firm
More law schools are piloting projects that create opportunities for
their graduates to learn to practice law by offering low bono work.332
Like the incubator programs, these new efforts promise to offer legal
services consumers reduced cost legal services. Although the idea of
establishing nonprofit law firms as a training ground for attorneys is not
new,333 the idea for such a model has recently gained traction.
In their law review essay, The Law School Firm, Professors Bradley
T. Borden & Robert J. Rhee propose that law schools establish nonprofit
law firms that are separate from but affiliated with law schools. They
acknowledge that among other considerations, ethics rules regarding fee
sharing and law school accreditation standards would need to be modi-
fied for the model to work, but they encourage law schools to begin "a
small-scale pilot program to see if the model is feasible".33 4 Their
thought piece offers a proposal for models that resembles a U.K. model
of legal training that envisions two-years of law school curriculum with
additional years of apprenticeship training.33 5 Another option presented is
330. Id.
331. In November 2011, the Boston Bar Association's Task Force on the Future of the Profes-
sion recommended the appointment of a committee to explore the development of a pilot incubator
program to provide lawyers assistance in setting up their own law firms. Report ofthe Boston Bar
Association Task Force on the Future of the Profession, Boston Bar Association 3 (2011), available
at http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/future-of-prof-task-force.pdf. The Chi-
cago Bar Foundation has also set up a committee to establish a post graduate program that would
support the development of practical skills and provide much needed legal pro bono services. State
Bar of California President Jon Streeter formed the 21-member Task Force on Admission Regulation
Reform to explore adding a practice training requirement for bar admission that has been dubbed by
some as a "legal residency" program. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Bar Mulls Apprentice Mandate, L.A.
DAILY J., Jan. 11, 2012. The task force will not release its recommendations until December 2013.
See Don J. DeBenedictis, Deans Defend Training at Schools, L.A. DAILY J., June 13, 2012 (discuss-
ing caution raised by law school deans to any proposed requirement).
332. Email from Fred Rooney to author, supra note 302.
333. Jeanne Chain, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the Lawyering
Process at Harvard Law School, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 75, 90 (2003) ("Finally, it was our hope that
lawyers in law schools and lawyers in practice would collaborate to study and experiment with
different allocations of their joint responsibility for preparing lawyers for practice.").
334. Id. at 3.
335. Id at 4.
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to retain the three year law degree but to offer opportunities at the law
firm for third year students. 336 Several law schools have begun to exper-
iment with the ideas of establishing law school law firms.
In November 2011, the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of
Law announced its collaboration with a privately owned law firm to
work with their alumni to "expand the availability of legal services and
service-learning opportunities."33' The private law firm, University Law
Group, works with recent graduates who pass the bar to provide legal
services in the areas of employment law, family law, bankruptcy, small
business formation, contract disputes, small claims, and small trusts and
estates, in addition to research assistance.338 An alumnus and former
BigLaw 339 partner, Dennis Gladwell, oversees the pilot program. 340 Many
University Law Group services are based on flat-rate fee arrangements of
$40-$50 per hour.34' University Law Group occupies temporary space at
the law school and pays lawyers an hourly rate based on the type of work
and the client's ability to pay.342 It relies heavily on referrals from attor-
neys who cannot provide the representation needed by low- to-mid-level
income families and individuals.34 3 The program's goals are "to show
that by serving low- and moderate-income Americans and small busi-
nesses with modest fees, the returns can be sufficient" and to provide
students with additional opportunities to learn. 3 "
In the fall of 2011, Pace Law School also announced the creation of
a school supported law firm that helps launch new attorneys into their
own practices. 34 5 Pace Community Law Practice will employ between
five and seven of their law school graduates who will be classified as
fellows and will be paid by the law school. Their work will include low
bono and fee sliding cases.346 The program is supported by a $100,000
foundation grant but the law school is raising money to support the pro-
336. Id. at 4-5.
337. Utah Law School Offers "Low Bono" Services with Recent Graduates, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Nov. 18, 2011, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/52938370-78/law-services-legal-low.html.csp; see
also Nic Dunn, Law Group Offers Low Bono Help, SALT LAKE CHRON., Nov. 22, 2011,
http://www.dailyutahchronicle.com/?p=2559714.
338. Utah Law School Offers "Low Bono" Services with Recent Graduates, supra note 337.
339. "BigLaw" is a popular term used by many blogs and in the legal community to describe a
law firm with a minimum of 101 attorneys that represent large corporations. An Introduction to
"Biglaw", TOP-LAW-SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.top-law-schools.com/introduction-to-biglaw.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
340. Email from Dennis Gladwell (July 3, 2012) (on file with author).
341. Id.
342. Telephone interview with Dennis Gladwell (July 3, 2012).
343. College of Law Announces University Law Group to Provide Low Bono Services to Un-
derserved Populations, UTAH L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://today.law.utah.edu/201 1/1 1/college-
of-law-announces-university-law-group-to-provide-low-bono-services-to-underserved-populations/.
344. Dunn, supra note 337.
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ject.34 7 The Pace Community Law Practice, although it employs its grad-
uates, promises to introduce important topics, such as assistance with
client development, malpractice insurance, and setting up a law practice,
through the use of seminars.3 4 8 The Pace model is a hybrid incubator and
post-graduate residency program that promises to hire the lawyer partici-
pants and pay them approximately $42,000.349 The Pace Community
Law Practice is scheduled to open on the law school campus in the fall of
2012.350
The Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of
Law (ASU Law School) also announced plans to create an affiliated
nonprofit training law firm.3 5 1 Dean Douglas Sylvester specified that the
current plan includes providing five opportunities for 15 to 30 lawyers
who would be supervised by five or six attorneys with experience in
practice areas that include bankruptcy, family law, and business organi-
zation.352 Plans for financing include private donations, law school funds,
and charging clients reduced rate fees. 3 53 The un-named ASU Law
School affiliated law firm indicated that although they are still fine-
tuning their program, they anticipate having the law firm operating by
2013.35
These are only some examples of what law schools are doing to re-
spond to the needs of recent graduates and the community. By no means
is this overview intended to be inclusive and complete. It merely at-
tempts to offer law schools working on similar efforts basic information
to help in the development of such projects. Law schools are just em-
barking on their journey to train lawyer-entrepreneurs, but what is clear
from existing and emerging efforts is that greater instruction on client
development and law office management will be key components in sup-
porting the development of self-employed lawyers.355
347. Id
348. Id; see also Tieme Plumb, Pace Law School Enters the In-House Law School Market,
PRELAW (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/pace-law-school-enters-house-law-
school-market.
349. Bob Rozycki, Pace Law to Launch Incubator for Recent Graduates, Fairfield Co. Bus. J.
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://westfaironline.com/1 7575/pace-law-to-launch-incubator-for-recent-
graduates/.
350. Id.
351. Karen Sloan, Think of It as a Residency for Lawyers, NAT'L LAW J. (June 5, 2012),





355. In addition to reduced office space, continuing legal education, and group rates for vendor
services, post-graduate programs should facilitate relationships with microlenders, accountants,
bookkeepers, technology support staff, and business consultants.
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V. ADVANCING THE TRAINING OF LAWYER-ENTREPRENEURS
Neither limited job opportunities nor entrepreneurial lawyers are
new to the legal profession.356 However, the recognition by law schools
that they need to do more to prepare their graduates for the practice of
law is something that is beginning to resonate.357 Unlike prior periods of
economic recession, economic pressures have converged with changing
law school accreditation standards that ask law schools to identify and
measure the outcomes of their educational program. 358 These factors,
coupled with an increasing demand for affordable legal services, create
an unprecedented opportunity for local law schools to abandon outdated
notions of prestige and to prepare lawyers to do the work legal services
consumers need. A more competitive legal market that drives the prices
of legal services down will require attorneys to become well-versed in
technology and marketing in order to be viable. Law schools that develop
substantive curriculum and post-graduate opportunities to support devel-
oping entrepreneurial skills and mindsets will become a more valuable
legal education product.
As law schools debate about how to integrate skills into the existing
law school curriculum, 359 law school personnel must confront their own
356. SERON, supra note 40, at 64; see also LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN (1993) (recounting a
story of opportunitism and innovation that lead to the rise of one of the country's largest law firms).
357. A Survey of Law School Curricula: 2002-2010, ABA, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR (July 24, 2012), http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/
files flutter/1341346391LawSchoolCurriculaSurveyExecSummary.pdf (reporting an increase in
skills instruction in law school as a result of ABA Standard 302(a)(4), which requires that students
receive "other professional skills" instruction); see also Karen Sloan, ABA: Law Schools Getting the
Message on Practical Skills, NAT'L L. J. (July 14, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNU.jsp?id=l 202561943191 &sireturn=20120620190759.
358. In October 2007, the Section of Legal Education formed a special committee to revise law
school accreditation standards to promote measurement of outcomes. CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET
AL., REPORT OF THE OUTCOME MEASURES COMMITTEE (2008), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome%20Measures%2Final%2Rep
ort.pdf. The Section on Legal Education, has proposed changes to ABA Accreditation Standard 302,
which provides for law schools to identified their desired learning outcomes of their students. Alt-
hough the outcome standards are not yet adopted, a change in focus from input measures to output is
inevitable. See also Steven C. Bennett, When Will Law School Change?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 87 (2010)
(arguing that the economic downturn may provide the impetus for changing law schools); ABA
President Names Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, ABANow (July 31, 2012),
http://www.abanow.org/2012/07/aba-president-names-task-force-on-the-future-of -legal-education/.
359. See Karen Sloan, What Is Law School for, Anyway?, NAT'L L. J. (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleN U.jsp?id=1 202538352545&What is law school for any
way (reporting the discussion on rethinking legal education at the 2012 Association of American
Law Schools annual meeting in Washington, DC); Jessica Dopierala, Bridging the Gap Between
Theory and Practice: Why are Students Falling Off the Bridge and What are Law Schools Doing to
Catch Them?, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 429, 431-440, 2007-2008) (describing the criticisms of
the case method and calls for change); Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for the
Millenium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5-12 (2000) (describing challenges clinicians
faced when forging clinical education in law schools). See generally ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL.,
ABA, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992); THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
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assessment of prestige and develop a greater understanding of what most
of their graduates must contend with in practice. 360 Law schools that are
reluctant to acknowledge the need to train lawyer-entrepreneurs may be
forced to acknowledge that they primarily produce solo lawyers. Once
law school faculty and administrators combat their prejudices and find
ways to compensate for their lack of emphasis on the work of attorneys
that provide personal legal services, 36' law schools can begin to develop
skills programs that produce lawyer-entrepreneurs.
Professor David Barnhizer points to external forces that will influ-
ence how law schools, particularly local law schools, will change in the
coming decades. 3 62 He projects that the oversaturation of solo practition-
ers, a result of the disappearance of other law jobs, will be the factor that
has the most significant effect on how law schools operate.363 Barnhizer
predicts that the number of attorneys working in solo and small firms
will continue to rise as law schools produce approximately 40,000 new
lawyers to an employment market with few jobs. 3 6 He argues that the
economic vulnerability of solo and small firm lawyers will be a factor
leading to the demise of local law schools.365 Barnhizer cautions that
unless law schools "learn to adapt to the changed conditions and still
declining demand for lawyers as that job is traditionally conceived, some
law schools will shrink dramatically. Others will disappear in the face of
hardened and unforgiving competitive conditions. 366
Barnhizer is not the only one, nor the first, to make these warnings.
Perhaps the leading contemporary critic of legal education has been
Richard Matasar, former dean of New York Law School. 367 Matasar
penned a series of controversial articles aimed at urging academics to
provide greater value to law graduates.368 Matasar's faculty webpage
360. Jonakait, supra note 130, at 902-03 (arguing that most law school faculty are products of
elite law schools and therefore do not possess sufficient understanding of the career paths of their
graduates).
361. See Bryant G. Garth and Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Compe-
tence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 499-507 (1993) (discussing conventional interpretations of teaching
and practice). Academics tend to view corporate legal work as more intellectually challenging than
personal service legal work and in doing so, place a lesser value of prestige on the work done by solo
and small firm lawyers See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 120, at 127-28; William Hornsby,
Challenging the Academy to a Dual (Perspective): The Need to Embrace Lawyering for Personal
Legal Services, 70 MD. L. REV. 420, 437 (2011).
362. David Barnhizer, Redesigning the American Law School, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249,
263-264 (2010).
363. Id at 253. Barnhizer points out that although the percentage of attorneys in solo practice
has remained consistent between 1980 and 2000, there was a 100% growth in the number of solo
practitioners and a 35% increase in the number of lawyers in law firms of two to five attorneys. Id. at
283.
364. Id. at 266.
365. Id. at 288-89.
366. Id. at 269.
367. Richard A. Matasar, Dean Emeritus, NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.nyls.edu/faculty/faculty_profiles/richard a-matasar (last visited May 15, 2012).
368. See Richard A. Matasar, A Commercialist Manfesto: Entrepreneurs, Academics and
Purity ofthe Hearth and Soul, 48 FLA. L. REV. 781 (1996) (arguing that financial considerations and
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explains, "[m]ost law schools have no chance to improve. They're mired
in the past, beholden to special interest groups, and incapable of disrupt-
ing their own comfort levels." 36 9 Matasar describes his goals to reform
legal education as two-fold: "First, to radically disrupt traditional ap-
proaches to legal education by emphasizing the need for professionalism
and the need for educational institutions to be flexible; and second, to
force the profession of law and the legal academy to think about ways
they can work with each other." 370 His writings encourage academics to
accept the difficult economic reality that most law graduates face, and
call for law schools to be more "businesslike."
In his 2005 article, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education,
Matasar suggests that law schools do not adequately train lawyers to
practice law, make a living and "adequately support the debt he or she
accumulates while in school".3 72 He argues that "expensive schools with
modest reputations will be in jeopardy" because their graduates will not
be able to earn salaries large enough to pay their student debt.173 Accord-
ing to Matasar, only the top 10% of the class at most law schools have
the opportunity to earn jobs that allow them to pay off the student
loans. 7 He argues that moderate prestige schools with high price tags
will not survive unless they change.37 5 Matasar's writings, although star-
tling, provide a call to action for law schools to create greater value for
its students.7  Matasar argues that legal education must shift its primary
mission from prestige-driven factors that promote law school rankings to
actually providing what students need.377 Although recent loan repay-
accountability must drive higher education); Richard A. Matasar, Does the Current Economic Model
of Legal Education Work for Law Schools, Law Firms (or Anyone Else)?, 82 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 20
(2010) (responding to the question of whether the current model of legal education is good for law-
yers or law firms); Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall ofAmerican Legal Education, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 465 (2005) (foreshadowing the current critique of the value of a law degree) [hereinaf-
ter Matasar, Rise and Fall]; Richard A. Matasar, The Two Professionalisms of Legal Education, 15
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99 (2001) (describing legal education as a law school
business that sells education to students and sells graduates to the legal profession).
369. Richard A. Matasar, Dean Emeritus, supra note 367 (accessed by searching previous
versions of N.Y.L.S. faculty profiles in the Internet Archive index).
370. Id.
371. Matasar's critique is not just against law schools but also in the failures of the profession
to be good teachers Richard A. Matasar, Skills and Values Education: Debate About the Continuum
Continues, 46 N.Y.L.S. Sch. L. Rev. 395, 410 (2002-2003) (criticizing the bar for not rising to the
call of the MacCrate Report). Despite his vocal critiques, Matasar was chastised for not bringing
about greater reform as dean of New York Law School. David Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-
Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BUl.; see also Paul L. Caron, Class Actions Filed Against
Cooley, NYLS Over Fraudulent Placement Data, TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2011/08/class-action-lawsuits.html.
372. Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 368, at 471-72.
373. Id. at 496.
374. See Debra Cassens Weiss, "Law Dean Says Schools 'Exploiting' Students Who Don't
Succeed, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 10:27 A.M.), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/
law dean says schools exploiting students who dont succeed.
375. Matasar, Rise and Fall, supra note 367, at 496.
376. Id. at 498 ("[T]he task is clear: create real value for your students and the school might
climb out of its predicament and rise.").
377. Id. at 112-13.
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ment programs make it easier for law graduates to manage debt through
income-based repayment programs, self-employed lawyers require more
instruction on how to manage a law office.
At a law school symposium discussing the changes in law practice,
William Hornsby, staff counsel in the ABA Standing Committee on the
Delivery of Legal Services, called upon law schools to reassess their
curriculum and offer greater instruction for solo and 'small firm law-
yers.3 78 Hornsby explains that the lack of preparation of the solo and
small firm bar is primarily attributed to the lack of faculty experience
with what it means to provide personal legal services. 37 9 He cites to a
2006 survey of law schools that reveals that less than half of law schools
that responded taught any law office management courses. 380 The schools
that include law practice management in their curriculum report that 80%
of those classes are taught by adjunct faculty. 381 Further, the class is of-
fered only to 15 to 50 students per year. 38 2 No school required the
course. 38 3 Hornsby points to this lack of commitment to law practice
management in law schools as a strong indicator that law school faculty
does not understand or value the work of solo and small firm lawyers
who are primarily providing personal legal services.384
Professor Debra Moss Curtis agrees that law office management is
critical in the development of skills for future lawyers.38 s She points to
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching's report on
Educating Lawyers and the 1992 MacCrate Report as just a couple of the
many calls to introduce more law school instruction with skills necessary
for lawyers to practice law.386 She argues that providing greater skills
instruction requires that law schools integrate law office management
courses into the curriculum because lawyers "have an ethical duty to
378. Hornsby, supra note 361, at 420.
379. Id. at 436.
380. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, REPORT ON A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL
PROFESSIONALISM PROGRAMS 38 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/reports/
LawSchoolProfSurvey.pdf.
381. Hornsby, supra note 361, at 437.
382. Id
383. Id.
384. Id.; see also, Levin, supra note 114, at 309-11 (reporting that attorneys in solo and small
firm practice are most prone to attorney discipline due to the lack of support structure and character-
istics of the legal problems they address).
385. See Debra Moss Curtis, Teaching Law Office Management: Why Law Students Need to
Know the Business ofBeing a Lawyer, 71 ALB. L. REV. 201, 202 (2008).
386. Id. at 205 (referencing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS:
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 87 (2007)). The MacCrate Report is the name common-
ly used to refer to a 1992 ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession lead by Robert
MacCrate, former ABA President. Id. at 208. Also referenced are: ABA, SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS
AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992); and ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
[Vol. 89:4934
TRAINING LA WYER-ENTREPRENEURS
manage legal work." 387 Professor Curtis offers ideas for content and inte-
gration of law office management courses in the curriculum before con-
cluding that "[l]awyers and students alike believe that law office man-
agement belongs in the law school curriculum."" In a 2010 law review
article, Professor Gary A. Munneke argues that managing a law practice
is a key element of a lawyer's competency but such has not been suffi-
ciently embraced by legal education or even the bar.3 89
In addition to learning to think like lawyers, tomorrow's law school
graduates must also learn how to be lawyers that can adapt to new com-
petitors, fast-changing technology, and a more global client base. To
make a living as self-employed lawyers, Millennials must develop strong
law office management structures that permit them to compete with larg-
er law firms and non-lawyers that are able to provide greater breadth for
a fraction of the cost. 390 Law schools cannot guarantee the economic via-
bility of every one of its graduates, but they can provide a framework for
its students and graduates to think about creating their own career oppor-
tunities. Law students who are training to also be entrepreneurs must
fully understand the business of law, the use of technology in effective
law practice management, and the ethical considerations that must gov-
ern their enterprises.39'
To be successful, lawyer-entrepreneurs will need the support of
their law schools. Most law schools are not currently equipped to gradu-
ate "our own garage guys who can transform how we do law." 392 Law
schools that undertake the challenge of training lawyer-entrepreneurs
should consider taking the following steps:
A. Educate Law School Personnel About Bar Demographics
To understand how to best advise students about their career oppor-
tunities, law schools must undertake the study of the career trajectories of
their graduates. With that information law schools should develop initia-
tives to educate their personnel about the career opportunities available
to its graduates. Faculty and career services staff, must know enough
about the career opportunities and challenges in the most common prac-
tice settings for their graduates in order to advise their students about
what to expect post-graduation. Each law school will have a unique set
of market characteristics to consider depending on its geography, its sta-
tus in the law school hierarchy, and the specific characteristics of its stu-
387. Curtis, supra note 385, at 208.
388. Id. at 228.
389. See Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: What You Need to Learn in Law
School, 30 PACE L. REV. 1207 (2010).
390. SUSSKIND, supra note 36, at 36-39.
391. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 211-212 (2010) ("law
schools should recognize that education about non-legal substantive issues").
392. Gillian K. Hadfield, Equipping the Garage Guys in Law, 70 MD. L. REV. 484, 489, 498
(2011) (calling for greater support from law schools to produce more innovative lawyers).
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dent body. If a law school has a significant number of its graduates in
solo and small firm practice, it should have personnel available to help
students and alumni plan for self-employment.
B. Educate Students About the Work Lives of Self-Employed Lawyers
The predominance of attorney self-employment is not just a by-
product of the recession. It is and has always been the largest sector of
the bar. Advancing a legal education program that acknowledges the
needs of future small-firm lawyers would communicate to prospective
law students that they are buying a law degree that helps them be more
self-sufficient. Law schools should communicate to their students that
periods of unemployment, taking on contract work, working in tempo-
rary legal jobs, performing work that does not require a law degree, and
even starting their own offices is part of the career trajectory for most
lawyers. 3 93 If local law schools developed programs to train lawyer-
entrepreneurs and advertise their commitment to help them develop
viable law practices, then students may at least have a more realistic
sense of a typical career path for self-employed lawyers.394 Law schools
that transform their curriculum into an educational program that prepares
future lawyer-entrepreneurs may not immediately fare well in the current
scheme of U.S. News rankings but will distinguish themselves as student-
centric leaders of the local law school pack.
C. Integrate Delivery ofLegal Services Courses in the Curriculum
Law schools should develop programs that explore how legal ser-
vices are delivered. Law school graduates must understand what it takes
to be a lawyer. Discussion of office management, consumer legal needs,
legal informatics, and the business of law should be taught by full-time
faculty and integrated into the third year curriculum. 9 These courses
help students understand how legal services are delivered, the cost of
393. Such an approach is consistent with one of Bamhizer's proposed solutions to create a
different and more flexible educational world where students could opt to attend a law school that
helps them prepare to meet specific goals. Bamhizer, supra at 362, at 306 ("There is no reason each
law school should be all things to all students. Various ways exist in which American law schools
could be "unbundled" and create a different and more flexible educational world.").
394. Jerome M. Organ, What Do We Know About the Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction of Lawyers?
A Meta-Analysis of Research on Lawyer Satisfaction and Well-Being, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 225,
271-273 (2011) (discussing how law schools can help students establish realistic expectations about
their law practice and their professional identity).
395. See generally Peter Toll Hoffman, Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 203 (2012); Gary A. Munneke, Managing a Law Practice: What You Need to
Learn in Law School, 30 PACE L. REV 1207 (2010); R. Lisle Baker, Enhancing Professional Compe-
tence and Legal Excellence Through Teaching Law Practice Management, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375
(1990). See also G.M. Filisko, Getting the Business, ABAJOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2010 12:04 AM CDT),
www.abajoumal.com/magazine/article/getting the business/; John Palfrey, The Law School Curric-
ulum: What is Technology's Role, NAT'L L. J. (Nov. 13, 2006) (advocating instruction on the im-
portance of technology in law); David C. Cummings, A Law School Course in Law Practice Man-
agement, 45 WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 37 (1991).
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providing such services and their role in the larger profession. Such cur-
riculum can encourage students to develop plans to assess their unique
contributions that will help them build networks, identify a client base,
and fulfill their professional obligation to justice. Law schools that do not
currently have personnel to offer such curriculum can look to other dis-
ciplines within the larger university, or work with the practicing bar to
integrate some post-graduate education into existing law school pro-
grams. 3
96
D. Develop Opportunities for Low Bono Legal Services
Students need opportunities for practical skills development where
they can apply what they learn in their classes. Many law school clinical
programs serve an important function by providing legal services to indi-
viduals that are not otherwise available to the indigent population.3 97
There is also a growing population of near poor that can benefit from
post-graduate programs that provide low bono legal services.398 In addi-
tion to the examples of incubator and post-graduate programs provided in
Part IV, law schools seeking to support lawyer-entrepreneur training
should also experiment with fee-generating clinical programs. 399 Fee-
generating clinical programs better simulate the practice settings of law-
yer-entrepreneurs by incorporating client development and fee agree-
ments into the clinical experience. 400 To minimize costs of new clinical
programs while increasing options for students, recent graduates, and
legal services consumers, law schools should experiment with offering
unbundled legal services through collaborations with legal aid organiza-
tions and bar associations. 4 0 1 These collaborations expose law students to
the needs of legal services consumers and the typical client base and is-
396. In an effort to support students starting their own law firms after graduation, Chapman
University School of Law offers free subscription to Solo Practice University. Susan McRae, Law
Schools Are Branching Out, L.A. DAILY J., May 29, 2012, at 1; see also About Us, SOLO PRACTICE
UNIVERSITY, http://solopracticeuniversity.com/about/ (last visited July 2, 2012).
397. See id.
398. Id; see also Jason DeParle et al., Older Suburban and Struggling, 'Near Poor' Startle the
Census, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at Al (reporting 2010 Census figures that report one-third of all
Americans are poor or near poor), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/l 1/19/us/census-
measures-those-not-quite-in-poverty-but-struggling.html?pagcwanted=all.
399. Gary Laser, Significant Curricular Developments: The MacCrate Report and Beyond, I
CLINICAL L. REV. 425 (1994); Chain, supra note 333, at 100-101. But see Martin Guggenheim, Fee-
Generating Clinics: Can We Bear the Costs?, I CLINICAL L. REv. 677 (1995); see also Lisa G.
Lerman, Fee-for-Service Clinical Teaching: Slipping Toward Commercialism, I CLINICAL L. REV.
685, 709-710 (1995) (warning law schools to carefully consider the possible pedagogical compro-
mises that a fee generating clinical program model may create if such programs are seen as fundrais-
ers).
400. Richard A. Matasar, A Commercial Manifesto: Entrepreneurs, Academics, and Purity of
the Heart and Soul, 48 FLA. L. REV. 781, 792 (1996).
401. For example, in 2009 Maryland School of Law launched JustAdvice, a program that
works pairs students with private lawyers to provide legal consultation and advice for a nominal fee
of $10. Carol Sorgen, Attorneys, Law Student's Offer 'Just' Advice, THE BEACON (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.thebeaconnewspapers.com/select-stories/careers-volunteers/attomeys-law-students-
offer-'just'-advice; see also About, JUSTADIviCE, http://justadvice.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited
July 2, 2012).
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sues that lawyer-entrepreneurs handle. At the same time, these programs
provide additional options for individuals, nonprofits, and small busi-
nesses that do not otherwise qualify for free legal services and cannot
find a affordable alternative in the market.
E. Keep Costs of Legal Education Down
Law schools cannot properly train lawyer-entrepreneurs without
grappling with the impact that the high cost of legal education has on
their livelihood. In addition to advising students about how to live frugal-
ly to minimize debt burdens, law school personnel must assess how their
current expenditures contribute to the rising cost of tuition. Such self-
assessment will not be easy or welcomed, but it is necessary and prefera-
ble to external prescriptions for change.402
CONCLUSION
I graduated from an elite law school at a time when its graduates
had the opportunity to choose which six-figure salary they wanted. Nei-
ther its career services personnel nor its public interest advising program
encouraged or mentored law students to open their own law firms. My
law school offered no law office management courses. Classroom dis-
cussions did not acknowledge the role of self-employed lawyers. Alt-
hough my clinical program taught me good client management, basic
office management skills, and incorporated a community lawyer as an
instructor, there was little focus on the role of solos in the delivery of
legal services. I started my own law practice without much context or the
necessary knowledge or skills to develop a viable model.
Without a plan or much mentoring, I eventually built a law practice
that allowed me to pay my school loans, cover my living expenses, and
meet my professional goals. Having my own practice allowed me to
serve the client community that I wanted to serve. The experience of-
fered me consistent lessons in humility and courage. I forged relation-
ships with mentors, attended as many continuing legal education pro-
grams as I could afford, and developed a client base through trial and
error. Practicing on my own was intellectually and emotionally challeng-
ing. It was also frightening and isolating. It does not have to be that way.
Law schools in the twenty-first century have the opportunity and re-
sponsibility to equip their graduates with the tools they need to be suc-
cessful lawyers and entrepreneurs. Law schools can serve an important
role not only in educating the emerging lawyer-entrepreneur but also in
promoting greater access to justice. The millions of Americans who do
not have access to lawyers and the thousands of attorneys who struggle
402. For proposals on how to reducing the cost of legal education, see Brian Tamanaha, Op-
Ed, How. to Make Law School Affordable, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A27, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/how-to-make-law-school-affordable.html.
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to establish viable law practices need alternatives to the current disjoint-
ed training model in the legal profession.

LAWYERS, LOYALTY AND SOCIAL CHANGE
DEBORAH J. CANTRELLt
ABSTRACT
Fundamentally, cause lawyers engage in their work to make social
change. Scholars of cause lawyering have generated a robust and rich
literature considering important issues, such as what kinds of advocacy
strategies best generate social change and what features of the relation-
ship between cause client and cause lawyer are critical to an engaged
and mutual relationship. But, the literature has neglected a key aspect of
the cause lawyer and client relationship: whether the particular kind of
loyalty that exists as between them hinders or helps in achieving social
change. This Article fills that void. It first illuminates the particular fea-
tures of the kind of loyalty that is expected between cause lawyers and
their clients, including features such as a mutually engaged relationship
and a strict conception offriends and enemies. Labeling that loyalty as
"hyper-loyalty," this Article scrutinizes whether the extreme fidelity re-
quired by hyper-loyalty helps produce actual social change. Drawing on
multiple fields, including negotiation and cognitive psychology, this Arti-
cle demonstrates that hyper-loyalty impedes social change by limiting
the range of relationships that can be explored as sites for problem solv-
ing. The Article offers a way forward, suggesting that hyper-loyalty be
replaced by relational loyalty. The three key features of relational loyalty
are: constructing the architecture of social change so that it is a con-
nected web of relationships instead of dyadic and oppositional; ap-
proaching that web of relationships with curiosity instead of advocacy;
and responding with compassion to all contained in the web of relation-
ships. This Article argues that relational loyalty inculcates a helpful dy-
namism in relationships, which both preserves mutual engagement be-
tween cause lawyer and cause client, while also creating unexpected
opportunities to craft innovative strategies or pathways to social change.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following two attorneys: an anti-poverty cause lawyer'
who is bilingual and works in a community in which most residents are
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Special thanks to the interdisci-
plinary group of scholars hosted by Fordham Law School who gave me detailed feedback, especially
Russ Pearce, Amy Uelmen, lan Weinstein, and Judy Povilus. Thanks also to Clare Huntington,
Nestor Davidson, Emma Leheny, Howard Lesnick, Erik Pitchal, Jacob Rukeyser, and workshop
colleagues at Colorado Law and University of Georgia Law School.
1. The term "cause lawyer' was coined by Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, and replaced
the phrase "public interest lawyer." See AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHENIGOLD, Cause Lawyering
and the Reproduction of Professional Authority, An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
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recent immigrants and a government official who spent a couple of years
working as a staff attorney at a legal aid office before moving into pri-
vate practice, and ultimately being appointed to her current high-level
position in the state's social services agency. Both the advocate and the
government official went to the same elite law school. Both have shared
professional connections. The advocate has been hearing from communi-
ty members that the local government benefits office is refusing to pro-
vide supplemental nutritional assistance applications in any language
other than English. When the advocate hears that the government official
is holding a series of town hall meetings in the area, the advocate makes
plans to attend to raise the issue of language accessibility. The advocate
remarks to her colleagues how frustrating it is to see a very smart person
like the government official working "for the enemy." 2 The advocate
notes that even though she thinks the official's own legal aid background
could be very helpful in problem-solving related to a particular issue, the
advocate just cannot trust anyone who now works for the government.
The advocate concludes that she had heard that the official was a nice
person, which she had no reason to disbelieve, but she felt uninspired to
try and forge any relationship with the official. The advocate planned to
attend the meeting not with any belief that there would be a useful ex-
change between the participants, but because the advocate felt it was
necessary to show the government official that the local community was
strong and committed to opposing the agency's inappropriate behavior.
The vignette highlights a common feature of social change advoca-
cy-that participants, including cause lawyers, identify strongly with
their side of the issue and distrust-with a similar intensity-participants
on the other side. In fact, this Article argues that such hyper-loyalty is
considered a core condition and baseline requirement of the relationship
between cause lawyer and cause client. In shorthand, it is part of the
DNA of how a cause lawyer works. 3 That hyper-loyalty is laudable in
many ways. It creates an expectation that the relationship between cause
lawyer and cause client will carry over time and over multiple advocacy
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3-5 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1998). The concept of cause lawyering differentiates between a lawyer who
essentially is agnostic about who are her clients or what kind of outcome her clients may be seeking,
and lawyers who commit to a particular kind of substantive work or a particular category of clients
because the lawyer is committed to some broader set of social or political principles. See AUSTIN
SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, What Cause Lawyers Do for, and to, Social Movements: An
Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3-4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A.
Scheingold eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2006); see also Deborah J. Cantrell, Sensational Reports: The
Ethical Duty of Cause Lawyers to Be Competent in Public Advocacy, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 568,
569-71 (2007) (providing a definition of "cause lawyer").
2. This vignette is based on many similar conversations that I heard during my own time as a
public interest lawyer.
3. Nestor Davidson helpfully suggested the DNA metaphor.
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efforts, and is not a one-off relationship of short duration.4 The cause
lawyer and client are in the struggle together.5 It creates an expectation
that the cause lawyer and the cause client fundamentally agree on at least
some components of a "just" society. The cause lawyer and client believe
in the struggle. 6 In its best form, it also forges a relationship that is mutu-
al, reciprocal, and in which both cause lawyer and cause client under-
stand and trust each other to bring relevant expertise to the advocacy
work.' The cause lawyer and client are both soldiers in the struggle.8
Cause lawyers and cause lawyering scholars have focused inten-
sively on the above features of the lawyer-client relationship, and the
role of hyper-loyalty in fostering those features. However, they have
done so while neglecting the central point of the cause lawyer-cause cli-
ent relationship-to make actual social change. The unexamined as-
sumption in the existing scholarship is that hyper-loyalty increases the
possibilities for effective social change. This Article fills the unpropi-
tious void in the scholarship by critically examining hyper-loyalty. It
scrutinizes the assumed truth that because hyper-loyalty makes the cause
lawyer and cause client feel better and stronger about their relationship,
the relationship, in turn, helps the cause lawyer and cause client actually
achieve social change.
This Article comes to a conclusion that may surprise many-that
hyper-loyalty creates more potential to impede social change work than
to assist such work. In particular, this Article identifies a particularly
problematic consequence of hyper-loyalty, noted in the vignette above,
which is that it encourages cause lawyers and cause clients to identify
others either as friends or enemies, and to hold steadfast to that dichoto-
my. Drawing on a range of literature, including work on cognitive heu-
ristics and biases, negotiation theory, and scholarship about intentional
relationships in social movements, this Article demonstrates several
ways in which hyper-loyalty impedes the flexibility needed to effect so-
cial change.
To avoid the negative consequences of hyper-loyalty, this Article
re-envisions what it means for cause lawyers and cause clients to be loyal
to each other. This Article recognizes the important starting contribution
the existing literature made by insisting that the cause lawyer and the
cause client must understand each other both as bringing expertise to the
relationship, and that the relationship must be mutually engaged and re-
4. See generally Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner's Reflections on Political Law-
yering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 298-302 (1996) (describing several multi-pronged cam-
paigns for which Bellow was the cause lawyer).
5. See id. at 302-03 (describing Bellow's own experiences as a cause lawyer).
6. See id. at 300.
7. See id. at 302-04 (describing the respectful relationship necessary for effective cause
lawyering).
8. See id. at 300-04.
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spectful. However, this Article then calls on cause lawyers and clients to
create a more relational form of loyalty to each other, not by bringing
distance to their own relationship but instead by situating their relation-
ship within a larger web of relationships of participants engaged on an
issue. The notion of a web of relationships, rather than hyper-loyalty's
dyadic contest with friends on one side and enemies on the other, creates
space for both cause lawyers and cause clients to expand the realm of
participants with whom a connection may be explored. Whereas hyper-
loyalty views exploring relationships across the line as disloyalty, rela-
tional loyalty understands exploration of the web of relationships as a
method of fostering new, and at times unexpected, but useful, collabora-
tors for social change.
This Article adds two additional key components to relational loyal-
ty. First, drawing particularly on negotiation literature, relational loyalty
calls on participants to approach others in the web of relationships with
curiosity, not advocacy. The softening of a stance from advocate to in-
quirer is designed to create a more expansive dialogue, which, like the
web itself, should bring forward new and possibly unexpected, but use-
ful, information. Next, relational loyalty calls on participants to approach
others in the web of relationships with compassion. This Article sharply
distinguishes between compassion and acquiescence or capitulation.
Compassion is not silence or the whitewashing of injustice. But the call-
ing out of injustice need not happen only in righteous anger. It can hap-
pen more productively from a compassionate stance that looks for oppor-
tunity in the particular situation with particular people.
In Part I, this Article traces the development of hyper-loyalty as a
core component of the relationship between cause lawyer and client.
Then, it describes the legitimate concerns about how to build a respectful
and mutual relationship between cause lawyers, who regularly come
from elite backgrounds, and cause clients, who regularly come from un-
derserved or underrepresented communities. It also describes the positive
features of hyper-loyalty as a way of communicating and cementing trust
between disparate participants, as a way of expressing mutual respect
and acknowledging mutual expertise. Part II turns to the harmful aspect
of hyper-loyalty detailing the ways in which it impedes cause lawyers
and clients from achieving actual social change. Part III builds out the
components of relational loyalty, including refraining participants as
being situated within a web of relationships and approaching all with
curiosity and compassion. Part IV acknowledges and addresses some
potential concerns about moving from hyper-loyalty to a relational loyal-
ty.
I. THE ROLE OF LOYALTY IN CAUSE LAWYERING
Scholars of cause lawyering, and cause lawyers themselves, take as
an important truth that loyalty is a key feature of the relationship between
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cause lawyers and their clients. In contrast to much for-profit lawyering,
cause lawyering brings with it robust notions of solidarity between client
and lawyer.9 The proposition is that there is more solidarity between the
cause lawyer and client because both of them understand their work to-
gether to be situated within a larger interest in social change. As Gary
Bellow articulated the relationship, it is a "politicized orientation" with
"the legal work . .. done in service to both individuals and larger, more
collectively oriented goals."o Independent of their legal relationship, the
lawyer and client are loyal to each other because of their shared com-
mitment to their cause, whatever it may be. Their "cause loyalty" is
stronger than the typical professional loyalty between lawyer and client.
It is hyper-loyalty.
That hyper-loyalty is the expected norm in cause work is not sur-
prising. Most cause lawyers, and many cause clients, are committed to
"doing the work" in a long-term way." They form long-term relation-
ships with each other, and even though there may be individual changes
over time between particular lawyers or clients, there is a strong level of
general continuity between the cause lawyering shop and the lay advoca-
cy community. For a historical example, think of the cause lawyers at
California Rural Legal Aid who worked closely with Cesar Chavez and
the United Farm Workers Union on several advocacy efforts.' 2
9. See Bellow, supra note 4, at 302 (noting the importance of "mutuality" in the relationship
between client and cause lawyer); see also Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369,
375 (1982) (calling for "counter-hegemonic" legal practice in which goal is to forge "authentic"
political collaborative between client and cause lawyer); Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge ofDemo-
cratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383, 1384-85 (2009). See generally GERALD P. LOPEZ,
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Lucie
E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 699 (1988) (highlighting the story of a Black South African village and the methods of the
"outsiders" who worked with them to empower resistance as a model for change-oriented lawyer-
ing); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995) (articulating a social
change plan to aid immigrant workers as a whole, instead of individual clients only); William P.
Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organ-
izations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1995) (Jefining the critical criteria for empowering organiza-
tional advocacy); LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (New York Univ. Press 2001)
(explaining the environmental justice movement); Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities:
Lawyering Across Language Diference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007) (suggesting the benefit to
community lawyering of a more collaborative relationship among lawyers, clients, and third-parties
such as interpreters); Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 1879 (2007) (discussing progressive public interest lawyers in the context of one campaign
involving immigrant labor).
10. Bellow, supra note 4, at 300.
I1. However, the privatization of pro bono legal work has somewhat altered that dynamic as
private law firms have built out books of business focused on providing free legal services often
related to cause lawyering. Because of very practical business concerns about conflicts of interest
with paying clients, private firms often pick one or two causes on which to focus, pairing in a long-
term way with one of two non-profit cause lawyering shops. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The
Politics ofPro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).
12. See Bellow, supra note 4, at 298.
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Additionally, a constitutive part of social change, or cause, work is
that cause advocates are pushing against the status quo. In order to mobi-
lize a collective for action, there must be some sense that there is one
group pushing for change and one group content with the status quo-in
other words, some sense of "us" and "them."' 3 The existing cause law-
yering literature has focused heavily on what cause lawyers must do to
ensure that there is a strong sense of "us" between cause lawyers and
cause clients. The Article turns now to those particular features of hyper-
loyalty.
A. The Ideal of Hyper-Loyalty
The ideal features of hyper-loyalty are straightforward. Lawyers and
clients are equal and "co-eminent practitioners" in their work towards
social change.14 Clients are "not just sources of information on the prob-
lems they face, but [also are] active partners in working collectively to
solve those problems."15 Lawyers and clients both are careful to view
each other as a "whole person,"i not as "cardboard" 7 cut-outs of what a
lawyer or client is expected to be under mainstream views of the legal
profession. Hyper-loyalty, however, is not an "oversentimentalized"
sense of relationship.' 8 As Gary Bellow has described it: "I surely influ-
enced and argued with those I served, often loudly and long. But I, in
turn, was influenced and argued with as well, and felt justified in assert-
ing my views only because I also felt open to being overruled or outvot-
ed."l 9
While hyper-loyalty can be between an individual lawyer and an in-
dividual client, it can also be between multiple lawyers and multiple cli-
ents or communities. 20 Nonetheless, it is dyadic in that it understands the
core commitment to be between the lawyer(s) and the cli-
ent(s)/community. While both lawyers and clients may look for oppor-
tunistic alliances with others, those alliances should neither weaken, nor
necessarily expand, the hyper-loyalty that exists in the dyad. 2 1 By defini-
13. See, e.g., ALBERTO MELUCCI, The Process of Collective Identity, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND CULTURE: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PROTEST, CONTENTION 47-49 (H. Johnston & B. Klandermans
eds., 1995) (noting that a collective must distinguish between itself and others in order to act and
mobilize).
14. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 29.
15. Piomelli, supra note 9, at 1385.
16. For an early, yet still very prescient, description of lawyers not seeing the client as a
"whole person," see Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS. 1, 21 (1975).
17. The phrase "cardboard clients" comes from Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard
Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 103-04 (2010).
18. Bellow, supra note 4, at 303.
19. Id. at 302-03.
20. In fact, some scholars insist that the better version of cause loyalty is between lawyers and
communities, and that cause lawyers should be wary of individualized lawyer-client relationships.
See, e.g., Ashar, supra note 9, at 1880, 1921-24.
21. See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for
Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 404-05 (2004) (providing an example of an
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tion and by action, hyper-loyalty presumes there are others or groups of
others to whom loyalty is not owed, and to whom displays of affinity are
not permitted.
Interestingly, hyper-loyalty can come about directly as discussed
above, but also indirectly as discussed below.
B. Two Indirect Routes to Hyper-Loyalty
The ideal of hyper-loyalty discussed above is a direct and intention-
al commitment to a relationship in which the cause lawyer and cause
client stand together against others. Hyper-loyalty is in place because
both lawyer and client desire their relationship to have that feature. How-
ever, a cause relationship can also indirectly become infused with hyper-
loyalty. As described more fully below, that indirect infusion results
from a cause lawyer compensating for other concerns about how she is in
relationship with her client. Nonetheless, whether infused directly or
indirectly, the consequence of hyper-loyalty is the same-cause lawyers
and cause clients hold fierce notions of "us" and "them."
The first indirect route to hyper-loyalty comes from cause scholars'
and lawyers' long-expressed worry that, historically and currently, the
legal profession is predominantly populated by members of the elite.22
As a result, lawyers from elite backgrounds have dominated cause law-
yering. As one scholar articulated the concern: "There are . . . significant
dangers when middle class lawyers get intimately involved in the task of
organizing the poor. More articulate, better educated, aggressive by na-
ture and training, some lawyers tend to dominate newly formed groups,
even when they try not to . . . .,,23 Thus, there has been a sustained nerv-
ousness about whether cause lawyers, even with their good intentions,
are capable of establishing and maintaining a mutual and reciprocal rela-
tionship with their clients.
The seminal critique of cause lawyers captured by elite culture is
Gerald Lopez's Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano's Vision of Pro-
gressive Law Practice.24 Lopez coined the phrase "regnant lawyer" to
environmental justice lawyer and low-income community thinking through whether to form an
alliance with yuppie neighborhoods that also might be affected).
22. For an example of historical, socioeconomic information, see generally JOHN P. HEINZ &
EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (Russell Sage
Foundation, 1982). For socioeconomic information about newer members of the legal profession,
see generally RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD 20 (NALP Foundation & American Bar
Foundation 2004) (noting that "newly admitted lawyers come generally from relatively privileged
socioeconomic backgrounds."); Richard Sander & Jane Yakowitz, The Secret of My Success: How
Status, Prestige and School Performance Shape Legal Careers 11, Brooklyn Law School, Legal
Studies Paper No. 207; 5th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper; UCLA School of
Law Research Paper No. 10-26 (2010) (analyzing data from the After the JD study), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1640058.
23. Ruth M. Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Diference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48
U. MIAMI L. REv. 999, 1024 (1994).
24. LOPEZ, supra note 9.
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describe those lawyers, cause or otherwise, who understand themselves
as experts in charge of lay clients and who presume that lay clients bring
no useful skills to the advocacy question at hand.25 For Lopez,
[Regnant lawyering] imposes unjustifiably limited relations between
those working against subordination and those strategies available to
wage the fight. It does not permit anyone in the fight, whether lay or
professional, to experience others as part of a working team. And it
almost laughs off anyone who wants to regard others as co-eminent
practitioners. 26
The regnant cause lawyer is disloyal to the client by failing to "ex-
press the highest regard for a client's understanding of his own situa-
1127tion .... Furthermore, the regnant cause lawyer is disloyal to a client
or community of clients by failing to understand that everyone has an
inherent ability to lawyer in the sense of having "built-in, problem-
solving, domination-fighting capacit[ies]."2 8
For Lopez, the antidote to regnant lawyering is rebellious lawyering
against subordination-what I have called the ideal of hyper-loyalty. As
Lopes articulates it:
[L]awyers must know how to work with, not just on behalf of, subor-
dinated people. They must know how to collaborate with other pro-
fessional and lay allies rather than ignore the help that these other
problem-solvers may provide in any situation. . . . And, at least as
importantly, they must open themselves to being educated by the
subordinated and their allies about the traditions and experiences of
subordinated life. 29
From a commitment to rebellious lawyering, Lopez crafts a kind of
hyper-loyalty between lawyer and client that requires the lawyer to con-
strain herself to ensure that the client is not subordinated within the law-
yer-client relationship. Lopez's goal is to encourage cause lawyers to
"nurture sensibilities and skills compatible with a collective fight for
social change,"30 implying mutual and reciprocal relationships between
lawyer and client.
However, his consistent and thorough portrayal of most cause law-
yers as regnant lawyers raises the risk that a lawyer who is trying to be
rebellious will be so concerned about subordinating the client or client
community that the lawyer will forego a mutual relationship for one in
25. Id. at 24 (listing characteristics of a regnant lawyer).
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 61.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Gerald Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989).
30. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 38.
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which the lawyer is intentionally, and well-meaningly, subservient.' In
other words, the hyper-loyalty displayed by the rebellious, yet cautious
lawyer, causes her to recede in the relationship.
That is an understandable response by a cause lawyer who takes
Lopez's critique seriously, and who is aware of the demographics of
privilege within the legal profession. 3 2 Because it remains true that most
lawyers come from elite socioeconomic backgrounds, a self-reflective
cause lawyer would rightly be mindful that her elite background would
have generated life experiences that may not match up with those of her
"subordinated" clients. After reading Lopez, the cause lawyer would also
be mindful of the way in which her legal education privileged a particu-
lar kind of analysis-thinking like a lawyer-which may prime her to
see her client's issues through a limited problem-solving lens.33 Thus, in
an effort to make sure her regnant tendencies are kept in check, the cause
lawyer intentionally restrains the ways in which she participates with her
client so as not unintentionally to dominate the relationship.
The mutually engaged and reciprocal relationship coming from
Gary Bellow's vision of hyper-loyalty is, in some ways, turned on its
head, even though a version of hyper-loyalty is maintained. Under the
above indirect route to hyper-loyalty, the cause lawyer is motivated to
draw clear lines between "us" and "them" as a way to double check her
own regnant tendencies. Keeping a forceful distance from "them," the
non-subordinated, the elite, eases the cause lawyer's concerns that she
might be trumping her clients in some way.
There is an even stronger version of indirect hyper-loyalty as a re-
sponse to the risks of regnant lawyering. It is reflected by arguments of
some cause lawyers that they should overtly embrace a model in which
31. I am not the first scholar to suggest that Lopez portrays cause lawyers in an unnecessarily
bleak way. See Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1993).
32. DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 22, at 20 (NALP Foundation for Law Career Research and
Education, Overland Park, KS, & American Bar Foundation, Chicago, IL 2004) (noting that "newly
admitted lawyers come generally from relatively privileged socioeconomic backgrounds"); see also
Sander & Yakowitz, supra, note 22, at 9-11.
33. LOPEZ, supra note 9, at 4-5 (describing his own experience at Harvard Law School); see
also STUART SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, Beating the Odds: Cause Lawyering and Legal Educa-
tion, in SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 51, 60-
71 (Stanford Univ. Press 2004); Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the
Interests ofJustice, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1929, 1931-36 (2002) (discussing the shift from the case
method to the clinical method of teaching and the benefits of the clinical approach); CHRIS
GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL
245-55 (1st. ed. 1991) (describing the author's first experience in a clinical leaming environment);
ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND 53-54
(Routledge 1992); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 87-90 (Carnegie Foundation 2007); Gillian K. Hadfield, Equipping the Garage
Guys in Law, 70 MD. L. REV. 484, 487-90 (2011) (exploring the disconnect between attorneys and
clients due to the current state of legal education).
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lawyers must be subservient to "the people." 34 Under that view,
"[o]rganized masses of people, not lawyers, play the critical roles [in
social change], and the significant victories (or losses) occur outside the
sphere of law. The more that lawyers try to implement social change
directly, the more inimical their impact."35 Under this model of lawyer
loyalty as subservience, the risk of the regnant lawyering always is the
reality of lawyering. That is because lawyers are too versed in a "rights"
framing of social order, and that framing derives from and depends on
the power-maintaining legal system.36 Lawyers must step aside and sub-
ordinate rights "to the goal of building an authentic and unalienated po-
litical consciousness." It is through political awareness and action that
"the people" will create social change.38
Just as Lopez allowed for the possibility of a mutual and reciprocal
relationship between his rebellious lawyer and her client, so, too, do the
above lawyers. They call for cause lawyers to "seek to develop a rela-
tionship of genuine equality and mutual respect" with clients. 39 But, they
remain extremely nervous about the fact that lawyers are sanguine that
social change can happen through the power-maintaining legal system,
and their nervousness comes through. For example, there has been blunt
criticism of the development of federally funded legal aid as creating
merely a "poverty industry" for legal professionals. 4 0 Given the warnings
about lawyers' capture by the legal system, a cause lawyer committed to
social change by political organizing will want to avoid lawyer domina-
tion. The risk-averse way to do so is to understand the hyper-loyalty she
owes to her client as being unidirectional-that she is in service to, or
subservient to, her client.
As with the cause lawyer worried about being a regnant lawyer, this
variant on indirect hyper-loyalty calls on a cause lawyer to have a. strong
sense of "them" as a way of protecting cause clients. Thus, hyper-loyalty
comes from an inward focus that is concerned about creating a kind of
relationship between cause lawyer and cause client that protects the
cause client. In this setting, hyper-loyalty is less focused outwardly on
34. See Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 21-22 (1984) [hereinafter Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change]; see also Steve
Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update Year 2010, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 499, 545-49 (2010) [hereinafter Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update
Year 2010]; Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 375-79 (1982).
35. Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, supra note 34, at 4.
36. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 375 ("But the great weakness of a rights-oriented
legal practice is that it does not address itself to a central precondition for building a sustained politi-
cal movement-that of overcoming the psychological conditions upon which both the power of the
legal system and the power of social hierarchy in general rest.").
37. Id.
38. See Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, supra note 34, at 6.
39. Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 376.
40. Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change-Update Year 2010, supra note 34, at 548-
49 (quoting then-Congresswoman Edith Green using the phrase "poverty industry").
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concerns about whether the kind of cause relationship created produces
good advocacy or social change.
It is a deep irony that the very elite training received by many cause
lawyers actually can reinforce some of the forces that produce unidirec-
tional hyper-loyalty. At the same time that a cause lawyer may commit to
loyalty as service/subservience out of worry that she needs to keep her
elitist legal training in check, that same notion of lawyer loyalty as ser-
vice is embraced deeply by traditional, elitist legal training.41 It is as if a
peculiar feedback loop is created in which the cause lawyer reflects and
worries about her elitist training, chooses a conservative course of behav-
ior in response to that self-reflection, and that conservative course of
behavior is then reinforced by the very elitist training the lawyer was
trying to avoid.
That odd feedback loop can be seen by looking at Daniel
Markovits's recent endorsement of lawyer loyalty as service, crafting it
in terms of a lawyer's fidelity to her client.42 For Markovits, fidelity calls
on a lawyer to be "self-effacing" so that the "lawyer becomes able to
work continually as a mouthpiece for her client." 4 3 Further, the purpose
of the lawyer's self-effacement is rooted ultimately in goals of political
legitimacy and democratic participation." In other words, a lawyer is a
faithful mouthpiece for her client as a way of ensuring that the client is
able to genuinely and fully participate in the democratic processes of
which the adversary legal system is a part.45 The lawyer breaches that
fidelity, and that commitment to the client's full democratic participa-
tion, if the lawyer substitutes her own value judgments for those of the
client.46
The Markovits lawyer is anything but a rebellious lawyer.
Markovits valorizes the adversary legal system as the place in which all
kinds of disputes, including those related to social justice, are well re-
solved.47 For Markovits, the good lawyer focuses her work in the legal
41. A few prominent defenses of lawyer loyalty as service are: Norman W. Spaulding, Rein-
terpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 101-04 (2003); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 129-33 (President and Fellows of
Harvard College 1993); TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE (Ashgate, 2009); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE (Princeton Univ. Press, 2010). For a
helpful comparison of the differences between several loyalty as service models, see Katherine R.
Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIz. L. REV. 493, 505-21 (2011). Other de-
fenses of the standard conception of lawyering include Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits
ofthe Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics ofLawyering, 104 Yale L. J. 1545 (1995),
and MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (Matthew Bender,
2004).
42. MARKOVITS, supra note 41, at 90-99, 171-211.
43. Id. at 93.
44. Id. at ch. 8.
45. Id. at 184-190.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Id. at 190-99.
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system because it is a place in which members of society can receive
justice.48 She is effective only to the extent she shows a kind of loyalty to
her client that is unidirectional, and not mutual or reciprocal. The feed-
back loop is triggered for the well-intentioned, but cautious, rebellious
lawyer when she tries to subordinate herself to her client out of worries
about being a regnant lawyer, only to have such subordination magnified
by traditional conceptions of the role a regnant lawyer ought to play.
Worrying about lawyer domination is the second indirect route to
hyper-loyalty. In the second variation, the worry is that cause lawyers
will understand their true loyalty to be to the cause, and thus view their
clients as one of several pieces of an advocacy strategy to be deployed.
As a result, clients become pawns, not empowered individuals.49 Schol-
ars have listed several negative consequences they believe result from
such instrumental cause loyalty. Those include:
* Disempowering client communities, and disabling their potential
for political activism and leadership;50
* Dismissiveness of clients' true narratives; ' and
* Presumptuousness about law as an effective tool for social
change.52
Of course, there also exists a more benign form of hyper-loyalty fo-
cused on the cause. It understands there are clients who are as committed
to the cause as are the lawyers. The clients affirmatively wish to be
agents in a larger strategy for social change, and do not view themselves
as being used by the lawyers. In fact, the clients understand themselves
to be equally situated with the lawyers and frilly push back if they disa-
gree with the way in which the lawyers want to portray or use them as
the face of the cause.53
48. Markovits situates the legal adversary system within a larger political system that must be
understood as legitimate. Id at 173-76 The adversary system is one part of the practical, applied
way in which a democratic government can ensure its political legitimacy. Id. at 176-184.
49. See Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 130 (2009) (summarizing critiques of cause lawyers, including their ascend-
ancy over clients); see also Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type: Categories of Cause Lawyer-
ing, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 657, 680-81 (2004) (discussing the lawyer's role in the category of
cause lawyer Hilbink labels "elite/vanguard").
50. See Ashar, supra note 9, at 1918-20; Quigley, supra note 9, at 464-66; see also Stephen
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1055 (1970).
51. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2111 (1991).
52. For a thoughtful summary of the debate, see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode,
Public Interest Litigation: Insights From Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 606-07
(2009); see also Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11, 19 (2003) (discussing how lawyers believed litigation could be used to
establish a constitutional right to live).
53. I, and other cause lawyers, have understood that such clients exist and are sought after by
cause lawyers. See generally Cantrell, supra note 1. See also Bellow, supra note 4, at 302-04.
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Nonetheless, because of the loud volume of the warnings about
dominating cause lawyers, a well-intentioned cause lawyer may respond
by standing back-either by tempering her own commitment to the cause
or by assuming that it is more important to the client to focus on individ-
ual client interests if and when those interests should be in tension with
larger cause goals. Thus, should the client raise individual interests, the
well-intentioned cause lawyer would not try to persuade the client that
she should set individual interests aside for cause interests. To do so
would be to start down the slippery slope of lawyer domination. As with
the first indirect route to hyper-loyalty, the result for such a conscientious
cause lawyer is still hyper-loyalty, but a unidirectional, subservient ver-
sion that runs from the lawyer to the client.5 4
Taking the above descriptions of hyper-loyalty, it is important to
next more carefully examine a set of assumptions underlying hyper-
loyalty. The following section turns to that inquiry.
C. The Assumptions Underlying Hyper-Loyalty
Whatever the route to hyper-loyalty, one of its key goals is sup-
posed to be to assist cause lawyers and clients to achieve social change.
Built into that goal are two assumptions. First, that there is a particular
kind of relationship between cause lawyer and client that best facilitates
and coordinates their shared social change efforts. It is one in which
cause lawyers and clients are mutually engaged, with each acknowledg-
ing their own and the other's strengths and weaknesses. Second, that the
shared relationship between cause lawyer and client excludes the "other
side," whatever or whoever that may be at any particular time. In other
words, that social change advocacy is most effective when cause lawyers
and clients delineate clearly and firmly who is a friend and who is an
enemy.
The first assumption about the internal relationship between cause
lawyer and client is the one on which scholars and cause lawyers have
focused, and from which the ideal of hyper-loyalty was developed.55 It is
not surprising that if one compares descriptions of mutually engaged and
reciprocal relationships to those without such features, there is unani-
mous agreement that participants are more satisfied with mutually en-
gaged relationships.56 Scholars still fuss around the edges of what consti-
tutes effective mutual engagement. For example, arguing that under-
54. 1 do want to be clear that cause clients can interrupt both forms of unidirectional, subser-
vient hyper-loyalty. A cause client steeped in the ideal of hyper-loyalty, expecting her lawyer to
engage with her in the ways that Gary Bellow has articulated, could call out her cause lawyer's
subservient behavior and insist upon a mutual and reciprocal relationship. Note, however, that the
cause relationship is still infused with hyper-loyalty, just an ideal form, not an indirect form. The key
feature of hyper-loyalty still exists in the relationship-that both cause client and cause lawyer have
strong and unyielding notions of "us" and "them."
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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standing features of particular contexts is critical when a cause lawyer
assesses how to remain "client-centered" in her work.57 Or, that cause
lawyers should focus more fully on situating legal work within "move-
ments of resistance," which might, themselves, lead with non-litigation
strategies. Or, that cause lawyers have paid insufficient attention to the
role of language in building or breaching cause loyalty with a client.59
Or, finally, that cause lawyers cannot truly establish hyper-loyalty unless
their work is also tied to community organizing.6 0 None of the fussing,
however, suggests any fault with the basic premise that mutual engage-
ment is better than unilateral engagement.
Notice, however, that the strong endorsement of the benefits of a
mutually engaged and reciprocal relationship does make problematic the
version of hyper-loyalty arising out of a well-intentioned subservience of
a cause lawyer to her client. Critically, subservient hyper-loyalty de-
prives both cause lawyer and client from the benefits of a robust conver-
sation. In social change work, at any given moment reasonable people
may disagree about the best strategy going forward. Cause lawyers may
disagree with each other, cause clients may disagree with cause lawyers,
and cause clients may disagree with each other. Those disagreements
arise from many sources--differences in background, differences in
training, differences in specialized knowledge, differences in prior expe-
rience on a related issue, differences in cognitive biases. Further, at any
given moment, different people may have relevant expertise. For one
decision-making moment, it may be that the client is the one with spe-
cialized knowledge, but in the next decision-making moment, it may be
the lawyer. Subservient hyper-loyalty deprives the group of an important
source of information and experience. Further, as Gary Bellow forth-
rightly noted, "Only a conception of clients as much weaker and manipu-
lable . . . dictates a level of subservience that leaves the lawyer without
her own vision and stake in the outcomes being pursued."6'
Turning now to the second assumption about the necessity of identi-
fying friends and foes. Upon critical examination, the assumption's flaws
surface. First consider a key feature of social change work. The work
requires cause advocates to regularly reassess strategies and to use multi-
ple advocacy methods. 6 2 In one moment, litigation may lead; in another,
57. Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Represen-
tation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 374 (2006).
58. Ashar, supra note 9, at 1879.
59. Ahmad, supra note 9, at 1045-46.
60. Quigley, supra note 9, at'456.
61. Bellow, supra note 4, at 304. For an assertive argument in favor of using strong persua-
sion with individual clients in a criminal defense setting, see Abbe Smith, The Lawyer's "Con-
science" and the Limits ofPersuasion, 36 HOFsTRA L. REV. 479, 481-81 (2007).
62. See Cummings & Rhode, supra note 52, at 603; Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the
Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering
Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333, 372-73 (2009); Marc L. Karin & Robin R. Runge, Toward Inte-
grated Law Clinics That Train Social Change Advocates, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 563, 568-69 (2011).
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legislative lobbying; in another, community organizing. Further, seldom
is it the case that only one advocacy method is in play at a time. 6 Most
often, cause advocates utilize multiple methods at the same time.
As a result, the "who," that is the "other side," is not static. While
litigation may have a technical plaintiff and defendant, cause litigation
generally has interested ancillary parties. As litigation develops, ancillary
parties may change from being supporters to opponents. Take some of
the recent education litigation as an example. In one lawsuit, challenging
school conditions in California, filed by the ACLU of Southern Califor-
nia, ancillary supporters included teachers and their union. However,
the ACLU of Southern California then alienated teachers and their un-
ions in a related lawsuit it filed challenging the way in which a school
district implemented teacher lay-offs.
Similarly, legislative work can result in groups who have had com-
peting interests coming together either to push for or oppose a particular
piece of legislation, even though the groups otherwise generally oppose
each other's missions. That same dynamic can come into play in com-
munity organizing. Thus, as a practical matter, understanding who one's
friends and enemies are is a fluid and dynamic process. But, robust no-
tions of loyalty between cause lawyers and clients create conditions that
encourage static notions of relationships. That, in turn, reduces the nim-
bleness necessary for cause lawyers and clients to perceive and pursue
opportunities for social change. I more fully describe the problem in the
next section.
II. THE HARMS OF HYPER-LOYALTY.
There are two helpful vantage points from which to consider the
harms that can flow from cause loyalty. One vantage point relates to the-
ories about decision making and problem solving. That vantage point
helps illuminate the ways in which cause lawyers and cause clients may
be subject to common decision-making errors because of the way hyper-
loyalty frames the decision-making processes. The other vantage point
relates to intentional choices available to cause lawyers and cause clients
about the ways in which they might helpfully choose to be in relationship
63. There has been a steady and long critique of cause lawyers as too focused on litigation.
See White, supra note 9, at 742. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 9. For a thoughtful summary of the
debate, see generally Cummings & Rhode, supra note 52.
64. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 443-44; Quigley, supra note 9 at 466-70; Ashar, supra note
9, at 1922, 1924-25; Cantrell, supra note 1, at 574-75.
65. For background on the case, the settlement, and the first year's enforcement, see generally
BROOKS M. ALLEN, ACLU FOUNDATION FOR S. CAL., THE WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT:
THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION (2005),
http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2005.pdf
66. See California Litigation, ACCESS QUALITY EDUCATION,
http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/ca/lit-ca.php3 (last visited June 14, 2012) (discussing Reed v.
Cahfornia).
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with others, but which they forgo because of their commitments to hy-
per-loyalty. I will take each vantage point in turn.
A. The Role of Cognitive Biases and Loyalty
Starting first with well-known information about cognitive heuris-
tics and bias. As is now well established, a notable feature of the way in
which we make decisions is our use of heuristics and biases, or "rules of
thumb," to quickly process information. As has also been thoroughly
demonstrated, those heuristics and biases can both help and impede accu-
rate decision making.68 Cause lawyers and cause clients are as prone to
cognitive bias as are any other decision makers. However, within the
cause lawyering relationship, those biases are triggered in particular
ways because the cause lawyer and cause client hold strong notions of
loyalty between themselves.
Consider one of the well-known biases: representativeness. The rep-
resentativeness bias posits that when people are asked to determine how
similar one thing is to another, they do so based on their own assess-
ments of resemblance rather than on more accurate probability assess-
ments.69 For example, if I see a very thin person and an average-weight
person both running on a path, I may assume that the thin runner is a
long-distance runner and the average-weight person is not. That is be-
cause the thin runner resembles marathon runners I have seen during the
Olympic Games, whereas the average-weight person does not. My as-
sumption is based on how close the thin runner comes to my own repre-
sentative image of marathon runners, not based on the mathematical
probability that across all thin and average-weight runners it is more like-
70ly that thin runners are long-distance runners.
Now consider cause lawyers and clients. Assume a low-income
community in which a brownfield is situated. The community members
have formed a neighborhood environmental justice group, which is being
represented by an environmental justice lawyer. Recently, some yuppies
have begun moving into the neighborhood and fixing up properties. The
environmental justice group and its lawyer are considering whether to
invite the yuppies to join the group.7 ' In this case, the environmental
67. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 19-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2008). The literature on cognitive
heuristics and biases is long and rich. My description of the field in this Article necessarily will be
short and summary. I will rely on a few sources to situate and support my summary, and readers who
are interested in undertaking a more thorough-going investigation of the field are encouraged to
review the bibliographies included in my source materials.
68. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 10-13 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2011).
69. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 26-277, 30-31; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note
68, at 149-53; PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS 217-19 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
70. For other examples, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 67, at 26-31.
71. The beginning of this fact pattern comes from Piomelli, supra note 21, at 401-02.
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justice lawyer worked with a different neighborhood group the year be-
fore and had the experience of a few more-resourced neighbors moving
in and co-opting the community group. From the lawyer's perspective,
the more-resourced neighbors then derailed the group's advocacy efforts.
Through the force of the representativeness bias, the lawyer is certain
that the current group of yuppies will have the same negative impact on
this second neighborhood group. He sees a resemblance between the two
groups, and focuses on that resemblance rather than on a more accurate
assessment of the likelihood that the two yuppie groups will behave simi-
larly. The cause lawyer's worries are magnified because of the hyper-
loyalty that he feels towards the community group and its cause. His
hyper-loyalty makes him focus on his concerns to such an extent that he
is rigid in his opposition to the yuppies, even in the face of facts that
suggest these yuppies are not like the others.
Further, the lawyer's certainty may not be checked by members of
the neighborhood group because of their own sense of hyper-loyalty with
the cause lawyer. Assume a mutual and reciprocal relationship between
the environmental justice lawyers and members of the neighborhood
group so that the lawyer is not carrying the day because he is bullying
group members. The conversations between the lawyer and group mem-
bers about the yuppies are engaged and fully participatory. Nonetheless,
group members feel hyper-loyalty to the lawyer and believe in the law-
yer's hyper-loyalty to them. That strong sense of loyalty means that they
give the benefit of the doubt to the lawyer. If the lawyer feels so strongly
about the yuppies, then there must be something there-whether that
"there" is based on cognitive bias or not.
Thinking about the above challenge in a slightly expanded form, it
is a challenge about the utility of stock stories.7 2 Stock stories are the
narrative version of the representativeness bias.73 Based on our lived
experiences, we create standardized narratives for what will transpire
given a certain set of facts. Gerald Lopez gives the example of the stock
story of "hailing a cab in Manhattan." He describes it as follows:
Walk outside to a street where cabs pass frequently, stand at the edge
of the sidewalk, wave to an unoccupied cab coming in your direction,
the cab (perhaps swerving radically to get there-it's Manhattan)
picks you up, tell the cabbie the destination, cabbie takes you (most
likely on an "entertaining" ride and hopefully by the most direct
route) there, pay (and tip or be castigated by) cabbie. 74
72. See Ty Alper et al., Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the First
Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 4-11 (2005); Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering,
32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1984).
73. See, e.g., BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 69, at 219-22.
74. Lopez, supra note 72, at 6.
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Like all other cognitive heuristics, stock stories are both useful and
lead to error. For example, in the cab stock story, when one travels to
another location and presumes that the same stock story will apply, one
might find oneself stranded without a cab. For example, in smaller loca-
tions where the stock story for that area is phoning a specific request for
a cab.
Thinking through the use of stock stories in lawyering, scholars
have noted the risk of a lawyer imposing her own stock stories on the
facts rather than taking time to understand fully the perspectives of the
client." Notice how that concern interacts with hyper-loyalty to increase
the chances that cognitive bias will occur. It is not only lawyers who are
subject to stock stories, so are clients. But, a diligent cause lawyer aware
of the risk that she may deploy her stock stories in a way that trumps her
clients' concerns, might be inclined to dismiss her own stock stories.
Then, the diligent and loyal cause lawyer will focus on finding her cli-
ents' narrative, and her hyper-loyalty to her clients can cause her to fail
to subject the clients' narrative to the same scrutiny as she applied to her
own narrative. The result is that the lawyer fails to discover her clients'
erroneously-deployed stock story. Thus, the cause lawyer and client each
erroneously assess their situation because of the strength of hyper-
loyalty.
In writing about lawyer problem-solving, Linda Krieger and Paul
Brest have comprehensively catalogued the range of cognitive biases and
heuristics that impact lawyers and have noted that de-biasing efforts are
"largely ineffectual."76 As they consider the role of a lawyer as a "cogni-
tive counselor," they worry that client-centered models of lawyering,
while very respectful of client autonomy and participation, lead lawyers
and clients to fall more easily to cognitive biases.77 Given the ineffec-
tiveness of other de-biasing techniques, Krieger and Brest hold out the
most hope if lawyers fully engage their clients, yet also maintain some
distance.78 Presumably, they would also recommend the corollary to cli-
ents as a way for clients to navigate their lawyers' cognitive biases.
Translating the Krieger/Brest recommendation into relevant terms for
this Article, they would likely be skeptical that hyper-loyalty leads to
effective decision-making, and would recommend to cause lawyers and
75. See id. at 11-14; see also Stephen Ellmann et al., Narrative Theory and Narrative Prac-
tice, in LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 139-42
(Thomson Reuters 2009); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients Stories, 12
CLINICAL L. REV. 329, 330-332 (2006); Angela Harris, Bad Subjects: The Practice of Theory and
the Constitution ofLegal Identity in Legal Culture, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 515, 522-23 (2003)
(discussing how legal projects "undertaken in the name of equality and respect silence those voices"
of subaltems, or socioeconomic outliers); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2110-11, 2118-19 (1991) (discussing
the competing narratives of clients and lawyers in poverty law).
76. BREST & KRIEGER, supra note 69, at 523-25.
77. Id. at 523-33.
78. Id. at 526, 533.
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clients that they reconsider whether hyper-loyalty helps to create actual
social change.
B. Relational Choices of Cause Lawyers and Cause Clients
Now consider the kinds of intentional choices that cause lawyers
and cause clients might make about their relationships with others, and
whether hyper-loyalty impedes some helpful relationships from forming.
This Article considers two possible constellations. The first is a calculat-
ed, instrumental choice by the cause lawyer and client to join with one
another because of an opportunistic and strategic assessment that such a
relationship will move the cause interest forward. Often, the strategic
relationship relates to a particular issue or project. The next is a choice
about relational advocacy-that the cause lawyer and client pay attention
to advocacy choices that are designed to build community more broadly.
While the examples are not exhaustive of intentional relational choices,
they do represent common choices available to cause lawyers and clients.
Starting with instrumental choices, an easy example is the earlier
one of an environmental justice neighborhood group joining with their
new yuppie neighbors. The groups are considering the collaboration be-
cause of geographic coincidence: the two sets of neighbors now share a
location and the location presents a problem. As noted before, cognitive
biases may influence whether the groups even will consider collaborat-
ing, but they still may make an intentional choice to join together on the
particular environmental issue related to their shared living space. Be-
cause of any number of perceived differences the groups have about each
other, one would expect that group collaboration would develop cau-
tiously and with concerns about whether the other group can truly be
trusted.
Under the best circumstances, group members would approach the
collaboration with inquisitiveness and openness.80 Members would ap-
proach differences of opinion not as moments of irresolvable conflict,
but as opportunities for reflective consideration and expression.8' Imag-
ining the ultimate ideal, the instrumental collaboration would lay the
foundation for an inclusive, long-term relationship, one that might even
lead to the dissolution of much of the sense of difference between
groups. For example, through learning about each other while working
on the environmental justice issue, community members might also dis-
cover that their neighborhood lacks an early childhood education pro-
79. 1 more fully consider what relational loyalty might look like in Part IV.
80. For this description, I am drawing upon the methodology created in the book by DOUGLAS
STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: How TO DISCUSS WHAT
MATTERS MOST 25, 43 (Viking 1999). Under their methodology, the key is for discussants to shift
focus to a "learning stance," in which each side approaches a conversation curious about the other
side's "story." Id.
81. Id. at 200.
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gram (ECEP) within easy commuting distance and that is affordable. The
group might discover that some of their members would be interested in
developing a home-based ECEP that they would staff and run. The envi-
ronmental justice lawyer is able to connect the group to a community
economic development lawyer who will provide free legal services to get
the ECEP up and running, and then connect the group to another pro
bono lawyer who will provide ongoing advice on maintaining a non-
profit. 82 Then, when one of ECEP staffers mentions to a parent that she
took an interesting class at the local YMCA on children's nutrition, that
prompts the parent to organize a neighborhood kids gardening project,
using open spaces between sidewalks and the roadway. The neighbor-
hoods share the produce. Under the best circumstances, the instrumen-
tal relationship is only the first node in an ever-expanding web of rela-
tionships.
The challenge that hyper-cause loyalty presents to those best cir-
cumstances is that it structurally maintains separation between the two
groups, thereby reducing the possibility that an expanding web of rela-
tionships can occur. The environmental justice lawyer and the communi-
ty group have already formed a relationship with strong expectations
about loyalty, not only loyalty to each other but also loyalty together
against others. Hyper-loyalty serves as a way of protecting the lawyer-
client relationship, but it also builds out firm distinctions between insid-
ers and outsiders, friends and enemies. That then means the cause lawyer
and cause client can be disinclined to work robustly across lines for fear
of being seen as disloyal. As Gary Bellow has noted, "some of the most
complex tensions" in cause work come when the cause lawyer or client
tries to work with other decision makers or power holders.84 Further,
when the relationship being contemplated by cause lawyer and cause
client has a very instrumental purpose, hyper-loyalty can heighten the
sense of "otherness" because the starting reason for contemplating an
alliance is already very limited. Thus, the groups come into the collabo-
ration having framed it as a one-time, limited engagement with each oth-
er. The protective shell created by hyper-loyalty might show itself in a
myriad of subtle ways. The cause lawyer interrupting a meeting of the
two groups when the conversation strays away from the environmental
justice topic by saying, "Let's keep on topic everyone." The neighbor-
hood group and the yuppies each having their own group names with
82. My hypothetical is based in part on a real non-profit based in New Haven, Connecticut,
and called All Our Kin, which has received free legal support services, including non-profit advising
through Yale Law School's clinical program. See ALL OUR KIN, http://www.allourkin.org/index.php
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
83. This part of the hypothetical is based on the many youth urban garden projects going on
across the country. See, e.g., DENVER URBAN GARDENS, http://dug.org/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2012);
THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY GARDENING COLLABORATIVE, http://www.ecologycenter.org/bcgc/
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
84. Bellow, supra note 4, at 304-06.
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both being used in public communications instead of creating a shared
name. And so on.
Of course, the challenge above is neither immutable nor preor-
dained, as this Article will explore more fully in the next section. Group
members and their lawyers assuredly could craft a shared relationship
that is inquisitive and open, and that handles conflicts and difficult con-
versations as opportunities, not threats. My point here is that hyper-
loyalty makes that harder, not impossible.
Consider now whether the disinclination to form an expanding web
of relationships dissipates if the cause lawyer and cause client are com-
mitted to advocacy that includes community building. Examples of that
kind of work include legal work in service of union organizing,85 and
legal work in service of organizing of a particular, or in a particular,
community. Key to law and organizing is a commitment to the collec-
tive as a source of empowerment and power.88 Thus, at the outset, cause
lawyers and cause clients involved in law and organizing understand
themselves to be in relationship through a collective, and through con-
nections with others. Because of that commitment to relationship build-
ing, one might expect that hyper-loyalty would not hinder as much a
cause lawyer or cause client seeing the potential of building relationships
in unexpected directions. But, when one surveys descriptions of relation-
ship building in the law and organizing literature, one finds fairly stark
descriptions of friends and enemies, or "us" and "the other side." In other
words, what counts as "community building" has very strict boundaries;
the "us" might be larger, but there definitively is a "them" who should
not be trusted.
For example, in a wonderfully detailed and descriptive recounting
of law and organizing work with restaurant workers in New York City,
Sameer M. Ashar describes workers, organizers, and lawyers ("us")
moving forward against restaurant employers, federal courts, highly visi-
ble individuals who either owned local restaurants targeted by the work-
ers or were the head of corporate restaurant chains, and local and state
government officials ("the other side").89 However, over the course of
85. See Emily Rae Woods, Ned Burke: Labor Union Lawyer (In House), in BEYOND THE BIG
FIRM 159-66 (Alan B. Morrison & Diane T. Chin, eds., Aspen Publishers 2007) (describing the
career path of an in-house union lawyer and his commitment to core union organizing goals).
86. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 428-30; Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460-65 (2001); Ashar, supra note 9, at
1879-80.
87. 1 am using this phrase loosely to refer to any kind of cause work in which organizing
plays a key role, even though there are often differences in focus, and sometimes tension, between
union organizing and other community organizing. See e.g., Gordon, supra note 9, at 423-27 (criti-
cizing unions for being focused only on bargaining for better contracts and for collaborating with
business); Ashar, supra note 9, at 1891-93 (noting the rise of community-organized workers centers
in response to the neglect of those workers by traditional unions).
88. See Quigley, supra note 9, at 455.
89. See Ashar, supra note 9, at 1889, 1898-99, 1911.
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the description of the advocacy campaign, people in one category never
move into the other.9 0
Similarly, in another stimulating article about creating a workers'
center for immigrant workers in Long Island, the "other side" includes
the following descriptions. Existing unions, with whom immigrant work-
ers had mixed results, were described as "do[ing] nothing" for the work-
ers. 9' Employees of federal and state labor-related agencies are described
as "often systematically block[ing] claims made by immigrants, effec-
tively preventing these claims from being addressed by the proper au-
thorities . . . allow[ing] them to act as keepers of the gates, turning per-
sonal animosity against immigrants into policy." 92 Further, workers who
came to the center for help would not receive legal services until they
were "willing to fight collectively" and participate in the center's larger
organizing campaign, creating the possibility that a worker could turn
from insider to outsider if she decided against organizing work.93 Again,
outsiders do not become insiders over the course of the story, and the
implied message from the strongly negative descriptions is that outsiders
are irredeemable. 94
Of course, when organizing a community, one reasonably needs to
prioritize efforts. Organizing does not happen because of a magic com-
munity-building wand; it takes hard, sustained, persevering work. As one
organizer describes it, community building includes, "consistent frustra-
tion ... with its petty disputes, confusion, personality problems and the
like."95 It makes sense to figure out which folks can stand together most
easily to start and then to move outward from there. It also makes sense
to tie closely the use of scarce legal resources to larger goals of commu-
nity building to ensure that individual work is coordinated with group
goals. What hyper-loyalty does to that reasonable process of prioritizing,
however, is to make more rigid and impermeable what should be a more
fluid sense of who the community is.
For example, when a worker chooses not to participate in organiz-
ing, the lens of cause loyalty too quickly views the worker's decision as
betrayal. The rationale might go something like this: "The rest of us have
come together and have been putting in time and effort to make safer
90. There is a necessary caveat to my conclusion. I am drawing it from a description that
necessarily truncates a much larger, more nuanced, lived history of an advocacy campaign. Any
advocacy campaign may very well have included moments of building unexpected relationships that
did not make it into the description. I am not trying to create a "cardboard" cut-out of law and organ-
izing, to borrow Kate Kruse's phrase. But, I am trying to highlight how much descriptions of that
work refer to features I have identified as belonging to hyper-loyalty.
91. Gordon, supra note 9, at 413.
92. Id. at 420.
93. Id. at 443-44.
94. See supra notes 91-93. I add the same caveat to this description that I noted about the
organizing campaign for restaurant workers.
95. Quigley, supra note 9, at 458 (quoting community organizer Ron Chisom).
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workplaces for all of us. If you are not willing to put in the same time
and effort as the rest of us, then that must mean you do not support our
goals. If you do not support our goals, you stand against us." Hyper-
loyalty prefers to understand the world as friends and enemies, thereby
diminishing the chance that "friends" will understand the declining
worker to have been motivated by a myriad of other possible benign rea-
sons such as fear, or uncertainty about what organizing entails, or ex-
haustion from a too-long workday. The risk, then, is that the declining
worker is left out of further conversations or efforts even though her wor-
ries may very well be able to be assuaged, and she could be eventually
brought into the organizing work.96 So, too, the employer labeled an "en-
emy," remains an enemy, even if further conversation would have re-
vealed productive possibilities for engagement.
If current expressions of hyper-loyalty are too rigid, then what
might a more expansive version of loyalty look like, and how would it
increase the relationality that this Article has argued is so critical to ef-
fective social change work? It is to those questions that the next section
turns.
III. RELATIONAL LOYALTY
First, relational loyalty does not mean lessening a lawyer's duty of
confidentiality. A cause lawyer and client, or client group, will still
share information with each other forthrightly and freely, with clients
assured that their communications will not be disclosed to others without
their consent. Further, given that what the cause lawyer says to her cli-
ents may be as sensitive as what the clients say to the cause lawyer, a
careful cause lawyer will take time with her clients to talk through vari-
ous consequences to the clients and the cause of the clients disclosing the
lawyer's communications.98 The idea of relational loyalty is not to create
a less-trusting relationship between cause lawyer and client; it is to create
for both lawyer and client a more expansive web of relationships within
which to create social change.
96. Here I want to be careful not to caricature organizing work. I fully acknowledge that a key
component of all good organizing training is working through community members' reluctances and
worries about organizing. I am not trying to suggest that an organizer could not, or would not, en-
gage with a reluctant worker to try and convince her to join in the organizing efforts. My suggestion
is more modest-that hyper-loyalty mutes those efforts.
97. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.6 (2010), ("A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .").
98. Recall that Rule 1.6 obligates the lawyer to preserve confidences, but does not place a
similar obligation on a client. Similarly, the evidentiary privilege between attorney and client is held
by the client, and an unaware client can easily waive the privilege unintentionally. Arthur Best,
EVIDENCE 198 (7th ed. 2009) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is waived if a client inadvert-
ently reveals a private communication had with an attorney without acting reasonably to prevent
disclosure or taking prompt remedial steps).
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A. A Web ofRelationships
Actively looking for and creating a web of relationships requires
cause lawyers and clients to concentrate more on the situations in which
they are working than on the dispositions of the people involved. In other
words, cause lawyers and clients must be prepared to examine all others
in ways other than constitutively as friends or enemies. Drawing on the
work of situationist scholars, the current patterned thinking of cause ad-
vocates and clients is to view those who are like-minded as good people,
and those who are not as bad people, and to reject the possibility that
specific features of the situation are the reason that someone is like-
minded or not.99 As noted earlier, hyper-loyalty exacerbates cognitive
biases, like attributions to disposition as opposed to situation. But, ac-
tively looking to create an expansive web of relationships pushes cause
lawyers and clients to consider the situation as creating behavior.
For example, a cause lawyer and her clients who are looking to
change the pace at which local government benefits offices process ap-
plications might consider the role played by specific situations faced by
department line employees in causing application delays instead of vili-
fying those line employees as elites who hate poor people. Paying atten-
tion to the situation may reveal factors that encourage building a connec-
tion with another. Maybe several department line employees share the
same interviewing space, which creates pressure to move through appli-
cant interviews quickly and curtly. Understanding the line employees to
be connected in the web of relationships could result in efforts to create
an expanded workspace, which may then give line employees more time
with applicants. 00
A powerful historical example of this kind of relational advocacy is
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s work to build a "beloved community."' 1 King
repeatedly reminded advocates that maintaining a generalized hostile
stance against all non-Black community members would fail to bring
about long-term, steadfast social change.102 As King noted in his Letter
99. For a thorough-going introduction to situationism, see generally Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Eco-
nomics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
100. Having been a poverty lawyer, I know very well that my example can be pressed. What
state agency really has the extra space contemplated by my hypothetical? If an agency had such
space, why would it agree to give more over to benefits offices than to other needs? I agree that there
are challenges to my hypothetical, but notice how many of the objections start from the presumption
that the state's actors could never be believed to behave in a way conducive to anti-poverty work.
Those objections start from the same dispositionist presumption that this Article asserts is unhelpful.
101. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Power of Nonviolence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE:
THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 12 (James M. Washington
ed., 1986) [hereafter A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
102. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Nonviolence and Racial Justice, in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 7 ("A second point is that nonviolent resistance does not seek to defeat
or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding."); id at 10 ("In your struggle
for justice, let your oppressor know that you are not attempting to defeat or humiliate him, or even to
pay him back for injustices that he has heaped upon you. Let him know that you are merely seeking
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From a Birmingham Jail, "I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all
communities and states. ... We are caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one di-
rectly affects all indirectly."'10 3 King's commitment to a beloved commu-
nity stemmed from his theological understandings,' but it also allowed
him to apprehend that greater social change was possible when one un-
derstood that people who acted badly in certain situations could still
change their behaviors when pressed into other situations. 05 A relational
sense of cause loyalty would mean that when a cause lawyer or cause
client suggests building an unexpected relationship, she would not be
considered disloyal, but would be understood as exploring whether there
justice for him as well as yourself. Let him know that the festering sore of segregation debilitates the
white man as well as the Negro."); id. at 14 ("God grant that as men and women all over the world
struggle against evil systems they will struggle with love in their hearts, with understanding good
will. Agape says you must go on with wise restraint and calm reasonableness but you must keep
moving. We have a great opportunity in America to build here a great nation, a nation where all men
live together as brothers and respect the dignity and worth of all human personality.")
103. Id. at 290
104. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
chs. 3-4 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) (describing his introduction to nonviolence through Mohan-
das Gandhi, the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, and his work with Dr. Edgar Brightman and Dr. L.
Harold DeWolf). See generally KENNETH L. SMITH & IRA G. ZEPP, JR., SEARCH FOR THE BELOVED
COMMUNrTY: THE THINKING OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 11 (Judson Press 1974).
I also want to note here examples of "beloved communities" coming from other religious
traditions. For example, Buddhism contains the concept of "dependent arising"-an account of
interconnectedness between all things. See HUSTON SMITH & PHILIP NOVAK, BUDDHISM: A
CONCISE INTRODUCTION 61 (2003). Judaism contains a moral obligation to "deem all of another's
concerns as weighty as one's own." LENN E. GOODMAN, LOVE THY NEIGHBOR As THYSELF 13
(2008). In the Catholic tradition, the Focolare Movement is based on the "spirituality of unity,"
which calls on a person to be a "gift for the other." Donald W. Mitchell, The Spirituality of Unity: A
Gift for Our Times, Remarks at Fordham Law School (April 5, 2011) (manuscript on file with au-
thor); see also CHIARA LUBICH, ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 3 (Michel Vandeleene ed., 2007) (through the
spirituality of unity, people are trying to become "the seeds of a new people that promotes a world of
greater solidarity especially with the poorest and weakest, a world more united"); id., at 280-81
(living a "culture of giving . . . could seem difficult, arduous, or heroic, [b]ut it is not, because the
human person, made in the image of God who is love, finds fulfillment precisely in loving, in giv-
ing"). See generally THOMAS MASTERS & AMY UELMEN, FOCOLARE: LIVING A SPIRITUALITY OF
UNITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) (describing US applications and projects). See generally,
Deborah J. Cantrell, What's Love Got to Do with It?: Contemporary Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy
from the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 296 (2010) (discussing across
multiple religious traditions the concept of "love of neighbor" and applying it as a lawyerly value).
105. This situationist account of Dr. King comes from Jon Hanson, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
Situationism, THE SITUATIONIST BLOG, http://thesituationist.wordpress.com/2008/01/20/1661/ (Jan.
22, 2007). Of course, changed behavior can come either voluntarily or coercively. Coerced social
change comes with the worry that the bad behavior has not been eliminated, but redirected into a less
obvious, but equally nefarious, channel. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of
Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011) (giving a detailed historical account
of civil rights advocacy strategies that led to disparate impact, including strategic choices about the
potential for driving discrimination underground if civil rights agendas were crammed down on
employers). It may also be the case that some "bad" behavior is unconscious. See, e.g., Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Curtis Hardin & Alexander J. Rothman, Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SoC'L PSYCH. 272 (1993) (one of the early studies capturing the effects of non-
conscious or implicit bias). Dr. Banaji is a leading researcher on implicit bias and is part of a larger
group of researchers focused on that topic. See PROJECT IMPICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/backgroundinformation.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011). 1 ad-
dress those concerns in more detail in Section V.
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is a moment to expand helpfully the web of relationships needed to cre-
ate social change.10 6
B. An Approach of Curiosity
A related feature of relational loyalty is that cause lawyers and
cause clients would approach other actors/participants with curiosity and
not with animosity or with an advocacy agenda to start. This feature
comes directly from the negotiation field. 07 As one set of researchers has
observed, "[c]hanges in attitudes and behavior rarely come about because
of arguments, facts, and attempts to persuade."' 08 Instead, starting from a
genuine "stance of curiosity" allows each conversant to focus truly on
listening to the other side.' 0 9
For example, curiosity requires participants to inquire about the
other's intentions, and not presume them."10 That can be key in cause
work given the propensity to frame a setting as "us" and "them," and the
resulting propensity to presume bad intentions on the part of "them.""'
Curiosity also requires participants to be conscious about the ways in
which they frame questions so that a question is not a cross-examination
or an advocacy statement, but is a genuine inquiry: i.e., asking the agen-
cy person, "What would make it easier for a benefits worker to be able to
have enough time for an initial interview?" instead of stating, in dis-
guised question form, "You would agree, wouldn't you, that benefits
workers must have more time for initial interviews?"ll 2 Finally, curiosity
calls on participants to separate acknowledging points made by the other
106. For an example of unexpected transnational labor collaboration spurred by the adoption of
new international law, see generally Tamara Kay, Legal Transnationalism: The Relationship Be-
tween Transnational Social Movement Building and International Law, 36 L. & SOC'L INQUIRY 419
(2011). 1 also understand the social change model of building a web of relationships to share as its
distant cousin theories of democratic constitutionalism in which change advocates, courts, and
legislators are all in relationship to each other in a dynamic contest over norms. See Robert Post &
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
373, 381-87 (2007); see also Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2008) (arguing that Supreme Court dissents are an example of "demosprudence," which
understands there to be a relationship of dialogue between the "lawmaking power of legal elites and
the equally important, though often undervalued, power of social movements or mobilized constitu-
encies to make, interpret, and change law"). Democratic constitutionalism remains a distant cousin
to my approach in large part because it implicitly understands membership in any of the groups as
impermeable. One is a member of the legal elite or a social movement, and one cannot, or does not,
cross over.
107. See STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 80, at 167-83.
108. Id. at 137.
109. Id. at 166-68; see generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 115 (2007) (asserting that cultural beliefs are resistant to change and positing that change
might be assisted by creating the most robust marketplace of culturally-related positions); Russell G.
Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting the Ordeal of
Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LTTrLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (introducing the idea
of "relational self-interest" as a way of bridging differences and seeing another's perspective).
110. See STONE, PAT7ON & HEEN, supra note 80, at 48-50.
111. Id. at 46 ("The conclusions we draw about intentions based on the impact of others'
actions on us are rarely charitable.").
112. See id. at 172-77 for further examples.
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side from agreeing with the other side. 1 3 Thus, a participant understands
that she can acknowledge a challenge presented by the other side without
agreeing with the conclusion the other side reaches based on the chal-
lenge.
For cause lawyers and clients who understand themselves as en-
gaged in an important advocacy campaign for social change, stepping
back from an advocacy stance can be challenging. The point of the work,
after all, is to convince others to change. The worry is that taking a
stance, other than as an advocate, might easily be misconstrued as giving
in, or as signaling weakness. Hyper-loyalty feeds in to the idea that an
advocacy stance is the way in which one signals strong solidarity with
one's cause client, or one's cause lawyer. Imbuing loyalty with a sense of
curiosity towards the other helps to move it towards a way of engaging
with others that ultimately permits more effective advocacy.
C. An Approach of Compassion
A final feature of relational loyalty is cultivating compassion. It is
certainly consonant with building a web of relationships and approaching
others with curiosity. By compassion, I mean a willingness to try actively
to understand another's position or conduct without vilifying the position
or the person. Further, compassion requires a participant to meet hostility
or other negative reactions with a reaction designed to de-escalate-
although de-escalation does not mean capitulation.114
Compassion does not require agreeing with, or excusing another's
position or conduct. A humorous vignette by noted insight meditation
expert Sharon Salzberg helps illustrate the point. Salzburg describes a
rickshaw trip to the train station in Kolkata (Calcutta) India in which a
person tried to assault her from the street. She avoided being pulled from
the rickshaw, and when she recounted the event to her teacher, he ex-
claimed that "with all of the lovingkindness in [her] heart," she should
have taken her umbrella "and hit that man over the head with it."" 5 As
Salzburg goes on to explain, compassion requires one to live with "sym-
pathy for all living beings," which allows a person "to name injustice
without hesitation, and to act strongly, with all the skill at our dispos-
al."ll6 I emphasize the final component because what often constitutes
"naming injustice" in social change work is expressing righteous anger-
a response that emphasizes divides and differences between people or
113. Id. at 180-83.
114. See Deborah J. Cantrell, Can Compassionate Practice Also Be Good Legal Practice?:
Answers from the Lives ofBuddhist Lawyers, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 73-74 (2010) (noting
the critical role compassion plays for Buddhist lawyers and that a key feature of compassion is
understanding, not avoiding conflict or capitulating to demands).
115. SHARON SALZBERG, LOVINGKINDNESS: THE REVOLUTIONARY ART OF HAPPINESS 131
(Shambhala Publications, Inc. 1995).
116. Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
9672012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
groups. In contrast, when using the skill of compassionate response, in-
justice is still identified clearly and forthrightly, but with an eye towards
identifying the myriad of conditions on which the particular situation
depends so that opportunities for change might be identified." 7
When compassion is joined with curiosity, participants increase
their capacity to comprehensively and accurately map out the full con-
tours of the situation for which a solution must be crafted."' 8 That com-
prehensive map is more likely to illuminate unexpected ways forward
than is a map created by participants who only distrust and dislike each
other. Of course, the fact of creating a more comprehensive map of the
situation does not itself guarantee that participants will find a solution.
Creating a comprehensive map comes at the beginning of the process,
and there will still be hard work ahead. During that hard work, it is likely
that participants will have to rejigger their map many times as the situa-
tion develops and changes. Each time, that rejiggering will benefit from
compassion, curiosity, and an effort to build out a web of relationships.
IV. Is THIS A RISKY UTOPIAN VISION OF CAUSE LAWYERING?
The foundational principles of this Article insist that social change
is more likely to happen, or happens more thoroughly, when advocates
work to build a web of relationships, and approach all others with curios-
ity and compassion. Those engaged in social change work may worry
that the risks of failure presented by the approach are too high and the
consequences too grave. More particularly, those skeptical of the ap-
proach may worry on a few related fronts. First, that the approach places
elite cause lawyers in a position in which it is too easy for them to be co-
opted by the existing legal and political systems. Relatedly, that power
dynamics in our society are structured in an intractable way that pre-
cludes building true relationships between those with power and those
without. Finally, that social change work requires there to be a group that
understands itself to have a grievance against others outside the group.
Thus, a sense of "otherness" is a necessary precursor to social change
work. The Article takes up each of those worries in turn.
Recall the earlier discussion of rebellious lawyering and its concern
that predominantly elite cause lawyers are unable to step back and em-
power their clients to take the lead in developing and implementing an
advocacy strategy."' 9 If cause lawyers are affirmatively to build a web of
117. See id.
118. A training technique built from the combination of curiosity and compassion is "parallel
universes." Created by Susan Bryant and Jean Kob Peters, the technique calls on the lawyer to create
several parallel universes in which a different reason explains the client's conduct in each universe.
In that way, a lawyer is reminded that any given outcome generally has multiple explanations or
contexts. See generally Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001).
119. See discussion infra Part lB.
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relationships, the worry is that they will focus on building relationships
within the existing legal and political systems. As one activist described
it, lawyers:
[A]re trained to understand and be comfortable with the system even
when they criticize it. Almost all lawyers, including community law-
yers, want to succeed in the system. They want money, power, politi-
cal advantage, respect or whatever their individual dreams are.
Therefore, confronting the system or raising hell makes the lawyer
very uncomfortable because it is not how the lawyer was trained to
deal with the system, and the lawyer, without realizing it, is chal-
lenged individually because the lawyer is part of the system. 120
Even benignly, elite cause lawyers who are conscientious about not
dominating clients may subtly or unconsciously signal to clients that the
best way for the clients to use the lawyer is to work within the system
and to leave the lawyer out of those activities designed to challenge the
system.121 Given that the point of building a web of relationships is to
accelerate the possibility of change, it is a bad consequence indeed if
building the web results instead in the cooptation of social change and
the reinforcement of the status quo.122
There are several countervailing efforts that cause lawyers and
cause clients must bring to bear to avoid cooptation. The first is that both
cause lawyers and cause clients must explicitly, intentionally, and mutu-
ally commit to the "web of relationships" or "relational loyalty" advoca-
cy approach. There can be no unspoken assumptions between lawyer and
client about what each other's motivations are, what assumptions are
being made, and upon what predictions are being relied. The work en-
gaged in by lawyer and client goes beyond simple technical efforts to
comply or enforce the law, and it requires the lawyer and client to insist
that the "moral perspective" of the work is transparently a part of the
conversation. 12 3 Further, cause lawyers and cause clients must understand
120. Quigley, supra note 9, at 459 (quoting community organizer, Ron Chisom).
121. For a succinct and useful historical account of lawyers' dominance within the political
system, see Robert W. Gordon, Are Lawyers Friends of Democracy?, in THE PARADOX OF
PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 31, 33 (Scott L. Cummings, ed.,
2011). To compare with accounts of lawyers and activists using the courtroom as political theater,
see Gabel & Harris, supra note 9, at 379-89. The seminal critique of elite cooptation of social
movements was issued in FRANCES PIvEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 297-300 (1977) (assessing the welfare rights social move-
ment and concluding that grassroots, activist protest work was co-opted by elite lawyers who were
most comfortable using a court-based, litigation-focused strategy built on existing legal structures).
122. For an interesting case study of how elites can both help and hinder social movement
work, see Douglas Neiaime, Convincing Elites, Controlling Elites, 54 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC'Y
175, 195-196 (2011) (considering elite impact in the U.S. marriage equality campaign).
123. See Robert K. Vischer, Legal Advice as Moral Perspective, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225,
268-270 (2006) (arguing that moral dimensions permeate most work between lawyer and client and
that competent lawyering cannot happen without explicitly engaging those moral dimensions); see
also Kruse, supra note 17, at 111 (arguing that current legal norms result in lawyers inappropriately
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that they both are capable of robust moral conversations and that disa-
greement does not mean disloyalty. 124 Just as they are meeting others
with curiosity and compassion, so too, must they meet each other.125
Cause lawyers and cause clients also must commit themselves to self-
reflecting on their own actions, both as a way of checking and analyzing
one's own behavior and also as a way of trying to build out a set of good
habits needed for a web-of-relationship approach to advocacy. 12 6
Again, I am not asserting that the approach is effective and easy. I
am asserting, however, that the challenges that will come up between
cause lawyers and cause clients, and between both as to others, are navi-
gable and surmountable. Nonetheless, the approach cannot be pursued
successfully if pursued half-heartedly. Then again, social change work,
in whatever its variety, has never been easy. So, if cause lawyers and
cause clients are going to be working hard no matter, better to work hard
using a model that offers more hope for change.
I now turn to the second concern: that the power differential be-
tween those in control and those pushing for social change precludes any
kind of true mutual relationship. As a result, cause lawyers and cause
assuming their clients are motivated only by self-interest instead of a broader range of moral com-
mitments).
124. Recall Gary Bellow's warning to cause lawyers not to err by assuming their clients are
weak and manipulable, and his description of his own vigorous conversations with clients. Bellow,
supra note 4, at 297 300, 303-304. As Ascanio Piomelli has described it, "An essential aspect of
collaboration is fully engaging with clients and groups: listening, but also challenging; learning, but
also teaching; allowing others to reach different conclusions, but sometimes voicing disagree-
ment . . . ." Piomelli, supra note 21, at 471.
125. For those concerned about an approach calling for mutual engagement, this is often the
moment where the concern is raised about the possibility of a cause lawyer and cause client reaching
a complete impasse. The unspoken assumption is that such irresolvable impasses will happen so
often, and that the risk to client individual autonomy is so great, that any model of mutual engage-
ment between lawyer and client is inappropriate. Note that this concern applies to all lawyer-client
relationships, whether the work is social change or private interests. Many scholars, including me,
have considered how mutual engagement and client autonomy can work in harmony, and for pur-
poses of this Article, I take that point as already having been well-articulated. See generally, Kathe-
rine R. Kruse, supra note 17; Vischer, supra note 123; Cantrell, supra note 104.
126. There are many, many ways in which one might practice self-reflection, and I mention
only two possible approaches here. One comes from the literature on mindfulness and lawyering, in
which techniques such as mindfulness meditation are used to train good habits of attention and
awareness. Exemplary of that approach is the work of Len Riskin. See Leonard L. Riskin, Further
Beyond Reason: Emotions, the Core Concerns, and Mindfulness in Negotiation, 10 NEV. L. J. 289,
314-15 (2010); Leonard L. Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution, 54
J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 83-85 (2004); Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential
Benefits of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 23-27 (2002). For an example of social change lawyers using mindfulness in their work, see
Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin & Jeffrey Selbin, From the "Art of War" to "Being Peace": Mind-
fulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2073, 2114-15 (2007). The
second approach comes from the literature related to legal clinical pedagogy, in which the role of
self-reflection for good student learning has been extensively studied. Some examples include J.P.
Ogilvy, The Use ofJournals in Legal Education: A Toolfor Reflection, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 55, 60
(1996); RoY STUCKEY, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 127-
28 (2007), available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best practices-full.pdf (not-
ing that self-directed learning requires that a student not "only learn something, but . . . reflect criti-
cally on the extent of her or his learning").
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clients must understand those in power as adversaries because to do oth-
erwise risks easy cooptation, or worse. Social movement history in this
country provides cautionary examples of power's easy ability to trump
agitators-think of any number of examples of violent suppression of
labor organizing,127 or violent uses of force during civil rights boy-
cotts. 12 8 Further, power also brings with it the power to ignore. If those in
power do not acknowledge opposition, then there is a risk that such op-
position is not seen as being a part of the contest at all. Thus, if one be-
lieves that the risks of cooptation or of being ignored are high, then one
might determine that the best strategy for change is to place oneself or
one's community in high and visible opposition to the "other." More
succinctly, to embark upon a strategy exactly contrary to the approach
recommended in this Article. Consider two examples of that strategy-
one from the left and another from the right.
First, an example from the left: In March 1987, AIDS activists in
New York City came together to form the group, ACT UP. ACT UP
staged its first protest on Wall Street on March 24, 1987.129 The day be-
fore the protest, one of ACT UP's original members, Larry Kramer, had
an editorial published in the New York Times titled "The F.D.A.'s Cal-
lous Response to AIDS." 30 In the editorial, Kramer excoriated the FDA
for being "intransigent in the face of this monstrous tidal wave of death."
He then called out national and local government administrations saying
that "when the histories of the Reagan and Koch administrations are
truthfully written, this scandal will dwarf the political corruption in New
York and the foreign policy blunders in Washington.""'' Kramer's blunt,
if not hyperbolic, writing became exemplary of ACT UP's rigorous and
confrontational approach to direct action. In an interview for ACT UP's
oral history project, Kramer noted that he became known as "the Angri-
est Gay Man in the World." 3 2 He also described his efforts to push ACT
UP to become "more militant" and to understand itself as "an army,"
including getting members to take shooting practice."3
127. See generally PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN
AMERICA 323-28 (1st ed. 2010) (detailing labor unrest and response in unionizing development in
America).
128. See, e.g., KING, JR., supra note 104, at 78-82 (describing responses to the Montgomery,
Alabama bus boycott during which Dr. King's house was bombed).
129. ACT UP 1987 Wall Street Action, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/documents/1stFlyer.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (recreating the flyer of
the first ACT UP action on March 24, 1987 for a "Massive AIDS Demonstration").
130. Larry Kramer, The F.D.A's Callous Response to AIDS, N. Y. TIMES, March 23, 1987, at
A19.
131. Id.
132. Interview by Sarah Schulman with Larry Kramer, ACT UP Oral History Project (Nov. 15,
2003) at 14, available at http://www.actuporalhistory.org/interviews/images/kramer.pdf.
133. Id. at 16.
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Picking up on Kramer's theme of ACT UP standing in clear opposi-
tion to the establishment, another early member of ACT UP described
the group as follows:
ACT UP, the organization, does exactly what its name says. We do
demonstrations, and act in such a way that the authorities (and in this
case we mean government officials, researchers, politicians, the
church and the law) feel is inappropriate but ultimately accomplishes
our goal by bringing into focus the problems which they are unwill-
ing or afraid to address.134
ACT UP demonstrations included chants that highlighted themes
like being at war or in a fight. For example, at the group's second anni-
versary protest in March 1989, protestors chanted, "We'll never be silent
again, ACT UP, we'll never be silent again, ACT UP, fight back, fight
AIDS . . . .' Similarly, at an October 1988 demonstration outside of
the FDA's office in Washington, DC, protestors chanted, "Forty-two
thousand dead of AIDS, where was the FDA, seize control, seize control,
seize control." 36
Next, an example from the right: the Thomas More Law Center
(TMLC).' 37 TMLC focuses its advocacy efforts on supporting school
districts in teaching "intelligent design" in science courses instead of
evolution.138 TMLC has portrayed itself as being deeply and inexorably
"within a grand narrative of oppression and resistance" to the mainstream
political and cultural power structures.139 Thus, TMLC has crafted a kind
of heroic resistance narrative that calls on its members to stand firmly
against "the other."
Both ACT UP and TMLC made a similar calculation. First, that a
call to a kind of "hyper hyper-loyalty" better mobilizes supporters than
does an approach that suggests there are any affinities between a group's
supporters and other groups. Second, that this hyper hyper-loyalty is a
very effective way to banish the risk of cooptation because it insists that
there could never be any common ground, ever, with the other side.
Thus, there is no reason to talk with anyone or any group that is not al-
ready committed to issues in the same way as the group. For ACT UP,
the point was not to negotiate with the FDA for any possible change in
the approval process for AIDS-related medications, from the smallest to
134. Jon Greenberg, ACT UP Explained, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/documents/greenbergAU.htmi (last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
135. Detailed Scenes: Fight Back, Fight Aids, ACT UP,
http://www.actupny.org/divatv/synopsis75.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (transcript of video
documentary by James Wentzy).
136. Id.
137. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REv. 941, 978 83 (2011)
(describing Thomas More Law Center's approach to litigating "intelligent-design" education cases).
138. Id. at 978-79.
139. Id. at 980 (internal citations omitted).
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the most significant. The point was to demand full capitulation by the
FDA. In fact, ACT UP splintered when some of its members were per-
ceived as agreeing to negotiate with the FDA and big pharmaceutical
companies. 140 Similarly, the point of TMLC is not to accept any possible
revisions to evolutionary teaching, but to accept only full use of an intel-
ligent design curriculum. Under such a model, change only happens
when it is crammed down on the other side, and change is an all or noth-
ing proposition.
In some ways, the purity of the above approach is alluring. It offers
up a simple narrative that there is a right way and a wrong way. There
are no uncertain margins in which hard cases exist. Thus, there is no rea-
son to be curious about conversing with someone who holds another
position. It is better just to be a strong advocate. But the very features of
that all-or-nothing approach that makes its group impermeable to coopta-
tion and invisibility, also makes it impermeable to expansion. As de-
scribed earlier, advocacy is often the least likely way to change a per-
son's mind on an issue. The situation always is perceived as if it were a
zero sum game, with winners and losers. Thus, standoffs, not change, are
the more likely result.
Contrast the ACT UP/TMLC approach with another example from
social movement work that provides a different understanding of power:
a dynamic vision in which all actors have power, and power can be used
to create space for a new, engaged dialogue and "to expand the sites,
means, and agents of persuasion."141 Concretely, I turn again to Martin
Luther King, Jr. King, who insisted on calling out immoral and uncon-
scionable behavior, including calling out the passivity and cooptation of
black and white churches. 142 But, he did so adamantly and unrelentingly
through the lens of his beloved community, and through his concept of
nonviolence as "love in action."l 4 3 King welcomed all into the civil rights
movement so long as they trained in, and committed to, love in action.4
King wats steady in his belief that it was through engagement, not disen-
gagement, that all members of a community would come to a commit-
140. See Interview by Sarah Schulman with Mark Harrington, ACT UP Oral History Project
(March 8, 2003) at 58-59, available at
http://www.actuporalhistory.org/interviews/images/harrington.pdf:
141. Piomelli, supra note 21, at 463.
142. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM CrrY JAIL (1963), reprintedin A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 298-99 ("let me rush on to mention my other disappoint-
ment. I have been so greatly disappointed with the white church and its leadership... . I felt that the
white ministers, priests and rabbis of the South would be some of our strongest allies. Instead, some
have been outright opponents, refusing to understand the freedom movement and misrepresenting its
leaders .... )
143. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., An Experiment in Love, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE,
supra note 101, at 16-20 ("Agape is not a weak, passive love. It is love in action. Agape is love
seeking to preserve and create community. It is insistence on community even when one seeks to
break it.").
144. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Nonviolence: The Only Road to Freedom, reprinted in A A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 54-61.
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ment of equality. 145 Nothing about the approach was easy, nor was the
change swift. But, change did come. 14 6
A final concern with the approach presented in this Article may be
that it defies a fundamental and necessary condition of social change-
that there is an identifiable group that has a grievance against another. 147
Social movement theorists have posited that there is no movement until a
group constructs an identity for itself that is in opposition to another. 148
That boundary drawing serves important functions of legitimating the
group and spurring collective action.149 The drawing of the boundary
between "us" and "them" provides the glue that allows "us" to be effec-
tive collective actors. Without that glue, social movement work does not
even begin.
In fact, the approach in this Article presumes that some sort of
group boundary drawing does happen and has some practical utility. A
cause lawyer and cause client must first self-identify as such, and in the
process discern as a starting matter who else has the same problem that
needs solving. There must be some initial conversations and organizing
work that happens in order to build a group that has sufficient energy,
resources, and skills to proceed with social change work. The group
needs to be sufficiently cohesive so that its members' efforts can be co-
ordinated and so that the group can assess how effective those efforts
have been. Relational loyalty between cause lawyer and cause client still
requires all of the above to occur; however, it encourages formation to
happen in harmony with a set of expectations about how the group is
situated more broadly within a web of relationships, and that advocacy
efforts will be imbued with curiosity and compassion. Thus, whatever
useful notions of "us" and "them" are needed at the beginning of organ-
izing do not become so rigid and hardened to preclude expanding bound-
aries.
145. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SHOWDOWN FOR NONVIOLENCE (1968), reprinted in A A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 64-72; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL
DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION (1963), reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 101, at 117-
25.
146. 1 do not mean my brief description of Dr. King's work to suggest that the civil rights
movement was something other than a complicated and nuanced sociological, psychological, and
political drama. My point is not to capture a complete picture of the civil rights movement, but to be
clear about how straightforward were Dr. King's first principles, and to suggest that his first princi-
ples mattered to outcomes.
147. See Melucci, supra note 13, at 48 (a collective "makes the basic assumption that its dis-
tinction from other actors is constantly acknowledged by them, even in the extreme form of denial);
see also Jennifer Fredette, Social Movements and the State's Construction of Identity: The Case of
Muslims in France, 54 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC'Y 45, 54 (2011) (arguing that there is no real Mus-
lim social movement in France because Muslims currently have no "collective identity," but, instead,
"there is great variation and even spirited disagreement" about identity, kinds of grievances, and
goals of activism).
148. See Melucci, supra note 13, at 48.
149. Id. at 48-49.
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CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, cause lawyers engage in their work to make social
change. Scholars of cause lawyering have generated a robust and rich
literature considering important issues such as what kinds of advocacy
work best to generate social change and what features are critical to an
engaged and mutual relationship between cause lawyer and cause client.
But the literature has neglected a key aspect of that relationship-
whether the particular kind of loyalty that exists between cause lawyer
and cause client hinders or helps in achieving social change.
This Article has taken up that inquiry. It has demonstrated that
cause lawyers and cause clients expect each other to show a heightened
level of fidelity to each other, what I have labeled hyper-loyalty. A criti-
cal feature of hyper-loyalty is that cause lawyers and cause clients view
the advocacy landscape as consisting only of friends and enemies. Fur-
ther, because of several dynamics, including the force of cognitive heu-
ristics and biases, and the force of intentional relationship choices, cause
lawyers and cause clients maintain strict and rigid classifications be-
tween friends and enemies. Thus, cause lawyers and cause clients view
any overtures to enemies as exceedingly disloyal behavior. The force and
rigidity of hyper-loyalty diminishes the possibilities that cause lawyers
and cause clients can create actual social change.
However, this Article provides a way forward by suggesting that
hyper-loyalty be replaced by relational loyalty. The Article defines rela-
tional loyalty as having three critical features. First, that cause lawyers
and cause clients understand the architecture in which they are situated to
be a connected web of relationships instead of a dyadic and oppositional
structure. Second, that cause lawyers and cause clients approach the web
of relationships with curiosity instead of advocacy. Finally, that cause
lawyers and cause clients respond with compassion to all contained in
the web of relationships. This Article argues that relational loyalty incul-
cates a helpful dynamism in relationships, which in turn creates unex-




MARIJUANA AT THE CROSSROADS: KEYNOTE ADDRESS
SAM KAMIN t
INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank the editorial board of the Denver University
Law Review for all of their hard work in putting this event together and
for asking me to give the keynote address. This essay represents a distil-
lation of the speech I gave at that event.1
In preparing this keynote, I was contacted by a reporter who would
be covering this event wanting to know exactly what I would be saying
during my remarks. 2 I told him that giving a keynote address at a confer-
ence about medical marijuana is sort of a procrastinator's dream; it is
almost impossible to know in advance what you will be talking about
because you have no idea what the state of the law will be in two or three
days. During one of the conference's sessions one of the participants was
leaving the stage and asked the other participants: "Has anyone Googled?
Did anything happen while we were on stage?" That really is a pretty
accurate encapsulation of the state of medical marijuana law and policy
at the moment. This is an area where the state of the law, the facts on the
ground, and the actions of law enforcement officials really are changing
from day to day. If I had given this same talk a month earlier I might
have spoken about a very different set of circumstances.
With that said, my goal in this essay is to provide an overview of
where we are with medical marijuana law and policy today. Given how
quickly things are changing, taking a step back from the daily details to
paint a broad picture of current state of marijuana law and policy is a
risky proposition. I then take the further imprudent step of tracing where
I see the state of law and policy headed in this ever-changing area.
I. STATE OF THE NATION
When we talk about medical marijuana in the United States today
what we have is a pyramid, a hierarchy of federal, state, and local regula-
t Professor of Law and Director of the Constitutional Rights & Remedies Program, Univer-
sity of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. This essay also builds on my earlier work in this area. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Medical
Marituana in Colorado and the Future of Mariuana Regulation in the United States, 43 McGEORGE
L. REv. 147 (2012)
2. See Michael Roberts, Mariuana at the Crossroads: Event Asks If MMJ Lawyers Are
Breaking oath, DENVER WESTWORD BLOGS (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:32 AM),
http://www.google.com/urlsa-t&rct-j&q=&esrc=s&source-web&cd=2&ved=OCCOQFjAB&url=h
ttp%3A%2F%2Fblogs.westword.com%2Flatestword%2F2012%2F01%2Fmarijuana at the crossro
ads _event.php&ei=SDyKT4 3D4GO2AWc5by3CQ&usg-AFQjCNFl2QFv275bl4u 8apjCYL35b
yLKQ.
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tion of marijuana. At the top of that pyramid we have federal law, and
the federal law governing marijuana is quite clear. The Controlled Sub-
stances Act (CSA) which has been in place since the 1970s prohibits the
cultivation, possession, sale, or distribution of marijuana and its deriva-
tives.' Although you would not know it from the number of institutions
brazenly selling marijuana around Denver, Colorado, and throughout
much of the western United States, violation of the federal prohibition
continues to carry with it the possibility of significant criminal penalties.
What is more, doctors who are licensed by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration cannot prescribe marijuana for their patients, because mari-
juana is classified under the CSA as a Schedule 1 narcotic. The federal
government has concluded, in its wisdom, that marijuana is a drug that
has no legitimate medical use, has a high possibility for addiction associ-
ated with it, and therefore cannot be prescribed by any doctor who is
federally licensed.'
At the same time that this clear prohibition exists at the federal lev-
el, we are experiencing a period of significant legal flux at the state level.
Until relatively recently, marijuana was prohibited not just under the
CSA but under the laws of every state in the union as well. Over the last
twenty or so years, however, a number of states began lowering the pen-
alties for possession of small amounts of marijuana and a number of lo-
cal authorities enacted provisions making marijuana offenses their lowest
enforcement priority. 6 For the last fifteen years, though, the most signifi-
cant marijuana law reform in the states has been the passage of measures
facilitating the medical use of marijuana. Currently seventeen states plus
the District of Columbia have enacted some form of a medical marijuana
provision.'
The medical marijuana laws of this state are emblematic of the
broader trend. Using the initiative process, Colorado voters passed
Amendment XX to the state constitution in the year 2000, which pro-
vides an affirmative defense to patients and caregivers who are in pos-
session of a small amount of marijuana for medical purposes. Rather than
repealing Colorado's laws against the possession and distribution of ma-
rijuana, Amendment XX simply states that some Colorado residents are
immune from conviction under those laws.
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012).
6. 2006 Mid-Term Election Results Offer Mixed Bag for Marituana Law Reform,
NORML.ORG NEWS RELEASES (Nov. 8, 2006), http://normi.org/news/2006/11/08/2006-mid-term-
election-results-offer-mixed-bag-for-marijuana-law-reform.
7. 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits,
PROCONORG, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceD)-000881 (last
updated Apr. 20, 2012).
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Thus, the state has permitted (or at least tacitly endorsed) that which
the federal government has officially prohibited-the possession of mari-
juana.8 This development is both contradictory and unproblematic from a
federalism perspective. That is, it is a matter of black letter constitutional
law that the federal government cannot commandeer state governments
into helping federal officials enforce the CSA's continuing marijuana
prohibition. 9 And the federal government, although free to prohibit mari-
juana under its Commerce Clause power,'o cannot force the states to pro-
hibit particular conduct that they do not wish to prohibit. Thus, there is
nothing inherently illegitimate or inappropriate about the states choosing
to decriminalize or even permit conduct that violates federal law."
It is important to remember, however, that the federal courts have
held that a state's adoption of medical marijuana provisions is irrelevant
in a federal prosecution under the CSA.12 That is, if a defendant is
charged in a federal court with violation of the CSA, it is legally irrele-
vant that she was growing or distributing marijuana for medicinal rea-
sons; it is a fact that cannot even be mentioned to a jury considering your
guilt under that Act. Thus, while the federal government cannot force the
people of Colorado to give up their medical marijuana provisions (and
cannot force Colorado to help it enforce the CSA), it is equally true that
the state cannot insulate its citizens from federal prosecution simply by
passing a medical marijuana provision. Thus, to the extent that state
medical marijuana laws are designed to protect state citizens from pun-
ishment from using marijuana for medical purposes, that goal is rendered
almost fully ineffective by continuing federal prohibition. The fact that
conduct permitted under state law is prohibited under federal law thus
reduces the state provisions to something approaching mere symbolism.
Finally, it is important to remember in this context that marijuana is
regulated not just at the state and federal levels, but by towns and munic-
ipalities as well. Again, the example of Colorado is illustrative. In our
state, medical marijuana distribution can be zoned, including zoned
completely out of business, at the city and county level. Local entities
cannot prohibit people from using medical marijuana within their bor-
ders, but they can certainly choose to prohibit any stores from selling it
within those borders. In other states, like California, much of the day-to-
day management of medical marijuana is left by the state government to
the counties. Unlike the anti-commandeering principle that prohibits the
federal. government from putting the states to work, California and other
8. It should be noted that Amendment XX does not explicitly permit the sale of marijuana,
merely its possession; later regulations have eliminated this odd grey area from the law. See COLO.
CONST. art. XVIll, § 14(2)(d).
9. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992).
10. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marguana and the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1421, 1446 (2009).
12. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001).
2012] 979
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
states explicitly require counties, even those that are ambivalent or worse
about medical marijuana, to implement state policy.'3
Thus, what we see nationwide in those states that have adopted
some kind of medical marijuana provision is this odd hierarchy of regu-
lation. We see continued prohibition at the federal level, increasing en-
couragement or permissiveness at the state level, and then a wide amount
of discretion left to the municipality in terms of how the law actually
operates on the ground. At a time of increased focus on the relative pow-
ers of the state and federal governments, it is worth noting that no other
activity-not abortion, not healthcare, not handguns, not gay marriage-
is treated as disparately by the three levels of government in this country
as marijuana is.
II. THE COLORADO EXPERIENCE
A. Amendment XX
In order to give a better sense of how we arrived at this particular
moment, it might help to give a little background on developments in
Colorado. As we have seen, Amendment XX was passed by voter initia-
tive in the year 2000,14 and then almost literally nothing of note hap-
pened for the next eight years. Some caregivers took advantage of the
increased clarity that the law gave them to help patients more openly, but
the system was nothing like the one we have in Colorado today where
there are two or three dispensaries within a few hundred yards of this
university, and there are blocks in some of our business districts that
seem to consist of nothing but dispensaries.
In fact, for the first eight years of medical marijuana in this state,
there were never more than a very small handful of dispensaries doing
business within the state. All of this changed when Barack Obama came
to prominence and then was elected president in November of 2008. Dur-
ing his campaign Senator Obama hinted, in a guarded way, that marijua-
na law enforcement would not be a high enforcement priority for his
administration. He talked about little old ladies who have cancer and how
he did not see how their prosecution could serve any important federal
principles. 1
B. The Wild West
Throughout Colorado and elsewhere people took notice of the fact
that we were leaving the Bush administration behind and moving to a
new, perhaps more permissive, administration. Following President
13. See Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 467-68 (2008).
14. COLO. CONST. art. XVlI, § 14.
15. See, e.g., Wayne Laugesen, Obama's Medical Marituana Campaign Promises,




Obama's inauguration and early hints from his administration that mari-
juana would in fact be a low federal law enforcement priority, there was
explosive growth in the number of dispensaries opening their doors in
Colorado. We will never really know the extent of this growth because
there was no statewide regulation of marijuana at that point; literally
nobody was keeping track of how many dispensaries were opening in the
state of Colorado. While there were press reports that famously blared
that there were more dispensaries than Starbucks in Denver and that
there were more than 1,000 stores open state-wide,1 6 the truth is that no
one knew for sure.
But what we did know, what we did have information on, is how
many Coloradans were seeking to register for marijuana patient cards
during this time. While there was no state-wide (and almost no local)
regulation of dispensaries during this period, there was a state registry of
marijuana patients kept by the Department of Health since Amendment
XX's passage in 2000. When we look at how many applications were
filed each month (and the running total of all applications throughout this
period) what we see is approximately six years of virtually flat applica-
tions-some patients were registering prior to later years of the decade,
but the numbers were small and growing slowly. And then, sometime
about April of 2009, what you see is an enormous number of people
signing up to get marijuana cards in Colorado.
16. Christopher N. Osher, As Dispensaries Pop Up, Denver May Be Pot Capital, US.A.,
DENVER PosT (Jan. 21, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci 14112792.
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The yellow line in this figure looks like the unchecked growth of an
organism. And that's exactly what we had in Colorado during this time-
there was nothing, except supply and demand, to put any restrictions on
who could open a dispensary, where it could be located, how marijuana
could be advertised, and so on.
And like any unregulated market-like any market, period-there
were good actors and bad. There were dispensary owners interested in
making medicine available to those who needed it and there were those
out to make a quick buck. There were dispensaries that sold reliably
dosed medicine and those who sold whatever green flammable material
they could get their hands on. There were stores that were knowledgeable
about various cannabis strains and their effects and there were stores
using shock value to lure customers, any customers, into their stores.1
As a result of abuses-both perceived and real-the unchecked
growth depicted above simply could not go on indefinitely. Furthermore,
there was significant disagreement regarding whether dispensaries were
even permitted under Amendment XX; while that amendment talks about
caregivers and patients, it makes no mention of dispensaries. Many
looked at the industry that popped up in 2009 and saw a reality that was
not envisioned in the amendment passed by voters nine years earlier.
C Out of the Wilderness and into the Light
It became clear, therefore, that 2010 would bring regulation. What
was less clear was exactly what kind of regulation we were going to get.
There was a strong push by law enforcement to essentially drive the dis-
pensaries out of business, to go back to what we had pre-2009, where
there were small individual caregivers helping two, or five, or ten folks,
but we did not see storefronts doing commercial business and serving
hundreds if not thousands of patients. Law enforcement made their case
and the dispensaries-now organized into trade groups-made theirs.
And, somewhat miraculously, the industry won. The marijuana indus-
try-people who were in the business of selling a Schedule 1 substance
for profit-prevailed in the state house over law enforcement and drug
treatment professionals.
But the victory for the industry was a guarded one. With official en-
dorsement came regulation. The legislature did not merely ratify the sta-
tus quo; instead it passed a number of regulatory measures and empow-
ered the Department of Revenue to create even more. As a result, Colo-
rado has now developed a marijuana regulatory regime that is unique in
the world. For the first time that anyone is able to discern, criteria had to
17. See, e.g., Nick Lucchesi, Sex Sells Medical Marijuana, Too: Meet the $5 Joint Lady on
Federal, DENVER WESTWORD BLOGS (July 27, 2010, 7:02 AM),




be created to determine who was authorized to sell marijuana, how they
could do so, what sort of security systems they had to put in place, what
records they had to maintain, and so forth." Many in the industry bristled
at this regulation, arguing that it would benefit first movers and large
entities able to pay the cost of compliance at the expense of the mom and
pop entities that had done the hard work of developing the industry
throughout its early stages. And there is certainly some truth to this. But
the crucial fact that lay at the bottom of the system was this: if an appli-
cant satisfied the criteria the state set forth, she could receive a certificate
allowing her to legally sell marijuana in this state.
And that is different than what happens in a state like California
where most of the regulation and oversight are done at the county level
and are comparatively haphazard and uneven. It is also different than
what happens in Amsterdam, or Portugal, or other places overseas that
have decriminalized or legalized marijuana or other drugs but where
manufacture and sale remain very much a gray area. Here, we have made
a conscious decision to eliminate gray areas; we have regulated in the
sunshine and have created a transparent set of regulations to deal with the
industry that has grown up in our state. 19
And what do those regulations provide for? Take, for example, the
vertical integration requirement which came into the 2010 bill at the very
last minute;20 it surprised a lot of people who were involved in the writ-
ing and passage of the bill. It said essentially that if you are in the busi-
ness of selling marijuana you must grow seventy percent of that marijua-
na yourself-you cannot simply contract with a grower to purchase what
you sell as you might have before 2009; instead, the new legislation re-
quired every retailer to become a manufacturer as well. Why did this
happen? The legislative history on it is pretty spotty. But I think most
people would agree now that the vertical integration requirement was an
attempt by lawmakers to give federal law enforcement a very wide berth.
The vertical integration requirement was designed to ensure that Colora-
do did not become a net importer (or exporter) of marijuana. Nothing
would be more destructive to the nascent industry that Colorado was
trying to regulate (and tax) than for large quantities of California or Mex-
ican marijuana to be discovered en route to voracious Colorado consum-
ers. Colorado lawmakers went out of their way to be sure that the exter-
nalities of marijuana cultivation were limited inside the state's borders in
an attempt to avoid (or at least postpone) confrontation with federal offi-
cials.
18. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-43.3-402, -701 (2012).
19. It is important to remember that what we have is really two regulatory regimes. We have
one in the Department of Revenue regulating dispensaries and one in the Department of Health
certifying patients and beginning to formulate rules for testing the validity of what is sold in retail
stores.
20. COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-43.3-402(4) (2012).
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This is but one example of the scale and intensity of regulation that
the medical marijuana industry is subject to in Colorado. Other exam-
ples-the seed-to-sale video surveillance of dispensaries, the limits on
out-of-state ownership and investment, the criminal background
checks-would tell a similar story.2 1 Simply put, marijuana is regulated
and taxed here in a way that it is not anywhere else. The result is an un-
easy status quo that at least appeared to be a model for regulation in other
states. Currently in Colorado patients who need marijuana can get it. You
may have to get on a government list to get it, and a lot of people are
chilled by that prospect. But compared to the way things were for mari-
juana patients before regulation-and in particular with the way they
were before Amendment XX-marijuana patients are far better off. Can-
cer patients no longer have to meet sketchy characters in the park in the
middle of the night to buy god knows what; they no longer have risk
arrest or worse to obtain their medicine. Now they can meet a state-
regulated entrepreneur in the daylight in an attractive retail shop, enjoy a
range of options and engage in conversation with someone knowledgea-
ble about the products and their effects.
III. AN UNEASY STATUS QUO
If things are so much better for marijuana patients today, why do I
describe the status quo as uneasy? For one thing, the current situation is
not necessarily consistent with medical marijuana as a strong state poli-
cy. That is, if the voters of this state care deeply enough about medical
marijuana to provide for it in our state constitution, why do we let coun-
ties ban it? We would not let them ban abortion clinics, or libraries, or
other entities that we have deemed constitutionally sacred; why do we
allow them to zone or ban outright marijuana dispensaries?
Furthermore, it is not clear how many medical users are really just
recreational users in disguise. There is still a sense among many in the
state that medical marijuana is nothing but a wink and a nod, a foot in the
door by those interested in full legalization.22 At one of our panels, the
distinction between medical use on the one hand and recreational use on
the other was problematized. If a user of marijuana-or of whiskey, Am-
bien, steak, or Advil says: "I take this because it makes me feel better," is
that medicinal use or is that recreation? We all take medicines or other
substances because they make us feel better; this is certainly not a prob-
lem that is localized, particularized, or even most pronounced with re-
gard to marijuana. Still, outside of the industry, the view persists that
medical marijuana is a sham, that doctors are willing to write a recom-
21. See 1 COLO. CODE REGs. 212-1:1.205 (2012).
22. See Jerrod Menz, Medical Marijuana Abuse: Youths Are Making a Mockery of Medical




mendation for anyone who walks through the door and that the majority
of patients are college students with "migraines."23
But the biggest problem we have with the status quo is the Sword of
Damocles hanging over the industry: namely that the production and sale
of marijuana remain a serious felony offense under federal law. The vol-
ume of marijuana that is grown and sold in Colorado's larger dispensa-
ries is the sort of drug manufacture and distribution that can earn people
something tantamount to a lifetime sentence under federal law. 24 And
while it is unlikely that any marijuana dispensary owner in compliance
with state law is going to federal prison any time soon, the fact remains
that medical marijuana is an industry built entirely on conduct that the
federal government continues to prohibit.
So on the one hand, things are perfectly sustainable. The industry is
regulated, patients can get their medicines, the state gets its tax revenue
and counties that object strenuously to the presence of dispensaries can
exclude them. Everything is ok except that every sale in every dispensary
is a violation of federal law. For those of you who remember the movie
Pulp Fiction, it's as John Travolta said to Samuel L. Jackson when de-
scribing the hash bars in Amsterdam, "[W]ell they're legal but they aren't
100 percent legal." "Not 100 percent legal" is a particularly uncertain
base on which to found a multi-million dollar industry.
And it is important to remember in this context that the vanishingly
small risk of being sent to a federal penitentiary is not the only-or even
the principal-influence that continuing federal prohibition has on the
nascent marijuana industry. Given that every marijuana transaction in
this industry is a federal crime, it is often hard for those in the industry to
convince banks to do business with them. It is hard to get investors to put
their money into a business that could be seized at any moment by the
federal government. It is hard to get a lease when your landlord can evict
you at any time because your business is one that violates federal law. It
is hard to form any contractual relationship when any contract involving
the sale of marijuana is almost certainly void because it constitutes a
violation of federal law. 25 Thus, so much of predictability that we sought
to achieve through our regulatory regime is lost because of this strong
disagreement between state and federal policy at this point. Continued
23. The facts paint a more complicated story. While early press reports did show that a small
number of doctors were responsible for a disproportionate share of all marijuana recommendations,
more recent public data shows that the average age of a registered marijuana patient in Colorado is
forty two, The Colorado Medical Mariuana Registry: Statistics, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/hs/
medicalmarijuanalstatistics.html (last updated Feb. 29, 2012).
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012).
25. See, $500,000 Mariuana Loan Up in Smoke, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/500000-
medical-marijuana-lawsuit-smoke/story?id=16322793 (reporting that an Arizona judge ruled unen-
forceable a pair of $250,000 loans made by two Arizona citizens to a Colorado dispensary).
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federal prohibition means that no state government has the power to cre-
ate legal certainty on its own.
Furthermore, patients do not know where they stand either. We
heard a heartbreaking story at the conference from a member of the audi-
ence who said that she was trying to convince her mother to get a mariju-
ana patient card to help her ease the pain of a broken hip. She told us that
her mother was in terrible pain but that she was more afraid of going to
prison. And the panel, to a person, said please tell your grandmother that
no U.S. Attorney in the country wants to put her in prison, and that is
almost certainly right. What it highlights, however, is that would-be pa-
tients are aware of the conflict between state and federal law and are
chilled by the prospect of federal law enforcement-however remote it
may be.
However, patients' concerns, like those of dispensary owners, are
not limited to the fear of going to prison. Many are concerned that they
will lose their kids, or their public housing, or other government benefits
if they test positive for marijuana, or if they are found out as marijuana
users. And this fear may be much more realistic. Many jobs do prohibit
you from taking a controlled substance, or from violating any state or
federal law. The provision of public housing is often premised on an
agreement not to use drugs, or not to have them on the premises. A pa-
tient shown to use marijuana or to have it in the home might be less like-
ly to be awarded custody in a divorce proceeding. So even patients who
are not worried about going to prison have concerns that their other set-
tled expectations will be lost if they use marijuana as medicine.
Furthermore, those providing services to the industry, whether
they're doctors, lawyers, bankers or landlords, do not know where they
stand either. For example, lawyers have a professional obligation not to
26
knowingly encourage or knowingly assist in the commission of a enme.
Obviously, this does not prohibit an attorney from informing her client
about the interaction between state and federal law and the existence and
substance of Colorado's regulatory regime. Beyond that, though-when
we move from informing to advising and assisting-what conduct is
permitted and what is prohibited? Can an attorney incorporate a business
whose primary-or sole-business is criminal? Can she write an em-
ployment contract for an employee whose every act will be criminal?
Can she help a businessperson do the compliance work that will result in
the issuance of a state license to sell marijuana?
The current contradictory state of the law obviously makes these in-
credibly difficult questions for a lawyer to answer. On the one hand, if
Colorado has chosen to regulate and tax this industry, it seems obvious
that those regulated by the state government should be allowed to seek
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2011).
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legal advice in complying with that regulation. On the other, if every sale
by every dispensary is a federal crime, it seems hard to argue that the
attorney-by writing a lease, by doing compliance work, by incorporat-
ing a business-is not knowingly facilitating criminal conduct.
What is more, there is the possibility, however remote, of criminal
prosecution for attorneys who have marijuana entrepreneurs as clients. A
lawyer who intends to help and in fact does help her client engage in
criminal conduct can be charged as an accomplice in that conduct; an
attorney who joins an agreement to engage in criminal conduct can be
charged with conspiring to commit that conduct. 28 The specter of crimi-
nal prosecution is particularly disarming because, while attorneys are
regulated at the state level, it is federal prosecutors who could charge an
attorney with conspiring with or aiding and abetting her dispensary own-
er clients. While it might be far-fetched to imagine the same state that
enacted medical marijuana provisions punishing attorneys for participat-
ing in that industry, it is less fantastical to imagine a federal prosecutor-
who has sworn to uphold federal laws including the CSA-going after
not only a dispensary, but its bank, its landlord, and its attorney as well.
So the fact that marijuana is legal but not 100 percent legal makes
everybody in the industry-patients, practitioners, lawyers, doctors,
landlords-uncertain with regard to exactly where they stand. Uncertain-
ty by its very nature breeds instability. So if the status quo can't hold,
where can we go from here?
IV. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
As I stated at the outset, merely attempting to describe the state of
the marijuana industry at the moment is hard, trying to predict the future
in this area borders on the ridiculous. With that said, I see three possible
ways forward from here. If we are not going to stay where we are-and,
as I have argued, the current legal status of marijuana does not seem like
a stable equilibrium-then where are we going? The first possibility is a
federal crackdown that would cripple the industry nationwide. The next
possibility is continued change in state law leading to an eventual para-
digm shift in federal policy. Finally, I propose a third possibility inspired
by what is going on in Colorado at the moment.
A. A Slow-Moving Crackdown
There is very good evidence that a slow-moving federal crackdown
on the marijuana industry is already underway. We have seen federal
enforcement actions in California, Montana, Washington state, and most
recently here in Colorado. What has generally happened in these instanc-
es is that the United States Attorneys in these states have sent letters to
27. See 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 333 (2012).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
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currently operating dispensary owners-and to their landlords-saying,
essentially, "your operation is in violation of the CSA, you are to cease
operations within the next 45 days." 29
On the one hand, this is merely the federal government flexing its
enforcement muscles. But on the other hand, it is a very unusual kind of
federal enforcement. Generally speaking, the DEA is not in the practice
of sending cease and desist letters to drug dealers; when the federal gov-
ernment has reason to believe that a large volume of drugs are being sold
from a particular establishment, it obtains a search warrant and it serves
that search warrant on the property, often very dramatically. What we
have in the medical marijuana context is letters being sent asking dispen-
saries to kindly stop violating the Controlled Substances Act. Obviously,
that is more than a little unusual. Another thing worthy of note in this
context is that the federal government has been sending letters to land-
lords saying, in essence, "one of your tenants is violating our federal
laws, could you ask them to stop or could you evict them, because we
would really hate to have to come in and seize your property because of
what they are doing."
The specter of civil forfeiture is enormously important in this con-
text because it addresses what the industry considers one of its greatest
assets-the inherent resource limits of federal law enforcement. A Unit-
ed States Attorney probably does not have the resources to prosecute
each of the hundreds of dispensaries operating throughout this state. But
of course, she does not really have to. Civil forfeiture with its stream-
lined procedures-property can be forfeited, for example, based on a
simple showing that it was more probable than not that a crime was be-
ing committed-creates an end-run around the difficulties of criminal
prosecution. What is more, sending letters to landlords essentially depu-
tizes those individuals, requiring them to remove the offending tenants or
face federal wrath.
These crackdowns started happening in 2011 and occurred in Cali-
fornia, Washington, and Montana, primarily. During this period, Colora-
do-the one state with an extensive state regulatory regime-was spared.
This led many to think that Colorado offered a model for how to avoid
federal ire. Perhaps federal law enforcement officials, noticing the exten-
sive work that Colorado had done to make sure that our dispensaries
were neither importing nor exporting marijuana, that the criminal ele-
ment had been kept out of the industry, that those selling marijuana were
regulated and taxed, would choose to focus their attentions elsewhere. In
29. See, e.g., Lisa Leff, Calif Pot Dispensaries Told by Feds to Shut Down: U.S. Prosecutors
Send Letters Even Though State Law Allows, MSNBC.coM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44806723/ns/us-news-crime-and-courts/t/calif-pot-dispensaries-
told-feds-shut-down/ (last updated Oct. 6, 2011).
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other states, without any sort of comprehensive registration and licensing
provisions, federal pressure was necessary to keep the industry in check,
some argued. Here, though, we can be trusted to keep an eye on things
ourselves, and the feds will simply choose to leave us alone.
This, as I said out the outset, is why it's not wise to write these talks
too far in advance. Just after New Year's 2012, twenty-three letters went
out to dispensaries in Colorado, informing them that they were operating
a medical marijuana dispensary within 1,000 feet of a school and that
they had forty-five days to cease and desist or face forfeiture.3 0 And the
U.S. Attorney for Colorado has intimated that there are more letters com-
ing.3 1 He stated that he did not want to wait until all the letters were
ready before he sent any out but that everyone in Colorado who was op-
erating a dispensary within 1,000 feet of a school would be getting such a
letter before long.
What is interesting about the Colorado letters, though, is what they
do not say. The letters do not merely inform dispensary owners that they
are in violation of the CSA and order them to close. Rather, federal offi-
cials sent letters only to those dispensaries operating within a 1,000 feet
of a school because a separate provision of the United States Code pro-
vides for increased penalties for drug sales occurring in such proximity
to schools.32 Thus, the feds targeted those committing particularly egre-
gious violations of the CSA, rather than all of those openly violating the
CSA. This is the equivalent of telling a bank robber: "It's a crime to rob
a bank, but it's a more serious one to do so with a firearm. Could you
please stop robbing banks with firearms?"
As disappointed as so many in Colorado were when these enforce-
ment letters went out in early 2012, therefore, I see some hope for opti-
mism in them. The letters, at least so far, have only been sent to a subset
of Colorado dispensary owners. While it would be hopeless optimism to
conclude that the federal government is tacitly approving of the operation
of the rest of the state's dispensaries by not sending them letters as well,
there is at least some basis for believing that the federal crackdown here
will be a limited one. We will see in the weeks and months ahead wheth-
er the rest of the businesses operating under state regulation will be al-
lowed to proceed unmolested.
30. See, e.g., Medical Marijuana: Deadline Reached for Colo. Dispensaries Near Schools to
Move or Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 27, 2012, 10:39 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/27/medical-marijuana-deadlin-n 1303712.html.
31. Twenty five more letters, with some minor changes, were in fact sent out in late March.
See Michael Roberts, Medical Marijuana: U.S. Attorney May Target Grows with Future Closure
Letters, DENVER WESTWORD BLOGS (Mar. 26, 2012, 11:29 AM).
http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2012/03/medical marijuana us attomeyseizure letters 25
dispensaries.php.
32. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (2012).
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Other developments on the federal level are significantly less prom-
ising, however. Perhaps most ominous is the Harborside case, an audit of
the largest dispensary in California and perhaps the world, in which the
IRS invoked a Reagan-era provision stating that drug dealers could not
deduct most of their expenses from their taxes. 33 There are not a lot of
businesses in this country that can survive if they have to pay taxes on
their gross receipts, and there's little reason to believe that the marijuana
business is any different. IRS enforcement thus provides another power-
ful, non-criminal means of squeezing the industry-a federal prosecutor,
concerned that she might not be able to obtain a conviction against a
dispensary in a medical marijuana state, might see an IRS audit--or the
specter of one-as a particularly effective tool in surprising the industry.
Banks, as I mentioned earlier, have been threatened as well. Not as
directly as dispensaries, to be sure, but the federal government has raised
the threat of money laundering charges against those doing business with
marijuana dispensaries.34 And, as with lawyers' ethical obligations under
the model rules, a literal reading of the money laundering statute would
seem to prohibit banks from providing services to those knowingly vio-
lating the CSA. As a result of these threats, the last bank willing to do
business with Colorado dispensaries announced that it was closing its
remaining marijuana accounts.35
Even the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has gotten in-
volved in the federal government's multi-prong attack on the marijuana
industry. A perfect storm of political criticism arose earlier this year
when the Obama Administration indicated that those persons known to
be users of medical marijuana were ineligible to possess firearms under
federal law.36 Montanans were particularly outraged that dispensary
owners arrested there had been charged with an enhancement for the
use of a firearm in connection with a drug crime; as one irate e-mailer
told me after I was quoted in a local paper there: "This is Montana, all of
us have guns."
What we see in all of these contexts is the federal government com-
ing down on the marijuana industry in subtle, interconnected, but unmis-
33. Lisa Leff, Harborside Health Center, Oakland Pot Shop, Hit with $2.4 Million Tax Bill,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 8:19 PM), http://www.huflingtonpost.com/2011/10/04/harborside-
health-center-tax-bill n 995139.html.
34. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (June 29,
2011), available at http://safeaccessnow.org/downloads/JamesCole-memo_06_29_2011 .pdf
("Those who engage in transactions involving the proceeds of such activity may also be in violation
of federal money laundering statutes and other federal financial laws.").
35. See, Michael Byars, Colo. Bank to Close Medical Marijuana Accounts, Leaving Dispen-
saries Scrambling, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (August 23, 2011)
http://www.dailycamera.com/boulder-county-news/ci_18743882.
36. See John Ingold, ATF Say Medical-Marijuana Patients Are Prohibited from Owning




takable ways. Without a major crackdown, without SWAT teams, with-
out an announced change in official policy, the second half of 2011 and
the first half of 2012 have seen the federal government making things
much harder on the marijuana industry. And certainly, the federal gov-
ernment has the capacity to make things very difficult indeed. They do
not need to arrest everybody to make this industry go away; and as we
have seen it is quite possible that they lack the resources to do so if they
tried. But what they can do, what they appear to be in the middle of do-
ing, is to make it extremely hard for marijuana businesses to do business.
B. Pressure at the Polls
Another possible way forward is continued pressure at the polls.
That is, medical marijuana momentum of the last fifteen or so years-
now eighteen states plus the District of Columbia-could become twenty
states, twenty-five states, thirty states. At the point where you have thirty
states and the majority of the nation's population living in a world where
marijuana is legal within the state but illegal nationally, the pressure of
those citizens' representatives in Washington to change law would be-
come unavoidable.
Marijuana initiatives are expected to be on the ballot in a number of
states this fall and we could see that momentum build before the end of
this year. Marijuana advocates in as many as a dozen states will be seek-
ing this fall to get medical marijuana provisions approved.17 Interesting-
ly, these advocates have focused nearly exclusively on the initiative pro-
cess rather than the various state houses.38 Perhaps this is why medical
marijuana has so far been largely a western phenomenon; the overlap
between states with an initiative and referendum process and states that
have approved medical marijuana laws is quite pronounced.
But it is not just medical marijuana that is on the ballot this fall. In
California, Washington State, and Colorado, voters will have the option
to approve full legalization-marijuana unmoored from the requirement
of a doctor's recommendation. Despite the momentum that medical mari-
juana has developed at the polls nationwide, no state has yet been bold
enough to take the federal prohibition head on and repeal its prohibition
on possession and sale by adults.
37. 12 States with Pending Legislation to Legalize Medical Marijuana, PROCONORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=002481 (last updated May 8,
2012).
38. Two states have explicitly used the initiative process, but eight more have passed medical
marijuana through the similar processes of ballots or propositions. See 18 Legal Medical Marituana
States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession Limits, supra note 7.
39. Compare Medical Marituana States, Maryuana Laws, Medical Mariuana Laws,
MEDICAL MARIJUANA BLOG, http://www.medicalmarijuanablog.com/state-laws (last visited Apr.
15, 2012), with State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INSTITUTE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewidei&r.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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The closest we have come thus far was Proposition 19 in California
in 2010. There, California came within 8 percentage points of passing a
full legalization provision.40 Notably, the federal government came out
very strongly against it in the closing days of the campaign. Attorney
General Eric Holder, in a public statement, assured the voters of Califor-
nia that full legalization would not be tolerated by federal law enforce-
ment. Again, it is important to remember that neither Attorney General
Holder nor President Obama can force the voters of a state to approve a
particular measure or to not approve another. By contrast what they can
do in the context of marijuana laws is promise to enforce federal law
more aggressively if provisions like Proposition 19 are enacted.
How likely is legalization to pass in one of these states in 2012?
Figure 2 presents a national poll on whether marijuana should be legal.
What is pretty amazing is in that in the twenty-two years since the poll
was first taken, the gap in support for medical marijuana has gone from
65 percentage points (81 percent against and 16 percent in favor) to just
5 percentage points (50 percent against and 45 percent in favor). Thus,
the overall trend is incredibly encouraging for marijuana supporters.
200 2011
40. Lisa Leff & Marcus WohIsen, Prop 19 Supporters Vow to Push Marituana Legalization in




Closer to home, we see a similar story. A Public Policy Polling survey 41
(entitled, fabulously enough, "Colorado Favors Gay Marriage, Marijuana
Use, Loves Tebow") shows continued strong support for medical mariju-
ana but comparatively weak support for full legalization. While Colorado
voters support medical marijuana by 68 percent to 25 percent, support for
legalization of marijuana stood at just 49 percent (though only 40% were
opposed; the rest were undecided).
Perhaps part of the reason that support for full legalization consist-
ently lags behind support for medical marijuana is that legalization cre-
ates interesting tensions in the marijuana community itself. Allen St.
Pierre, the head of NORML, which for years has been at the forefront of
law reform when it comes to marijuana, said recently that it was time to
admit that medical marijuana is a "farce" and to change the focus to out-
right legalization.42 As dismissive of medical marijuana as St. Pierre was,
there is reason to think that many in the medical marijuana community
will be equally unimpressed with the prospect of full legalization. As I
discussed above, things are in a pretty decent state for those who view
marijuana as medicine. Many of those in the medical marijuana commu-
nity worry that legalization will create both a public backlash-
confirming the worst fears of those who long suspected that medical ma-
rijuana was just a gateway to full legalization-and that it will wake the
oft-slumbering federal giant.
So, oddly, we see that a federal crackdown is underway at a time
when a near-majority of the country supports the legalization of marijua-
na and large majorities in a number of states are in support of or have
enacted medical marijuana provisions. So we see something of a colli-
sion course.
C A Third Way?
A collision course, that is, unless there is a more cooperative way
for the state and federal governments to interact with regard to marijua-
na. I conclude, therefore, on a hopeful note. And this hopefulness derives
from what we have seen happen in Colorado. In this state we have
moved in just a few years from a Wild West free-for-all, to the most reg-
ulated marijuana market anywhere in the world. We've gone from a place
where anyone could sell marijuana anywhere without oversight or super-
vision to a regulatory regime with over seventy pages of meticulous reg-
41. Colorado Favors Gay Marriage, Marifuana Use, Loves Tebow, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2011/12/colorado-favors-gay-marriage-
marijuana-use-loves-tebow.html.
42. Michael Roberts, Medical Marifuana v. Recreational Use: NORML Controversy, Colora-
do Connection, DENVER WESTWORD BLOGS (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:25 PM),
http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2012/01/medical marijuana norml controversycolorado.php
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ulations.4 3 These regulations cover such arcana as Display of License
Required-Limited Access Area; Lock Standards in Medical Marijuana
Licensed Premises; and, my personal favorite, Specifications for Video
Surveillance and Recording of Medical Marijuana Licensed Premises.44
Is the Colorado medical marijuana regime perfect? Of course not.
There are probably drugs sold by licensed providers to licensed patients
that end up being sold to others; some of those others are almost certain-
ly children. There are probably doctors writing prescriptions to patients
in the absence of a bona fide doctor-patient relationship. Out-of-state
money may be funding Colorado dispensaries; dispensaries may not be
reporting all of their income; employees may be taking inventory and
selling it on the street. The state has done its best to solve these problems
but probably has not eliminated all of the bad actors in the industry or all
of the opportunities for them to misbehave. The Colorado system is not
perfect. It is just much, much better than any other state has done so far
in regulating the medical marijuana industry. Yet, as long as the federal
government maintains the CSA as an immutable constant, it doesn't mat-
ter how much thought a state puts into its medical marijuana regulation.
It is simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Unless. The federal government could come to the conclusion that
not all medical marijuana states are created equally. One thing that could
follow from that is that Congress could go from making the Controlled
Substances Act a rule, to making it a default. That is, Congress could
conclude that the CSA applies-that marijuana is a prohibited sub-
stance-unless a state is able to convincingly regulate marijuana within
its own borders. Congress could say to the states: Can you find a way to
keep kids from buying? Can you find a way to make sure it is being sold
in-state to people who are authorized to buy it? Can you find a way to
make sure that organized crime is kept out of it? That the drugs do not
end up on the streets? Can you track marijuana from seed to sale all of
these pieces? If you can do those things we will allow you to do so and
we will leave you alone. If you can come up with a sufficiently robust
state regulatory regime we will allow you to use that regime, rather than
us coming in from Washington and enforcing our own.
We have seen similar state-federal cooperation in other contexts.
For example, under the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection
Agency can authorize states to issue discharge permits within their own
territories or to leave the issuance of these permits to the EPA itself.45 In
a very different context, the Supreme Court said something similar to the
43. See Colorado Medical Mariyuana Enforcement Division Rules, COLORADO DEPARTMENT
OF REVENUE, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/Rev-MMJ/CBON/1251592984795 (follow
"Current MMED Rules" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
44. See I COLO. CODE REGs. 212-1:10.105, 212-1:10.300-400 (2012).
45. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (g) (2012).
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states in Miranda v. Arizona46 with regard to the now famous Miranda
warnings; it essentially told the states: "You need not necessarily use
these warnings in every case but you must use something at least as ef-
fective.'m In the habeas corpus setting, Congress has told the states that
federal courts will apply a one year statute of limitations in federal habe-
as proceedings, unless the state meets certain criteria for the provision of
counsel, in which case a shorter statute of limitations will apply.48
All of these are examples of cooperative federalism; of the federal
government setting a goal and leaving it to the states to determine the
best way to implement that goal. What is more, because the federal gov-
ernment is not requiring anything of the states in any of these exam-
ples-a state is free to allow the federal government to issue discharge
permits, to use the warnings set forth in Miranda, or to choose not to opt-
in to the counsel provisions-there is no infringement upon state auton-
omy. Thus, if the federal government were to determine that its goal was
not a blanket ban on marijuana, but rather a regime in which marijuana
was regulated, supervised by doctors, and taxed in a way that minimizes
its negative externalities on society, a cooperative federalism solution
would satisfy both federal concern about the dangers of recreational
drugs and an increasing public support for the use of marijuana as medi-
cine.
Now that you have finished reading this, please Google medical ma-
rijuana law and policy. You will likely find that what was true when you
started reading this essay no longer is.
46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47. See id. at 467 ("Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and
the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be
observed.").
48. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2261 (2012).
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MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
OF FEDERALISM
ROBERT A. MIKOSt
Medical marijuana has emerged as one of the key federalism battle-
grounds of the last two decades. Since 1996, sixteen states have passed
new laws legalizing the drug for certain medical purposes.' All the while,
the federal government has remained committed to zero-tolerance, pro-
hibiting the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana for any
purpose.2 The federal government's uncompromising stance against
medical marijuana seemingly exposes the states' vulnerability to the
whims of the national political process, and it has inspired calls for the
courts to step in and protect state experimentation from this and other
instances of arguable congressional over-reaching. 3
I suggest, however, that the true story of the battle over medical ma-
rijuana and its implications for the political safeguards of federalism is
more nuanced and less gloomy than the standard account portrays. True,
the political safeguards of federalism failed to prevent passage of the
federal ban. Indeed, it seems very little consideration was given to states'
rights when the ban was passed as part of the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) in 1970. And, ironically, the very forces that originally failed to
prevent passage of the ban now preserve it against increasingly loud calls
t Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Law School. I thank Alex Kreit, Scott Moss, and participants at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium on Marijuana at the Crossroads for helpful comments on drafts of this symposi-
um contribution. I also thank Brennan Hughes, Stephen Jordan, and Tom Watson for excellent
research assistance.
1. These states include California (1996); Oregon (1998); Washington (1998); Alaska
(1999); Maine (1999); Colorado (2000); Hawaii (2000); Montana (2004); Nevada (2004); Vermont
(2004); Rhode Island (2006); New Mexico (2007); Michigan (2008); New Jersey (2010); Arizona
(2010); and Delaware (2011). See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL
MARIJUANA LAWS, 6-8 (2011), available at http://www.mpp.org/legislation/state-by-state-medical-
marijuana-laws.html.
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010).
3. I say "arguable" because I do not believe the federal marijuana ban actually constitutes
congressional over-reaching, even though many others have espoused that view. See, e.g., Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal marijuana ban
exceeds Congress's Commerce power as applied to the purely local production and consumption of
the drug); Brief of the States of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2-3, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336486
("While the amici States may not see eye to eye with some of their neighbors concerning the wisdom
of decriminalizing marijuana possession and use in certain instances, they support their neighbors'
prerogative in our federalist system to serve as 'laboratories of experimentation."' (footnote omitted)
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., Concurring))); Randy E.
Barnett, The Presumption of Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical Marijuana and Fundamental
Rights, 22 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 29, 36-39 (2006) (recounting his advocacy on behalf of patients
who challenged federal ban in Gonzales v. Raich).
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for reform. But since the emergence of the medical marijuana movement
in California in the mid-1990s, the political process has worked to un-
dermine the federal ban's impact on medical use of the drug. The reality
on the ground today is that the federal ban on marijuana is largely tooth-
less. To be sure, it has bite in individual cases and it clearly shapes the
way states regulate medical marijuana. But it hasn't stopped the medical
marijuana movement. More than 400,000 people already use the drug
pursuant to state medical marijuana programs.4 Medical marijuana dis-
pensaries have proliferated-at one point, they supposedly outnumbered
Starbucks and McDonalds in Los Angeles County.5 And nearly every
year new states jump on the bandwagon and pass medical marijuana
laws.
The budding success of the medical marijuana movement offers a
number of broader lessons about the power of the states in our federal
system. In this symposium contribution, I use the case of medical mari-
juana to demonstrate that the national political process can protect states'
prerogatives, even when Congress passes and the federal courts uphold
legislation that arguably over-reaches. I suggest that political forces can
help curtail the enforcement of federal laws post-enactment. Though
these laws remain on the books, under-enforcement helps to preserve
state prerogatives they supposedly supplant. I also briefly consider some
shortcomings of these de facto constraints on the federal government's
law-enforcement power, especially in comparison to formal dejure con-
straints on its lawmaking power.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the political
safeguards literature and its focus on federal lawmaking. It also explains
why medical marijuana poses a challenge to the political safeguards ar-
gument. Part II then discusses the political safeguards that exist at the
law enforcement stage. It explains how the federal government's limited
law enforcement capacity can help to undo at least some of the damage
caused by (arguably) over-reaching federal legislation. Part III then iden-
tifies the shortcomings of relying exclusively on enforcement constraints
to protect federalism. Nevertheless, it suggests that enforcement con-
straints can help to promote the values of federalism, even if imperfectly.
4. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States'
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1464 (2009) (estimating
participation at 400,000 as of 2009).
5. See Roger Parloff, How Pot Became Legal, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 2009, at 156, available at
http://www.santabarbaraca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/82A61 E58-3E97-4D45-864C-
7CD80ElD72Fl/0/FortuneMagazineArticle92809.pdf (reporting that medical marijuana dispensa-
ries outnumber Starbucks and McDonald's locations combined in L.A. County).
6. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LEGISLATION 2012
(2012), available at http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/MMJBills2012.pdf (cataloguing pending
state medical marijuana legislation).
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I. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS AT THE LAW-MAKING STAGE
The standard account of the political safeguards of federalism fo-
cuses on how the national lawmaking process helps to block the passage
of legislation that threatens the states' constitutional prerogatives. There
are several features of the national political process that are supposed to
keep Congress at bay. To illustrate the idea, I need only discuss a few.
First, the states have a strong voice and sympathetic ear in Wash-
ington. Nearly two-thirds of state governors maintain permanent offices
in Washington, DC, through which they can lobby Congress on behalf of
their states.8 State lawmakers and executive officials also engage in co-
ordinated lobbying campaigns, managed by organizations like the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures.9 What is more, it has been sug-
gested that federal officials are prone to heed the demands of the states'
lobbies because many of these officials began their careers in state gov-
ernment. As Larry Kramer explains, "A very high percentage of employ-
ees in all three branches of the federal government began their careers
working for states.... With views shaped by this background and expe-
rience, these former state officials remain aware of and sympathetic to
the concerns of state institutions-a feeling undoubtedly reinforced by
continuing ties to friends and former colleagues still in the state sys-
tem."' 0
Second, ordinary citizens may be reluctant to expand the federal
government's authority vis-a-vis the states. As I have explained else-
where,
First, some citizens may fear that congressional action on one issue
may lay the groundwork for federalizing related issues-issues on
which they would prefer state control. Second, citizens may worry
about how laws will be enforced by Executive branch officials in the
federal government. .. . Since they trust state governments more than
they trust the federal government, and since they generally exert
more control over state executive officials (via direct election and re-
7. The canonical work in the literature is, of course, Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). For a sampling of the literature inspired at least in part by
Wechsler's thesis, see, for example, JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF
DESIGN (2008); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV.
1321 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards ofFederalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L.
REV. 265 (1990); Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 01H. ST. L.J. 1669
(2007); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People's Affection: Federalism's Forgotten Marketplace,
56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
8. JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT THEIR
INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 35 (2009).
9. Kramer, supra note 7, at 285 n.272.
10. Id. at 285.
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calls), citizens may prefer to have state officials administer the laws
(and have state courts interpret them), and hence, may oppose con-
gressional legislation that vests enforcement authority in federal offi-
cials. Third, citizens also care about government processes, and not
just the outcomes of those processes. Some citizens value the oppor-
tunity to participate directly in lawmaking that is only available at the
state level (via ballot initiatives, etc.) and thus may resist efforts to
federalize policy domains that crowd out such opportunities. Moreo-
ver, some citizens value federalism itself; that is, they have opinions
about which level of government ought to control various policy do-
mains, and these federalism beliefs may temper their support for
congressional proposals which, though appealing on the merits, in-
trude into domains they believe in principle should be controlled by
the states instead. 1 I
To the extent that members of Congress heed the preferences of their
constituents, they might opt not to pursue legislation given what I have
called the "[p]opulist [d]istaste for [flederalization."l 2
Third, the national law-making process is designed to impede con-
gressional action. Bicameralism, presentment, and the Senate filibuster
create several chokepoints at which federal legislation can be blocked.13
By making it very difficult to enact federal laws, the Constitution
"leave[s] the states free to govern" on many important issues.14
These features of our polity make the passage of federal legislation
very difficult, but not impossible. What happens when these safeguards
fail to block the passage of over-reaching legislation? This clearly hap-
pens. The corpus of federal criminal law alone is replete with examples.
Any number of the 3,000 plus federal criminal provisions might seem to
encroach upon state prerogatives. 5 (The exact number of violations de-
pends on one's views regarding the proper national role in our federal
system.)16
11. Mikos, supra note 7, at 1673-74; see also Cindy D. Kam & Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens
Care About Federalism? An Experimental Test, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 589 (2007) (using
survey experiment to demonstrate that citizens' federalism beliefs and their judgments about the
comparative trustworthiness of federal and state authorities could temper their support for congres-
sional legislation).
12. Mikos, supra note 7 at 1691.
13. Clark, supra note 7, at 1339 (arguing that "[miultiple veto gates establish, in effect, a
supermajority requirement[]" for the passage of federal laws); see also Mikos, supra note 7, at 1691
(concluding that the states' majoritarian-friendly lawmaking procedures gives them a decided ad-
vantage vis-i-vis Congress in satisfying citizens' policy preferences).
14. Clark, supra note 7, at 1329.
15. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
16. There are at least some federal criminal statutes that are uncontroversial, either because
they serve a distinct federal interest-e.g., protecting the President-or because they target a "prob-
lem" the states readily acknowledge but are not capable of addressing-e.g., smuggling of narcotics
across international borders.
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The ban on medical marijuana is one prominent example. The ban
obviously made its way through the "gauntlet"' 7 that is the federal law-
making process. The scheduling of marijuana was but one issue among
many in the comprehensive federal drug reforms that were passed by
Congress in 1970. Indeed, Congress chose to place marijuana on Sched-
ule I-a categorization reserved for the most dangerous and least re-
deeming of substances-in spite of the misgivings of some prominent
Nixon Administrative officials. In testimony before Congress in 1969,
for example, Assistant Secretary of Health and Scientific Affairs Dr.
Roger Egeberg recommended that Congress "make a clear legal distinc-
tion between marihuana and the hard narcotics, with which it has errone-
ously been associated in law and the public mind." 18 Despite Egeberg's
protestations, however, Congress proceeded to list marijuana on Sched-
ule I, and despite repeated petitions to revisit that decision, 19 marijuana
has remained on that list for more than forty years.
For those who believe that Congress has no business regulating ma-
rijuana, the political safeguards failed in a very important sense. The
political safeguards failed to stop Congress from running roughshod over
state prerogatives concerning this important issue. The federal ban that
was enacted makes no exceptions, for medical use or otherwise. 20 Even
research employing the drug is permitted only sparingly.21 Anyone who
possesses, distributes, or cultivates marijuana pursuant to state law can
be criminally prosecuted-among other things-for violating the federal
ban.22 State medical marijuana laws provide no defense against federal
enforcement actions.23
What is more, as if to throw salt on the wound, the same forces that
originally failed to block adoption of the federal marijuana ban now
17. Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TExAS L. REV. 1549, 1609 (2000).
18. Crime in America-Views on Marihuana: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Crime, 91st Cong. 7 (Oct. 14, 1969) (statement of Dr. Roger 0. Egeberg delivered by Dr. Jesse
Steinfeld).
19. E.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON MARlIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING (1972) (recommending de-criminalization of simple possession of marijuana);
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 n.23 (2005) (recounting history of failed petitions before
the DEA to re-schedule marijuana); Letter from Lincoln Chafee, Governor of R.I., & Christine
Gregoire, Governor of Wash., to Michele Leonhart, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/priorities/
healthcare/petition/combined document.pdf (detailing governors' recent petition to reschedule
marijuana).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2010); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (holding that the terms of the statute "leave no doubt that [a medical necessity]
defense is unavailable" in criminal prosecutions under the CSA).
21. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1433-34 (discussing federal government's apparent reluctance
to approve research on medical uses for marijuana).
22. For a discussion of the civil sanctions that can be imposed against medical marijuana, see
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New Approach to Medical
Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 633, 634 (2011).
23. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005).
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work to entrench it. Public opinion polls consistently show that more
than 70% of American adults favor legalization of medical marijuana. 24
Yet, given the obstacles to federal lawmaking outlined above, it still
seems unthinkable that Congress would act to reschedule marijuana any-
time soon--even 70% support may not be enough.
II. THE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS AT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT STAGE
So, does episodic overreaching by Congress demonstrate that the
political safeguards of federalism are a failure? Does it bolster the case
for more aggressive judicial review of federalism issues? In the context
of medical marijuana, does it make the claim that Gonzales v. Raich2 5 -a
seminal Supreme Court case upholding the federal marijuana ban-was
wrongly decided, and that the Court should have barred Congress from
regulating some activities regarding marijuana?
Not necessarily. Putting aside debates over the legitimacy of relying
exclusively on the political safeguards approach, 2 6 I suggest that the po-
litical safeguards haven't necessarily failed to protect state prerogatives.
Even when the federal government passes over-reaching legislation, the
political process may nonetheless preserve state prerogatives by curbing
enforcement of such legislation.
Most federalism scholars pay too little attention to the important
role that enforcement priorities could play in protecting states' rights.2 7
From a legal realist perspective, enforcement clearly matters-it argua-
bly "controls the effective meaning of the law."28 In the extreme, an utter
lack of enforcement of a law is tantamount to repeal of that law. Notably,
24. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1462 (discussing polling data).
25. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
26. For the view that the Constitution requires judicial review of Congress's lawmaking
powers, see, for example, Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and Stale Autonomy: Fed-
eralism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1988) ("If the Constitution forbids federal
interference with state autonomy, then the courts cannot abandon their duty to enforce that limit
simply because the political process appears to provide a tolerable substitute for judicial review.");
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo , The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1466-68 (2001); William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Second
Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1732 (1985).
27. For some noteworthy exceptions, see, for example, Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 893, 899 (2000) ("Overlooked in much of the debate about federalization is the central role that
prosecutors play in the federalization of crime-and the important role they can play in controlling
federalization."); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and En-
forcement Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 759 (1999) (suggesting that "the nature and extent"
of Congress's delegation of lawmaking authority to federal prosecutors "cannot be assessed simply
by reference to the specificity of substantive lawmaking (or the lack thereof)", but must also consid-
er Congress's "interactions with, and manipulation of, the federal enforcement bureaucracy"); see
also Sam Kamin, Medical Mariuana in Colorado and the Future of Mariuana Regulation in the
United States, 43 McGEORGE L. REV. 147, 167 (2012) (examining Colorado's medical marijuana
industry and concluding that "the disconnect between the law as written and the conduct on the
ground may simply have gotten too great to be tenable going forward").
28. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 700
(2011).
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of the 3,000 or so federal criminal laws now on the books,2 9 many appear
to be rarely (if ever) enforced.30
Enforcement of any law requires the ongoing appropriation of fiscal
and political capital, both of which are in short supply. The federal gov-
ernment employs about 100,000 law enforcement agents. That's a very
large number, but it's still only enough to investigate, prosecute, and
punish a tiny fraction of all criminal violations of federal law. And in-
creasing the federal government's capacity to enforce all of its criminal
laws vigorously would necessarily require raising taxes, a prospect that is
generally disfavored (to put it mildly) by most voters.
Hence, every year, federal lawmakers must decide how to allocate
this relatively fixed and finite level of resources across an expansive and
growing set of enforcement priorities. 32 Not surprisingly, the squeaky
wheel gets the grease in this process. The crisis that sparked federal leg-
islation in some past year commonly fades away and is eclipsed by a new
crisis that demands a portion of the enforcement pie. This means that law
enforcement priorities may shift over time, even though the content of
the law remains largely fixed. The appropriations process gives oppo-
nents of federal legislation the opportunity to scuttle it-de facto, if not
de jure-on an almost annual basis. The old laws stay on the books (re-
moving them is too difficult) but they can fade away, just like the crises
that inspired them.
A similar process is played out in the Executive Branch. Congress
budgets enforcement expenditures into categories," but sometimes
29. This figure is, at best, an estimate of the total number of federal crimes. See Mila Sohoni,
The Idea of "Too Much Law", 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1603-06 (noting that it is impossible to
tabulate precisely the number of federal crimes on the books).
30. Cf id. at 1606-07 ("Federal criminal law enforcement accounts for only about 6 percent
of the country's total felony prosecutions each year. A blinkered focus on metrics of numerosity
obscures these substantive details, which have obvious relevance to the question whether the quan-
tum of federal criminal law has exceeded the optimal level.").
It is revealing that more than two-thirds of all federal criminal prosecutions in 2011 involved just
three broad crime categories: drugs (31%), immigration (28%), and fraud (13%). THOMAS F.
HOGAN, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 17-19 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness20ll.pdf. For more detailed data on the
number of federal prosecutions by crime, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
31. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
(last updated Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmn?ty-tp&tid=74 (reporting 105,000 feder-
al agents whose primary function is the "prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the
apprehension of alleged offenders").
32. To be sure, Congress cannot necessarily control the level of enforcement resources dedi-
cated to particular crimes-e.g., marijuana distribution, health care fraud, etc. See Richman, supra
note 27, at 798. However, Congress can (and does) achieve a less precise level of control over en-
forcement by assigning responsibility for particular crime types (e.g., drug offenses) to particular
agencies (e.g., the DEA) and then controlling the funding of such agencies. See id. at 796-799.
33. For a breakdown of the Department of Justice's fiscal year 2012 budget, see
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 BUDGET & PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (2012),
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agents have broad discretion in spending the funds they've been allocat-
ed. If they disagree with legislation or simply don't consider it a high
priority, these agents can effectively scuttle it by refusing to enforce it-
openly or sub silentio.34
I do not suggest that under-enforced laws are entirely irrelevant. In-
deed, even un-enforced laws could have some impact on individual be-
havior, if people feel pressured to obey them due to moral obligations or
social norms.3 ' But the states' regulatory choices seem more likely to
matter when the federal government doesn't enforce its own.
Now, consider how the political forces just discussed have helped to
constrain enforcement of the federal ban on medical marijuana, thereby
preserving state prerogatives at least to some extent. The federal ban
hasn't quashed the medical marijuana movement-far from it. Sixteen
states have legalized medical marijuana as a matter of state law, notwith-
standing the federal ban.36 Six of those states have done so after Gonza-
les v. Raich put to rest any serious doubts about Congress's authority to
proscribe marijuana. 37 Marijuana use is rampant: "More than 14.4 million
people regularly use marijuana in the United States. . . ."3 This includes
more than-and perhaps many more than-400,000 medical marijuana
39 40users in just sixteen states. Oregon alone has 57,000 registered users.
Marijuana dispensaries have proliferated in some medical marijuana
states. Before a local ordinance limited their number, as many as 1,000
dispensaries may have been operating in Los Angeles County alone.41
Ten dispensaries will soon open in the District of Columbia, Congress's
own backyard.4 2 Unlike most illicit drug dealers, these dispensaries are
operating in plain sight-in other words, they're not hiding from the fed-
eral government. The Discovery Channel even hosts a documentary se-
ries, Weed Wars, showcasing people who are unabashed about flouting
the ban. And while the federal Executive continues to squeeze medical
marijuana distributors, some of its actions suggest the federal ban is now
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012summary/pdf/fyl 2-bud-summary-request-performance.pdf#bud-
sum.
34. For a discussion of how federal prosecutors prioritize their limited enforcement resources,
see generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, When Prosecutors Don't: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial
Declinations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221 (2003).
35. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY LAW (1990).
36. See MARUUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1464 (emphasis added) (citing SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, fig. 2.1, available
at http:// www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH/2k7NSDUH/2k7results.cfm#Ch2).
39. Id. (estimating number of medical marijuana users in thirteen states as of 2009).
40. OR. HEALTH AUTH., OREGON MEDICAL MARUUANA PROGRAM STATISTICS,
http://public.health.oregon.gov/diseasesconditions/chronicdisease/medicalmarijuanaprogram/pages/d
ata.aspx (reporting enrollment statistics for state medical marijuana registry).
41. See Parloff, supra note 5.
42. Tim Craig, D.C. Council Approves Limits on Medical Mariuana Growth, WASH. POST
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-council-approves-limits-on-
medical-marijuana-growth/2012/01/17/gIQAxLNa6P story.htmi.
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"more of what you'd call a 'guideline' than an actual rule." 4 3 In Colora-
do, for example, the United States Attorney recently issued letters to
twenty-three marijuana dispensaries, threatening them with civil and
criminal penalties, that is, unless they moved (all of the dispensaries in
question were located near schools). In other words, one United States
Attorney is now asking individuals who are openly flouting federal law
not to stop doing so altogether, but to do so more discretely.4
Why has the federal ban been so ineffectual at stopping the medical
marijuana movement? In large part, it is because political realities se-
verely curtail enforcement of it. To enforce a federal ban on medical
marijuana effectively would entail monumental financial and political
costs. It would take a massive commitment of new law enforcement re-
sources to hire more agents, pursue more arrests, launch more prosecu-
tions, and build more prisons just to dent the medical marijuana drug
trade. The federal government already spends approximately $2.4 billion
per year to combat marijuana.45 Just imagine how much more it would
take to seriously curtail this ubiquitous drug. All of this would require
comparable increases in federal taxation-and Congress is reluctant to
raise taxes, probably even to curb drugs.
But raising taxes to fund a troop surge in the war against medical
marijuana would be especially unpopular. Medical marijuana now has a
great deal of public support, apparently even among those who don't use
it. As mentioned earlier, over 70% of the population supports legalization
of the drug for medical purposes. 46 It stands to reason that most politi-
cians who oppose medical marijuana will incur some political costs in so
doing.
In the midst of this enforcement gap, states have been able to pursue
modest medical marijuana reforms. People are willing to participate in
state medical marijuana programs because the perceived benefits can be
quite high and because the legal consequences under federal law are-at
least on average-far from dire. States have been able to further weaken
the deterrent influence of the federal ban. For one thing, "[b]y legalizing
medical use of marijuana . . . state laws may have softened public atti-
tudes towards it. The use of marijuana may seem more efficacious and
less dangerous or wicked because it is permitted by state law."4 7 In addi-
tion, "people may feel relieved of the [moral] obligation to obey the fed-
43. To paraphrase Captain Barbossa in PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: CURSE OF THE BLACK
PEARL (Disney 2003).
44. John Ingold, All Targeted Colorado Mariyuana Dispensaries Near Schools Shut Down,
Feds Say, DENBER POST (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana/ci_20064569.
45. JEFFREY A. MIRON, THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION 9-10
(2005), available at http://www.cannabis-commerce.com/library/MironReport 2005.pdf; see also
Robert A. Mikos, State Taration of Marituana Distribution and Other Federal Crimes, 2010 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 223, 230-31 (discussing expenditures on marijuana prohibition).
46. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
47. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1472.
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eral ban because state law permits marijuana use," 48 especially "when
they deem the state-and not Congress-as having the 'legitimate right
to dictate their behavior' regarding marijuana use."4 9 Finally, the "pas-
sage of . .. state [medical marijuana] laws, many by wide margins, sig-
nals that society is more likely to support than to censure medical use of
marijuana," thereby removing the threat of social sanctions.o In short, by
passing their own laws approving of marijuana, "[s]tates have succeeded
at removing-or at least diminishing-the biggest obstacles curbing
medical use of marijuana: state legal sanctions and the personal, moral,
and social disapproval that may once have inhibited use of the drug."'
Importantly, the Supreme Court helps to ensure that these forces
continue to constrain Congress. In particular, Congress can't sidestep the
resource constraints and political gauntlet outlined above by comman-
deering the states' own lawmaking and law enforcement resources.52
This is a crucial constraint on Congress, because the states have substan-
tial law enforcement capacity-for example, they now handle 99% of all
marijuana cases.53 Congress can't duck the need to raise taxes-or the
potential wrath that would be caused by an even more aggressive cam-
paign against medical marijuana-by ordering state legislatures or state
executives to help quash the drug. The anti-commandeering rule enables
states to passively resist federal authority. The only thing the states may
not do is actively facilitate violations of the federal ban-e.g., by grow-
ing the drug themselves or helping others to do so.5 4
III. ARE CONSTRANTS ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
NECESSARILY A GOOD THING?
Are these constraints on federal law enforcement a desirable sup-
plement-or perhaps, even an alternative-to the other safeguards of
federalism? In this part, I offer some very tentative thoughts concerning
these questions.
First, it is important to note that resource constraints won't always
prevent enforcement of over-reaching federal legislation. Marijuana is, in
some respects, an unusually tough test for the federal government. The
federal ban on the drug is tough to enforce in large part because the drug
is so popular and so easy to grow. But other congressional prohibitions
are comparatively easy to enforce. This is true, for example, when the
48. Id. at 1474.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1478.
51. Id. at 1479; see also Robert A. Mikos, Compliance in Federal Systems (2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting empirical evidence that conflict between
state and federal laws erodes compliance with restrictive regulations).
52. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
53. See Mikos, supra note 4, at 1443 n.90.
54. See id. at 1445-50, for a detailed explanation of the extent to which the anti-
commandeering rule limits Congress's power to preempt state medical marijuana laws.
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proscribed behavior is relatively uncommon. The federal Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act, for example, proscribes one abortion procedure that is
relatively uncommon (the procedure was performed in about 4,000 cases
per year, prior to the ban) and one that can be performed by only a very
small cadre of specially-trained physicians." Not surprisingly, it would
seem that few people are willing to flout that ban (at least openly), even
though thirty-two states apparently permit the procedure outright (pursu-
ant to state law), and all of the rest permit the procedure in at least some
cases (e.g., to protect the mental health of a pregnant woman) when fed-
eral law does not.5 6
Even when the behavior Congress targets is more commonplace, as
with marijuana use, Congress can sometimes fill enforcement gaps by
empowering private citizens to help enforce its laws. Federal employ-
ment discrimination laws provide a prime example. Congress has em-
powered the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
enforce such laws, but the agency faces a daunting task: in 2011, for ex-
ample, nearly 100,000 individuals brought employment discrimination
claims to the agency's attention.57 The agency, with a total staff of 2,470
and a budget of $367 million, cannot fully investigate and prosecute eve-
ry such claim.58 Indeed, it typically files a rather paltry number of suits
against employers-only 300 in FY 2011.' However, the EEOC's litiga-
tion statistics clearly under-state the impact of federal employment law,
at least in part because federal law creates a private right of action
against employers who discriminate. In other words, aggrieved employ-
ees can bring suit directly against their employers (though sometimes,
only after they have filed a charge with the EEOC), "thereby lessening
the need for [the EEOC] to enforce the law."6 0
Second, even when the federal government cannot enforce its laws
vigorously, it can still limit the states' regulatory options in important
ways. The CSA, for example, makes it difficult for the states to monitor
and control their medical marijuana exemptions. Among other things, it
55. The prohibition is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003). For a discussion of the frequency of
the procedure, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 134-35 (2007).
56. For a survey of state laws governing partial birth abortion, see Bans on "Partial-Birth"
Abortion, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Dec. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibBPBA.pdf.
57. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY1997
THROUGH FY 2011, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.
58. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC BUDGET AND STAFFING
HISTORY 1980 TO PRESENT, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/budgetandstaffing.cfn.
59. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2011, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm.
60. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1468 n.169. The number of suits brought by the EEOC (300 in
2011) compromises only a small fraction of the total number of employment and labor law suits filed
in federal court (roughly 37,000 in 2002). See Ann C. Hodges, Medication and the Transformation
of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 365, 369 n.27 (2004) (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl C-2 (2002)).
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prevents the states from directly cultivating and distributing marijuana,61
an approach that would undoubtedly enhance their ability to prevent di-
version of the drug into the black market and to protect patient health.
(Indeed, many states assumed ownership of all liquor stores following
the repeal of Prohibition, in order to better control the consumption of
alcohol.62) And some states have been reluctant to scrutinize individuals'
eligibility to use marijuana under state law, out of fear that any infor-
mation they gather about patients could be seized and exploited by feder-
al law enforcement agents.
Third, the constraints on the federal government's law enforcement
power may not protect individual rights adequately, even when they do
protect states' rights. With respect to medical marijuana, most people
flouting the federal ban will never be caught or punished. That is why I
have argued that "the states, and not the federal government, . . . have
emerged the victors" in the battle over medical marijuana. 4 But some
individuals have been and will continue to be prosecuted under the fed-
eral ban. To the extent the federal ban represents a usurpation of state
power, these prosecutions will seem unjust in our constitutional system.
And even if they are infrequent, the prosecutions may seem all the more
arbitrary and unjust due to their infrequency.65 We're much more com-
fortable in a world where troubling federal laws can't be enforced, but
only the lawmaking safeguards or judicial safeguards could provide that
assurance.
Lastly, it is important to recognize the danger that embracing open
defiance of federal law could breed contempt for the rule of law itself.66
The mode of preserving state prerogatives discussed herein hinges on
private citizens being willing to defy federal law-the more the better.
Some may applaud citizens who openly flout the federal marijuana ban,
61. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1426 (arguing that state distribution and cultivation programs are
preempted by the CSA); see also Mikos, supra note 22, at 662-63 (discussing the ease with which
preemption challenges could be raised in state courts).
62. See Harry G. Levine & Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from
Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 MILBANK Q. 461, 473-76 (1991) (suggesting that one of the
primary means of controlling alcohol once Prohibition was repealed was through state ownership of
retail distribution).
63. See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government? 161 U.
PA. L. REv. 103 (2012).
64. Mikos, supra note 4, at 1425.
65. Cf Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 948 (2005)
(decrying disproportionate sanctions that arise as a result of federal case selection). There is another
reason not everyone will enjoy the benefits of the enforcement safeguards. Namely, some people
may feel a moral obligation to obey federal law, even if they know they will never be caught and
punished for so doing. These people will only enjoy the benefits of state law if the federal law is
repealed or invalidated by a court decision.
66. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1854,
1866 (2005). This is a danger, of course, that the Supreme Court itself has arguably invited, by
refusing to impose a duty of fidelity upon the states. For an insightful discussion of competing views
of responsibility to the central authority in federal systems, see generally Daniel Halberstam, Of
Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality ofFederal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731 (2004).
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perhaps even hoping their actions will encourage others to do the same.
But what happens if such actions also encourage defiance of other feder-
al laws, such as federal school desegregation orders?
In spite of these concerns, the constraints on federal law enforce-
ment power generate some important benefits for our federal system that
should not be overlooked. In the gaps created by the under-enforcement
of federal law, states have been able to craft new policies that better re-
flect local preferences regarding the medical use of marijuana. In sixteen
different laboratories (far more, if local variations are included), policy-
makers are demonstrating the wisdom-or folly-of alternative ap-
proaches to medicine and drug abuse. The satisfaction derived and les-
sons learned from these experiments would never have emerged but for
the federal government's inability to vigorously enforce its own zero-
tolerance solution.
In the view of those who deem that federal policy oppressive, the
states are also serving as a valuable check against federal tyranny. To be
sure, they cannot shield their citizens from federal sanctions. But by giv-
ing medical marijuana use their blessing, the states might further erode
support for and the efficacy of federal law. In this way, the states might
serve as a modern instantiation of the Framers' vision of the states as
checks on federal tyranny.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conflict over medical marijuana policy holds some important
insights for the study of federalism more generally. Among other things,
the conflict exposes the shortcomings of assessing the federal govern-
ment's power vis-i-vis the states based on the mere existence of a federal
law governing some (ostensibly) state domain. The law as written clearly
matters, but how the law is enforced is perhaps a more accurate yardstick
of federal power.
The federal government passed a stringent ban on marijuana more
than four decades ago. Today, however, the federal government lacks the
fiscal and political capital needed to enforce that ban aggressively and to
quash the burgeoning medical marijuana movement. For example, the
number of prosecutions now being brought under the CSA pales in com-
parison to the number of violations now occurring. In the gap between
the federal ban as written and the federal ban as enforced, a growing
number of states have begun to experiment with more tolerant approach-
es to marijuana policy. As long as the political process continues to un-








I begin by thanking the editors of the Denver University Law Re-
view for inviting me to present my research at their timely symposium
"Marijuana at the Crossroads."' As a legal scholar, I find it both exhila-
rating and frustrating to work in an area of law that is undergoing un-
precedented yet long overdue and painstakingly slow change. The U.S.
War on Drugs, especially the war on cannabis, has long raised serious
questions of liberty, equality, justice, efficiency, federalism, and foreign
policy. In the constitutional domain alone, this war implicates interests
arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, and Twenty-first Amendments. 2 On the occasion of this sym-
posium, I wish to offer a short essay3 on a single though important aspect
of the quickly changing landscape of American law in this area, the dis-
tinction between medicinal and recreational uses of cannabis.
To be sure, the line between these uses is often blurred. While some
uses of cannabis are essentially medicinal, that is, and others essentially
recreational, many uses have strong elements of both. Yet, like the dis-
tinction between law and morality,4 medicinal and recreational uses must
be understood as distinct for some practical purposes. In the sixteen
states and the District of Columbia where cannabis has been approved
for medicinal use,5 the distinction between medicinal and recreational
t Associate Professor of Political Science, San Francisco State University. JD, UC Has-
tings, PhD, UCSB
1. January 27, 2012, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law.
2. 1 have written on some of these issues elsewhere. See M.D. Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich:
An Opening for Rational Drug Law Reform, I TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 307 (2005); M.D. Carcieri, Gon-
zales v. Raich: Congressional Tyranny and Irrelevance in the War on Drugs, 9 U. PENN. J. CONST.
L. 1131 (2007) [hereinafter Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich]; M.D. Carcieri, Rawls and Reparations, 15
MICH. J. RACE & L. 267 (2010) [hereinafter Carcieri, Rawls]; M.D. Carcieri, Obama, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Drug War, 44 AKRON L. REV. 303 (2011) [hereinafter Carcieri, Obama]; and
M.D. Carcieri, California's Proposition 19: Selective Prohibition and Equal Basic Liberties, 46
U.S.F. L. REV. 479 (2012) [hereinafter Carcieri, California's Proposition 19].
3. In the spirit of a short essay, and to avoid redundancy, I shall not provide extensive argu-
ment on all aspects of the topics I touch upon, and invite the interested reader to see where I have
developed them in my previous work.
4. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 597 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Chris Roberts, Rolling Paper: Looking at the Current State of Safe Access, SF
WKLY. (July 20, 2011), http://www.sfweekly.com/2011-07-20/culture/medical-marijuana-safe-
access-update-chris-roberts/; Dana Mattioli, High Hopes at Miracle-Gro in Medical Mariuana




use has concrete legal significance. In those states, whether adults caught
by police with small amounts of cannabis can avoid arrest and criminal
charges will often turn on whether they can produce a physician's au-
thentic note approving use of cannabis for medicinal purposes. Under
federal law and the law of other states, by contrast, the distinction be-
tween medicinal and recreational use is legally meaningless. All cannabis
use is a crime under such laws, although punishment for conviction var-
ies.
Yet what about constitutional law-is the medicinal-recreational
distinction significant there? I have two answers. As an empirical matter
of Supreme Court case law, I submit that the distinction is less signifi-
cant than one might have assumed. I shall illustrate this by showing how
the medicinal-recreational distinction shows up under Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment analysis. As a normative matter of how citi-
zens should vote on upcoming state ballot initiatives seeking to replace
cannabis prohibition with regimes of regulation and taxation, I submit
that the distinction should be no barrier to support for such measures.
The bottom line is that since government, for good reasons, does not
require that even dangerous, highly addictive drugs like alcohol or tobac-
co be consumed solely for medicinal purposes, the equal liberty principle
at the core of our Constitution forbids it to do so with a less dangerous,
less addictive substance like cannabis.
II. THE EMPIRICAL DOMAIN OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Commerce Clause
As of this writing, in consolidated landmark rulings, the Supreme
Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate
at the heart of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.6 Alt-
hough the majority rejected Congress's authority to impose the mandate
under its commerce power, and upheld it only under the taxing power,
these cases have kept the Commerce Clause on the front pages of major
newspapers for several months. As it happens, the last major decision in
this area was Gonzales v. Raich.7 In Raich, the Court affirmed Con-
gress's commerce power to enact, and oversee strict enforcement of the
federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), particularly its complete ban
on any use of any amount of cannabis for any purpose, even by adults
and even in the privacy of their homes.9
By the time the Court heard Raich, it had developed a two-part rule
to test the limits of Congress's commerce power. First, the activity tar-
geted by Congress must be commerce, or at least economic activity. If
6. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
7. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
8. See id. at 33.
9. Id. at 42.
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that initial requirement is satisfied, then Congress may regulate the activ-
ity so long as it has a rational basis to conclude that, in the aggregate, the
activity exerts a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' 0 For our pur-
poses, the key point is that the threshold inquiry is only whether the ac-
tivity targeted is economic, regardless of whether such activity is done
for a medicinal or recreational purpose." From a Commerce Clause
perspective, then, medicinal and recreational uses are identical insofar as
the activity targeted by federal law--consumption of cannabis-is the
same regardless of whether it takes place for medicinal or recreational
purposes.12
B. Fourteenth Amendment
While it has addressed other aspects of cannabis law,13 the Supreme
Court has never specified the standard of review-the level of scrutiny-
that laws imposing cannabis prohibition must survive upon challenge
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lower federal and state supreme
courts addressing the issue have held that such laws are subject to mere
rational basis scrutiny, which they generally survive. 14 On a correct read-
10. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557-560 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
11. Such a limited inquiry suggests why States under their police power, not Congress under
its commerce power, should presumptively be allowed to legislate in this area where the activity in
question is not interstate commerce.
12. In his controlling opinion, Justice Stevens concedes that the medicinal-recreational dis-
tinction is meaningless from a commerce clause perspective, and that both types of use are on the
same side of the boundary between what Congress can and cannot reach under its commerce power.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-29. 1 agree with him on these points, but disagree about which side of the
line they are both on. Beyond the problems with stretching the word "commerce" of Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3
to be synonymous with the broader term "economic," at least some human activity must be non-
economic. Otherwise, not only can Congress regulate any activity it wants, which is flatly incon-
sistent with the commerce clause's grant of power to regulate only that which is commerce, but we
are also left with a very impoverished view of society, one in which there is never any distinction,
for example, between marital sex and prostitution. In this spirit, the private adult use of cannabis,
whether for medicinal or recreational purposes, cannot simply be reduced to economic activity-
done either to maximize one's chances of financial gain or to minimize one's chances of financial
loss. I submit that it is rather generally done, under either category, simply to feel better.
Justice Stevens relied heavily on the analogy between Raich and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), a New Deal era case in which Congress's power to regulate a farmer's production
and consumption of wheat was upheld under the Commerce Clause. Yet not only is Wickard inappo-
site insofar as Congress was in that case truly regulating an interstate market with the Agricultural,
Adjustment Act, while the Controlled Substances Act involved in Raich is an attempt to destroy an
interstate market using federal criminal law, but Justice Stevens cherry picks Wickard out of a range
of relevant precedents. He ignores the force of later cases like Lopez and Morrison as well as of
earlier landmark cases like Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Even so staunch a Fed-
eralist as John Marshall saw the need to draw clear lines between what Congress can and cannot
reach under the Commerce Clause. I thus agree that while key constitutional words like "commerce"
must have some breathing room, they must also have limits. Otherwise, quite simply, a written
Constitution is a sham. As Marshall saw and explained in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
137 (1803), this is not an option. See generally Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich, supra note 2.
13. Besides Raich, see United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 582 U.S. 483
(2001), which held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act.
14. See, e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fogarty,
692 F.2d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 1982); NORML v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.D.C. 1980); State v.
Sunderland, 168 P.3d 526, 539 (Haw. 2007) (Moon, C.J., concurring and dissenting); State v.
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ing of the Court's leading, relevant Fourteenth Amendment case law,
however, I have argued that such laws are properly subject to strict scru-
tiny. 1 I have justified this partly on grounds that the racist origins and
racially disparate impact of cannabis prohibition establishes a suspect
classification,16 but primarily because laws imposing cannabis prohibi-
tion burden the fundamental right of bodily autonomy (i.e., presumptive
control over the boundaries and contents of our bodies).' 7
Strict scrutiny, of course, is an ends-means analysis. The medici-
nal-recreational distinction might thus be relevant as government tries to
show that the ends and means of cannabis prohibition are constitutionally
adequate. Yet the key point for our purposes is that before ends and
means can be assessed, the applicable level of ends-means scrutiny must
be established, and at this crucial, threshold stage of inquiry, the distinc-
tion is irrelevant. Whether cannabis is used medicinally or recreationally,
that is, cannabis prohibition burdens the fundamental right to control the
contents and boundaries of one's body, triggering strict scrutiny on that
account.
The United States government might be able to provide reasons for
prohibition of private adult cannabis use that would survive the rigor of
strict scrutiny. However, judging from the longstanding quality of propa-
ganda on the Drug Enforcement Administration and Office of National
Drug Control Policy websites, this seems doubtful. Indeed, it is not clear
that such prohibition can even pass rational basis scrutiny. Thus, beyond
Congress's dubious commerce authority to make private adult cannabis
use a federal crime, even state cannabis prohibition, with the legitimacy
flowing from the police power, is on weak ground under a faithful read-
ing of Fourteenth Amendment case law. My point, however, is that the
medicinal-recreational use distinction is irrelevant to the crucial, thresh-
old Fourteenth Amendment question of the applicable level of scrutiny.
III. THE NORMATIVE DOMAIN OF FUTURE STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES
Yet there is more. As interesting as the U.S. constitutional law of
cannabis may be, the Supreme Court is not where the action is on reform
in this area. Indeed, the action is not even in the federal government, as
Congress has long been intransigent on this issue,' 8 and the Obama Ad-
Maalan, 950 P.2d 178, 183-184 (Haw. 1998); Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 612 (Wash. 1997);
State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869, 874 (Wash. 1980).
15. See generally Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2. Laws banning heroin, cocaine, and metham-
phetamine might pass strict scrutiny. My point is that, on a correct reading of the case law, strict
scrutiny would apply to them, too.
16. See Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2, at 324-326, since those pages in my Akron article
present my (brief) case that cannabis prohibition embodies a suspect classification for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes.
17. See id. at 311-323.
18. Congress has, for example, long refused even to instruct the DEA not to harass sick pa-
tients in states with medical cannabis laws. See, e.g., Hinchey Encouraged by Record House Support
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ministration, in full re-election mode, has recently increased harassment
of cannabis dispensaries in California and Colorado.1 9 Fortunately, we
are not doomed to wait for any of the three branches of the national gov-
ernment to be the catalyst for rational reform in this area. In 2012, can-
nabis law-reform momentum is with the States, where voters on upcom-
ing measures seeking to replace cannabis prohibition with regimes of
taxation and regulation20 are not bound by the technical rules of ends-
means analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Turning to the normative question, regardless of whether govern-
ment could satisfy strict scrutiny of cannabis in court, this should still not
matter for voters contemplating upcoming revisions of California's
Proposition 19.21 The reason is that where the law, for reasons well and
widely understood,22 merely regulates the consumption of dangerous
drugs like alcohol and tobacco, the prohibition of less dangerous sub-
stances like cannabis violates the core principle of constitutional democ-
racy on which we all depend, the principle of equal basic liberties.23 i a
free society, where the law creates a presumption of liberty, each person
has a vital interest in not having his liberty denied while others are al-
lowed an equal or more harmful liberty. Civil liberty is thus fused with
equality, yielding the equal liberty principle. A core command of this
principle, embodied in the Rawlsian idea of "justice as regularity,"2 4 is
that "similar cases be treated similarly. Men could not regulate their ac-
tions by means of rules if this precept were not followed." 25
In this light, as well as the insignificance of the medicinal-
recreational distinction under U.S. constitutional law, I submit that this
for Medical Mariuana; Vows to Keep Fighting for Amendment, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July 25,
2007.
19. See Henry K. Lee, Judge Won't Block Federal Crackdown on Medical Pot, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 1, 2011, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Judge-won-t-halt-
federal-medical-pot-crackdown-2339891.php; Felisa Cardona, 25 Colorado Medical Maryjuana
Dispensaries Told to Move Away from Schools or Close, DENVER POST, Mar. 23, 2012,
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_20240930/25-dispensaries-told-move-away-from-
schools-or.
20. Notwithstanding misleading opinion/editorial commentary in top California newspapers,
Proposition 19 received 46% of the vote in 2010. See generally Carcieri, California's Proposition
19, supra note 2. At this writing, revisions of Proposition 19 have qualified for placement on the
2012 ballot in Colorado and Washington, yet the parallel campaign in California is in disarray. See
Joe Mozingo, Effort to Put Mariuana Legalization Measure on Ballot Is in Disarray, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/10/local/la-me-pot-initiatives-20120310.
21. Proposition 19 would have changed California cannabis law from a regime of prohibition
to one of regulation and taxation. See Carcieri, California's Proposition 19, supra note 2, at 480 n.8.
Colorado and Washington have now qualified initiatives modeled on Proposition 19 for their No-
vember 2012 ballots. See Mozingo, supra note 20.
22. Not only did the U.S. repeal alcohol prohibition as a policy, economic and constitutional
failure, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, but in a free society, adults must presumptively be allowed to
decide what goes in their bodies.
23. See Carcieri, Rawls, supra note 2, at 53, 171-227; Carcieri, California's Proposition 19,
supra note 2, at 484-491.
24. Carcieri, Rawls, supra note 2, at 208.
25. Id. at 209; see also Carcieri, Obama, supra note 2, at 323-324.
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distinction should be no barrier to voting for state ballot initiatives seek-
ing to replace cannabis prohibition with regimes of taxation and regula-
tion. Beyond the CSA's dubious legitimacy under the Commerce Clause,
and even beyond doubts that federal or state cannabis prohibition could
survive rational basis scrutiny (never mind the strict scrutiny that would
properly apply), the inconsistency of merely regulating dangerous, addic-
tive drugs like alcohol and tobacco while prohibiting and thus criminaliz-
ing less dangerous, less addictive drugs like cannabis deeply violates the
equal liberty principle.
Measures like Proposition 21526 in 1996 effectively used medicinal
use as a wedge issue, a way to lay the foundation for measures like Prop-
osition 19, fourteen years later. Yet because prohibition of private adult
recreational use is just as suspect from the perspective of equal basic
liberties as prohibition of private adult medicinal use, voters can support
upcoming measures like those in Washington and Colorado with a clear
conscience, knowing that they are voting to remove a profound,
longstanding injustice in their law.
26. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2012); see Carcieri, Gonzales v. Raich,
supra note 2, at 1132.
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WHEN MAY A PROBATION CONDITION ALLOWING USE OF
MEDICAL MARIJUANA VIOLATE THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT? JUDICIAL RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
PROMOTING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
FREDERIC RODGERSt
INTRODUCTION
Judges in states that have legitimatized medical marijuana, such as
Colorado, are faced increasingly with the question of whether they must
order persons to whom they grant probation in criminal cases to refrain
from medical marijuana use. Under federal law it is "unlawful for any
person to knowingly or intentionally possess" marijuana.' Any person
who violates the prohibition may be sentenced to prison for "not more
than one year."2
Notwithstanding federal law, the Colorado Medical Use of Marijua-
na Amendment provides an exception from the state's criminal laws for
any patient in lawful possession of a "registry identification card," au-
thorizing the holder to use marijuana for medical purposes. While pos-
session of marijuana remains a criminal offense in Colorado, a patient's
medical use of marijuana within the limits set forth in the Amendment is
deemed "lawful."s
Against this legal backdrop, judges recognize that probation is a
privilege, not a right.6 Many convicted persons, including inter alia, im-
t Frederic Rodgers served as judge in Gilpin County, Colorado since appointment by Gov-
ernor Richard Lamm in 1986 until retirement in 2011. Before that he was a U.S. Army military
judge, juvenile court magistrate, a municipal court judge, and in private practice. He is a long-time
member of the editorial boards of the ABA Judges Journal and Judicature, served as Chair of the
ABA Judicial Division, on the ABA Board of Governors, as an at-large member of the ABA House
of Delegates and member of the Board of Directors of the American Judicature Society. Long active
at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, he chaired its Faculty Council in 1999 and chaired
its Board of Trustees for 2009-2010.
1. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); see also § 802(6) (2006); § 812(b)(1), (c), sched. I (c)(10)
(2006) (defining marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance).
2. See § 844(a). (defining possession of a controlled substance as a federal crime subject to
imprisonment of not more than one year); see also § 829(a),(b) (2006) (establishing conditions for
the lawful prescription of drugs); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27-28 (2005) (holding that, under
federal statutes, marijuana has no acceptable medical uses).
3. COLO. CONST. art. XVHI, § 14(2)(b).
4. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-406(1) (2012).
5. COLO. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 14(4)(a).
6. See People v. Colabello, 948 P.2d 77, 79 (Colo. App. 1997). Gonzales v. Raich was de-
cided on commerce clause grounds, not preemption under the supremacy clause (Art. VI). 545 U.S.
at 22; see also People v. Mentch, 195 P.3d 1061, 1068 (Cal. 2008) (holding that an individual must
do more than simply supply a patient with medical marijuana to qualify as a "primary care-giver");
State v. Mullins, 116 P.3d 441, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (same).
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paired drivers, gain this privilege, especially first offenders. When a de-
fendant is granted probation, the court suspends what might be a harsher
punishment, if consistent with the offender's potential for rehabilitation
and the safety of the community.' In effect, probation is a contract be-
tween the court and the convicted person, allowing him or her to avoid
jail by good conduct and following all the terms of probation. If the de-
fendant breaches those terms, the judge revokes probation and imposes
another sentence.' The same reasoning applies to juvenile offenders.9
The question then becomes, can a judge impose a probation condition
banning marijuana use when the defendant is a medical marijuana user.?
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(the Code) provides a template for each state to adopt as its own Code of
Judicial Conduct.i0 Colorado's 2011 Code of Judicial Conduct follows
the language of the ABA Code in all pertinent respects: Canon 1 requires
in Rule 1.1(A) that "[a] judge shall comply with the law, including the
Code of Judicial Conduct."" Rule 1.2 states that "[a] judge shall act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety."' 2 Canon 2 in Rule 2.2 requires that
"[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.' 3 The Code's definition of "'law'
encompasses court rules and orders as well as statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisional law."' 4 Comment 2 in Canon 2 says,
"[a]lthough each judge comes to the bench with a unique background
and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law with-
out regard to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in
question."'
7. Holdren v. People, 452 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo. 1969).
8. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 780, 791 (1973) (defendant's probation was re-
voked and his original sentence reinstated for "associat[ing] with known criminals" in violation of
his probation terms and being "involved in, and arrested for, a burglary;" the Supreme Court, on
habeas corpus petition later held that due process entitled defendant to hearing before revocation of
probation).
9. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-5, 7-9 (1967) (juvenile's probation revoked and juvenile
"committed ... as juvenile delinquent to State Industrial School" until age 21 or "discharge by due
process of law;" the Supreme Court, on habeas corpus petition, held that the revocation of probation
did not meet procedural due process requirements); in re B.L.M., 500 P.2d 146, 147-48 (Colo. App.
1972) (juvenile's probation revoked after state presented evidence that juvenile was involved in
criminal activity in violation of terms of his probation).
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1990) (amended 2010).
I1. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1, R. 1.1(A) (2011).
12. Id. R. 1.2.
13. Id. Canon 2, R. 2.2.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at Canon 2 cmt. 2.
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MANDATORY CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures (1968), the ABA Standards Relating to Pro-
bation (1968), and the ABA Standards for Traffic Justice (1974) each
encourage the use of probation in preference to incarceration as long as
such a sentence does not unduly diminish the seriousness of the of-
fense. 16 Probation has been described as "a matter of grace."' 7 Trial
judges are alert to an offender's potential for rehabilitation, and many
face the reality of overcrowded jails when making decisions on whether
to grant probation." Drug and alcohol treatment providers are a large
part of the therapeutic landscape, and many successes are realized by
addicted persons who genuinely desire to recover.
In Colorado, as in all other states, "probation is a statutory creation
and the terms of probation must be derived from the applicable statute."' 9
Colorado law identifies mandatory and discretionary conditions for pro-
bation, and states:
[C]onditions of probation shall be such as the court in its discretion
deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the defendant will lead a
law-abiding life and to assist the defendant in doing so. The court
shall provide as [an] explicit condition[] of every sentence to proba-
tion that the defendant not commit another offense during the period
for which the sentence remains subject to revocation.20
In considering probation, the court necessarily considers community
protection, the seriousness of the offense, "and the offender, in that or-
der."21 Standard conditions of probation require no excessive consump-
22
tion of alcohol or controlled substances. Monitoring by toxicology test-
ing or AntabuseTM 23 may also be a requirement. Persons on probation
waive certain privacy rights enjoyed by other members of society, such
as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and they
16. ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 63-64, 240 (1967) (Probation Standards § 1.3;
Sentencing Alternatives Standards §§ 2.3 and 5.3; Traffic Standards § 4.3).
17. Gehl v. People, 423 P.2d 332, 334 (Colo. 1967).
18. Many Colorado county sheriffs place numeric limits on non-violent prisoners the county
jail will hold, and may ask judges to release non-violent prisoners to meet the limits. The author has
been contacted by county sheriffs in four counties-Adams, Gilpin, Jefferson, and Summit-about
such limits and releases.
19. People v. Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. 1997).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(l) (2012).
21. Logan v. People ex rel. Alamosa Cnty., 332 P.2d 897, 899 (Colo. 1958); see Brockelman,
933 P.2d at 1318-19.
22. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a) (2012).
23. 14 ROBERT DIETER, COLO. PRAC., CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6.46 (2d ed.)
(2011).
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must accept the inevitable random visit by the probation officer as well
24as drug and alcohol screening.
State laws also require a person on probation not to violate any fed-
eral, state or local laws or orders of court.25 While the possession of ma-
rijuana remains unlawful under federal law,26 the highly publicized Oc-
tober 19, 2009 Department of Justice memo on marijuana enforcement
brings little clarity to the situation.2 7 Marijuana remains on the controlled
substances list and thus is ipso facto illegal, but the memorandum states
that the U.S. government will not prosecute compliant patients in states
permitting marijuana use by persons with debilitating medical condi-
tions28. Under this state of the law, an applicant for probation who partic-
ipates in a legal marijuana compassionate use program squarely presents
a sentencing judge with a real-life conundrum on how to apply seeming-
ly conflicting federal and state laws.2 9
EFFECT OF LOCAL RULES OF COURT ON SENTENCING A MEDICAL
MARIJUANA PATIENT TO PROBATION
Six of Colorado's twenty-two judicial districts are governed by
blanket chief judge orders forbidding the use of medical marijuana for
anyone on supervised probation, thus restricting trial judges' options.o
Two districts (i.e., the third and nineteenth) allow probationers to contin-
ue their prescribed use of medical marijuana.3' In the remaining districts,
judges have addressed the issue on a case-by-case basis, 32 until the recent
case of People v. Watkins. In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals
vacated a trial court's order approving a defendant's use of marijuana for
24. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(X) (2012); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112, 118-19 (2001).
25. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-204 (2012); People v. Colabello, 948 P.2d 77, 78, 80
(Colo. App. 1997).
26. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812, 844(a) (2006).
27. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. David W. Ogden to Selected United States
Attorneys 1-2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-
marijuana.pdf. Deputy Attorney General Ogden's memorandum announced that federal prosecutori-
al priorities should not target "individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance
with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana." Id. Nonetheless, it states that
the "prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit
continues to be an enforcement priority," and that it "does not 'legalize' marijuana or provide a legal
defense to a violation of federal law. Id.
28. Id.
29. Under principles of federalism as expressed in the U.S. Constitution, "states must be free
to develop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). This freedom extends to the "great latitude" given
the states "under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort, and quiet of all persons." Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (quoting Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996)).
30. Jeffrey Wolf, Deborah Sherman, & Nicole Vap, Colo. Judges Play Doctor with Medical




33. No. 10CA0579, 2012 WL 310776 (Colo. App. Feb. 2, 2012).
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medical purposes while on probation.34 The court of appeals concluded
that state criminal law" requires that probation sentences include a con-
dition that probationers not commit criminal offenses, including federal
offenses, notwithstanding the Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana
Amendment.36
Appellate courts, faced with the question of whether courts have au-
thority to impose a sentencing condition that denies a qualifying patient
the right to use medical marijuana in accordance with permitted state use,
have reached divergent results. 37 Some Colorado trial judges have ex-
pressed some discomfort with the strictures of the Watkins decision and
with local chief judge orders limiting their exercise of judicial discretion
to fashion the terms of probation to the unique needs of individual cas-
es.38 They point to cases in other jurisdictions which seem to reach a
result contrary to Watkins, such as People v. Tilehkooh,39 in which the
California Court of Appeal reversed a probation revocation for marijuana
possession for "failure to obey all laws" because state courts do not en-
force federal law.4 0 In City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court,4 1 that
same California court also held that federal law did not preempt state law
on the issue of medical marijuana and probation, so that the defendant
was entitled to have the marijuana evidence returned to him after crimi-
nal charges had been dismissed.42 Similarly, in People v. Bianco,43 the
same court held that trial judges must be free to "impose conditions of
probation that [may] impinge on a defendant's constitutional rights if
they are 'narrowly drawn' and 'reasonably related to a compelling state
interest in reformation and rehabilitation."'"
34. Id. at *7.
35. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(1) (2012).
36. Watkins, 2012 WL 310776, at *7. Attorney Sean McAllister sought review of the decision
in the Colorado Supreme Court, stating that "[tihe Court of Appeals is undermining Colorado law
and trying to enforce federal law on their own.. . . Judges don't have the expertise to decide what a
defendant needs for his health care needs. It should be up to the doctor." Felisa Cardona, Colorado
Court of Appeals Nixes Medical-Pot Use for Those on Probation, DENVER PosT, Feb. 8, 2012, at
4B. However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Chief Justice Bender and Justice Mirquez
would have granted as to "[w]hether trial courts have the discretion to allow a seriously ill Colorado
probationer to use medical marijuana during a term of probation after the court considers the indi-
vidual circumstances of the case and the offense for which probation is imposed." Watkins v. Peo-
ple, No. 12SC179, 2012 WL 1940753 (Colo. May 29, 2012).
37. See, e.g., People v. Tilehkooh, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1438, 1447 (2003); City of Garden
Grove v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355, 386 (2007); People v. Bianco, 93 Cal. App. 4th 748,
750-51 (2001).
38. Interviews with trial judges participating in ethics programs the author presented in 2009-
II.
39. 113 Cal. App. 4th 1433 (2003).
40. Id at 1438, 1447. Accord State v. Nelson, 195 P.3d 826, 833-834 (Mont. 2008) (using the
same analysis, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction requiring defendant to comply with all federal
laws).
41. 157 Cal. App. 4th 355 (2007).
42. Id. at 386, 391.
43. 93 Cal. App. 4th 748 (2001).
44. Id. at 754-55 (quoting People v. Hackler, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1049, 1058 (1993)).
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Although the Watkins court distinguished the cases permitting judg-
es to authorize medical marijuana patients to continue their use of mari-
juana while on probation, this decision raises questions regarding judicial
independence and the extent to which a judge must exercise judicial re-
straint under the Code of Judicial Conduct in applying the law, regardless
of personal philosophy. The Colorado Supreme Court has expressed its
discomfort with a statute that established a classification of marijuana
that was contrary to the "overwhelming weight of [scientific] authori-
ty."4s In that case, the court recognized its ethical responsibility to give
great deference to a legislative classification, even one with which it
strongly disagreed. Although the majority encouraged the legislature to
amend the questionable law and demonstrate that it "is in touch with
scientific reality," nonetheless it left reforming the law to the General
Assembly. 46 In the dissenting opinion, Justice Lee disagreed, quoting
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,47 who declared "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,'- 8 concluding that "[a] [c]ourt is not at liberty to shut its
eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon
the truth of what is declared." 4 9 Later, when the Colorado Supreme Court
confronted the same issue in People v. Bennett,50 it again deferred to the
legislature, "[a]t least for the time being."5' After the issue arose for the
third time in People v. Steed,52 the Court referred to Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct53 saying, "[p]erhaps a dissent may be written in a
succeeding case or two, but in our minds the Code of Judicial Conduct
should bury the idea of a judge dissenting on the same issue Ad infini-
tum." 54 The court's comment in Steed may be explained by the legisla-
ture at last having followed the court's recommendations and amended
the law, although not in time to benefit the Steed appellant.
Several cases from other jurisdictions are helpful in understanding
the tension between judicial reactions to statutes restricting judges' dis-
cretion and prevailing notions. of judicial independence. A New Mexico
judge objected to his chief judge's order transferring juvenile cases out
of his court and dispersing them among the other judges' divisions of the
court.5 Enraged, Judge Castellano purported to countermand the chief
45. People v. Summit, 517 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. 1974).
46. Id. at 851-54.
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. Id. at 177.
49. Summit, 517 P.2d at 855 (Lee, J., dissenting) (quoting Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543, 547 (1924)).
50. 536 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1975).
51. Id. at 430.
52. 540 P.2d 323 (Colo. 1975).
53. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1, R. 1.1 (2010) (stating that "[a] judge
should comply with the law").
54. Steed, 540 P.2d at 326 n.3.
55. In re Castellano, 889 P.2d 175, 180-81 (N.M.1975).
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judge order and held the court administrator in contempt for refusal to
follow his directions, sentencing her to jail. The state supreme court
stepped in, prohibiting his actions, and ultimately removed him from
office for, inter alia, failure to follow the law, in violation of Canons 1
and 2 of the Code. Similarly, an Indiana trial judge was reprimanded
for failing to obey an appellate court mandate to vacate an improper sen-
tence, which caused a prisoner to spend an extra year in prison.57 An
Ohio judge was suspended for false and incendiary statements made dur-
ing a television interview that were critical of the appellate court that had
just reversed one of his decisions.58 A Wisconsin trial judge who refused
to follow his chief judge's order setting trial court hours and threatened
to "go public" with untruthful stories about the chief judge was suspend-
ed for failure to follow the law and attempted extortion.59
In jurisdictions with laws permitting use of marijuana by persons
diagnosed with debilitating medical conditions and without superseding
appellate opinions or other requirements restricting the probation option,
the sentencing judge considering probation must carefully review the
offender's pharmaceutical regimen. If the offender is demonstrably inca-
pable of controlling his or her behavior when under the influence of any
drugs-legal or illegal-probation would be an ill-considered sentence.
However, an offender who is prescribed any drug (including medical
marijuana) that has the potential to impair ability to drive, but who at the
same time is willing to abide by the law and not drive a car while taking
that drug, might be a good candidate for probation, if not otherwise indi-
cated by the facts.
Clearly, courts may order a probationer to abstain from alcohol and
controlled substances as a condition of probation.6 0 Equally certain is that
courts may prohibit the use of illegal drugs.6 1 Judges know that a proba-
tioner who professes to work toward rehabilitation may lead a law-
abiding life and be a safer driver if on a program of monitored abstention
from either legal or illegal intoxicants. 62 Judges recognize that communi-
ty safety and protection are furthered when an alcoholic in recovery is on
a monitored sobriety program. With alcohol prohibited, this probationer
is more likely to work through the recovery program successfully;63 from
this a judge may infer that a successful recovery program will reduce the
56. See id at 182-85.
57. In re Newman, 858 N.E.2d 632, 633-36 (Ind. 2006).
58. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri, 710 N.E.2d 1107, 1108, 1111 (Ohio 1999).
59. In re Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crawford, 629 N.W.2d 1, 3, 11 (Wis.
2001); see also In re Lokuta, II A.3d 427, 43-32, 449-50 (Pa. 2011); Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance, Public Admonishment of Judge Anthony C. Edwards 2 (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/publicadmon/Edwards 2-7-12.pdf (ruling that judge abused his authority
and violated his duties to "respect and comply with the law" and to "be faithful to the law").
60. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIll) (2012).
61. Id. §§ 18-1.3-204(1), (2)(a)(VIll)).
62. Id. §§ 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIll) (XIV.5), 42-4-1307(7)(b)(VI) (2012).
63. See id. § 18-1.3-204(1).
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likelihood of the offender returning to drinking or drugging and driving.
However, a prohibition of prescribed medication use is rarely a provision
of probation.64
Should the same rationale governing alcohol use also apply to med-
ical use of marijuana? If the offender demonstrates a propensity to drive
a vehicle while impaired by prescribed medications of any kind, a judge
may deem the defendant a danger to society and decline to grant proba-
tion. Whether the drug of choice is alcohol, VicodinTM, NyQuilTM or ma-
65rijuana, a judge may regulate its use as a requirement of probation.
However, the difference under the law between these substances turns on
whether the use is recreational or medically therapeutic. Few have the
temerity to argue with a straight face that alcohol use is therapeutic.
True, it may relax, relieve tension, and provide a pleasurable high to the
drinker, but its medical use is limited to local sterilization. Medication,
whether available over the counter or by prescription only, is arguably
different. A speaker at the Marijuana at the Crossroads Symposium at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law opined that differentiating
marijuana from the other drugs because of its recent history as a recrea-
tional drug does not settle the question. 66
JUDGES' CHOICES
Judges need to examine their own state's law on medical marijuana,
in particular whether it provides immunity or an affirmative defense to a
marijuana patient or provider. It is reasonable to question the wisdom of
64. While possession of marijuana remains a criminal offense in Colorado, id. § 18-18-
406(1), a patient's medical use of marijuana within the limits set forth in the Amendment is deemed
"lawful" under subsection (4)(a) of the Amendment. COLO. CONST. art. XVil, § 14(4)(a). Under the
Amendment, however, a physician does not prescribe marijuana, but may only provide "written
documentation" stating that the patient has a debilitating medical condition and might benefit from
the medical use of marijuana. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(2)(c)(ll); Beinor v. Indus. Claim Ap-
peals Office, 262 P.3d 970, 973 (Colo. App. 2011) (stating that "a physician's inability to prescribe
marijuana under Colorado law is reflected in the very physician certification" which specifies that
'[t]his assessment is not a prescription for the use of marijuana"'). Therefore, a defendant's physi-
cian's certification does not constitute a "written lawful prescription" as required by the terms of his
probation.
The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari in Beinor but Chief Justice Bender and
Justice Marquez would have granted as to the following issues:
Whether the medical marijuana provisions of the Colorado Constitution, article XVIII,
section 14, confer a right to use medical marijuana or merely protection from criminal
prosecution.
Whether petitioner was erroneously disqualified from receiving state unemployment
compensation benefits under 8-73-108(5)(e)(IX.5),for violating his employer's zero-
tolerance drug policy by having marijuana in his blood, notwithstanding his authorization
to use medical marijuana.
Beinor v. Industrial Claim Appeal Office, No. I 1SC676, 2012 WL 1940833 (Colo. May 29, 2012).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-204(2)(a)(VIII), (XV) (2012).
66. Jill Lamoureux-Leigh, a representative of Colorado marijuana dispensary owners and
active with Colorado state regulatory activities. See Chase Squires, Grass Confusion: DU Law Panel
Tackles Tangled Maryuana Laws, DENVER POST, Feb. 9, 2012, at 14C,
http://yourhub.denverpost.com/denver/grass-confusion-du-panels-tackle-tangled-marijuana-
laws/VmSaSuasj l UEnxHoawxO8J-ugc.
2012] PROBATION AND MEDICAL MARIJUANA USE
converting a recreational drug to a medical drug by popular vote.67 Many
judges fear that state initiatives approving medical marijuana are simply
a back-door approach to legalizing all drugs.68 Some are chiefly con-
cerned that marijuana use violates the law regardless of whether the fed-
eral government intends to enforce it against medical users and, thus, is
incongruous with the requirement that a probationer be law-abiding.69 In
their view, the Code of Judicial Conduct renders unethical a sentencing
judge's decision to overlook the illegality of marijuana use under federal
law, despite its state-sanctioned medical use.
Each case before a judge must be carefully examined on its own
merits and the applicable law. A judge's comfort level may be elevated
by evidence at sentencing about the defendant's medical condition and
the effects of prescribed marijuana upon it. If any applicant for probation
appears to be using any prescribed medication in bad faith, such use may
serve as a factor in the judge's weighting of the community safety and
protection sentencing goals in deciding the probation issue. Judges may
determine that a defendant's marijuana use for medical purposes is in
bad faith if there exists no debilitating medical condition to support the
patient's placement on the state registry of qualified medical marijuana
users. Other factors which may influence a judge to determine bad faith
medical marijuana use are: (1) the marijuana use is reasonably related to
the crime for which the defendant was convicted; (2) a demonstrated
likelihood that the defendant will possess marijuana for non-medical
purposes, or in greater quantities than permitted for medical purposes
under law; (3) a demonstrated tendency on the defendant's part to be-
come addicted to drugs; or (4) a demonstrated likelihood that medical
marijuana use will undermine a court ordered substance abuse treatment
72program.
Whether marijuana prohibition eventually goes the way of the
Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Volstead Act is
unknowable. 73 It is important not to sentence by rote, formula, and man-
67. As Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Alex Kozinski stated in his concurrence in
Conant v. Walters, while the allowance of medical marijuana "may seem faddish or foolish . . . the
public record reflect[s] a legitimate and growing division of informed opinion on this issue." 309
F.3d 629, 640 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J. concurring). "A surprising number of health care profes-
sionals and organizations have concluded that the use of marijuana may be appropriate for a small
class of patients who do not respond well to, or do not tolerate, available prescription drugs." Id. at
640-41.




71. See CoLO. REV.STAT. § 18-18-406.3(2)(a) (2012).
72. People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal.1975).
73. Alcohol prohibition under the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919, U.S. CONsT. amend.
XVIII, was repealed fourteen years later by the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933. U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
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datory guidelines. 74 in states where the law provides complete immunity
to a qualifying medical marijuana user, appellate courts have resolved
the issue without regard to questions of judicial ethics.7 5 Resolving in-
consistencies and harmonizing conflicting views have always been a part
of the judicial job description.76 The current anomalous state of the law
on medical marijuana is one of the challenges judges must face, but it is
not insurmountable.
74. In United States v. Booker, the Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines, previous-
ly mandatory, should be treated as merely advisory to cure a constitutional deficiency in the system.
543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (Breyer, J.).
75. See Tilehkooh, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 1438, 1447; City of Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th
at 386; Bianco, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 750-51 n.41; see also Nelson, 195 P.3d at 833-34.
76. The Colorado rules of statutory construction offer little guidance. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
2-4-201-216 (2012). In particular, the preference favoring local over general applicability of con-
flicting statutes in § 2-4-205 applies to conflicts in state law, rather than conflicts between federal
and state law.
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REFLECTIONS ON MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROSECUTIONS
AND THE DUTY TO SEEK JUSTICE
ALEX KREITt
Whatever else may be said of state medical marijuana laws, few
would disagree that they have generated a wide array of difficult legal
issues. During the sixteen years since California passed the first modem
state medical marijuana law, the Supreme Court alone has reviewed two
medical marijuana cases. In 2001, the Court prevented medical marijua-
na caregivers from relying on the common law defense of medical neces-
sity in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative,' con-
cluding that under the federal "Controlled Substances Act, the balance
already has been struck against a medical necessity exception." 2 Just four
years later, in Gonzales v. Raich,3 the Court affirmed the federal gov-
ernment's authority under the Commerce Clause to prosecute the non-
* ** 4commercial, intrastate cultivation and possession of medical marijuana.
Meanwhile, federal trial and circuit courts have considered a variety of
issues, including whether sick and dying patients have a fundamental
right to medical marijuana;s whether physicians have a First Amendment
right to recommend medical marijuana to patients;6 and whether a provi-
sion of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) designed to provide im-
munity to state and local undercover officers also shields a medical mari-
juana grower deputized by the City of Oakland.7 State courts have faced
an even more varied set of legal questions, with cases that present issues
specific to state medical marijuana laws,' as well as cases that call on
courts to address the relationship between federal and state marijuana
laws.9
t Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law.
1. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
2. Id. at 499.
3. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
4. Id. at 26-27, 32-33 (upholding federal prohibition of intrastate, noncommercial cultiva-
tion and possession of medical marijuana because it was an essential part of the broader regulatory
scheme governing controlled substances).
5. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 859, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing how medical mari-
juana has not yet achieved the classification of a fundamental right that would be constitutionally
protected).
6. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (analyzing the interaction of the
First Amendment with the ability of a doctor to discuss medical marijuana with his or her patient).
7. United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2006).
8. E.g., People v. Colvin, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 857-58 (Ct. App. 2012).
9. See Cnty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 467 (Ct. App. 2008)
(considering federal preemption of state medical marijuana laws).
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In the midst of these disputes, the application of rules of profession-
al conduct to attorneys who practice medical marijuana law has received
comparably little attention. Within the past few years, however, more
attorneys have begun to consider this important issue, primarily as the
result of two state ethics opinions. Both opinions focused on the applica-
tion of Rule 1.2(d) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to attorneys who advise medical marijuana patients
and caregivers. Model Rule 1.2(d) provides the following:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of con-
duct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of
the law.'0
It is not difficult to see how this provision might present a difficult
question in the context of medical marijuana law. For example, is an
attorney who advises her client in the negotiation of a lease to open a
medical marijuana dispensary in compliance with this rule? In 2010,
Maine's Bar Association became the first to weigh in on the question of
"whether and how an attorney might act in regard to a client whose in-
tention is to engage in conduct which is permitted by state [medical mari-
juana] law . . . but which . . . is a federal crime."" The Maine Commis-
sion advised a "case by case" evaluation of whether an attorney's advice
on establishing a medical marijuana distribution business would run
afoul of Model Rule 1.2(d), but cautioned that "participation in this en-
deavor by an attorney involves a significant degree of risk." 2 In 2011,
the State Bar of Arizona became the second official ethics body to ad-
dress this issue and adopted a position that appears to be somewhat more
favorable than Maine's for medical marijuana attorneys. According to
the Arizona opinion, "A lawyer may ethically counsel or assist a client in
legal matters expressly permissible under the Arizona Medical Marijuana
Act . . . , despite the fact that such conduct potentially may violate appli-
cable federal law" at least in certain circumstances.' 3
The application of Model Rule 1.2(d) to attorneys who advise pa-
tients and providers on how to comply with state medical marijuana laws
undoubtedly presents a focused and pressing question of professional
ethics. This essay argues that medical marijuana prosecutions raise
equally challenging-albeit more nebulous-ethical problems. In partic-
ular, the prosecution of medical marijuana patients and providers pre-
10. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2011).
11. Maine Ethics Opinion No. 199 (2010) (Advising Clients Concerning Maine's Medical
Marijuana Act).
12. Id.
13. State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion 11-01 (2011) (Scope of Representation).
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sents difficult and important questions about the exercise of discretion in
light of the prosecutor's duty to seek justice. This essay does not seek to
offer prosecutors specific advice about how to view medical marijuana
prosecutions. Instead, it aims to illuminate some of the ethical issues a
conscientious prosecutor should thoughtfully consider in deciding
whether and how to pursue a medical marijuana prosecution.
Part I provides an overview of the prosecutor's ethical duty to seek
justice and not merely to convict. Part II considers how this ethical duty
may be implicated in federal and state medical marijuana prosecutions. I
argue that medical marijuana cases can present particularly difficult ethi-
cal challenges for prosecutors because they involve a uniquely conflicted
area of law that makes the careful exercise of prosecutorial discretion all
the more important. Part III offers concluding remarks.
I. THE DUTY TO SEEK JUSTICE
Because of their unique role in the criminal justice system, prosecu-
tors are subject to special ethical duties. While a criminal defense attor-
ney is obligated to zealously advocate for her client, a prosecutor acts as
a representative of the sovereign. She "is not simply a lawyer advocating
the government's perspective of the case" but "is the alter ego of the
[State] exercising its sovereign power of prosecution."' 4 In this role, a
prosecutor has a great deal of power in the form of nearly unfettered dis-
cretion to decide which cases to pursue and which charges to bring. 5 In
recognition of the prosecutor's unique "responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate,"' 6 Model Rule 3.8 provides
for "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," outlining specific re-
quirements prosecutors should follow-for example, the obligation to
"make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense."17 However, a prosecutor's ethical obligations ex-
tend beyond specific requirements. They are grounded in a general duty
14. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1999).
15. See United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have no jurisdiction
to review prosecutors' charging decisions, absent proof of discrimination based on suspect character-
istics such as race, religion, gender or personal beliefs."); see also Steven D. Clymer, Unequal
Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 649 (1997) ("Despite the
significant ramifications of the forum selection decision, there is little administrative direction or
judicial oversight to guide federal prosecutors in exercising their discretion to choose among offend-
ers eligible for federal prosecution."). Some states courts have been more receptive to arguments to
constrain prosecutorial discretion, though even in those states, prosecutors retain a great deal of
power in deciding who to prosecute and what charges to bring. See, e.g., Jersey v. Lagares, 601 A.2d
698, 32 (1992) (holding that aspects of New Jersey's mandatory minimum drug sentencing scheme
impermissibly delegated judicial sentencing powers to the prosecutor and requiring prosecutors to
adopt guidelines to govern their decisions to seek enhanced sentences under the law).
16. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2011).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2011).
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under the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards "to seek justice, not merely
to convict."' 8
Though the prosecutor's duty to "seek justice" is well ingrained in
the criminal justice system and supported by a rich history,' 9 the admoni-
tion is also highly generalized. The duty to seek justice is not a rule that
typically requires a particular course of action in a particular setting-"it
does not set forth permissible and impermissible conduct, and it does not
set out criteria for how prosecutors are supposed to determine what is
just."20 The broad nature of the injunction leaves open the possibility that
it may "point in contradictory directions"21 in a given case, and may even
tempt a prosecutor to reflexively stretch the concept of "seeking justice"
to fit his own preferences in every case. As one commentator put it:
"What prosecutor doesn't think that he or she is 'seeking justice'?"22
Indeed, some believe the duty should be abandoned because it is "un-
workably vague for purposes of meaningful interpretation and applica-
,,23tion.
Though it may be difficult to draw precise instruction from the duty
to seek justice because of its fluid nature, many professional ethics
scholars and practicing prosecutors have worked to give shape and struc-
ture to this broad ethical obligation so that it may help guide prosecutors
in engaging in ethical reasoning. A thorough review of the deep literature
in this area is beyond the scope of this essay; an impression of different
conceptions of the duty is sufficient to appreciate why medical marijuana
cases might pose difficult ethical challenges for prosecutors.
Some commentators have relied on the duty to seek justice to coun-
sel prosecutors to follow a particular course of action in response to a
legal problem. One commentator recently argued, for example, that the
obligation to seek justice should lead prosecutors to voluntary refrain
from seeking peremptory challenges.2 4 Others have articulated different
visions for understanding the duty to seek justice and considered how the
duty might relate to some of the different responsibilities of a prosecutor.
18. ABA Standard for Criminal Justice 3.1-2(c) (1993).
19. See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 607,612-18 (1999) (outlining the history of the prosecutor's duty to "seek" or "do" justice).
20. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice ", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv 635, 637 (2006).
21. Green, supra note 19, at 622.
22. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 355, 378 (2001).
23. Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration ofthe Prosecu-
tor's Ethical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 Hous. L.
REv. 1337, 1339 (2004); see also Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, Changes to the Culture of
Adversarialness: Endorsing Candor, Cooperation and Civility in Relationships Between Prosecutors
and Defense Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 850 (2011) (describing proposed revisions to
the Criminal Justice Standards that describe "the prosecutor with more nuance and complexity" than
implied through analysis of prosecutor's duty to seek justice).
24. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 372 (2010).
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In Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors Do Justice?, Fred C. Zacharias outlines a theory of the duty to seek
justice based on prosecutorial power, arguing that "the fear of unfettered
prosecutorial power is the impetus for the [prosecutor's] special ethical
obligation." 25 By contrast, Bruce A. Green argues that a role-based justi-
fication for the duty to seek justice "best explains ordinary intuitions
about the nature of prosecutors' special ethical obligations"2 and may
carry different practical implications for prosecutors than a power-based
conception.
To better understand some of the considerations that may be impli-
cated by the duty to seek justice, it may be helpful to briefly examine one
recent account of the ethical obligation in more detail. In Character and
Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a Prosecutor's Ethi-
cal Duty to "Seek Justice, " R. Michael Cassidy attempts to give meaning
to the special ethical obligations of prosecutors by looking to Aristotle's
framework of virtue ethics.2 7 Cassidy contends that virtue ethics is a use-
ful tool for understanding the duty to seek justice because employing
consequentialist or deontological theories to inform professional ethics
decisions can present difficulties. Virtue ethics, Cassidy argues, can ad-
dress the shortcomings of other theories because it is a teleological phi-
losophy in which "[t]he proper threshold question" is "not 'what should
one do?' but 'what kind of person should one be?"' 28 Singling out Cassi-
dy's theory for closer inspection here is not meant as an endorsement of
his approach. Instead, it is meant to serve as an example that highlights
some of the different considerations and issues that may relate to the duty
to seek justice.
Cassidy believes there are four key virtues that are important for
guiding prosecutors in seeking justice: (1) Fairness, (2) Courage, (3)
Honesty, and (4) Prudence.29 By understanding and aiming to possess
these virtues, Cassidy argues, prosecutors can more effectively engage in
ethical reasoning to help guide their decision-making process in difficult
cases. The virtue of fairness, 30 for example, "is concerned with right rela-
tions towards others"3' and encompasses ideas like a concern for the well
being of others for their own sake. In the context of making a deal with
an accomplice for testimony, this virtue might counsel a prosecutor to be
25. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991).
26. Green, supra note 19, at 625.
27. See generally Cassidy, supra note 20, at 640-53 (section of the article discussing Aristotle
and ethics).
28. Id. at 643-44.
29. Id. at 646-49.
30. Though this virtue is typically described as the virtue of justice, Cassidy adopts the "con-
struction of justice as fairness ... to avoid the obvious tautology that would result from attempting
to identify the contours of a prosecutor's duty to 'seek justice' with reference to this cardinal virtue."
Id. at 647-48.
31. Id. at 647.
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attuned to whether the defendant making the deal played a more signifi-
cant role than the person he is testifying against and to weigh that con-
sideration in deciding what might be a fair deal, or whether to make a
deal at all.3 2 While fairness emphasizes reciprocity and equal treatment,
"[c]ourage is the virtue that enables an individual to do what is good
notwithstanding harm, danger or risk to themselves."33 In the context of
plea bargaining, for example, a prosecutor might rely on this virtue to
reject a deal that is too lenient in exchange for testimony, even if doing
so means risking a conviction of the other accomplice. The virtue of
honesty requires a person to be comfortable with incongruity and to be
"willing to accept circumstances and other people for the way they are,
rather than feeling the need to make them consistent with his own pre-
dispositions." 3 5 For a prosecutor making a deal for testimony, this virtue
would counsel him to be mindful to affirmatively seek out checks to en-
sure that the informant is being truthful when he testifies, rather than
leaving the task entirely to cross-examination by the defendant's attor-
ney.36 Finally, the virtue of prudence-also referred to as "practical wis-
dom"-aims to guide us in moral reasoning by outlining a three-step
process of deliberation, judgment and decision for resolving ethical prob-
lems.3 1 Cassidy argues that this virtue is particularly important for prose-
cutors because "we expect prosecutors-like judges-to be impartial in
assessing the propriety of potential courses of action, and to come to a
decision only after careful and balanced deliberation about the public
interest."38
For present purposes, the particulars of Cassidy's vision are second-
ary to more fundamental points about the duty to seek justice that it helps
to illuminate. Specifically, as the discussion above indicates, many of the
most difficult ethical problems that a prosecutor faces cannot easily be
reduced to a neat set of guidelines or factors that will inevitably lead to a
particular outcome. A prosecutor who is deciding whether to offer a sen-
tence reduction to a defendant in exchange for her testimony (and, if so,
how much of a reduction) should surely be guided by the duty to seek
justice in exercising this discretion. The different factual permutations
that arise in practice make it impossible to formulate a precise ethical
rule for this circumstance, but the duty to "seek justice" can provide
prosecutors real guidance nonetheless. The duty can help a prosecutor
identify and appreciate the ethical considerations involved in each case
and provide a meaningful framework to guide her in ethical reasoning.
Though in any given case, a range of different outcomes may be ethically
32. See id. at 664-67.
33. Id at 648.
34. Id. at 660-61 ("A prosecutor must have the courage to say no and mean it .....
35. Id. at 648-49.
36. Id. at 662-63.
37. Id. at 649.
38. Id. at 651.
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defensible, the duty to seek justice can guide a prosecutor in picking
among these options.
Indeed, it is when prosecutors are called upon to exercise discretion
in ambiguous factual and legal settings that the duty to seek justice can
provide the most value. In these situations-which implicate important
ethical questions but where formulating precise ethical rules may be im-
possible-the injunction to seek justice provides prosecutors with an
ethical vision to guide their decisions. The Model Code of Professional
Responsibility explains the prosecutor's "duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict" by reference to prosecutorial discretion, noting that
the "special duty exists because . . . the prosecutor represents the sover-
eign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to prosecute."39
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MEDICAL MARIJUANA PROSECUTIONS
Medical marijuana prosecutions can present especially challenging
ethical problems for the prosecutor who aims to conscientiously follow
the duty to seek justice. In the medical marijuana setting, the law can
often be ambiguous and limited resources may require a prosecutor to
select a handful of people for prosecution from a large group of similarly
situated individuals. These considerations may lead some prosecutors to
pursue medical marijuana prosecutions only in rare instances-for ex-
ample, where an individual is relying on a state's medical marijuana law
as a pretext for clearly unlawful activity. 40 Other prosecutors, however,
have not been so restrained. For these prosecutors, determining how to
exercise their discretion in the context of medical marijuana prosecutions
may be especially difficult. This section considers two examples that
highlight some of the ethical problems that prosecutors who decide to
pursue medical marijuana cases may face.
A. Federal Medical Maryuana Prosecutions
Though sixteen states and the District of Columbia 4' have adopted
medical marijuana laws, it remains illegal to possess, cultivate, or dis-
tribute the plant for any purpose under federal law.42 After California
39. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980); see Angela J. Davis, Prosecu-
tion and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 36 (1998) (arguing
that prosecutorial charging decisions "raise fundamental questions about the duty and responsibility
of the prosecutor to seek justice for all parties-defendants as well as victims-and to assure that all
parties receive equal protection under the law").
40. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (Oct
19, 2009).
41. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO
REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST 1 (2011), available at
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/State-by-State-Laws-Report-201 I.pdf.
42. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131, 1135
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding the DEA's denial of a petition to reclassify marijuana under federal law
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enacted its medical marijuana law in 1996, the federal government im-
mediately took action to try to effectively block implementation of the
law.43 These early efforts included threats to revoke the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) registrations of physicians for recommend-
ing medical marijuana," civil suits under the CSA to enjoin the operation
of medical marijuana dispensaries,4 5 and criminal prosecutions of medi-
cal marijuana caregivers.4 6 The Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Gon-
zales v. Raich left little doubt that the federal government could constitu-
tionally prosecute individuals whose actions conformed with state medi-
cal marijuana laws-from the largest dispensary operator to an individu-
al patient in possession of a small quantity of marijuana for personal
medical use.47 Federal drug enforcement officials enthusiastically exer-
cised this power during the 2000s,4 with nearly 200 raids of medical
marijuana dispensaries by 200849 and a significant number of criminal
prosecutions.o Despite federal efforts, states have continued to adopt
medical marijuana laws at a steady pace 5 and there has been a sharp
increase in the number of medical marijuana patients and dispensaries in
states that permit them.5 2 Most of these dispensaries operate in the open
like any other business, promoting themselves through advertisements
and clearly marked signage, and, in one instance, even becoming the
subject of a reality television series on the Discovery Channel.53
During the Bush administration, there did not appear to be a particu-
lar method for selecting medical marijuana providers to target for federal
prosecution. In one high profile case from 2008, for example, the federal
after the Administrator determined that marijuana did not have a currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States).
43. See Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug Laws in an
Age of State Reforms, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 555, 565-72 (2010) (describing federal efforts to interfere
with California's medical marijuana laws).
44. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2002).
45. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486-487 (2001).
46. See, e.g., Federal Cases, AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS,
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/section.php?id=184 (last visited May 9, 2012) (providing an over-
view of federal medical marijuana prosecutions).
47. See, e.g., Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705, 706 (2006)
(describing the scope of the Raich decision).
48. For a more detailed discussion of federal efforts to interfere with state medical marijuana
laws, see Ruth C. Stem & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen's Race: Medical Marituana
in the New Century, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673, 674-75 (2009).
49. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: How
TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST S-1 (2008), available at
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/SBSRNOV2008_1.pdf (providing an over-
view of state medical marijuana laws).
50. See, e.g., AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, supra note 46.
51. See MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, supra note 41, at 1.
52. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1427-28 (2009)
(describing why state medical marijuana laws have been able to operate effectively despite federal
efforts to interfere with them).
53. See Austin L. Ray, 'Weed Wars' Star on Politics, Activism and Wellness, CNN.COM (Jan.
25, 2012 10:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/25/showbiz/tv/weed-wars-steve-
deangelo/index.html (describing the reality television show).
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government prosecuted Charlie Lynch, a Morro Bay, California dispen-
sary operator who had the support of town officials-including the
mayor and city councilmembers, who attended his store opening cere-
mony.54 Lynch was convicted, 5 and at sentencing, District Court Judge
George H. Wu indicated some displeasure with having to impose a one-
year jail sentence for Lynch. The New York Times reported that Wu
"talked at length about what he said were Mr. Lynch's many efforts to
follow California's laws on marijuana dispensaries" before concluding:
"I find I cannot get around the one-year sentence . . . ."56 People like
Lynch, Judge Wu lamented, "are caught in the middle of the shifting
positions of governmental authorities." 5 7 During the same period that the
federal government was prosecuting Lynch, however, other dispensaries
continued to operate openly throughout the state, many of them engaged
in more questionable methods of operation. Six months before Lynch's
trial, for example, a dispensary operator in Los Angeles held a press con-
ference to announce the installation of a 24-hour medical marijuana
vending machine at his establishment. 8 Asked about the development,
Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Jose Martinez told the
press: "Once we find out where [the vending machine is] at, we'll look
into it and see if they're violating laws."59 The comment is somewhat
baffling considering that the location of the machine was announced to
the press and its illegality under federal law could not be clearer.
The incongruity between the federal response to Lynch and the ma-
rijuana vending machines is almost surely the result of limited federal
law enforcement resources. As Robert A. Mikos explained in his insight-
ful article, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marituana and the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, "[t]hough the CSA
certainly threatens harsh sanctions, the federal government does not have
the resources to impose them frequently enough to make a meaningful
impact on proscribed behavior.,,0 As a result, prosecutors have been
faced with a situation where large numbers of people are openly defying
federal law but they only have resources to prosecute a handful of them.
54. See John Stossel, Andrew Sullivan & Patrick McMenamin, California Man Jailed for
Medical Marituana, ABCNEWS.COM (June 11, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Stossel/story?id=7816309&page=l#.T43tftVGz-A.
55. See United States v. Lynch, No. 07-0689, 2010 WL 1848209, at *1 (C.D. Cal. April 29,
2010) (providing a history of the case).
56. Solomon Moore, Prison Term for a Seller of Medical Marituana, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2009, at Al8.
57. Lynch, 2010 WL 1848209, at *23.
58. See Associated Press, Pot Vending Machines Take Root in Los Angeles, MSNBC.COM
(Jan. 30, 2008, 7:01AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22910820/ns/health-health care/t/pot-
vending-machines-take-root-los-angeles/#.T2pzAIFJQfk.
59. Id
60. Mikos, supra note 52, at 1464; see also id. at 1464-69 (describing why the federal gov-




This presents a difficult problem for deciding how to exercise prosecuto-
rial discretion in a way that is consistent with the duty to seek justice.
To be sure, every charging decision may implicate prosecutorial
discretion and commentators have noted the lamentable absence of "a
systemic effort to define the principles that should govern prosecutorial
decision-making." 62 Moreover, drug prosecutions generally have been
cited as a particular area of concern in this regard. In one particularly
notorious example of questionable federal decision-making in drug en-
forcement, then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York Rudy Giuliani instituted a program called "Federal Day," in which
"the feds would choose a day, without advance notice, to prosecute low-
level dealers in federal court."6 In most other contexts, however, a fed-
eral prosecutor's charging decision is likely to mean the difference be-
tween prosecution at the state or federal level, 65 and criminals who re-
main free do so only by eluding authorities and concealing their activity.
By contrast, when a federal prosecutor pursues charges against a medical
marijuana operator, the decision to prosecute is not a choice of venue but
the difference between a prison term and freedom. Those who escape
prosecution do not do so by avoiding detection; they operate as openly as
any other business, and yet only a small fraction of them are prosecuted.
As a result, federal prosecutors who insist on pursuing medical marijuana
cases must decide how to choose between a number of easy targets for
conviction, knowing that the handful they charge may face severe penal-
ties while the rest may continue to operate out in the open. In these cir-
cumstances, conscientious prosecutors should be especially mindful of
the duty to seek justice and avoid the temptation to engage in decision-
making that "would offend common notions of justice [like making deci-
sions] on the basis of a dart throw, a coin toss or some other arbitrary or
capricious process."
In recent years, the already difficult ethical problem facing federal
prosecutors in this area has become even more complex as the result of
federal pronouncements indicating an intent to stop medical marijuana
prosecutions altogether. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama said
that he did not think it was a good use of federal resources to interfere
with state medical marijuana laws, explaining, "I'm not going to be using
61. For a discussion of other Department of Justice efforts to centralize the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion, see, for example, Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and
the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1442 (2008) ("The project to achieve nationwide
uniformity in sentencing . . . became, from the perspective of Main Justice, a project to achieve
nationwide centralization of prosecutorial power. . . .").
62. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837,
842 (2004).
63. See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 15, at 649.
64. ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE CORRUPTION OF JUSTICE 20
(2007).
65. See Clymer, supra note 15, at 649-51.
66. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (1992).
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Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws on this is-
sue." 67 Not long after being confirmed as Attorney General, during the
first 100 days of the Obama Presidency, Eric Holder was asked about
medical marijuana prosecutions and replied, "What the president said
during the campaign, you'll be surprised to know, will be consistent with
what we'll be doing here in law enforcement."6 8 Consistent with that
position, Holder announced that "[t]he policy is to go after those people
who violate both federal and state law."69
A few months after Attorney General Holder's comments to the
press, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a memo to all Unit-
ed States Attorneys that advised federal prosecutors "not [to] focus fed-
eral resources in [their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the
medical use of marijuana." 7 0 The memo was thought to be the realization
of Obama's statements as a candidate and to signal an end to federal in-
terference with state medical marijuana laws. It was widely reported that
the memo meant an end to federal raids of medical marijuana dispensa-
ries, so long as they were operating lawfully under relevant state law.
The New York Times ran a front-page article about the memo under the
headline U.S. Won't Prosecute in States That Allow Medical Marijuana,
reporting that "[p]eople who use marijuana for medical purposes and
those who distribute it to them should not face federal prosecution, pro-
vided they act according to state law, the Justice Department said Mon-
day in a directive with far-reaching political and legal implications."7 It
does not appear that the White House, the Department of Justice, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, or any individual United States At-
torneys took steps to dispel this impression in the days and weeks follow-
ing the release of Ogden's memo. Indeed, in at least one case, the De-
partment of Justice moved to have a Santa Cruz medical marijuana col-
lective's lawsuit seeking to enjoin federal medical marijuana prosecu-
tions on the basis of the Tenth Amendment dismissed as moot because of
the memo.72 Assistant United States Attorney Mark Quinlivan explained
67. Tim Dickinson, Obama's War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/polities/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216.
68. Bob Egelko, U.S. to Yield Marituana Jurisdiction to States, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2009,
at A-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2009/02/26/BA2016651R.DTL.
69. Scott Glover, U.S. Won't Prosecute Medical Pot Sales: Atty. Gen. Holder's Statements Is
Hailed as a Landmark Change in Policy and Echoes a Pledge by Obama, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2009, at 1.
70. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 40.
71. David Stout & Solomon Moore, US. Won't Prosecute in States That Allow Medical
Mariuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,2009, at Al.
72. See, e.g., Joint Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Santa Cruz v. Holder, Civil
Action No. 03-1802 JF (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21,2010).
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to the court that, in light of the Ogden memo, "the plaintiffs would be
seeking to enjoin, basically, a policy that is in the past."73
Consistent with the Ogden memo, federal raids and prosecutions of
medical marijuana dispensaries slowed for a short period but did not
stop. Indeed, even as the Ogden memo was released, United States At-
torneys continued prosecuting medical marijuana operators, without
much clarity as to whether they believed the operators were out of com-
pliance with state law or whether they had decided not to follow the Og-
74den memo's advice about the use of federal law enforcement resources.
One of these prosecutions took place in San Diego against James Stacy,
who operated a medical marijuana collective called Movement in Action,
taking "great care to make sure that his cooperative was formed and op-
erated in compliance with California law."7 Stacy became a federal de-
fendant just ten weeks after opening his collective in the late summer of
2009.76 During a joint investigation involving the DEA and the San Die-
go County Sheriffs Office, a local undercover agent obtained a medical
marijuana recommendation under false pretenses and then purchased
medicine from Movement in Action. Not surprisingly, Stacy sought to
rely on the Ogden memo to block his prosecution, filing a motion to dis-
miss the indictment based on an entrapment by estoppel theory. Stacy
argued that public statements by Attorney General Holder had led him to
believe his conduct was lawful under federal law and that the Ogden
memo meant he could not be prosecuted if he was operating in compli-
ance with California law. The prosecutor successfully argued, however,
that the Ogden memo created no legally enforceable right. "Even if De-
fendant's prosecution were contrary to the guidance set forth in the
Memorandum," the court explained, there is no legal basis "for dismiss-
ing an indictment because it is contrary to internal Department of Justice
guidelines."77 Because Stacy's compliance with California law and his
reliance on the widely reported Obama policy would not provide him
73. Transcript of Oral Argument, Santa Cruz v. Holder, Civil Action No. 03-1802 JF (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 30, 2009).
74. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice's New
Approach to Medical Maryuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 633, 643-45 (2011) ("Of course, one
might expect the DOJ to heed its own policy, in which case judicial enforcement of the NEP would
be unnecessary. In reality, however, the DOJ is a fragmented agency, one in which several autono-
mous decision-makers help shape enforcement policy.").
75. United States v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
76. See Teri Figueroa, Medical Marijuana Activist Speaks of Legal Battle, N. COUNTY TIMES
(Apr. 3, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/vista/article_7alelel8-8935-54e5-
b60b-569bedc74a41.htmI.
77. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. Though Stacy's case is noteable because of its timing in
relation to the Ogden memo, other federal medical marijuana defendants have received much longer
sentences. See, e.g., Rebecca Richman Cohen, Opinion The Fight Over Medical Marituana, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/opinion/the-fight-over-medical-
marijuana.html (describing the case of Chris Williams, a Montana medical marijuana operator facing
a mandatory minimum sentence of more than 80 years).
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with a defense in federal court, he ultimately accepted a plea deal and
was sentenced to two years of probation.78
Perhaps sensing that there would be no internal repercussions for
ignoring the Ogden memo,79 the number of federal medical marijuana
raids, prosecutions, and threats of prosecution slowly began to increase
during 2010.80 By the end of that year, claims that these efforts exclu-
sively targeted individuals who were in violation of both state and feder-
al law were losing credibility and began to fall by the wayside. It was
becoming clear that the federal approach to medical marijuana under
President Obama was not much different than it had been under Presi-
dent Bush.8' In June 2011, likely in recognition of the fact that many
prosecutors had decided not to follow the Ogden memo in good faith,
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a second memo.82 Os-
tensibly, the Cole memo was issued to provide additional "guidance"83
regarding the Ogden memo but, in reality, it directly contradicted it.
Notwithstanding the Ogden memo's instruction not to "focus federal
resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for the med-
ical use of marijuana," 84 Cole's memo advised that "[t]he Ogden Memo-
randum was never intended to shield [medical marijuana dispensaries]
even where those activities purport to comply with state law."85
By the beginning of 2012, the Obama administration had largely
abandoned any pretense of taking a more deferential approach to state
medical marijuana than previous administrations. The over-100 raids on
dispensaries during Obama's first three years in office is on pace to ex-
ceed the number under Bush. Indeed, in a 2012 article summarizing the
Obama administration's approach to medical marijuana, Rolling Stone
writer Tim Dickinson argued, "over the past year, the Obama administra-
tion has quietly unleashed a multiagency crackdown on medical cannabis
that goes far beyond anything undertaken by George W. Bush."86 Some-
what astonishingly, some Obama officials have continued to make public
statements indicating that only those who are in violation of state medi-
78. See Figueroa, supra note 76.
79. See Mikos, supra note 74, at 645-46 (arguing that the Ogden memo "may not have much
influence over prosecutions brought by U.S. Attorneys" because it is legally unenforceable and
cannot easily be enforced internally).
80. See, e.g., Kris Hermes, Has the Federal Government Changed Its Policy on Medical
Marijuana Enforcement or Just Changed Its Reasons for Continued Interference?, AM. FOR SAFE
ACCESS (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:22 AM), http://safeaccessnow.org/blog/?p=1228 (describing the medical
marijuana raids that occurred following the release of the Ogden memo).
81. See Dickinson, supra note 67 (reporting on the developments that led federal prosecutors
to disregard Ogden's memo).
82. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to U.S. Attorneys (June
29, 2011).
83. Id.
84. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 40.
85. Memorandum from James M. Cole, supra note 82.
86. Dickinson, supra note 67.
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cal marijuana laws will face federal criminal prosecution. In March 2012,
for example, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California Benja-
min Wagner discussed the federal crackdown on medical marijuana, stat-
ing that his office had "reserve[ed] criminal prosecution for the most
flagrant violators of not only federal law but state law."8 In response to
requests to release local medical marijuana prosecutorial guidelines,
however, Wagner demurred, "I'm not in a position to be of much com-
fort." He continued, "You don't ask the CHP, 'How many miles over the
speed limit can I go before you pull me over?""' Similarly, in June 2012,
Attorney General Holder told a House Judiciary oversight committee that
"We limit our enforcement efforts to those individuals, organizations that
are acting out of conformity with state law . . . ."' Notwithstanding
Holder's statement, U.S. Attorneys have threatened to prosecute state
and local government employees for administering their own medical
marijuana laws.90 It is difficult to see how prosecuting state officials for
implementing state law could possibly be consistent with a policy of
limiting enforcement to those who are out of compliance with state law.
Though Ogden's memo and Holder's statements may not create le-
gally enforceable rights-particularly in light of the 2011 Cole Memo-
randum-they should certainly give federal prosecutors reason to think
carefully about how to pursue medical marijuana cases in light of their
ethical duty to seek justice. Though some have tried to downplay the
significance of Attorney General Holder's 2009 statements and the Og-
den memo,9 1 to pretend that they were not intended to announce a shift in
federal policy and signal that state medical marijuana laws would operate
free from federal interference is disingenuous at best. They were univer-
sally reported in the media in that light, without objection from federal
officials. Moreover, some federal prosecutors-including, most recently,
Attorney General Holder-regrettably continue to make public remarks
implying that only individuals whose conduct does not comply with state
medical marijuana laws will face federal prosecution. A federal prosecu-
tor who hopes to act ethically in exercising her discretion cannot be blind
to the reality that many people did-and still may-reasonably believe
that their compliance with state medical marijuana laws will protect them
87. David Downs, U.S. Attorney Breaks Silence on Medical-Marijuana Battle,
NEWSREVIEW.COM (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/u-s-attomey-breaks-
silence-on/content?oid=5379500.
88. Id.
89. Stephen Dinan, Holder Says No Effort to Shut Down All Medical Marituana, WASH.
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/jun/7/holder-no-
effort-shut-down-all-medical-marijuanal.
90. See, e.g., Mike Baker, States Reassess Marijuana Laws After Fed Warnings, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 3, 2011, available at http:// http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110503/us-
medical-marijuana-feds/ ("Washington state's two U.S. attorneys warned that even state employees
could be subject to prosecution for their role in marijuana regulation.").
91. Id. ("U.S. attorneys have said in their recent memos that they would consider civil or




from federal prosecution. Although they may be mistaken in believing
this, it certainly counsels caution in pursuing medical marijuana prosecu-
tions. Indeed, because the Ogden Memorandum has not been rescinded,
there is an argument to be made that an ethical federal prosecutor should
seek to act in accordance with its advice and only take legal action
against individuals who are truly operating outside the bounds of state
medical marijuana laws.92 Federal prosecutors who do not feel bound to
faithfully follow the policy outlined in Ogden's memo, however, should
at least consider the impressions it created when deciding what tools to
use in pursuing medical marijuana prosecutions.93
B. State Medical Marijuana Prosecutions
Because of the complex and unusual relationship between state and
federal law with respect to medical marijuana, federal medical marijuana
prosecutions present particularly challenging ethical problems with re-
spect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Medical marijuana pros-
ecutions by local officials in some states also pose concerns with respect
to the ethical duty to seek justice. This is because some state medical
marijuana laws are unusually ambiguous and have been subject to wildly
divergent interpretations in different localities. To be sure, not all state
medical marijuana laws suffer from this problem. Colorado, for example,
has adopted a thorough and precise regulatory structure to govern the
medical marijuana market. 94 California stands at the opposite end of the
spectrum, with fundamental questions about the law still unresolved six-
teen years after passage of the state's Compassionate Use Act.9s
Though news accounts of large, professionally run medical mariju-
ana stores in California96 may lead one to assume that the state's law
clearly contemplates and regulates storefront dispensaries, their legality
is actually premised almost entirely on a single provision of California
law. The relevant statute, enacted by the California legislature in 2004,
provides that medical marijuana patients and their caregivers may "asso-
ciate within the State of California in order collectively or cooperatively
to cultivate marijuana for medical purposes." 97 In some parts of Califor-
nia, medical marijuana providers and law enforcement are in agreement
92. See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 307
(2001) (arguing that the legal role of individual prosecutors "does not permit unfettered moral discre-
tion" and that "[p]rosecutorial discretion requires attention to office policies and procedures").
93. See Cassidy, supra note 20, at 636.
94. See Sam Kamin, Medical Marguana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation
in the United States, 43 McGEORGE L. REV. 147, 150-51 (2012) (describing Colorado's medical
marijuana laws).
95. See Peter Hecht, California Supreme Court's Daunting Task: Unite Pot-Dispensary
Rulings, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13, 2012, at IA ("When it comes to rulings on medical marijuana,
California courts have a case of multiple personality disorder.").
96. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, How Mariuana Became Legal, CNNMONEY, Sept. 18, 2009,
available at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/1 l/magazines/fortune/medical marijuanalegalizing.fortune/.
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11362.775 (West 2012).
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in interpreting this provision to allow for storefront medical marijuana
"collectives or cooperatives" that operate more-or-less like food coopera-
tives. In Oakland, for example, the Harborside Health Center has over
30,000 patients registered in its database and, though it operates as a non-
profit as required by California law, generates annual revenues of about
$20 million.98
In other parts of the state, however, local law enforcement officials
have adopted a significantly more restrictive interpretation of the "collec-
tive and cooperative" provision." In San Diego, for example, District
Attorney Bonnie Dumanis has made clear that she does not believe store-
front dispensaries are permitted under California law.100 Instead, her of-
fice has argued that the law allows only literal collective cultivation,
meaning that most (or possibly all) medical marijuana collective mem-
bers would need to contribute physical labor to cultivation efforts to op-
erate lawfully.1o' Though her office clearly believes that California's
medical marijuana does not permit operations like Oakland's Harborside,
Dumanis has never clearly articulated exactly what she believes the law
does allow. This has resulted in a significant amount of confusion and
has complicated efforts by cities within the county to pass ordinances to
regulate dispensaries. In 2010, the San Diego County grand jury issued a
report criticizing Dumanis's office for failing to provide "clear and uni-
form guidelines under which qualified medical marijuana patients can
obtain marijuana." 02 The grand jury recommended "that the District
Attorney's Office should publish a position paper to outline what it con-
siders the legal and illegal operation of medical marijuana collectives and
cooperatives."' 03
Instead of releasing guidelines, however, Dumanis's office has lim-
ited pronouncements about its view of the law to a case-by-case series of
criminal prosecutions. In perhaps the most well-known case, her office
prosecuted Jovan Jackson for operating a medical marijuana collective
98. See Parloff, supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Chris Lindberg, Room for Abuse: A Critical Analysis of the Legal Justification
for the Medical Mariuana Storefront "Dispensary," 40 Sw. L. REV. 59, 103 (2010) (arguing for a
more restrictive interpretation of California's medical marijuana laws).
100. On September 10, 2009, for example, Dumanis said that there was "no such thing right
now" as a "legitimate medical marijuana dispensar[y]" in San Diego. Eric Wolff, District Attorney:
There Are No Legal Medical Marituana Dispensaries Right Now, LAST BLOG ON EARTH (Sept. 10,
2009), http://lastblogonearth.com/2009/09/1 0/district-attomey-there-are-no-legal-medical-
marijuana-dispensaries-right-now.
101. See Lindberg, supra note 99, at 117-18 ("To cultivate whether individually or as a group,
you have to plant, water, fertilize, protect from pests, and prune, i.e., cultivate. If some members of
the group do not participate in the cultivation, then they are not among those who cultivated collec-
tively or cooperatively.").





known as Answerdam.'0 Answerdam was operated in a similar fashion
to other storefront dispensaries in the state and so fell into the disputed
area of California's law.10 At the close of trial, the prosecutor argued
that the jury should not be instructed on California's medical marijuana
"collective and cooperative" provision because Jackson's storefront op-
eration was illegal as a matter of law. The Judge disagreed, instructed the
jury on the medical marijuana defense, and the jury promptly acquitted
Jackson. After the trial, the jury held a press conference in which the
foreperson explained that "the prosecution gave his ... kind of narrow
definition [of a collective] during the closing arguments, but there was
nothing in the law that really backed that up.',,06 Somewhat incredibly,
after Jackson's acquittal, Dumanis's office prosecuted him a second time
for running the same medical marijuana collective, which had continued
to operate during the first trial.10 7 This time, however, the trial court
granted the prosecutor's motion to deny Jackson's medical marijuana
defense and he was convicted.108
San Diego County's District Attorney is far from alone in advanc-
ing a narrow interpretation of California's medical marijuana law, and
courts are currently split on its meaning. Two recent decisions interpret-
ing California's "collective and cooperative" provision are instructive. In
People v. Colvin,109 decided February 23, 2012, the Second Appellate
District overturned a trial court decision that denied a medical marijuana
defense to a man charged with "transporting in his car about one pound
of marijuana from one medical marijuana establishment to the se-
cond.""o The trial court reasoned that Colvin did not qualify for the de-
fense because "the transportation here had nothing to do with the cultiva-
tion process.""' The appellate court reversed in a decision that found the
statute allows medical marijuana cooperatives that operate like "[a] gro-
cery cooperative [which] may have members who grow and sell the food
and run a store out of which the cooperative's products are sold. But not
everyone who pays a fee to become a member participates in the cooper-
ative other than to shop at it."" 2 Less than one week after Colvin, on
February 29, 2012, the Court of Appeal for California's Second Appel-
late District came to a much different conclusion about what the state's
104. Brief for Appellant at *1-2, People v. Jackson, No. D058988, 2011 WL 6402248 (Cal.
App. 4 Dist. Nov. 21, 2011).
105. See id.
106. Id. at *12 (first alteration in original).
107. Id.
108. Shortly before this essay went to press, Jackson's conviction was overturned. See People v
Jackson, 210 Cal. App. 4th 525 (2012).
109. 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2012).
110. Id. at 857.
111. Id.at859.
112. Id. at 863; see also id. (criticizing the State's position because it "does not specify how
many members must participate [in the cultivation process] or in what way or ways they must do so,
except to imply that Holistic, with its 5,000 members and 14 growers, is simply too big to allow any
'meaningful' participation in the cooperative process").
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medical marijuana law allows in Lake Forest v. Evergreen Holistic Col-
lective.i 3 Lake Forest concerned the validity of a local ban on medical
marijuana dispensaries. As in Colvin, the Lake Forest court "reject[ed]
the City's suggestion . . . that a patient or primary caregiver personally
must engage in the physical cultivation of marijuana" for a collective
operation to be lawful.1 14 But, while Colvin permitted a medical marijua-
na defense for transportation between two collectives under the collec-
tive and cooperative provision, Lake Forest concluded that medical mari-
juana collectives must cultivate and store all marijuana on the same site
as it is dispensed in order to be lawful."l5 According to Lake Forest,
transportation between dispensaries of the sort involved in Colvin is not
authorized under California's medical marijuana laws. Instead, "a quali-
fied patient [may] transport medical marijuana from the cultivation site
in an amount limited to his or her personal medical need." 16
In sum, courts and prosecutors across California are currently divid-
ed on the question of what sorts of entities and activities the state's med-
ical marijuana law permits. Some believe that the law legalizes only co-
operatives in which every member contributes labor to the cultivation
project; others argue that medical marijuana cooperatives may operate
like food cooperatives; still others conclude that storefront operations are
allowed, but only so long as they abide by certain conditions (like grow-
ing and storing all marijuana on site). As a result, a collective that may
be welcomed by prosecutors in one county might face stiff criminal pen-
alties in another. This is not to imply that where there is disagreement
about what the law means, it is unethical to bring prosecutions. But,
when there is so much uncertainty in the law, the duty to seek justice
should lead prosecutors to carefully consider their decisions to ensure
defendants are treated with fairness and honesty.1 17 For example, a duti-
ful prosecutor who interprets California's law more narrowly than col-
leagues in other jurisdictions may wish to consider issuing clear guide-
lines before bringing prosecutions so that those who wish to abide by the
law can do so. Whatever course of action a prosecutor decides to take,
she should be sure not to overlook-and, indeed, give serious considera-
tion to-the ethical considerations involved in pursuing prosecutions
amidst fundamental disagreements about the meaning of the law she is
planning to enforce.
113. See 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332, 337 (Ct. App. 2012).
114. Id. at 352; see id ("A person may participate in a lawful cooperative without any re-
quirement that he or she personally must create goods to stock the shelves of a consumer cooperative
or grow the produce in an agricultural one.").
115. Id. at 351 ("[Slection 11362.775 requires that any collective or cooperative activity in-
volving quantities of marijuana exceeding a patient's personal medical need must be tied to the
cultivation site.").
116. Id.




Amidst the increasing focus on the ethical obligations of private at-
torneys who represent medical marijuana providers, there is a risk that
the ethical duties of the attorneys who prosecute them may be over-
looked. This essay attempts to shed light on this issue, and argues that, in
comparison to the ethical problems facing private attorneys, medical
marijuana prosecutions present equally compelling-albeit less precise-
ethical questions. Because of the unique relationship between state and
federal laws concerning medical marijuana and the unusual history of
federal enforcement, federal prosecutors who pursue medical marijuana
cases should carefully evaluate how they exercise their discretion. In
many states with medical marijuana laws, hundreds of dispensaries cur-
rently operate in the open like any other business and federal drug en-
forcement officials have the resources to prosecute only a small percent-
age of them. Moreover, statements by federal officials may have under-
standably led some of these operators to believe that complying with
state law will provide them with some measure of protection from feder-
al prosecution. In this setting, the decision to bring a federal prosecution
carries especially significant consequences. Similarly, in states with am-
biguous medical marijuana laws, state prosecutors face difficult deci-
sions about how to exercise their discretion in a manner that is most con-
sistent with the duty to seek justice.
Though this essay sketches some of the ethical problems facing
prosecutors in the context of medical marijuana law, it does not advocate
any particular course of action for prosecutors. Some of the prosecutorial
tactics discussed above appear to be on shakier ethical ground than oth-
ers. For example, months after Eric Holder announced the Obama admin-
istration's "policy is to go after those people who violate both federal and
state law,"' 18 James Stacy found himself facing federal prosecution for
operating a dispensary that appeared to be in compliance with California
law and that was no different than hundreds of other dispensaries openly
operating throughout the state. Within the State of California, San Die-
go's district attorney has ignored a county grand jury's request for prose-
cutorial guidelines and, instead, left dispensary operators to guess at how
her office will view their operation.
Reasonable minds may disagree about how the duty to seek justice
relates to these examples. But, at a minimum, they should give conscien-
tious prosecutors a reason to be carefully attuned to this duty when exer-
cising discretion in the medical marijuana context. In particular, prosecu-
tors who decide to pursue action against medical marijuana caregivers
should consider whether it may be more consistent with the duty to seek
justice to take some action short of prosecution as an initial step. Increas-
118. Glover, supra note 69, at 1.
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ingly, federal prosecutors have sent warning letters to dispensary opera-
tors and landlords before pursuing legal action against them. There may
be public policy-based reasons to disagree with even this sort of federal
interference into state medical marijuana laws.l19 From an ethical per-
spective, however, this approach would seem to be preferable to filing
charges without warning in light of the unique legal uncertainties in this
area of the law. 120 The open-ended nature of a prosecutor's ethical obli-
gations may make it difficult to draw more definitive conclusions than
this. Though the injunction that prosecutors "seek justice" is notoriously
vague and cannot be easily reduced to precise advice, however, this
should not diminish its importance.
119. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 43, at 556 (arguing that because the federal government does
not have sufficient resources to block the implementation of state medical marijuana laws, its efforts
to interfere result in a less regulated market and are counter-productive).
120. See Cassidy, supra note 20, at 640.
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Is ASSISTING MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES
HAZARDOUS TO A LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL HEALTH?
ALEC ROTHROCKt
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) states, in part, that a
lawyer shall not "counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal."' A lawyer who provides legal ser-
vices to a medical marijuana dispensary does not assist in his client's
violation of Colorado criminal laws banning the possession and sale of
marijuana as long as the dispensary qualifies as a caregiver under article
18, section 14 of the Colorado Constitution and complies with that sec-
tion and other legal requirements.2
Is the lawyer therefore in compliance with Colo. RPC 1.2(d)?
The answer is "no," not if the same conduct violates federal crimi-
nal law.
The analysis and answer are no different under Amendment 64 to
the Colorado Constitution with respect to a lawyer's assistance of a client
in the recreational marijuana business.3
I. Is MEDICAL MARIJUANA LEGAL?
In 2000, Colorado voters passed an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution creating limited exemptions from C.R.S. § 18-18-406,
which makes unlawful the possession, use, and sale of marijuana.4 Since
that time, hundreds of medical marijuana dispensaries have opened for
business in the State of Colorado.
As with any new business owner, a lawyer may be engaged to pro-
vide a variety of legal services incident to the creation of the business,
including:
* forming the entity that will operate it;
* drafting and negotiating buy-sell agreements among the owners;
* drafting and negotiating loan documents or documents raising
capital for the business;
t Alec Rothrock is a shareholder at Burns, Figa & Will P.C. His practice emphasizes legal
ethics and attorney discipline defense. Mr. Rothrock is a past chair of the Colorado Bar Association
Ethics Committee. A version of this article appeared in the May 25, 2010 edition of the Business
Law Newsletter of the Business Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association.
1. COLO. RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012).
2. COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14.
3. Id. art. 18, § 16.
4. Id. art. 18, § 14.
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* assisting in preparing applications for required licenses;
* registering trademarks;
* helping to draft and negotiate the documents necessary to pur-
chase or rent the property from which the business operates; and
* furnishing an opinion letter opinion regarding the client's legal
rights and risks.
And that is just to get the business up and running, to say nothing of
the need for legal services to the ongoing business.
Yet 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)5 continues to make the possession, use,
and sale of marijuana illegal at the federal level, even though it affects
some purely intrastate activities.6 Indeed, in the so-called Ogden Memo,
adopted in October 2009, the United States Department of Justice di-
rected federal prosecutors to focus their resources elsewhere than on "in-
dividuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana"; however,
the memo confirmed that the conduct remains illegal under federal law.
Since the release of the Ogden Memo, U.S. Attorneys in different juris-
dictions have taken less sanguine public positions on the enforcement of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 8
II. COLORADO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.2(D)
DECONSTRUCTED
A. Colorado Rule ofProfessional Conduct 1.2(d) Applies to Conduct
Made Criminal Under any Law
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) applies to conduct
made criminal under any law. It states as follows:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of con-
duct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of
the law.9
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) thus prohibits the dis-
tinct activities of (1) counseling a client to engage in criminal conduct
5. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) lists "marihuana" as a controlled substance within the meaning of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
6. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
7. Memorandum for Selected United States Attorneys from David W. Ogden (Oct. 19,
2009), available at http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192.
8. E.g., Letter from John F. Walsh, United States Attorney, to Stanley L. Garnett, District
Attorney (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrell
2012/denO32012.pdf
9. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012).
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and (2) assisting a client in criminal conduct. The lawyer must also
"know" that the client's conduct is criminal. These terms are described
below. First, however, there is a threshold question about whether Rule
1.2(d) prohibits lawyer counseling and assistance of conduct that is not
illegal under state law but is illegal under federal law.
For purposes of Rule 1.2(d), if certain conduct is criminal under any
jurisdiction's law, the fact that it is not criminal under the concurrently
applicable law of another jurisdiction is irrelevant. Also, a federal no-
prosecution policy is not a change in the law, and by its nature, it is tem-
porary.
Ethics opinions from two other states reach diametrically opposed
conclusions regarding the effect of the federal government's no-
prosecution policy on lawyers' obligations under Rule 1.2(d). A Maine
ethics opinion states that Rule 1.2(d)
does not make a distinction between crimes which are enforced and
those which are not. So long as both the federal law and the language
of the Rule each remain the same, an attorney needs to perform the
analysis required by the Rule and determine whether the particular
legal service being requested rises to the level of assistance in violat-
ing federal law. . . . [T]here is no guarantee that, with a change in
policy, administration, or resources, the federal law might ultimately
be enforced to the chagrin of lawyers whose conduct enabled the dis-
pensaries.' 0
In contrast, an Arizona ethics opinion interprets the Ogden Memo as
creating a "safe harbor for conduct that is in 'clear and unambiguous
compliance' with state law" unless and until a court holds that federal
law preempts Arizona's medical marijuana law." The Arizona opinion
concludes by stating that it "decline[s] to interpret and apply" Rule 1.2(d)
in a way that prevents lawyers from assisting clients in engaging in activ-
ities authorized by state law, "thereby depriving clients of the very legal
advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the conduct that the
state law expressly permits." 2
Arizona's opinion is flawed. It suggests that Arizona's medical ma-
rijuana law either displaces federal law within the State of Arizona or
protects Arizona citizens from the application of federal law. If this was
the intent of the opinion, it represents a misunderstanding of federalism.
If, instead, the intent of the opinion was to hold up the current no-
prosecution policy as a "safe harbor," it ignores the clear words of Rule
1.2(d) and incautiously encourages Arizona lawyers to rely on a policy
10. Maine Op. 199, "Advising Clients Concerning Maine's Medical Marijuana Act" (July 7,
2010).
I1. Section IV, Analysis, Arizona Op. No. I1-01 (February 2011).
12. Id.
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that could change at any time. Like it or not, the federal law remains un-
changed and in force in every comer of Arizona.
B. Discussing the Legal Consequences of a Proposed Course of Conduct
and Making Good Faith Arguments Under the Law
Lawyers have an important role in the medical marijuana business.
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) in fact permits them to
engage in this role. Specifically, Rule 1.2(d) permits lawyers to "discuss
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client
and ... counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law."l 3 There is no
more important function for lawyers in our society.
Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) permits-and clients
expect lawyers to give-an "honest opinion about the actual conse-
quences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct." 4 Provided
the lawyer does not encourage the client to break the law, discussing the
"legal consequences" of a proposed course of conduct may include a
discussion not only of what the law is, but also of the likelihood of its
enforcement in a given situation." In a working paper, Professors Sam
Kamin and Eli Wald of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law,
relying on the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, agree
with this point and argue that a lawyer can "advise a client that enforce-
ment of the law, at least vis-a-vis dispensaries operating within the con-
fines of the state's regulatory apparatus, is a low priority."' 6 Such advice
would not violate Rule 1.2(d); whether it is sound advice at the time it is
given is another matter.
Lawyers are not ethically responsible if the client uses this infor-
mation to engage in a crime or fraud. The lawyer's responsibility may be
"especially delicate" when the "client's course of action has already be-
gun and is continuing."' 7 A lawyer may not "continue assisting a client in
conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but then
discovers is criminal or fraudulent."' 8
A leading treatise offers the example of the lawyer who advises a
client that it is unlawful to claim certain tax deductions but also that the
likelihood that the Internal Revenue Service will discover them in an
13. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012).
14. Id. 1.2 cmt. 9.
15. Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence
and Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1588 (1995).
16. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Medical Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders? 27 (2012),
available at http://works.bepress.com/sam-kamin/3.
17. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10.
18. Id.
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audit is minimal.' 9 According to the authors, there is no "wholly satisfac-
tory" answer to whether the lawyer assisted the client in criminal con-
duct, in violation of Rule 1.2(d), or simply explained the law and the
legal consequences of the client taking the deductions.20
Applying the analysis of a 1985 ABA Formal Ethics Opinion, how-
ever, if the lawyer had a good faith belief that the deductions were law-
ful, or that there was a good faith argument in support of taking them,
Rule 1.2(d) would not prohibit the lawyer from advising the client about
the option of taking the deductions. This would be the case even if the
lawyer believed that it was more likely than not that the client's position
would fail if challenged.2 '
Counseling or assisting a client to make a "good faith effort to de-
termine the validity, scope, meaning or application" of a law does not
mean advising a client to break the law without telling anyone.2 2 The
lawyer must advise the client to affirmatively challenge the law either to
test its validity or applicability in the client's circumstances or to protest
against what the client considers a greater evil.2 3 This is what the Com-
ment to Rule 1.2(d) describes as a "course of action involving disobedi-
ence."24
For example, a New Hampshire lawyer advised her client-the
mother in a child abuse case-to violate a statute making it unlawful to
disclose information without the court's permission that might identify
the child or parent involved in a hearing in such a case." In hopes of
currying public favor, the mother gave extensive documentation about
the hearing to a local newspaper. In a subsequent lawyer discipline case,
the lawyer argued that the Comment authorizing a "course of action in-
volving disobedience" permitted her to "self-determine the validity of the
19. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 5.14, at 5-47 to -48 (3d ed., 2012
Supp.). Another commentator expressed the view that Rule 1.2(d)'s language permitting a lawyer to
discuss the legal consequences of a proposed course of conduct must refer to circumstances in which
either the client's intentions or the law itself is ambiguous. Otherwise a lawyer could "discuss" with
a client "various methods of operating a proposed drug-smuggling ring, murdering a political rival or
disgruntled spouse, or cheating a trusting business partner," as long as the lawyer's advice remained
"personally uncommitted" and did not "heat up to the level of 'counsel' or 'assist."' CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 694 (1986).
20. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.14, at 5-48.
21. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985).
22. See W. William Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer
Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns to Aim Better?, 87 KY. L.J. 1019, 1022 n.7 (1999) (writing
that this part of Rule 1.2(d) "requires distinguishing between good faith test case litigation, classic
civil disobedience by appealing to higher law, and surreptitious civil disobedience, which is no
different than law-breaking" (emphasis in original)).
23. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.15, at 5-48, -49.
24. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 12 (2012).
25. Werme's Case, 839 A.2d I (N.H. 2003).
1051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
statute and advise her client to disobey it because she concluded that [it]
is unconstitutional" under the First Amendment.26
The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed. It observed that the
Comment modified a rule that required a "good faith effort to determine
the validity, scope, meaning or application" of the law. There were at
least two "good faith" options available to the lawyer: (1) seek permis-
sion from the court in the child abuse case to disclose the information,
and (2) file an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute was
unconstitutional.2 7 The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a rep-
rimand issued by an inferior disciplinary tribunal.2 8
C. The Counseling Prohibition
On the prohibited side of the Rule 1.2(d) spectrum, a lawyer may
not "counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the law-
yer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .29 For example, a Minnesota
criminal defense lawyer was found to have counseled clients to engage in
criminal conduct by referring female clients to another client who oper-
ated a prostitution business if they could not afford to pay his fees.30
A 1952 ABA Formal Opinion admonishes that there is a "sharp dis-
tinction . . . between advising what can lawfully be done and advising
how unlawful acts can be done in a way to avoid conviction."3' The legal
distinction is sharp but the factual difference may be subtle. As the
Comment to Rule 1.2 points out, sometimes there is a fine line between
presenting an analysis of the law and suggesting the means by which the
client may violate it.3 2
A leading authority refers here to a distinction between "innocent
discussion" and "active participation"-passive/active distinction.33 An-
other authority describes the counseling prohibition in much the same
way, stating that it prohibits a lawyer from advising a client about the
legality of proposed conduct "with the intent of facilitating or encourag-
ing the client's action." 34 Perhaps this active/passive distinction, or focus
on the lawyer's intent, is what the Comment means when it states that a
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.; see I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.15, at 5-48 (implying that client must act
"openly").
29. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012).
30. In re Olkon, 605 F. Supp. 784, 790 (D. Minn. 1985).
31. ABA Comm. on Profl Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 281 (1952); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980) ("A lawyer should never encourage or aid his client
to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to violate the law and avoid punishment there-
for.").
32. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9.
33. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.13, at 5-40.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. a (2000).
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lawyer may not "knowingly" counsel a client to engage in criminal (or
fraudulent) conduct,35 an adverb absent from the Rule itself.
This focus on the lawyer's state of mind suggests a subjective anal-
ysis. One of these same legal authorities states that it also is important to
understand the "level of certainty that the client will actually misuse the
information."3 This inquiry is objective in nature.
A classic law school hypothetical that illustrates the counseling pro-
hibition is that of the lawyer who advises a client about which countries
do not have extradition treaties with the United States.37 Another is the
lawyer whose client has a "large amount of undeclared income in cash
who wants to know how small a cash transaction must be before banks
are relieved of the duty to report it."38
D. The Assisting Prohibition
Rule 1.2(d)'s prohibition against assisting a client in conduct the
lawyer knows to be criminal is the most significant impediment to a law-
yer who provides legal services to a client in the medical marijuana in-
dustry. "Assistance" is a term that requires some connection between the
lawyer's conduct and the client's criminal conduct. However, the prox-
imity of the connection leaves bar prosecutors with considerable latitude,
checked only by the disciplinary tribunal and superior appellate tribunals.
The Comment to Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) of-
fers limited help in circumscribing the term. It states, "The lawyer is re-
quired to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how
the wrongdoing might be concealed." 3 9 "Criminal" can be substituted for
"fraudulent" in this sentence. If the lawyer believes that the client ex-
pects the lawyer to provide this kind of assistance, another Rule of Pro-
fessional Conduct requires the lawyer to "consult" with the client about
the limitations on the lawyer's assistance.4 0 Several Colorado attorney
discipline cases involve prohibited assistance to a client, including the
lawyer who assisted his client in criminal impersonation by failing to
disclose her true identity to the district attorney or the court in a criminal
trespass case,4 1 and the lawyer who assisted a client in emptying his bank
35. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9.
36. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.13, at 5-40.
37. Id. at 5-40.1 (emphasis in original).
38. Id; see also People v. Gifford, 76 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2003) (holding respond-
ent lawyer counseled client was in violation of Colo. RPC 1.2(d) by advising client to offer real
estate to his ex-wife in exchange for ex-wife's and another witness's recantation of testimony in a
pending criminal matter).
39. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10.
40. Id. 1.4(a)(5); accord id. 1.2 cmt. 13.
41. People v. Casey, 948 P.2d 1014 (Colo. 1997).
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accounts and supplying him with money preparatory to fleeing with his
minor child to avoid a child custody order.42
A leading treatise states that both the counseling and assisting pro-
hibitions in Rule 1.2(d) "track[ ] standard principles of accessorial liabil-
ity."43 For example, "Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, a defendant may be
charged as a principal in the commission of a substantive criminal of-
fense whenever he 'aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
its commission. . . .' In order to prove a crime of aiding and abetting, the
government must prove that the defendant associated with the criminal
venture, that he purposefully participated in it, and that he sought by his
actions to bring it about.""
An ABA Formal Opinion holds that assisting a client in a crime or
fraud may include a lawyer's failure to disavow her own work product if
she discovers that her client has used the work product to further a crime
or fraud.4 5 The example given in the ABA Opinion is that of outside
counsel to a small lighting fixture company that was in the process of
obtaining a $5 million unsecured loan from a bank. After issuing an
opinion of counsel attesting to, among other things, the enforceability of
the company's lighting fixture contracts against the client's customers,
outside counsel discovers that for the past three years, the chief executive
officer and the treasurer of the company have been creating millions of
dollars worth of false lighting installation contracts. In other words, a
material portion of outside counsel's opinion letter is false. Outside
counsel believes that her continuing representation of the client in the
matter would "discourage inquiry into the soundness of the loan and per-
haps even encourage the bank to make further extensions of credit." The
opinion concludes that the lawyer must withdraw from the representation
of the company in that matter and disavow her opinion letter, even if
doing so will effectively disclose information that the lawyer is obligated
to keep confidential.
42. People v. Chappell, 927 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1996).
43. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 19, § 5.12, at 5-36. Engaging in criminalonduct usually
constitutes disciplinable conduct, whether or not the lawyer is convicted. COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.5(b);
COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2012).
44. United States v. Wang, 898 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Colo. 1995); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-1-603 (2012) ("A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another
constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the
offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the
offense.").
45. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992).
46. See . COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (lawyer must decline or withdraw
from representation if representation would violate Colo. RPC 1.2(d), inter alia, or "other law").
Colo. RPC 1.2 cmt. 10 and Colo. RPC 4.1 cmt. 3 state that if necessary to avoid assisting a client in a
crime or fraud, a lawyer not only must withdraw from the representation but also must "disaffirm an
opinion, document, affirmation or the like." The latter goes on to state that in "extreme cases, sub-
stantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to avoid
being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a client's
crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under [Colo. RPC 4.1(b)] the lawyer is
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Examples of improper "assistance" tend to arise in a non-litigation
setting. In a litigation setting, a lawyer's representation of a client related
to medical marijuana is less likely to constitute impermissible "assis-
tance" if the client's conduct is completed, or if the client is making a
"good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or applica-
tion of the law," as discussed above.
An isolated criminal defense representation involving allegedly ille-
gal use or possession of marijuana does not constitute assistance of the
crime in violation of Rule 1.2(d), even though the lawyer's objective in
the representation is to gain or preserve the client's freedom, which, at a
basic level, permits the client to engage in the same conduct again.4 7 Af-
ter all, the same could be said about virtually any criminal defense repre-
sentation.
Criminal defense representation for past conduct is not permissible,
however, when a lawyer "accepts a retainer from an organization, known
to be unlawful, and agrees in advance to defend its members when from
time to time they are accused of crime arising out of its unlawful activi-
ties." 48 For a lawyer to undertake such an arrangement, the enterprise
must be "lawful."49 This distinction conjures an image of swarthy men
involved in organized crime, but from the perspective of federal law, a
dispensary owned by Rotary Club members also may be considered an
"unlawful" organization.
But the entire purpose of some litigation is to permit the client to
engage in conduct illegal under federal law. A lawyer who fights to ob-
tain unemployment compensation for an employee discharged from em-
ployment for using marijuana in compliance with state medical marijua-
na law, but in violation of the employer's "zero-tolerance drug policy,"
assists the client's continued violation of federal law prohibiting the use
of marijuana.o However, the lawyer does not violate Rule 1.2(d) if the
required to do so, unless the disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6." In turn, Colo. RPC 1.6(b)(3) and
(4) permit a lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation in order to prevent fraud by a
client or substantial financial injury that may result from a client's crime or fraud, but only if the
client has "used the lawyer's services."
47. People v. Sexton, No. 10CA1206, 2012 WL 503648 (Colo. App. Feb. 16, 2012).
48. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 281 (1952); accord United
States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1165-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting ABA Formal Op. 281
with approval ); see also id. ("[It need hardly be [be]labored that an attorney may not agree with an
illegal syndicate to represent its members or employees with respect to future violations of the law."
(second alteration in original) (quoting In re Abrams, 266 A.2d 275 (N.J. 1970)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
49. See COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 12 (2012) (stating Rule 1.2(d) "does
not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a
lawful enterprise"); ABA Defense Function Standard 4-3.7(c) ("Defense counsel should not agree in
advance of the commission of a crime that he or she will serve as counsel for the defendant, except
as part of a bona fide effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or application of the law, or
where the defense is incident to a general retainer for legal services to a person or enterprise engaged
in legitimate activity.").
50. Beinor v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011).
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representation constitutes a "good faith effort" to determine the "mean-
ing" of the unemployment compensation statute involved. A lawyer who
challenges a trial court's restriction on a divorce client's parenting time,
imposed because the client's use of medical marijuana allegedly endan-
gered the client's minor child, assists the client's violation of federal law
but does not violate Rule 1.2(d) if the lawyer's services represented a
good faith effort to determine the application of law of child endanger-
ment.5 '
Similarly, a lawyer who seeks to permit a client on probation to use
medical marijuana notwithstanding a condition of the client's probation
requiring him not to "commit another offense" while on probation assists
the client to violate federal law, but does not violate Rule 1.2(d) if the
action constituted a good faith effort to determine the meaning of a state
probation statute and the medical marijuana provisions of the Colorado
Constitution.5 2 A lawyer who represents a dispensary in opposing a zon-
ing ordinance that has the effect of closing the client's operation is seek-
ing to keep the client stay in business, a business activity that violates
federal law, but does not violate Rule 1.2(d) if done in a good faith effort
to determine the validity of the ordinance.5 3
E. Knowledge of Criminal Conduct
With respect to both the counseling and assisting prohibitions, the
lawyer must "know" that the client's conduct is criminal. Knowledge
means actual knowledge of the fact in question. A reckless state of
mind does not constitute knowledge.55 However, knowledge may be, and
often must be, inferred from the circumstances.
It is not clear from Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d)
whether the emphasis of the knowledge requirement is on the lawyer's
awareness of the client's activities or on the lawyer's awareness of their
criminal nature.5 7 It may be both, although it is doubtful that a lawyer's
ignorance of the law would excuse a violation of Rule 1.2(d).
Nor is willful ignorance of a client's activities likely to serve as a
valid defense to a Rule 1.2(d) violation. In a 1981 informal opinion, the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility construed a
virtually identical rule in the ABA Model Code of Professional Respon-
51. In re Marriage of Parr & Lyman, 240 P.3d 509 (Colo. App. 2010).
52. People v. Watkins, 282 P.3d 500 (Colo. App., 2012).
53. Giuliani v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. Cnty. Comm'rs, No. I ICA1919, 2012 WL 5360940 (Colo.
App. Nov. 1, 2012).
54. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.0(f).
55. Id. 1.0 cmt. 7A.
56. Id. 1.0(0.
57. Compare id. 1.2(d) ("[L]awyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." (emphasis added)), with id. 1.2 cmt. 9
("Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit a crime
or fraud." (emphasis added)).
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sibility to mean that "[a] lawyer must be satisfied, on the facts before him
and readily available to him, that he can perform the requested services
without abetting . . . criminal conduct and without relying on past client
crime . . . to achieve results the client now wants. Otherwise, the lawyer
has a duty of further inquiry."58 This language is not inconsistent, at least
according to some commentators, with a lawyer's operating assumption
that a client is using the lawyer's counsel for lawful purposes. 9
In their paper, Professors Kamin and Wald rely on the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers to argue that a lawyer does not
assist a client within the meaning of Rule 1.2(d), unless the lawyer has an
"actual intent to encourage the commission of the crime." 60 The Restate-
ment defines "assisting" in this context as "providing"-with the "intent
of facilitating or encouraging the client's action"-"other professional
services, such as preparing documents, drafting correspondence, negoti-
ating with a nonclient, or contacting a governmental agency."61
One problem with this interpretation is that Rule 1.2(d) itself does
not require proof of the lawyer's intent, and the Restatement does not
have the force of law. Although some Rules of Professional Conduct,
including Rule 1.2(d), require bar counsel to prove a lawyer's knowledge
of certain facts, few if any require bar counsel to prove the lawyer's in-
tent. The lawyer's intent is generally relevant as a matter of proof only
for purposes of determining the appropriate sanction for a rule viola-
tion.62
HI. APPLICATION OF COLORADO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1.2(D) TO REPRESENTATION OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
DISPENSARIES
In most instances, a lawyer will know when a client is engaging a
lawyer's services to establish a medical marijuana dispensary. This will
usually be the client's stated purpose in consulting the lawyer, and the
client needs no encouragement from the lawyer to embark on the ven-
ture. The client may even request that the lawyer analyze the laws-state
and federal-that apply to the operation of the proposed business. So far,
so good under Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d). For the
lawyer, the delicate ethical concern lies in knowing the difference be-
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981).
59. Michael M. Mustokoff, Jonathan L. Swichar & Cheryl R. Herzfeld, The Attorney/Client
Privilege: A Fond Memory of Things Past An Analysis of the Privilege Following United States v.
Anderson, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 118 (2000).
60. Kamin & Wald, supra note 16, at 29.
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. a (2000).
62. E.g., In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43, 48 (Colo. 2003) (discussing difference between knowledge
and intent for purposes of determining appropriate level of discipline under ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions).
1057
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tween "directing, suggesting, or assisting in criminal ... conduct, on the
one hand, and providing information about the law ... on the other."63
It is possible to draw distinctions under Colorado Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.2(d) between conduct that does and does not further a
client's federal criminal conduct. With the exception of the legal opinion,
all of the activities described above would likely fall under the vague
definition of assistance, unless perhaps dispensary activities are only one
possible business activity of the enterprise. The proximity of the lawyer's
services to the dispensary's core activities is likely to be a critical factor,
so helping a small dispensary is more ethically risky than helping a far
flung enterprise whose activities may or may not include these core ac-
tivities.
It is readily apparent that drawing lines between providing infor-
mation, on one hand, and providing counseling or assistance, on the oth-
er, is largely a self-defeating exercise. There are a good many public
policy reasons why Rule 1.2(d) should not smother lawyer assistance to
clients in the medical marijuana industry, but these reasons do not
change the plain wording of Rule 1.2(d). And, of course, Colorado Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) is not interpreted one way for medical
marijuana violations of federal law and another way for all other crimes.
Lawyers who represent medical marijuana dispensaries in a business
setting almost cannot help but violate the rule.
The possible disciplinary consequences for this conduct are an en-
tirely different matter. They depend on matters largely outside lawyers'
control, namely the initiation of a request for investigation with Colora-
do's Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), and OARC's pros-
ecution policy.
No Colorado lawyer has been publicly disciplined, or even subject-
ed to public charges, based on counseling or assisting a client to partici-
pate in the medical marijuana business in compliance with state law.
There is no indication that OARC interprets Colorado Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.2(d) in the elastic way that federal courts have histori-
cally interpreted the Commerce Clause in federal constitutional jurispru-
dence. OARC's policy on disciplinary prosecution for providing standard
legal services to state-law abiding members of the medical marijuana
industry seems to be one of tolerance, not unlike the policy on criminal
prosecution taken by the Justice Department in the Ogden Memo. Of
course, just as the dispensaries must rely on the criminal prosecution
policy of the current President's administration, so too must Colorado
lawyers rely on the disciplinary prosecution policy of OARC and its su-
pervisor, the Colorado Supreme Court.
63. Pepper, supra note 15, at 1588.
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